Dennis v. Solano County Jail, et al

Filing 11

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 11/20/13 ordering plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Plummer, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ROME ROBERT DENNIS,

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No. 2:12-cv-2046-CMK-P

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

SOLANO COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Defendants.
/
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied
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if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

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which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

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allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

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the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff makes the following statement of his claim:

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On March 7, I entered Solano County Jail. I have been a mental
Health patient for 20 yrs and am at the level of enhanced out
patient treatment. I have 7 suicide attempts and have been on a
number of medication[s]. I’ve been diagnosed Bipolar-Borderline
Personality disorder. I’ve asked for help and treatment and I’ve
been denied. I am required to have therapy every day for 6 hours
when I ask for this I get punished and tortured by being put in the
rubber room. Im being neglected.

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(Compl., Doc. 1, at 3).
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II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from several defects. First, plaintiff fails to identify

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who the defendants are. He only names the Solano County Jail and Mental Health Staff. He

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names no individuals who are or could be responsible for his lack of treatment. He indicates

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there are several Doe defendants, but it is plaintiff’s responsibility to identify and name the

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proper defendants.

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

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connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations.

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See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

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(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

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conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations

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are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the

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plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

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constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

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Here, plaintiff fails to make any factual allegations against any defendant,

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including the Doe defendants. Rather, he simply claims he did not receive necessary treatment

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while in jail. Such allegations are insufficient. Plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to what

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happened and who was responsible.

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In addition, the only defendants plaintiff names are the Solano County Jail and the

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Mental Health Staff. The Mental Health Staff would apparently include the Doe defendants.

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However, the Jail would be considered a municipal, not an individual, defendant.

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Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to

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whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

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Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id.

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at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local

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government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials

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under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.

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397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not

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of the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the

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plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or

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custom of the municipality. See id. A claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is sufficient to

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withstand dismissal even if it is based on nothing more than bare allegations that an individual

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defendant’s conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice. See Karim-Panahi v. Los

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Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988).

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There are no such allegations in plaintiff’s compliant. Rather, he simply claims

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his mental health was neglected. Again, such allegations are insufficient to meet the necessary

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pleading standards.

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Finally, as to his actual claim of being denied mental health treatment, the

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treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined

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are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual

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punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

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825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of

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dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

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when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

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such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

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105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

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health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

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injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition
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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference.

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See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

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demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Here, plaintiff alleges little more than negligence, stating he felt neglected. He

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claims he asked for help and was denied, but fails to state who or how he asked for help, and who

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denied him help. He fails to allege any facts to indicate actual deliberate indifference, nor does

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he indicate for how long he went without receiving the treatment he believes was necessary.

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Plaintiff simply fails to allege sufficient facts for this court to determine whether he can state a

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claim.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

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amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

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action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

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informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

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Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

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amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

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complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

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plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

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plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

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time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

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1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

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with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

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See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1.

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Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

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Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order.

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DATED: November 20, 2013
______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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