Robles v. Comtrak Logistics, Inc.

Filing 54

ORDER denying 25 Motion to Dismiss signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 12/18/14. (Kaminski, H)

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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 SALVADOR ROBLES, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, 10 Plaintiffs, 11 12 13 No. 2:13-cv-00161-JAM-AC ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS v. COMTRAK LOGISTICS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 14 Defendants. 15 Defendant Comtrak Logistics, Inc. (“Defendant”) moves to 16 17 dismiss (Doc. #25) the first amended complaint (“the FAC”) (Doc. 18 #24). 19 violations of the California Labor Code (“Labor Code”) and the 20 California Department of Industrial Relations’ Industrial Welfare 21 Commission’s Industry and Occupation Orders for the 22 Transportation Industry (“IWC Wage Orders”), Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23 8, § 11090 (2001). 24 preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization 25 Act of 1994 (“FAAA Act” or “FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). 26 For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is DENIED. 27 28 The FAC states twenty-three causes of action for I. Defendant contends each cause of action is FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Defendant is a major provider of full dray truckload 1 1 transportation services across the country. 2 Salvador Robles (“Plaintiff”) is a former driver for Defendant 3 who was initially classified as an independent contractor and 4 later hired as an employee driver by Defendant. 5 FAC ¶ 5. Plaintiff Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff alleges Defendant retained and exercised 6 significant and pervasive control over all of its drivers, 7 thereby making those drivers Defendant’s employees under 8 California law. 9 misclassified these drivers as independent contractors in order FAC ¶ 6. Plaintiff claims Defendant has 10 “to avoid various duties and obligations owed to employees” under 11 the Labor Code and the IWC Wage Orders. 12 FAC ¶ 1. The FAC states the first twelve causes of action (“IC 13 Claims”) as a class action on behalf of Plaintiff and a class of 14 drivers who (a) signed an independent contractor and/or equipment 15 lease contract with Defendant; (b) were assigned to an operating 16 terminal in California; and (c) were residents of California 17 (“the Class”). 18 (1) declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that Defendant 19 unlawfully misclassified members of the Class as independent 20 contractors; (2) reimbursement of business expenses based on 21 violations of Labor Code § 2802 and IWC Wage Order #9, §§ 8-9; 22 (3) & (4) failure to pay minimum wage pursuant to California law 23 for actual miles driven and certain other hours worked, including 24 but not limited to during “waiting time,” inspections, and 25 fueling; (5) & (6) failure to pay wages in accordance with the 26 designated wage scale in violation of Labor Code §§ 221, 223; 27 (7) quantum meruit/unjust enrichment; (8) failure to provide or 28 pay wages required for meal periods; (9) failure to provide paid The claims brought on behalf of the Class are: 2 1 rest periods; (10) failure to timely provide itemized wage 2 statements; (11) failure to timely pay compensation due and owing 3 upon discharge; (12) violations of California’s Unfair 4 Competition Law, Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. 5 (“UCL”). 6 an employee; therefore, each of these causes of action relies on 7 the premise that Defendant improperly classified the drivers as 8 independent contractors when legally they should have been 9 treated as employees under California law. 10 These claims involve obligations owed by an employer to In addition, the FAC restates the same claims found in the 11 second through twelfth causes of action on behalf of Plaintiff 12 individually for labor and wage violations during his time 13 working for Defendant in which he was classified as an employee. 14 These eleven claims, the thirteenth through twenty-third causes 15 of action (“EE Claims”), allege that although Plaintiff was 16 properly classified as an employee by Defendant during the 17 relevant time period, Defendant still failed to abide by the 18 applicable provisions of the Labor Code and the IWC Wage Orders. 