McKeen-Chaplin v. Provident Savings Bank, F.S.B.

Filing 101

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 8/12/15 ORDERING that each Plaintiff's Summary Judgment is DENIED and Provident's Motion is GRANTED; Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant. CASE CLOSED.(Mena-Sanchez, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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9
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GINA MCKEEN-CHAPLIN,
individually, on behalf of
others similarly situated,
and on behalf of the general
public,

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13
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No. 2:12-CV-03035-GEB-AC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AND
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION

Plaintiffs,
v.
PROVIDENT SAVINGS BANK, FSB,

15

Defendant.

16
On March 17, 2015 an order issued concerning summary

17
18

judgment

19

Savings Bank, FSB (“Provident”). (ECF No. 85.) The parties moved

20

for reconsideration of that order and requested leave to file

21

supplemental

22

Procedure 1 that supplemental briefing would conserve resources

23

in light of their recent stipulation to a bench trial. (ECF No.

24

94.) The request for supplemental briefing was granted, (ECF No.

25

95), and after consideration of that briefing, the March 17 order

26

is vacated and superseded by the instant order.

27
28

motions

Each

filed

briefing,

party

by

Plaintiffs

arguing

seeks

under

summary

and

Defendant

Federal

judgment

Rule

on

Provident

of

Civil

Provident’s

affirmative defense, in which Provident asserts it was justified
1

1

in not paying Plaintiffs overtime wages prescribed in the federal

2

Fair

3

summary judgment on its affirmative defense in which it asserts

4

it was justified in not paying Plaintiff McKeen-Chaplin overtime

5

wages prescribed in the California Labor Code. Provident argues

6

that

7

underwriters, were “administratively exempt” from the overtime

8

requirement in the FLSA, and that Plaintiff McKeen-Chaplin was

9

“administratively exempt” from the overtime requirement in the

10

Labor

the

Standards

FLSA

Act

(“FLSA”).

Plaintiffs,

who

are

Provident

former

also

Provident

moves

for

mortgage

California Labor Code.

11

Both

federal

and

California

law

provide

overtime

12

provisions for employees who work in excess of forty hours per

13

week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Cal. Labor Code § 510(a). However,

14

neither

15

provisions apply to “any employee employed in a bona fide . . .

16

administrative . . . capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); 8 Cal.

17

Code

18

requirements do “not apply to persons employed in administrative

19

. . . capacities.”). Under both federal and California law, the

20

employer

21

exemption applies to its employees. Bothell v. Phase Metrics,

22

Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (“An ‘employer who

23

claims an exemption from the FLSA has the burden of showing that

24

the exemption applies.’”) (quoting Donovan v Nekton, Inc., 703

25

F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1983)); Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co.,

26

Inc.,

27

exemption from [California’s] overtime laws is considered to be

28

an

the

Regs.

20

FLSA

§

bears

11040(1)

the

Cal.4th

affirmative

nor

the

(stating

burden

785,

defense,

California

of

794-95

and

that

proving

(1999)

therefore
2

Labor

Code

California’s

that

the

(“[T]he

the

overtime

overtime

administrative

assertion

employer

of

bears

an

the

1

burden of proving the employee’s exemption.”). This exemption is

2

“to be narrowly construed against [an] employer[]” asserting it.

3

Arnold

4

(1960)(referencing

5

Integrators, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 1363, 1370 (2007) (“[U]nder

6

California

7

provisions are narrowly construed.”).

v.

Ben

law,

Kanowsky,
the

FLSA);

exemptions

8

Inc.,

361

U.S.

Eicher

from

v.

statutory

388,

Advanced

mandatory

392
Bus.

overtime

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS1

II.

9

The following facts concern the motions and are either

10

admitted or are “deemed” uncontroverted since they have not been

11

controverted

12

260(b).2

13

with

Provident

specific

“is

in

facts

the

as

required

business

of

by

Local

selling

Rule

mortgage

14

loans” and “employs . . . mortgage underwriters . . . whose

15

primary duty is to underwrite home mortgage loan[] applications

16

for one- to four-family residential units.” (Def. SUF ¶ 1, ECF

17

No. 76-1; Pl. SUF ¶ 1, ECF No. 77-1.)

