Estate of Mark Anthony Scott et al v. County of Sacramento et al

Filing 66

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 11/13/2014 GRANTING defendant Caryl Skerritt's 46 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Marciel, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Estate of MARK ANTHONY SCOTT,
deceased, by and through MARY
SCOTT, TINA SCOTT, REGINA
ALLEN, and KIM NZIBO as
Successors in Interest; MARY
SCOTT, Individually; TINA
SCOTT, Individually; REGINA
ALLEN, Individually; and KIM
NZIBO, Individually,

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No. 2-13-cv-00024-GEB-KJN

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
SKERRITT’S PARTIAL MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO;
Sacramento County Sheriff‟s
Department Sheriff SCOTT
JONES; Sacramento County Main
Jail Commander Captain
ROSEANNE RICHAEL; Sacramento
County Sheriff‟s Department
Chief of Correctional and
Court Services JAMIE LEWIS;
Sacramento County Main Jail
Chief of Correctional Health
Services AARON BREWER;
Sacramento County Jail
Systems Medical Director
ROBERT PADILLA, MD;
Sacramento County Main Jail
Director of Nursing with
Correctional Health Services
PAM HARRIS; Sacramento County
Main Jail Watch Commander,
Lieutenant GEORGE McKEEL
(#11); Sacramento County
Sheriff‟s Department JAMES
TIDWELL (#897); Sacramento
County Sheriff‟s Department
Deputy DAVID PANTOJA (#2615);
Sacramento County Sheriff‟s
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Department Deputy KEN BECKER
(#931); Sacramento County
Sheriff‟s Department Deputy
MICHAEL MATRANGA (#572);
Sacramento County Sheriff‟s
Department Sergeant MICHAEL
XIONG (#71); Sacramento
County Sheriff‟s Department
Sergeant SCOTT HUFFORD (#41);
CARYL SKERRITT, RN, and DOES
1 through 40, inclusive,

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Defendants.

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Defendant

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Caryl

judgment

Skerritt
two

summary

11

against

her

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specifically,

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Skerritt was deliberately indifferent to decedent Mark Scott‟s

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serious medical need, and the portion of claim five in which

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Plaintiffs

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Government Code Section

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action to summon medical care for Mark Scott.

federal

allege

First

claim

that

one

Skerritt

the

three

Amended
in

is

claims

for

partial

Plaintiffs

of

moves

10

in

on

(“Skerritt”)

Complaint

which

alleged
(“FAC”);

Plaintiff

liable

under

alleges

California

845.6 for her failure to take reasonable

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Plaintiffs allege in the FAC that “[t]his action stems

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Mark Scott‟s death at the Sacramental County Main Jail on January

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6, 2012.” (FAC ¶ 3, ECF No. 6.)
I.

21
A

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of

party

LEGAL STANDARD

seeking

demonstrating

summary

material

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(1986).

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substantive

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Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat‟l Trust & Sav. Ass‟n, 322 F.3d

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1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

“A

fact
law,

is
it

v.

„material‟
could

affect

2

a

Catrett,
when,
the

genuine

initial

24

Corp.

of

the

burden

Celotex

absence

bears

23

fact.

the

judgment

477

under
outcome

issue

of

U.S.

317,

323

the

governing

of

the

case.”

1

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

2

If

a

movant

satisfies

its

“initial

burden,”

“the

3

nonmoving party must set forth . . . „specific facts showing that

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there is a genuine issue for trial.‟” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

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Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass‟n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)

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(quoting

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cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by

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citing to particular . . . material in the record . . . or

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showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

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presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot

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produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Rule 56(c)(1).

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Summary

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favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences

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must be drawn in favor of that party.” Sec. & Exch. Comm‟n v.

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Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v.

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Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir.

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2001)).

former

judgment

Rule

56(e)).

“evidence

“A

must

party

be

asserting

viewed

in

that

the

a

light

18

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Any party opposing a motion for summary
judgment
or
summary
adjudication
[must]
reproduce the itemized facts in the [moving
party‟s] Statement of Undisputed Facts and
admit those facts that are undisputed and
deny those that are disputed, including with
each denial a citation to the particular...
document relied upon in support of that
denial.

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If

most

Further, Local Rule 260(b) prescribes:

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fact

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the

nonmovant

does

not

“specifically

.

.

.

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[controvert duly supported] facts identified in the [movant‟s]

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statement of undisputed facts,” the nonmovant “is deemed to have

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admitted the validity of the facts contained in the [movant‟s]

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statement.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 527 (2006). A district
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court has “no independent duty „to scour the record in search of

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a genuine issue of triable fact.‟” Simmons

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Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Keenan v.

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Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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II.

v.

Navajo

Cnty.,

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

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The following facts are either uncontroverted in the

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summary judgment record under Local Rule 260(b), or considered

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uncontroverted since they are undisputed.

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Skerritt

was

working

as

a

registered

nurse

at

the

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Sacramento County Main Jail on January 6, 2012, the date on which

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Mark Scott died. (Pls.‟ Resp. & Opp‟n Skerrit‟s SUF (“SUF”) ¶ 13,

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ECF No. 51.) While on duty that day, she received a call from a

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Sacramento County Sheriff‟s Department Deputy who “told Skerritt

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that Scott complained that he was sick and vomiting.” (SUF ¶ 31.)

