Jones v. California Medical Facility Custody Staff
Filing
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ORDER and FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 10/17/12 ORDERING that Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED without prejudice; and the Clerk of Court is directed to randomly assign a district judge to this action. It is RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without prejudice. Referred to Judge Kimberly J. Mueller; Objections to F&R due within 14 days.(Dillon, M)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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LUTHER JONES, JR.,
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Plaintiff,
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No. 2:12-cv-02381 KJN P
vs.
CALIFORNIA MEDICAL FACILITY
CUSTODY STAFF,
ORDER and
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Defendant.
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, who seeks relief pursuant
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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local
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Rule 302.
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Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, because this action must be dismissed without prejudice, for the
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reasons set forth below, the court also denies without prejudice plaintiff’s motion to proceed in
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forma pauperis.
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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised
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claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
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granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28
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(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an
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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
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pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
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Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
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2000) (“a judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably
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meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at
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1227.
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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and
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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
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(1957)). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more
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than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual
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allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. However,
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“[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair
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notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
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U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555) (citations and internal
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quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept
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as true the allegations of the complaint in question, id., and construe the pleading in the light
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most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
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Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at California State Prison-Solano (“CSP-
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SOL”), alleges that he was “adversely transferred” from CMF to CSP-SOL on January 18, 2012.
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(Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff states that he is diabetic and has “P.A.D.” (peripheral artery disease)
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and “R.L.S.” (restless leg syndrome). Plaintiff alleges that he does “not get anywhere near the
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medical treatment I was getting at CMF,” which has caused plaintiff to “have more injuries
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because of non-treatment.” (Id.) These problems include “waking up in a[n] emergency room at
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CSP Solano in a diabetic coma;” walking long distances in inclement weather (plaintiff states
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that, at CMF, his meals were brought to him); and the inability to obtain toothpaste for his
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sensitive teeth, previously prescribed by a CMF dentist. Plaintiff also alleges that his property
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was confiscated by CMF staff, and that plaintiff continues to be deprived of his “personal TV,
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hot pot, religious cross, headphone, and my big cooking bowl, two quart water container which I
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had for years. Plus all my connectors and three (3) different length cables.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff
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contends that these conditions are causing him significant mental distress. Plaintiff seeks the
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return of his property, and $455,000 damages. Plaintiff states that his 602 appeal (challenging
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his past and pending transfers, and the confiscation of his property) is still pending but, because
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plaintiff has now been “reclassified for another transfer,” he filed this action because he was
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concerned that his current appeal would become “null and void.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.)
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Plaintiff names as defendants the California Medical Facility, as well as “CMF
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Custody Staff, Third Floor, Counselor to Captain,” “CMF R&R Staff, Officers to Sgt. CMF
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Medical & Psych.,” and “CSP Solano Medical Staff, Social Worker, psychotherapist,
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psychologist, nurses and doctors.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.)
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Several problems beset the complaint. Most significantly, plaintiff concedes that
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he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before initiating this action. The Prison Litigation
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Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that a prisoner exhaust his available administrative remedies
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before bringing a federal civil rights action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Brown v. Valoff, 422
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F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 2005); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). The
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district court must dismiss an action where it is clear from the face of the complaint that plaintiff
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failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);
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McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Wyatt v. Terhune,
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315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (“A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a valid grounds for dismissal.
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. . .”); see also Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002).
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In the present case, it is clear from the face of the complaint that plaintiff did not
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exhaust his administrative remedies before initiating this action. While the PLRA does not
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require exhaustion when circumstances render administrative remedies “effectively unavailable,”
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Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2010), plaintiff does not make this assertion. Rather,
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plaintiff states that he intentionally initiated this action before exhausting his administrative
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remedies because he was concerned that he would be transferred to another institution before
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CSP-SOL completed review of his appeal. Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the underlying appeal is
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underscored by plaintiff’s supplemental filing (see Dkt. No. 9), which contains, inter alia, a
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Second Level Response to the appeal, dated August 16, 2012 (see id. at 9), more than a month
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after plaintiff filed his complaint. For these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint and this action must be
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dismissed without prejudice. Once plaintiff receives the Director’s Level Response to his appeal,
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he may file a new action in federal court.
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The following is provided as guidance should plaintiff choose to file a new
complaint in a new action, after exhaustion of his administrative remedies.
First, the alleged circumstances underlying the confiscation and retention of
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plaintiff’s property are too vague to ascertain whether plaintiff can state a potentially cognizable
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due process claim. The United States Supreme Court has held that “an unauthorized intentional
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deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
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requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful
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postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
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Only an authorized, intentional deprivation of property -- one carried out pursuant to established
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state procedures, regulations, or statutes -- may constitute an actionable violation of the Due
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Process Clause. Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Knudson v.
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City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Second, plaintiff has failed to allege the necessary elements for stating a
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potentially cognizable challenge to his medical care. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
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(1976), the Supreme Court held that inadequate medical care did not constitute cruel and unusual
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punishment cognizable under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment unless the alleged
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mistreatment rose to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” In applying
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this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the indifference to [plaintiff’s] medical needs must
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be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this
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cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429
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U.S. at 105-06. To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that defendants knew
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of and disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
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825, 837 (1994). A prison official must “both be aware of facts from which the inference could
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be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inferences.” Id.
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Plaintiff’s allegations fail to meet these requirements.
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Third, all of plaintiff’s claims fail to allege an actual connection or link between
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the alleged conduct of specifically identified, individual defendants and plaintiff’s alleged
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constitutional deprivations. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978);
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Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a
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constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in
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another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that
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causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th
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Cir. 1978); see also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into
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causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual
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defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”).
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There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or
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connection between a specific defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode,
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423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v.
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Duffy, supra, 588 F.2d at 743. Moreover, “[u]nder Section 1983, supervisory officials are not
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liable for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability. A supervisor may be liable
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[only] if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,
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or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
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constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations
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omitted). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are
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not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Should plaintiff file
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a new action after exhausting his administrative remedies, he must identify individual
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defendants, the challenged actions or inactions of each defendant, and demonstrate how these
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actions or inactions deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, supra, 423
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U.S. at 371.
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Finally, because plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed at the outset for failure to
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exhaust administrative remedies, the court declines to impose the filing fee, which is otherwise
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required of prisoners granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). In
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any newly-filed action, plaintiff may submit a new application to proceed in forma pauperis.
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Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that if he attempts to further pursue the instant action, rather than
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file a new civil rights action after exhaustion of his administrative remedies, the court will grant
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in forma pauperis status and impose the $350.00 filing fee in this case before again
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recommending that this action be dismissed.
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The court notes that plaintiff is not a frequent or vexatious litigant in this court, or
subject to the “three strikes” rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
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1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied without prejudice;
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and
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2. The Clerk of Court is directed to randomly assign a district judge to this action.
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For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action
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be dismissed without prejudice.
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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days
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after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections
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with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings
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and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified
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time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153
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(9th Cir. 1991).
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DATED: October 17, 2012
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_____________________________________
KENDALL J. NEWMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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