Lally v. Rabobank, N.A.

Filing 43

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 11/12/2014 GRANTING 31 Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action and REAFFIRMS its prior decision granting summary judgment for Defendant on all of the other causes of action in Plaintiff's Complaint; DENYING Plaintiff's 38 Motion to Strike. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JASBIR LALLY,

No.

2:13-cv-00130 JAM-CKD

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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RABOBANK, N.A., Does 1-10,
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
STRIKE

Defendants.
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The Court has received, read and considered the parties’
supplemental briefings on Defendant Rabobank’s (“Defendant”)
motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Jasbir Lally’s
(“Plaintiff”) third and fourth causes of action for failure to
take steps to accommodate her disability in the workplace. For
the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is granted.
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lally worked for Defendant Rabobank for over five
years without incident.

See Lally Decl. ¶ 2.

As an

“Administrative Vice President,” Plaintiff supported the CEO in
administrative tasks and supervised other administrative

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assistants.

Lally Depo. at 21:9-18.

Things changed when Plaintiff came under the direction of a

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new CEO, John Ryan, in October 2012.

See Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 2-3;

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Lally Depo. at 22:22-23:1.

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suffering from symptoms of stress, sleeplessness, and anxiety.

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Lally Depo. at 42:14-19 & 45:10-19.

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medical professional, who diagnosed her with an anxiety disorder.

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Lally Depo. at 32:9-13.

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medication, took several sick days, and embarked on a three-week

Around that time, she started

Plaintiff sought help from a

Thereafter, Plaintiff began taking

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vacation concluding January 8, 2013.

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119:12-13, 123:5-9, 127:4-128:4 & 134:1-4.

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Lally Depo. at 74:1-3,

While on vacation, Plaintiff took action in hopes of

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bettering her work situation.

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claim against Defendant, citing her “Mental Stress.”

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Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6; id. Exh. B.

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Defendant the first of numerous “Work Status/Progress Reports”

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detailing Plaintiff’s health limitations and activities she could

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and could not engage in.

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E, G & I.

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on the basis of “[a] serious health condition” that was “[w]ork

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[r]elated.”

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leave to begin on January 14 and did not specify a “return to

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work date.”

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date to be determined.”

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She filed a workers’ compensation
Stangeland

She had her medical provider send

Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6; id. Exhs.

Finally, she filed a “Leave of Absence Request Form”

Stangeland Suppl. Decl. Exh. C.

See id.

She requested her

Defendant granted this leave through “a
See Stangeland Suppl. Decl. Exh. D.

After her vacation, Plaintiff returned to work for a single

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day on January 10.

Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13; id. Exh. A.

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Thereafter she remained on leave until Defendant terminated her

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in early February for exporting confidential documents to her
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personal email.

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Decl. ¶ 5.

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Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 9; id. Exh. A; Weiss

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action on January 22,

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2013 (Doc. #1) alleging nine causes of action: (1) Termination

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(or demotion) in violation of public policy; (2) Disability

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discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing

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Act (“FEHA”); (3) Failure to engage in the interactive process

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towards a reasonable accommodation under FEHA; (4) Failure to

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provide reasonable accommodation under FEHA; (5) Disability

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harassment under FEHA; (6) Unlawful retaliation under FEHA;

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(7) Intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) National

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origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

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1964 (“Title VII”); and (9) Color discrimination under Title VII.

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Defendant lodged a counterclaim (Doc. #6) seeking damages for

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Plaintiff’s alleged transmission of confidential bank information

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and injunctive relief to prohibit her use of these documents.

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See Weiss Decl. ¶ 9.

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Defendant brought this motion for summary judgment as to

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each of Plaintiff’s causes of action (Doc. #31).

The Court heard

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oral argument on October 15, 2014 (Doc. #36).

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granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to all of

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Plaintiff’s claims, except the third and fourth causes of action.

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The Court also ordered further briefing and factual development

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on the third and fourth claims.

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(Doc. ##37, 39 & 40) and Defendant filed a supplemental statement

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of material facts (Doc. #37).

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Defendant’s supplemental statement or to provide any further

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factual development.

At that time, it

Both parties submitted briefing

Plaintiff failed to respond to

Instead, she filed an “ex parte motion to
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strike all of the defense supplemental briefing beyond the

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initial ten pages” (Doc. #38).

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II.

OPINION

A. “Ex Parte motion to strike”
As an initial matter, the Court declines Plaintiff’s

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request that it disregard portions of Defendant’s briefing.

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That briefing complied with this Court’s order and with the

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local rules.

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At oral argument, the Court ordered the parties to provide

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supplemental briefing up to ten pages and further factual

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development.

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ten-page brief, as well as other documents comprising the

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factual basis for that briefing: a “statement of undisputed

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material facts” and the declarations and exhibits supporting

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those facts.

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to comply with the Court’s order to engage in further factual

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development.

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rules.

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Defendant complied with this order by filing a

These additional documents were required in order

They were also required to comply with the local

See Local Rule 260.

Because Defendant has complied with the Court’s order and

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the local rules, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s “ex parte” motion

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to strike.

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submitted in Defendant’s supplement briefing.

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The Court has therefore considered all documents

B. Motion for summary judgment on third and fourth causes
of action.

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The parties’ arguments in their supplemental briefing

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concerned Plaintiff’s third and fourth claims — failure to

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engage in the interactive process and failure to accommodate. 1

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The analyses for these issues are interrelated, so the Court

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considers both below.