18

To

initiate

a

mortgage,

Provident

“loan

officers[,]

19

[who are not underwriters,] . . . discuss the loan products with

20

[the] borrower.” (Pl. SUF ¶ 51.) “A loan processor then runs a

21

1

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25
26
27
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Provident requests judicial notice be taken of documents Plaintiffs
filed in state court. The request is denied since Provident does not explain
in the request the relevance these documents have to its motion.
2
LR 260(b) prescribes:
Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment . . .
[must] reproduce the itemized facts in the [moving
party’s] Statement of Undisputed Facts and admit those
facts that are undisputed and deny those that are
disputed, including with each denial a citation to the
particular portions of any . . . document relied upon
in support of that denial.
If the non-movant does not “specifically . . . [controvert duly
supported] facts identified in the [movant’s] statement of undisputed facts,”
the nonmovant “is deemed to have admitted the validity of the facts contained
in the [movant’s] statement.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 527 (2006).

3

1

credit check, gathers further documentation, assembles the file

2

for

3

underwriting system [(“AUS”)].” (Pl. SUF ¶ 4.) The AUS “applies

4

certain guidelines to a loan and returns a preliminary decision

5

(approval, refer, or ineligible.)” (Pl. SUF ¶ 5.) “The loan . . .

6

goes to the underwriter after this processing is finished.” (Pl.

7

SUF ¶ 4.)

the

underwriter,

8
9

An

and

runs

“underwriter

the

has

to

loan

make

through

sure

an

that

automated

the

[loan]

processor put the correct information into the AUS and . . . that

10

the

11

particular loan.” (Pl. SUF ¶ 6.)

12

applying “Provident’s guidelines or lending criteria as well as

13

agency

14

determine whether the particular loan falls within the level of

15

risk

16

Provident

17

borrower’s income, assets, debts and investments . . . . This

18

comprises

19

10)(emphasis added.)

20

AUS

is

applying

guidelines

Provident

the

that

is

are

In

of

the

reviewing

rules

to

job

to

accept.”

includes

Plaintiffs’

a

loan

to

the

facts

of

a

The underwriter does this by

specific

willing

underwriter’s

most

correct

job

each

loan

(Def.

product

SUF

¶

consideration

duties.”

application,

to

11.)
of

(Def.

A

“the

SUF

underwriters

¶

may

21

impose “conditions” on a loan application and refuse to approve

22

the loan until the borrower satisfies those conditions. (Def. SUF

23

¶¶ 14, 16, 19.) The referenced conditions include “items and/or

24

documentation

25

approved. (Def. SUF ¶ 13.) While some “conditions” are required

26

by the guidelines, underwriters can include additional conditions

27

beyond those the guidelines require. (Def. SUF ¶ 16.) Further,

28

“[i]n certain circumstances, [Provident underwriters] can request

that

an

underwriter

4

requires”

the

loan

will

be

1

that Provident make an exception to the guidelines” and approve a

2

loan that does not satisfy the guidelines. (Def. SUF ¶ 24.)

3

When a Provident underwriter approves a loan, the loan

4

is “transferred to other [Provident] employees . . . to finalize

5

loan funding.” (Pl. SUF ¶ 55.) Provident sells approved mortgage

6

loans to third-party investors. (Pl. SUF ¶ 12.)

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8

III. DISCUSSION
A.

9

FLSA Claim
“The FLSA delegates to the Secretary of Labor broad

10

authority

11

administrative exemption.

In accordance with that authority, the

12

Secretary

a

13

test,’ to determine whether employees . . . qualify for the

14

administrative exemption.” In re Farmers Ins. Exch., 481 F.3d

15

1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006). Federal courts “must give deference

16

to [Department of Labor’s] regulations interpreting the FLSA.”