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After accessing Scott‟s electronic medical records, Skerrit told

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the deputy that Scott “probably should fill out a kite so he

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could see a nurse at some point.” (Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.) “Skerritt

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understood that the kite would be picked up in ordinary course

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that

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placement on nurse‟s sick call.” (Id. ¶ 24.)

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did not see anything in the chart that indicated to her that an

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episode of vomiting was a sign of an emergent or urgent issue,

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she advised the deputy to also tell the inmate to drink water to

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replenish his fluids lost.” (Id. ¶ 25.)

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day

and

would

“Scott

was

be

reviewed

sick

and

by

a

vomiting

registered

nurse

for

“Since. . .Skerritt

blood

.

.

.”

Pls.‟

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Separate Stat. Disputed Facts) ¶ 20, ECF No. 53.) The deputy did

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not tell Skerritt that Scott‟s vomitus contained blood. (SUF ¶

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37.)
4

1

No

one

condition

at

the

during

jail

After

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home to inform Skerritt that Scott had passed away. (Id. ¶ 30.)

Deliberate

¶

31.)

Skerritt‟s shift ended, a co-worker contacted her at Skerritt‟s

A.

(Id.

about

3

6

shift.

again

Scott‟s

III.

work

Skerritt

2

5

her

contacted

DISCUSSION

Indifference

to

Serious

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Skerritt

Needs

in

Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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Medical

seeks

summary

judgment

on

Plaintiffs‟

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deliberate indifference claim, arguing that no reasonable jury

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could find she had knowledge Scott was suffering from a “serious

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medical need,” since “an episode of vomiting, standing alone,

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does

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assessment.” (Mot. & Mem. P&A ISO Def.‟s Mot. Partial Summ. J.

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(“Mot.”) 5:7-10, ECF No. 46-1.)

not

call

for

nor

require

emergent

care

or

urgent

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Plaintiffs counter it is disputed whether Skerritt was

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“deliberately indifferent [to Scott‟s medical needs, since she

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did] not . . . obtain information from . . . Scott [before]

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choosing not to see him,” notwithstanding

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[Scott‟s] vomit” and the blood was “an indicator of a serious

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emergent medical need . . . .” (Pls.‟ Mem. P&A Opp‟n Def. Mot.

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Partial Summ. J. (“Opp‟n”) 7:2-7, ECF No. 49.)

that “[b]lood [was] in

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The elements of the deliberate indifference claim at

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issue require Plaintiffs to prove that Scott had a (1) serious

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medical need and (2) that Skerritt‟s response to that need was

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deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

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(9th Cir. 2006). A medical need is “serious” when “failure to

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treat it will result in „significant injury or the unnecessary

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and wanton infliction of pain.‟” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d
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1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014.)

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To

act

with

deliberate

indifference,

“the

[medical

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provider] must both be aware of facts from which the inference

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could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

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and... draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835

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(1994). Deliberate indifference “requires more than ordinary lack

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of due care for [a] prisoner‟s interest[] and safety.” Id. “A

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prison [medical provider] is deliberately indifferent . . . [to

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an inmate‟s serious medical condition] only if the [provider]

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knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and

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safety.‟”

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Toguchi v. Chang, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)).

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Colwell

Here,

v.

the

Bannister,

763

uncontroverted

F.3d

facts

1060,

do

1066

not

(quoting

show

that

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Skerritt was aware of the serious medical condition Scott had,

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and therefore, she “did not provide constitutionally deficient

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treatment by failing to address a [condition] of which she was

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not aware.” Rouster v. Cnty. of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 449 (6th

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Cir. 2014)(stating even if the “best medical practices” were not

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followed,

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indifference if [the medical provider] did not know that [the

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inmate‟s] stomach [problem] was caused by a serious ailment.”).

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this

“is

Therefore,

not

necessarily

Skerritt‟s

evidence

summary

of

judgment

deliberate

motion

on

Plaintiffs‟ deliberate indifference claim is granted.
B.

Failure to Summon Medical Care
Skerritt

also

seeks

summary

judgment

on

Plaintiffs‟

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claim that she is liable for her failure to summon medical care

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for Scott, arguing the record is devoid of evidence from which a

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reasonable inference could be drawn that she knew or had reason
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to know Scott suffered from an “obvious and serious” medical

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condition. (Mot. 6:20-26.)

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Under

California

Government

Code

Section

845.6,

“a

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public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the

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failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a

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prisoner in h[er] custody . . . if the employee knows or has

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reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical

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care and [s]he fails to take reasonable action to summon such

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medical

care.”

“Liability

under

section

845.6

is

limited

to

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serious and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care.”

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Watson v. State, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836, 841 (1993).

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Plaintiffs counter the summary judgment motion arguing

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that Skerritt “knew that blood in vomit . . . is frequently an

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indicator of a serious emergent medical need.” (Opp‟n 15:11-18.)

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Whether or not Skerritt knows that blood in vomit could be an

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indicator of a serious and obvious medical condition is not the

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issue.

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knowledge

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Skerritt is entitled to summary judgment.

The

uncontroverted
Scott

was

vomiting

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IV.

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facts

demonstrate

blood.

(SUF

¶

Skerritt
37.)

had

no

Therefore,

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Skerritt‟s motion for

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partial summary judgment in GRANTED.

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Dated:

November 13, 2014

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