Young v. Jefferies et al

Filing 38

ORDER signed by Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 9/10/14 DENYING 35 Motion for Reconsideration. (Manzer, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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THOMAS D. YOUNG,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:12-cv-02673-KJM-EFB

v.

ORDER

OFFICER SANDOVAL,

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Defendant.

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This matter is before the court on defendant Officer Sandoval’s (“defendant”)

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motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order on plaintiff Thomas Young’s

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(“plaintiff”) motion to compel. ECF No. 35. Defendant’s motion was considered without

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argument, see L.R. 303(e), and the court now DENIES the motion.

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I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 14, 2013, the court issued a discovery and scheduling order that

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provided in part any motions to compel discovery shall be filed by February 20, 2014. ECF No.

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20 at 4.

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On March 10, 2014,1 nearly three weeks after the motion to compel deadline,

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plaintiff filed a document styled as a “request for extension of time for motion for an [order]

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Where applicable, the dates used for plaintiff’s filings are determined in light of the
prisoner mailbox rule. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).
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compelling discovery.” ECF No. 26. In his filing, plaintiff requests “an extension of time for an

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Order Compelling Discovery,” stating he “attempted to resolve this dispute without help from the

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court, but now time is running out.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff further states, “[p]laintiff move [sic] this

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Court for an Order pursuant to Rule 37 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Compelling

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Defendant Sandoval to produce for inspection and copying the following documents . . . .” Id.

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Plaintiff then lists the four documents he seeks in discovery and includes defendant’s response to

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each request for production. Id. at 2–3. Finally, plaintiff argues in support of an order

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compelling the documents, reasoning in part “[p]rison official can not [sic] avoid Discovery of

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relevant information merely by claiming it is confidential . . . .” Id. at 3 (quotations and citation

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omitted).
On April 24, 2014, plaintiff filed a request for time for further discovery. ECF No.

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29. Plaintiff sought additional time to file “necessary Discovery Motions” related to plaintiff’s

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April 4, 2014 motion for summary judgment. Id. Defendant opposed the request on April 29,

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2014, arguing the request is untimely and “not supported by a showing of good cause . . . .” ECF

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No. 30 at 1. Defendant noted plaintiff’s March 10, 2014 request but did not otherwise oppose

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either the request for extension of time or the motion to compel. Id. at 2.

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On July 1, 2014, the magistrate judge assigned to this action issued an order

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granting plaintiff’s March 10, 2014 motion to compel. ECF No. 33. The magistrate judge first

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found good cause to extend the February 20, 2014 deadline for filing a motion to compel,

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reasoning “the scheduling order afforded plaintiff little time to pursue discovery . . . in light of

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plaintiff’s incarceration and lack of access to legal resources.” Id. at 2. The magistrate judge

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then addressed plaintiff’s motion to compel and ordered defendant to provide plaintiff amended

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responses to three of the four requests. Id. at 3–4.

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On July 15, 2014, defendant filed the instant request for reconsideration. ECF No.

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35. Defendant argues the magistrate judge’s order on plaintiff’s motion to compel “exceeds the

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scope of relief requested by Plaintiff, and denies Defendant an opportunity to file an Opposition

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to this Motion on the merits.” Id. at 1. Defendant argues plaintiff’s request “clearly sought only a

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modification of the Scheduling Order in order to allow Plaintiff to file a Motion to Compel after
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the deadline previously set by the Court.” Id. at 2. Defendant avers request number two fails to

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reproduce defendant’s response in its entirety and defendant was therefore “not reasonably on

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notice that the [request] would be considered as a Motion to Compel.” Id.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) directs district judges to consider timely

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objections to nondispositive pretrial orders issued by magistrate judges and to “modify or set

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aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” See also L.R. 303(f);

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28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). “‘A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to

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support it, the reviewing [body] on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

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that a mistake has been committed.’” Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers

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Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,

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333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “[R]eview under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard is significantly

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deferential . . . .” Id. at 623. “To succeed [on a motion for reconsideration], a party must set forth

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facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.”

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Enriquez v. City of Fresno, No. CV F 10–0581 AWI DLB, 2011 WL 1087149, at *1, 3 (E.D.

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Cal. Mar. 23, 2011) (citation omitted). Furthermore, when filing a motion for reconsideration, a

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party must show “what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not

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exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.”

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L.R. 230(j)(3). “A motion for reconsideration ‘may not be used to raise arguments or present

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evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.’”

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Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009)

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(quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)).

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III.

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DISCUSSION AND ORDER
While defendant argues he was not reasonably on notice that the request would be

construed as a motion to compel, this argument is unavailing.
First, with regard to defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s request “clearly sought

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only a modification of the Scheduling Order,” ECF No. 35 at 2, plaintiff’s request states that

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“[p]laintiff move [sic] this Court for an Order . . . Compelling Defendant Sandoval to produce for
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inspection and copying” four separate requests. ECF No. 26 at 1. Following this explanation,

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plaintiff then lists each request, defendant’s responses and concludes with an argument in favor of

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production because defendant’s objections are without merit. Id. at 3–4. Considering the entirety

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of plaintiff’s request, the court cannot find he sought only a modification of the scheduling order.

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Rather, plaintiff sought an extension of time to file a motion to compel and separately an order

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compelling production of certain documents.

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Second, defendant argues request number two did not feature defendant’s response

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in its entirety and therefore failed to put defendant on notice as to the relief sought. ECF No. 35

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at 2. However, plaintiff states in request number two defendant’s response is the same as the

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response to request number one, which is listed on the same page directly above request number

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two. ECF No. 26 at 2. That plaintiff did not retype the entire response is not a sufficient basis for

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finding the request failed to put defendant on notice.

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Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s order addressing plaintiff’s motion to compel

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was not clearly erroneous such that this court “‘is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

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mistake has been committed.’” Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 622 (quoting U.S. Gypsum

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Co., 333 U.S. at 395); see also Thomas v. Beutler, No. 2:10–cv–01300–MCE–CKD, 2013 WL

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594458 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2013) (explaining “[i]f the Court believes the conclusions reached by

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the Magistrate Judge were at least plausible, after considering the record in its entirety, the Court

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will not reverse . . . .” (citing Phx. Eng’g & Supply Inc. v. Universal Elec. Co., Inc., 104 F.3d

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1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1997))).

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For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 35, is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 10, 2014.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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