17

Webster v. Public Sch. Emp. of Wash, Inc., 247 F.3d 910, 914 (9th

18

Cir. 2001). The “short duties test” states:

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28

to

has

‘define

[

formulated

]

and

delimit[

test,

known

]’

as

the

the

scope

‘short

The term “employee employed in a bona fide
administrative capacity” . . . shall mean any
employee:
(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a
rate of not less than $455 per week . . .
exclusive
of
board,
lodging
or
other
facilities;
(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of
office or non-manual work directly related to
the management or general business operations
of the employer or the employer’s customers;
and
(3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise
of discretion and independent judgment with
respect to matters of significance.
5

of

the

duties

1

29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (emphasis added).

2

It

is

undisputed

that

the

salary

requirement

is

3

satisfied. Provident seeks summary judgment on the second and

4

third

5

requirement.

6

1.

requirements

Plaintiffs

cross

move

on

the

second

Work Directly Related to Provident’s General

7

Operations

8
9

and

Plaintiffs argue Provident cannot satisfy the second
requirement

of

10

determination

11

was,]

12

related

13

[Provident]

14

the

15

whether

exemption,

performance

to

the

The

or

Plaintiffs’

of

office

management

or

[Provident’s]

uncontroverted

or

“primary

which
duty

involves

541.200(a)(2).

the

of

administrative

non-manual

general

facts

work

business

customers.”

is[,]

[or

directly

operations
29

establish

C.F.R.

that

of
§

each

16

Plaintiff’s primary duty was “to underwrite home mortgage loan

17

applications for one- to four-family residential units,” and that

18

this duty constitutes “office work” referenced in 29 C.F.R. §

19

541.200(a)(2). (Pl. SUF ¶ 1; see also Def. SUF ¶ 10.) However,

20

Plaintiffs argue this mortgage loan underwriting duty did not

21

constitute work directly related to Provident’s general business

22

operations.

23

29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) defines the phrase “directly

24

related to management or general business operations” as it is

25

used

26

follows:

27
28

in

the

administrative

exemption

in

pertinent

The phrase “directly related to . . . general
business operations” refers to the type of
work performed by the employee. To meet this
requirement, an employee must perform work
6

part

as

1

directly related to assisting
with the
running or servicing of the business, as
distinguished, for example, from working on a
manufacturing production line or selling a
product in a retail or service establishment.

2
3
4

(emphasis added).

5

The distinction between “running or servicing
of
the
business”
and
“working
on
a
manufacturing production line or selling a
product
in
a
retail
or
service
establishment,” has given rise to what many
courts
refer
to
as
the
“administrative/production dichotomy.” Under
the dichotomy, “production employees (whose
job it is to generate the product or service
the business offers to the public) will not
qualify
for
the
exemption.”
Stated
differently, if a court determines that an
employee
generates,
or
“produces”
the
product/service that the employer offers to
the
public,
then
that
employee
is
a
“production” employee who cannot qualify for
the administrative exemption. If, on the
other hand, the employee does not “produce”
the employer's product or service, the court
must undertake an additional analysis to
determine whether the employee performs an
“administrative” function within the meaning
of 29 C.F.R. § 541.201.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Lutz

18

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2890170, at *8 (S.D. Ohio June 25, 2014).
[T]he
administration/production
dichotomy
[is] . . . one piece of the larger inquiry,
recognizing that a court must “constru[e] the
statutes and applicable regulations as a
whole.”
Indeed, some cases analyze the
primary duty test without referencing the ...
dichotomy at all. This approach is sometimes
appropriate because . . . the dichotomy is
but one analytical tool, to be used only to
the extent it clarifies the analysis. Only
when work falls “squarely on the ‘production’
side
of
the
line,”
has
the
administration/production
dichotomy
been
determinative.

26

Bothell,

27

quotations omitted).

28

Plaintiffs

19
20
21
22
23
24

v.

Huntington

299

F.3d

Bankcshares,

at

1127

argue

No.

(third

they
7

2:12-cv-01091,

alteration

were

part

of

in

2014

WL

original,

Provident’s

1

production line since they produced loans that Provident sold to

2

third-party investors, and rely on the Second Circuit’s opinion

3

in Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009)

4

as

5

“d[id] not ‘sell’ mortgage loans;” “[r]ather the underwriters

6

service[d] Provident’s mortgage selling business by assessing the

7

risk associated with loan applications and deciding whether to

8

approve them.” (Def. Mot. 1:21-25.)

