Hamilton v. Solano Irrigation District et al

Filing 11

ORDER signed by Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 4/11/2013 DENYING defendants' 5 Motion to Dismiss. (Marciel, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL HAMILTON,
Plaintiffs,

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v.

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No. CIV S 12-2727 KJM KJN

SOLANO IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
et al.,

ORDER

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Defendants.
______________________________/
Plaintiff Michael Hamilton (Hamilton) has filed a complaint against Solano

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Irrigation District (SID), Kevin King (King) and David Mansfield (Mansfield) (collectively

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“defendants”) alleging six claims stemming from the loss of his job as a mechanic for SID: (1)

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disability discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 12101; (2) disability discrimination, CAL. GOV’T CODE

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§12900; (3) violation of his First Amendment rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) violation of

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California Labor Code §1102; (5) whistleblower retaliation in violation of California Labor Code

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§ 1102.5; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. He seeks compensatory and

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punitive damages.
All defendants have moved to dismiss the sixth cause of action for intentional

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infliction of emotional distress; King and Mansfield have moved to dismiss the request

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for punitive damages. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. The court ordered it submitted without

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argument and now DENIES the motion.

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I. STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

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Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to

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dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A court may

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dismiss “based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged

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under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

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1990).

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Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim

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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), in order to survive a motion

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to dismiss this short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

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(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include

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something more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or

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“‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Id.

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to

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dismiss for failure to state a claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

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draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses

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on the interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law

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in the action. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

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In making this context-specific evaluation, this court must construe the complaint

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in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true the factual allegations of the

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complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). This rule does not apply to “‘a legal

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conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)

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(quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), nor to “allegations that contradict matters properly subject

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to judicial notice” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint.
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Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2001). A court’s

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consideration of documents attached to a complaint or incorporated by reference or matter of

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judicial notice will not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

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United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003); Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington,

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51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); compare Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d

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977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that even though court may look beyond pleadings on motion to

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dismiss, generally court is limited to face of the complaint on 12(b)(6) motion).

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II. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

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Defendants argue that under the California Government Code, a public agency

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and public employees acting in the scope of their employment cannot be liable for common law

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torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Plaintiff does not dispute that

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the SID is a public agency within the meaning of this section.

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Government Code section 815(a) provides in relevant part: “Except as otherwise

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provided by statute . . . [a] public entity is not liable for any injury, whether such injury arises

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out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” As a

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result, a public agency’s direct tort liability “must be based on a specific statute declaring [public

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agencies] to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care . . . .” Eastburn v. Reg’l

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Fire Prot. Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1183 (2003). Any attempt to impose direct tort liability on

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SID is barred by this statute. However, a public agency may be vicariously liable for an

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employee’s act or omission within the scope of employment “if the act or omission would . . .

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have given rise to a cause of action against that employee . . . .” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815.2(a);

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Eastburn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1180. Under California Government Code § 820(a), “a public

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employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private

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person.” Defendants have pointed to nothing to suggest that defendants King and Mansfield

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would not be liable, and thus SID not vicariously liable, for intentional infliction of emotional

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distress. Moreover, section 815(a) does not preclude suit against Mansfield and King, as this
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section applies only to public entities, not public employees. Jacobsen v. Schwarzenegger, 357

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F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1215 (C. D. Cal. 2004). The motion to dismiss on the ground of governmental

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immunity is denied.

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At the end of their argument, defendants state, “[a]dditionally, Plaintiff has not

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even identified what actions were taken by King or Mansfield that would create any sort of

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liability. . . Plaintiff’s complaint is vague in that it is unclear what acts King and/or Mansfield

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were allegedly involved in that would give rise to any sort of liability.” ECF No. 5-1 at 4. They

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cite no authority. In reply, defendants contend that these two sentences constitute a challenge to

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the factual adequacy of the IIED claim. They are incorrect: a position argued in such a

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conclusory manner is waived. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010)

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(finding that an argument made in two sentences without citation to authority was waived).

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III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES

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Citing California Government Code § 818, defendants argue that a party cannot

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recover punitive damages from a public entity. Plaintiff agrees that Government Code § 818

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precludes the assessment of punitive damages against a public agency, but notes that he is

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seeking punitive damages only against defendants King and Mansfield. In Runyon v. Superior

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Court, 187 Cal. App. 3d 878, 880-81 (1986), the California Court of Appeal rejected the

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argument defendants make here and held that “[a] proper interpretation of Government Code

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section 818 is that it prohibits a claim of punitive damages against a public entity, but not against

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individual public employees.” See also Fenters v.Yosemite Chevron, No. CV-F-05-1630

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OWW/DLB, 2006 WL 2016536, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jul 17, 2006) (same).

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No.5, is

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denied.

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DATED: April 11, 2013.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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