Daniels v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation et al
Filing
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ORDER signed by Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. on 10/11/2013 GRANTING 7 Defendant's Motion to Strike the Complaint; DISMISSING CASE without prejudice; the Clerk of Court is directed to close this file. CASE CLOSED(Reader, L)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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YVETTE DANIELS,
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No. 2:12-cv-02999-MCE-EFB
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION, MARK MIRANDA,
DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
Defendants.
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On December 31, 2009, Plaintiff Yvette Daniels (“Plaintiff”), a youth counselor
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with Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (hereinafter
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“CDCR”), along with two other CDCR employees, Maria Aguilar and Karen Currie, filed a
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complaint against CDCR. That lawsuit alleged sex discrimination on behalf of all three
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plaintiffs given the sexually explicit materials they claim they were subjected to in the
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workplace. Plaintiff Daniels further claims that her supervisors, Mark Miranda and Rich
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Alvarado, retaliated against her in response to her complaints that youth offenders
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improperly possessed said materials. That lawsuit, entitled Yvette Daniels, et al v.
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California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Case No. 2:10-cv-00003-MCE-
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AC (“Daniels I”), is currently scheduled to go to trial on February 24, 2014.
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On December 12, 2012, Plaintiffs’ counsel in Daniels I, Pamela Price, filed the
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above-captioned second action on behalf of Yvette Daniels, only. That lawsuit
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(hereinafter referred to as “Daniels II”) names both the CDCR and Mark Miranda as
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Defendants and alleges claims sounding solely in retaliation. Defendants CDCR and
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Miranda (collectively “Defendants” unless otherwise indicated) now move to strike
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Daniels II as superfluous and redundant. Alternatively, Defendants ask that the motion
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be consolidated with Daniels I and be subject to the scheduling order governing the
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maintenance of that lawsuit. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ Motion to Strike.
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The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient defense or any
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redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)
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(emphasis added). “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure
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of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with
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those issues prior to trial....” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885
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(9th Cir. 1983). A Rule 12(f) motion on grounds of redundancy is proper if the material
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sought to be stricken entails “a needless repetition” of allegations. Sliger v. Prospect
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Mortg., LLC, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2011). The possibility that
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superfluous pleadings will cause the trier of fact to draw an unwarranted inference at trial
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is the type of prejudice that is sufficient to support the granting of a motion to strike.
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Campagnolo S.R. v. Full Speed Ahead, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 663, 665 (W.D. Wash. 2009),
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citing California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d
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1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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Examination of the respective allegations contained in the Daniels I and Daniels II
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claims indicates unequivocally that the substance of the second lawsuit is virtually the
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same as the first. In both actions, Daniels alleges retaliation by her supervisor, Mark
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Miranda, and the CDCR in response to Plaintiff’s complaints that youth wards possessed
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sexually explicit materials.
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See Complaint, Daniels I (attached as Ex. A to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice
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herein1), ¶¶ 9-15, 21, as compared to identical allegations in Daniels II, ECF No. 1,
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¶¶ 5-13, 21. The only difference in the retaliation allegations made in Plaintiff’s two
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lawsuits is that in Daniels II, Plaintiff alleges two additional adverse actions allegedly
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taken against her for the same protected activity alleged in Daniels I. Complaint, Daniels
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II, ¶¶ 14-17. In addition, although Miranda’s alleged retaliation against Plaintiff is
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described in Daniels I, only in Daniels II is Miranda actually named as a Defendant.
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The fact that Daniels II alleges two post-Daniels I retaliatory acts that occurred in
2011 does not justify a second lawsuit. Having occurred in 2011, more than a year-
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and-a-half ago, Plaintiff and her counsel had ample time to amend Daniels I to include
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those additional allegations (or to add Miranda as an additional defendant) if they
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deemed it necessary to do so. Moreover, since the complaint in Daniels I alleges that
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the claimed retaliation against Plaintiff “was continuing in nature up to the present” (see
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Complaint, Daniels I, ¶ 35), the need to specifically amend Daniels I to allege those
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additional acts of retaliation seems questionable, at best. Nonetheless, as Defendants
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argue, Plaintiff at no time sought either leave to amend her initial complaint, or a
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stipulation from the CDCR to do so. Instead, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s concurrently
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pending Motion to Sever her prior Daniels I retaliation claims in order to consolidate
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those claims into the newly filed Daniels II action, Plaintiff’s counsel apparently wants to
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delay adjudication of Plaintiff’s assertions against Defendants. Defendants allege
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Plaintiff’s counsel seeks that delay because she has done minimal discovery in pursuit of
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her lawsuit in Daniels I. As defense counsel indicates, from the inception of Daniels I in
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late 2009 through February 1, 2013, Plaintiff’s counsel failed to take a single deposition.
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Doyle Decl.,¶ 9. The fact that Plaintiff moved, in Daniels I, to reopen discovery (on
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grounds that much of the needed discovery in that case was not completed by the
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applicable discovery cutoff) would appear to highlight that shortcoming.
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Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 is unopposed and
is granted.
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Irrespective of what Plaintiff’s motives in filing this new complaint may or may not
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be, and without having to resort to speculation in that regard, the fact remains that the
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retaliation claims pled in this lawsuit are virtually identical to those already being
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maintained in Daniels I. The instant action is therefore redundant under Rule 12(f). As
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such, Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED.2 The instant lawsuit is
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stricken as redundant and is accordingly dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice, to
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any effort by Plaintiff to seek leave to amend her complaint in Daniels I should she
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choose to do so. Having dismissed the Complaint, the Court need not address
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Defendants’ alternative argument that this case be consolidated with Daniels I if
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permitted to proceed in any fashion. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 11, 2013
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Having determined that oral argument was not of material assistance, the Court ordered this
matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).
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