9

support

for

Davis

this

argument.

concluded

that

Provident

on

the

counters

facts

Plaintiffs

before

it,

an

10

underwriter’s job fell “under the category of production rather

11

than of administrative work,” concluding:

12

[the] Underwriters . . . performed work that
was
primarily
functional
rather
than
conceptual. They were not at the heart of the
company's business operations. They had no
involvement
in
determining
the
future
strategy or direction of the business, nor
did they perform any other function that in
any way related to the business's overall
efficiency or mode of operation. [They]
played no role in the establishment of [their
employer’s] credit policy. Rather, they were
trained only to apply the credit policy as
they found it, as it was articulated to them
through the detailed Credit Guide.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 536.

21

Plaintiffs

work

as

Provident

underwriters

was

not

22

similar to “work on a manufacturing production line or selling a

23

product in the retail or service establishment,” 29 C.F.R. §

24

541.201(a), since Plaintiffs’ did not “produc[e] anything in the

25

literal sense.” Bollinger v. Residential Capital, LLC, 863 F.

26

Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 (W.D. Wash. 2012). “To place them [on the

27

production side because they ‘produce[d]’ loans that [were] sold

28

to

third-party

investors]

would
8

elevate

form

.

.

.

over

1

substance.”

2

Therefore,

3

resolve the question of whether Provident satisfies the second

4

prong of the administrative exemption.

In

re

the

Farmers

Ins.

Exch.,

administrative/production

481

F.3d

at

dichotomy

1132.

does

not

5

Provident argues Plaintiffs’ primary duty was related

6

to Provident’s general business operations since Plaintiffs role

7

was analogous to work in quality control prescribed in 29 C.F.R.

8

§541.201(b),

9

related to . . . general business operations includes . . .

10

which

states

in

relevant

part:

“[w]ork

directly

control . . . and similar activities.”

11

Plaintiffs counter they did not perform quality control

12

work since “Provident has at least three quality control programs

13

. . . . [that are] distinct from Plaintiffs’ underwriting work.”

14

(Pl. Opp’n 6:27-7:6.) Plaintiffs contend their work should not be

15

characterized as quality control because while “all [Provident]

16

employees are responsible for ‘quality,’” it is the “Corporate

17

Loan

18

reviewing

19

addressing performance issues causing those errors[;]” and “an

20

underwriter who denies a loan for not meeting guidelines is not

21

transformed

22

carpenter who refuses to use an unsafe saw becomes a safety

23

inspector.”

24

22; 4:27-28, ECF No. 96.)

Committee”

that

errors

into

performs

identified

a

quality

“a
in

quality
quality

control

control

function

control

audits

worker

any

more

by
and

than

a

(Pl. Supp’l Mem. Cross Mot. Summ. J., 4:2-3; 4:20-

25

The uncontroverted facts establish that “Provident uses

26

an outside company to perform quality control functions” and that

27

Provident

28

“completely re-underwrite 10% of loans.” (Pl. SUF ¶¶ 47, 49.) The

has

an

internal

Corporate

9

Loan

Committee

that

1

uncontroverted facts also establish that Provident underwriters

2

“must apply Provident’s guidelines or lending criteria as well as

3

agency guidelines . . . to determine whether [a] particular loan

4

falls within the level of risk Provident is willing to accept,”

5

and this review comprises most of Plaintiffs’ job duties. (Def.

6

SUF ¶¶ 10-11.) This evidence evinces that the work tasks in which

7

an underwriter engages for the purpose of determining whether a

8

particular

9

willing to accept “makes [the underwriter’s] duties analogous to

10

a quality control employee who prevents a defective product from

11

being

12

controls. Lutz, No. 2:12-cv-01091, 2014 WL 2890170, at *13. Since

13

Provident has shown Plaintiffs’ primary duty included “quality

14

control . . . [or] other similar activities,” Plaintiffs’ work

15

was directly related to Provident’s general business operations.