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The parties first dispute when Defendant was on notice of

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Plaintiff’s disability.

Defendant argued in the first round of

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briefing that “Plaintiff never communicated her need for

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accommodation” and “never provided Rabobank with any written

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document from her health care provider . . . .”

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18:3; Stangeland Decl. ¶ 9.

Mot. at 17:28-

Upon further factual development,

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Defendant concedes that it did become aware of Plaintiff’s

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anxiety disorder when she filed a worker’s compensation claim on

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January 2, 2013.

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further concedes that throughout the month of January, it

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received communications from Plaintiff and her medical provider

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about her need to alleviate stress, as well as multiple “Work

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Status/Progress Reports” detailing activities that Plaintiff

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could and could not engage in.

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Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 6-12.

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Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6.

Defendant

Suppl. Brief. at 5; Stangeland

Plaintiff meanwhile persists in arguing that Defendant was

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on notice of her disability since October 2012.

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to Suppl. Brief. at 2 & 3.

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the Court’s previous ruling.

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issue of notice in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

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disability discrimination claim.

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the Court found that Plaintiff failed to establish a triable

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issue of whether Defendant was on notice before January 2013.

Opp. at 5; Opp.

But this argument is foreclosed by
The Court already addressed the

For the reasons then stated,

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These issues were determined to be suitable for decision
without further oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).
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This lack of notice forecloses Defendant’s liability as a

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matter of law.

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accommodate or engage in the interactive process under FEHA if

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the employer was on notice of the disability or the need to

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accommodate.

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(9th Cir. 2001).

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favor is warranted to the extent Plaintiff alleges that

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Defendant failed to accommodate her or engage in an interactive

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process between October and January 2.

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An employer can only be liable for failure to

Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188
Therefore, summary judgment in Defendant’s

Even after January 2, Plaintiff has not shown a genuine

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factual dispute.

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meet its FEHA obligations because it “unilaterally concluded it

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could not accommodate Ms. Lally and sent her away.”

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Suppl. Brief. at 6:11-12.

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support Plaintiff’s version of events.

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only at work for a single day between January 2 and her

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termination on February 8.

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absence was not that Defendant “sent her away.”

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Plaintiff herself requested to be absent.

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her vacation until January 8.

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single day on January 10, she was granted leave after filing her

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“Leave of Absence Request Form.”

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was only because she so requested.

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the Court to any facts or produced any further evidence to the

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contrary.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to

Opp. to

But the undisputed evidence does not
Indeed, Plaintiff was

Yet the reason for Plaintiff’s
Rather,

First, she scheduled

Then, after coming to work for a

If Plaintiff was sent away, it
Plaintiff has not pointed

Defendant next argues that granting this leave of absence
fulfilled its obligations under FEHA.

The Court agrees.

Under FEHA, an employer must “engage in a timely, good
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faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine

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effective reasonable accommodations . . . .”

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§ 12940(n).

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employer in fact provided a reasonable accommodation as defined

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by section 12490(m).

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2013 WL 6907153, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2013); Tannlund-McCoy

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v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway & Transp. Dist., 2003 WL

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21838378, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003).

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circumstances, a leave of absence can constitute a reasonable

Cal. Gov’t Code

An employer fulfills these requirements if the

See Violan v. On Lok Senior Health Servs.,

Under some

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accommodation.

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Lucent, 642 F.3d 728, 744 (9th Cir. 2011); Tannlund-McCoy, 2003

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WL 21838378, at *7; Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal.App.4th

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215, 226 (1999).

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suffered from anxiety resulting in a “temporary, total inability

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to drive a bus.”

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leaves of absence, after which she was able to fully resume her

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job responsibilities.

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[two] leave[s] of absence [] granted w[ere] . . . [sufficient]

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reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.”

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See, e.g., Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing v.

For instance, in Tannlund-McCoy, a bus driver

Id. at *1, *7.

Her employer granted her two

Id. at *7.

The court held that “the

Id.

Here, Defendant is correct that the leave of absence

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constituted sufficient accommodation.

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Defendant granted a leave of absence for the purpose of

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alleviating Plaintiff’s “serious health condition.”

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possible that this leave would not have fully enabled Plaintiff

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to return to work and resume her responsibilities.

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case, FEHA may have required Defendant to engage in further

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consultation and interactive process with Plaintiff.

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Hanson, 74 Cal.App.4th at 226.
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As in Tannlund-McCoy,

It is

And in that

See

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But such a possibility is merely speculation that cannot

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hold off summary judgment.

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698 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere speculation cannot

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raise an issue of fact.”).

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because shortly after Plaintiff began her leave of absence, her

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employment ended for unrelated reasons.

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circumstances presented by the undisputed facts, the Court holds

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that this accommodation was adequate as a matter of law.

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did not compel Defendant to engage in any further process.

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See Emeldi v. University of Oregon,

This possibility was not borne out

Therefore, under the

FEHA

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for

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Defendant on the third cause of action for failure to engage in

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the interactive process and the fourth cause of action for

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failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.

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motion on these grounds, the Court need not reach the parties’

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remaining arguments, including whether the restrictions in the

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Work Status/Progress Reports left Plaintiff unable to perform

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any duties and whether assigning her to a new supervisor was

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requested or required.

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III.

Resolving the

ORDER

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as

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to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action and reaffirms

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its prior decision granting summary judgment for Defendant on all

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of the other causes of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 12, 2014

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