Manning, et al., v. CDCR, et al.,

Filing 209

ORDER denying 201 Motion for Reconsideration signed by Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr on 1/26/15. (Kaminski, H)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SHERMAN D. MANNING,

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No. 2:12-cv-02440-MCE-AC-P

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

M. BUNNELL, et al.,
Defendants.

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On December 22, 2014, the magistrate judge issued an order, ECF No. 192,

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granting in part Plaintiff Sherman D. Manning’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to compel, ECF

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No. 132. Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration

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(“Motion”) of the magistrate judge’s order. ECF No. 201. For the following reasons, the

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Motion is DENIED.

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Pursuant to E.D. Local Rule 303(f), a magistrate judge’s orders shall be upheld

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unless “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id. Plaintiff’s motion to compel requested

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an order requiring that Defendants respond to his request for disclosure of any incidents

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of workplace discipline and any past civil, criminal, or administrative cases to which they

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were parties. ECF No. 132 at 1-5. The magistrate judge granted the motion in part and

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required that: (1) Defendants supplement their responses to Interrogatory No. 2 by

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identifying any criminal convictions or adverse findings sustained in administrative
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proceedings; and (2) Defendants Humphries, Johnson, Ralls, and Wenker supplement

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their responses to Interrogatory No. 4 by identifying any adverse disciplinary actions that

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were sustained during their CDCR employment. ECF No. 192 at 12. Subsequently,

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pursuant to Defendants’ request, the magistrate judge issued a protective order

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governing permissible and impermissible disclosure by Plaintiff of the workplace

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discipline and/or criminal or administrative adverse findings (collectively “Confidential

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Information”). ECF No. 199.

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Defendants request reconsideration on the grounds that there is new evidence

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Plaintiff will violate the protective order by disclosing the Confidential Information, and

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that the Confidential Information is irrelevant because it has no bearing on Defendants’

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pending motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 201 at 5.

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As to Defendants’ first argument, they point specifically to Plaintiff’s statement in

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his opposition to the proposed protective order that the “public . . . ha[s] the right to know

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[Defendants’] past conduct” and that Plaintiff would appeal the granting of a protective

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order to the Ninth Circuit. ECF No. 198 at 9. However, the argument that Plaintiff may

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wish to disclose information to the public is not new evidence. Indeed, at the time

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Plaintiff’s motion to compel was granted, Defendants were aware that Plaintiff previously

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disseminated information about prison life and prison officials through the internet and

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published materials, and even argued this point in their opposition to the motion to

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compel. ECF No. 145 at 4. Thus, any tendency Plaintiff has to share prison system

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information with the public was before the magistrate judge at the time the motion to

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compel was granted in part and does not constitute newly discovered evidence that

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warrants reconsideration. Moreover, in his opposition to the Motion, Plaintiff states that

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he will neither violate the protective order nor attempt to appeal the issuance of that

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order. ECF No. 206.

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As to Defendants’ other argument, their motion for summary judgment was filed

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before the magistrate judge granted the motion to compel, and, thus, it is not new

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evidence warranting reconsideration. Moreover, the question of whether to compel
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discovery does not depend on its relevance to a motion for summary judgment. Rather,

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the key question is whether the item or information sought in discovery is “reasonably

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calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

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The Federal Rules of Evidence allow for the admission of evidence to show a person’s

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habit or routine (Rule 406), to attack a witness’s credibility (Rule 607), and, under some

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circumstances, to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness with a criminal conviction

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(Rule 609). Thus, any history of workplace discipline or adverse results in administrative

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or criminal proceedings may lead to admissible evidence regarding Defendants’

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credibility, truthfulness, or habit, and, as such, is discoverable. See id.

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CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 201,

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is DENIED. If Defendants seek additional time to comply with the magistrate judge’s

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order granting in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel, they are directed to file an appropriate

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motion before the magistrate judge.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 26, 2015

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