16

29 C.F.R. §541.201(b)

17
18

loan

sold”

falls

within

notwithstanding

the

level

Provident’s

of

use

risk

of

Provident

other

is

quality

Therefore, Provident’s motion on this requirement is
granted and Plaintiffs’ motion denied.

19

2.

Primary Duty Includes the Exercise of Discretion

20

and Independent Judgment With Respect to Matters

21

of Significance

22

Provident
the

argues

third

it

should

on

motion

concerning

24

Plaintiff’s “primary duty include[d] the exercise of discretion

25

and

26

significance,” that is prescribed in 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3);

27

specifically,

28

could “‘waiv[e] or deviat[e] from [the guidelines] without prior

judgment

Provident

with

argues

the

10

requirement

its

23

independent

administrative

prevail

respect

mortgage

to

loan

because

matters

each

of

underwriters

1

approval’

2

criteria and/or request[] exceptions in order to approve a loan

3

that d[id] not [meet the lending criteria].” (Def. Mot. 21:5-10.)

4

Plaintiffs counter that there is a question of fact

5

regarding how often Plaintiffs performed these duties. Plaintiffs

6

cite in support of their position deposition testimony evincing

7

that underwriters rarely requested exceptions. Plaintiff Clayton

8

testified she requested exemptions “maybe once a month,” Ludwig

9

Decl.

by

Ex.

7

declining

to

(“Clayton

approve

Dep.

Tr.”)

a

loan

that

109:11-15,

met

ECF

lending

73-5),

and

10

Provident’s Vice President of Mortgage Operations testified that

11

she “wouldn’t say [exceptions] happen[] often.” (Ludwig Decl. Ex.

12

10 (“Baker April 2013 Dep. Tr.” 73:14-16, ECF No. 73-6.)

13

Provident responds:

14

19

[Plaintiffs’ position] d[oes] not take into
account
that
Plaintiffs’
discretion
and
independent judgment was manifested not only
when they chose to act, but also in each
circumstance where they chose not to act....
Plaintiffs
exercise[d]
discretion
and
independent
judgment
every
time
they
underwr[o]te a loan file and decide[d] not
only
to
request
an
exception
to
the
guidelines, but also when they decide[d] not
to request an exception.

20

(Def. Supp’l Br. ISO Mot. Summ. J., 4:8-13, ECF No. 97.)

15
16
17
18

21

Plaintiffs

that

request

Provident

underwriter’s

24

‘decision’ about requesting an exception from the guidelines when

25

the loan satisfie[d] the guidelines.” (Pls.’ Supp’l Reply 3:19-

26

23, ECF No. 98.)

exercise

C.F.R.

§

of

discretion

541.202
and

duty

states

since

in

independent
11

considered
“there

pertinent
judgment

part

an

23

primary

be

to

to

29

cannot

not

exception

28

guidelines

deciding

22

27

the

reply

of

[was]

part,

involves

a
no

“the
the

1

comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct....

2

[T]he

3

importance or consequence of the work performed.” 29 C.F.R. §

4

541.700 prescribes:

term

5

‘matters

of

significance’

refers

to

the

8

The

of

The term ‘primary duty’ means the principal,
main, major or most important duty that the
employee
performs.
Determination
of
any
employee’s primary duty must be based on all
the facts in a particular case, with the
major emphasis on the character of the
employee’s job as a whole.

9

level

6
7

uncontroverted

facts

establish

that

underwriters

10

could place “conditions” on a loan application that satisfied

11

Provident’s

12

unless or until the borrower satisfied those conditions. (Def.

13

SUF ¶¶ 16, 19.) It is also uncontroverted that Plaintiffs could

14

“request that Provident make an exception to the guidelines” so

15

that an underwriter could “make a loan that d[id] not . . .

16

[satisfy the] guidelines.” (Def. SUF ¶ 24.) Performance of these

17

duties

18

judgment since they “involved the comparison and the evaluation

19

of

20

significance since they could influence whether Provident would

21

approve a loan. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202. Further, Provident has shown

22

Plaintiffs’ duty to make decisions about when—and when not—to

23

decline to approve a loan that met the lending criteria, and when

24

to request an exception to the lending criteria, were part of

25

Plaintiffs’ primary duty in performance of their underwriting

26

function, since the responsibilities were “the ... most important

27

duty

28

541.700; see (Def. SUF ¶¶ 10-11 (setting out an underwriter’s

guidelines,

required

possible

.

