Haverlock v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes on 6/15/2017 GRANTING 31 Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees; Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $25,683.00 in attorney fees under Sec 406(b). The Commissioner is directed to pay the fee fort hwith and remit to plaintiff the remainder any withheld benefits; and upon receipt of the $25,638.00 in attorney fees pursuant to Sec 406(b), counsel shall reimburse plaintiff in the amount of $7,500 previously paid by the government under the EAJA. (Reader, L)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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LAURA FAYE HAVERLOCK,
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Plaintiff,
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No. 2:12-cv-2393 DB
v.
ORDER
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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Plaintiff brought this action seeking judicial review of a final administrative decision
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denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.
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By order filed February 20, 2014, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was granted, the
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decision of the Commissioner was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.1
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(ECF No. 28.)
On April 4, 2017, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF No. 31.) At the outset of the representation, plaintiff and
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her counsel entered into a contingent-fee agreement. (ECF No. 31-2 at 1-2.2) Pursuant to that
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Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See ECF Nos. 7 & 9.)
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Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF
system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.
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agreement plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $25,638.00, which
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represents 25% of the retroactive disability benefits received by plaintiff on remand, for
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approximately 49.1 hours of attorney time expended on this matter. (ECF No. 31 at 5; ECF No.
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31-1 at 3.) Defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s motion on April 18, 2017. (ECF No. 33.)
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Defendant’s response addresses the applicable factors relating to counsel’s fee request but takes
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no position on the reasonableness of the requested fee. (Id. at 6.)
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Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social
security claimants.
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under
this subchapter who was represented before the court by an
attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment
a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent
of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled
by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social
Security may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such
attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due
benefits.
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42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42
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U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing
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party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009)
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(en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). Although an attorney fee
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award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is not paid by the government, the Commissioner has
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standing to challenge the award. Craig v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 864 F.2d 324,
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328 (4th Cir. 1989). The goal of fee awards under § 406(b) is to provide adequate incentive to
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attorneys for representing claimants while ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits
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received are not greatly depleted. Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir. 1989).
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The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must
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ensure that the fee actually requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“[Section]
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406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b)
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instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). “Within the 25
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percent boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is
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reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a
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reasonable fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee
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arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’”
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Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793 & 808).
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The Supreme Court has identified five factors that may be considered in determining
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whether a fee award under a contingent-fee arrangement is unreasonable and therefore subject to
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reduction by the court: (1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved by the
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representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct in order to increase the
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accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison to the
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amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours worked and
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counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for noncontingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52
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(citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing
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whether the fee requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable.
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Here, there is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard
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performance by counsel. Rather, plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a
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successful result for plaintiff. There is also no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any
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dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the $25,638.00 fee, which
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represents 25% of the past-due benefits paid to plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits
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awarded. In making this determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case
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and counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to represent plaintiff on
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such terms. See Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Finally,
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counsel has submitted a detailed billing statement in support of the requested fee. (ECF No. 31 at
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9-10.)
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Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by
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counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. See generally Azevedo v. Commissioner of Social
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Security, No. 1:11-cv-1341 AWI SAB, 2013 WL 6086666, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013)
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(granting petition pursuant to 406(b) for $17,893.75 in attorney’s fees); Coulter v. Commissioner
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of Social Security, No. 1:10-cv-1937 AWI JLT, 2013 WL 5969674, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
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2013) (recommending award of $15,084.23 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 406(b)); Taylor v.
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Astrue, No. 1:06-cv-00957-SMS, 2011 WL 836740, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2011) (granting
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petition pursuant to 406(b) for $20,960 in attorneys’ fees); Jamieson v. Astrue, No. 1:09cv0490
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LJO DLB, 2011 WL 587096, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011) (recommending award of $34,500 in
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attorney fees pursuant to 406(b)).
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An award of § 406(b) fees is, however, offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees
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granted under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S.
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at 796. Here, plaintiff’s counsel was previously awarded $7,500 in EAJA fees (see ECF No. 30)
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and the award under § 406(b) must be offset by that amount.
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
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1. Plaintiff’s April 4, 2017 motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), (ECF No.
31), is granted;
2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $25,683.00 in attorney fees under § 406(b). The
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Commissioner is directed to pay the fee forthwith and remit to plaintiff the remainder any
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withheld benefits; and
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3. Upon receipt of the $25,638.00 in attorney fees pursuant to § 406(b), counsel shall
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reimburse plaintiff in the amount of $7,500 previously paid by the government under the EAJA.
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Dated: June 15, 2017
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DLB:6
DB\orders\orders.soc sec\haverlock2393.406(b).ord
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