AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Yeager, et al.

Filing 221

ORDER signed by Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 9/24/2015 DENYING #219 Motion for Protective Order/Request to Seal; GRANTING the Yeagers seven days to: (1) file the assignment in question on the docket or (2) withdraw reliance on said document. (Michel, G.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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AT&T MOBILITY LLC,

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No. 2:13-cv-0007-KJM-DAD

Plaintiffs,
v.

ORDER

GENERAL CHARLES E. “CHUCK”
YEAGER (RET.), et al.,
Defendants.

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On September 14, 2015, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the question of

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General Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager’s competency to proceed in this case without representation.

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Minutes, ECF No. 218. Before that hearing, the court ordered General and Mrs. Victoria Yeager

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to submit, by August 31, 2015 for the court’s in camera review, “[t]he assignment of rights

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described in paragraph sixteen of the declaration of Victoria Yeager, filed August 24, 2015, ECF

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No. 214-1,” among other things. Order Aug. 24, 2015, at 3, ECF No. 216.

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No assignment was submitted for in camera review by August 31, but Mrs. Yeager

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brought a copy to the September 14, 2015 evidentiary hearing. At hearing, General and Mrs.

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Yeager agreed to provide a copy of that document to Kennedy Luvai of Parsons Behle & Latimer,

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defendants-in-intervention. The court allowed General and Mrs. Yeager until Friday, September

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18, 2015, to submit a request to file the assignment of rights under seal.
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The Yeagers filed their request as ordered. ECF No. 219. They argue that

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disclosure of the assignment would improperly reveal their private financial information. Id. at

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4–5. Mrs. Yeager also describes how in June of this year, a man who claimed he had been raised

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by General Yeager harassed them at home. See generally V. Yeager Aff., ECF No. 219-1. The

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man left only after Mrs. Yeager threatened deadly force. Id. ¶ 8. The same person had sent

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General Yeager messages on Facebook. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. She also reports, “General Yeager and I have

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been stalked many times,” id. ¶ 4, and “We have several legal matters in which this sort of

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information has and continues to be misused which is an expensive and timely distraction from

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the issues at hand,” id. ¶ 3.

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I.

LEGAL STANDARD
The common-law “right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute.”

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Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). A litigant may request court records

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be sealed or redacted. See id. (listing traditional examples). In the Ninth Circuit, courts faced

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with requests to seal or redact begin “with a strong presumption favor of access to court records.”

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Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). The party seeking

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to seal or redact a document “bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption” by

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“articulat[ing] compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the

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general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in

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understanding the judicial process.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172,

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1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135 and Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430,

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1434 (9th Cir. 1995)) (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

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The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly confirmed, however, that the traditional

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compelling-reasons standard applies only “to dispositive pleadings, including motions for

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summary judgment and related attachments.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (citing Foltz, 331

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F.3d at 1136 and San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court--N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d

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1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)). The “usual presumption of the public’s right of access is rebutted”

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“for a sealed discovery document attached to a non-dispositive motion.” Id. at 447 (quoting

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Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted)
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(emphasis in Kamakana). Rather than “compelling reasons,” only “good cause” to withhold the

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information must be shown. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180.

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The court’s decision is a matter of discretion. Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434.
II.

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DISCUSSION
The Yeagers themselves raised the assignment of rights in support of their position

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at the evidentiary hearing. See Objections & Resp. 12, ECF No. 214 (“The Court should be

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aware that General Yeager has assigned his rights in this case and the underlying rights to both

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Victoria Yeager and himself in joint ownership with right of survivorship. Therefore, even if the

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Court were to appoint a guardian ad litem with full authority in spite of the Yeagers’ objections

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and the evidence before the Court, the guardian could not settle the entire case.” (record citation

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omitted)). As noted above, the purpose of the evidentiary hearing was a determination of General

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Yeager’s competence to proceed without representation, as a step in the process of considering

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appointment of a guardian ad litem.

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The Ninth Circuit has not provided detailed guidance on the distinction between

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dispositive and non-dispositive motions. Traylor Bros. v. San Diego Unif. Port Dist., No. 08-

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1019, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53827, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 2009). It is clear, nevertheless,

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that dispositive matters include at least those that resolve the merits of an underlying dispute.

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See, e.g., Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (motions for summary judgment are dispositive); Foltz,

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331 F.3d at 1135–36 (summary judgment is dispositive because it “adjudicates substantive rights

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and serves as a substitute for trial”). Non-dispositive matters do not resolve the case, or are only

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“tangentially related” to it. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179; see also Digital Reg of Texas, LLC

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v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 12-1971, 2015 WL 604055, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2015) (petitions for

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attorneys’ fees are not dispositive); Traylor Bros., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53827, at *3–5 (a

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motion to disqualify is not dispositive). The finding of competency or incompetency and the

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appointment of a guardian ad litem are matters only tangentially related to the merits of this

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action, which concerns at its heart the distribution of the interpleaded funds. The correct standard

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here is therefore the “good cause” standard.

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Although the good cause standard is less exacting than the compelling reasons

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standard, see Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180, the party seeking to seal or redact a record must show

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what “specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted,” Foltz, 331 F.3d at

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1130. Broad and unsupported allegations fall short. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co.,

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966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992); accord Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir.

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2014) (the need “to avoid embarrassment or annoyance” does not suffice under this standard).

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Here, the Yeagers have not described what specific prejudice or harm will result

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should the assignment of rights be publicly available, but have made only general statements of

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possible harm. They do not explain how the assignment would be misused or how its disclosure

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would cause them any specific harm, financial or otherwise. A trespassing stalker, particularly

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one dissuaded only by threat of deadly force, is a cause for concern, but the court cannot conclude

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that should this person have access to the assignment of rights, the Yeagers or their finances

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would face any greater danger. The document reveals no financial details or account balances,

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for example. Its language discloses little more than what the Yeagers have divulged in previous

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public filings. Although the public has a diminished interest in the details of General Yeager’s

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competency and the appointment of a guardian ad litem, it has an interest nonetheless. See Pintos

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v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting a “weaker public interest”). If

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the Yeagers wish the court to address their position that any guardian ad litem the court appoints

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could not have full authority to prosecute or settle General Yeager’s case, in light of the terms of

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their assignment agreement, the assignment must be made a part of the public record.

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III.

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CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the motion is DENIED. Within seven days of the filing

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of this order, the Yeagers may elect to (1) file the assignment on the docket or (2) withdraw

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reliance on that document. See Mitchell v. Cate, No. 11-1240, 2014 WL 1671589, at *5 (E.D.

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Cal. Apr. 28, 2014). Should the Yeagers elect to withdraw reliance, the hard copy filed at the

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evidentiary hearing will be returned to the Yeagers. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 141(e)(1).

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This order resolves ECF No. 219.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: September 24, 2015.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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