.

.

the

courses

and

could

exercise

of

[Provident

of

conduct,”

decline

discretion

and

underwriters]

12

to

approve

and

concerned

perform.”

a

loan

independent

matters

29

C.F.R.

of

§

1

role

2

borrower’s income, assets, debts, and investments in order to

3

determine if the loan falls within the level of risk Provident is

4

willing to accept);

5

(1995) (defining duty as “an act or a course of action required

6

of one by position, custom, law, or religion”); Mtoched v. Lynch,

7

786

8

dictionary to define a statutory term)). Therefore, Provident’s

9

motion is granted.

10

in

Provident’s

F.3d

B.

11

1210,

loan

business

as

consideration

of

a

see also Webster’s II New College Dictionary

1217

(9th

Cir.

2015)

(applying

Webster’s

State Law Claims
Provident

argues

McKeen-Chaplin

was

administratively

12

exempt from California’s overtime laws and seeks summary judgment

13

on this affirmative defense to her state law overtime claims.

14

The

California

Labor

Code,

which

imposes

overtime

15

compensation requirements on employers, authorizes California’s

16

Industrial Welfare Commission to establish exemptions from the

17

requirements for administrative employees. The phrases “primarily

18

engaged

19

“discretion

20

state administrative exemption] in the same manner as such terms

21

are construed in” the FLSA’s administrative exemption. 8 Cal. ADC

22

§

23

Commission’s exemption defines an administrative employee as one:

24

(a) Whose duties and responsibilities involve
. . . The performance of non-manual work
directly related to management policies or
general
business
operations
of
his/her
employer or his employee’s customers . . .
and

25
26
27
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in

duties
and

that

meet

independent

11040(1)(A)(2).

(emphasis

the

test

judgment”

added).

of
are

The

the

exemption”

“construed

Industrial

(b) Who customarily and regularly exercises
discretion and independent judgment; . . . .
13

in

and
[the

Welfare

1

and

2

(d)
Who
performs
under
only
general
supervision
work
along
specialized
or
technical lines requiring special training,
experience, or knowledge; . . . . and

3
4

(f) Who is primarily engaged in duties that
meet the test of the exemption. . . .

5
6

(g) Such employees must also earn a monthly
salary equivalent to no less than two (2)
times the state minimum wage for full-time
employment.

7
8
9
10

Cal. Code. Regs. § 11040 (“Wage Order 4”). Satisfaction of the
wage requirement concerning this exemption is undisputed.
Provident

11

argues

McKeen-Chaplin

is

administratively

12

exempt since her work as an underwriter satisfies the FLSA’s

13

administrative exemption and she “primary engaged in duties that

14

met the [California law exemption]” because she testified at her

15

deposition

16

applications. (Ludwig Decl. Ex. 1 (“McKeen-Chaplin Dep. Tr.”)

17

113:19-115:15, ECF No. 73-4.)

that

she

spent

most

of

her

time

reviewing

loan

18

McKeen-Chaplin argues summary judgment is inappropriate

19

since there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether

20

she was administratively exempt under the FLSA. This conclusory

21

assertion

22

Provident’s motion on her state claims.

is

McKeen-Chaplin’s

only

argument

in

opposition

to

Provident made a factual showing under the applicable

23
24

state

law

standard

25

exempt and McKeen-Chaplin has not presented facts from which a

26

reasonable

27

administratively exempt. Therefore, Provident’s motion on this

28

issue is granted.

inference

that

can

McKeen-Chaplin

be

14

drawn

was

that

administratively

she

is

not

1

IV.

2

For

the

stated

CONCLUSION
reasons,

each

Plaintiff’s

summary

3

judgment is DENIED and Provident’s motion is GRANTED. Judgment

4

shall be entered in favor of Defendant.

5

Dated:

August 12, 2015

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