19 After the instant motion and responsive briefings were 20 filed, the Court exercised its discretion to stay the action 21 (Doc. #36) on August 5, 2013, pending resolution of appeals in 22 two federal district court cases in California regarding 23 preemption of California law by the FAAA Act. 24 Circuit’s resolution of the appeals, the Court lifted the stay 25 (Doc. #39) on July 25, 2014. 26 supplemental briefing (Doc. #41); the Court granted the motion 27 (Doc. #42) on July 30, 2014, further allowing Plaintiff to file a 28 responsive brief. Upon the Ninth Defendant requested leave to file Supplemental briefing was submitted by 3 1 Defendant (Doc. #43) on August 20, 2014, and by Plaintiff (Doc. 2 #50) on September 3, 2014. 3 notices of recent decisions (Doc. #26, 34, 51-53) they believe 4 are relevant to the Court’s resolution of the current motion, 5 most recently on October 29, 2014. 6 Both parties have filed multiple II. OPINION 7 A. 8 Plaintiff requests the Court take notice (Doc. #30) of three 9 documents, attached as Exhibits “A”, “B” and “C” (Doc. #29-2, 29- 10 Request for Judicial Notice 3, 29-4) to the Declaration of Christina Humphrey (Doc. #29-1). 11 Generally, the Court may not consider material beyond the 12 pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 13 claim. 14 the complaint so long as authenticity is not disputed, or matters 15 of public record, provided that they are not subject to 16 reasonable dispute. 17 2241664 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (citing Lee v. City of 18 Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) and Fed. R. Evid. 19 201). 20 The exceptions are material attached to, or relied on by, E.g., Sherman v. Stryker Corp., 2009 WL Exhibit A is a copy of the House of Representatives 21 Conference Report 103-677, discussing the intended application of 22 the FAAA Act. 23 Statement on Signing the FAAA Act. 24 take notice of the legislative history of relevant statutes, 25 Plaintiff’s request is GRANTED as to these two documents. 26 v. McCormick & Schmick Rest. Corp., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155 27 (C.D. Cal. 2006) 28 Exhibit B is a copy of President Clinton’s As the Court may properly Louis Exhibit C is a Department of Transportation notice in which 4 1 the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) rejects 2 a petition for preemption. 3 California meal and rest break laws should be preempted as 4 improper regulations “on commercial motor vehicle safety.” 5 Court does not find the decision of the FMCSA to be relevant to 6 the issue presently before it. 7 therefore DENIED as to this document. The document discusses whether The Plaintiff’s request for notice is 8 B. Discussion 9 Defendant has moved the Court to dismiss the entire FAC. It 10 correctly points out that the IC Claims rely on the allegation 11 that Defendant improperly classified Plaintiff and the Class as 12 independent contractors. 13 is an “attempt by Plaintiff to dictate the terms of [Defendant’s] 14 contractual relationships” with its drivers, and is thus 15 preempted by the FAAA Act. 16 Claims are an attempt by Plaintiff to force Defendant to “alter 17 its compensation system for company drivers and provide these 18 drivers with meal and rest breaks.” 19 actions are expressly preempted by the FAAA Act. 20 argues the Court should therefore dismiss the entire FAC with 21 prejudice. 22 23 1. MTD at pp. 2-3. Defendant argues this In addition, Defendant argues the EE Defendant contends these Defendant Legal Standard Federal law may preempt state law under the supremacy clause 24 either by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict 25 between federal and state law. 26 Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (citations omitted). 27 The motion before the Court is based on a claim of explicit 28 preemption. MTD at p. 6. N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross v. When addressing preemption claims, 5 1 “the question whether a certain state action is preempted by 2 federal law is one of congressional intent. 3 Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” 4 McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137–38 (1990). 5 said to bar state action in fields of traditional state 6 regulation,” it is assumed that “the historic police powers of 7 the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 8 that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” 9 Cross, 514 U.S. at 655 (citations omitted). The purpose of Ingersoll–Rand Co. v. “[W]here federal law is Blue The Court must look 10 to the history and context of the FAAA Act, in addition to the 11 statutory language used, in order to determine the intended scope 12 of its preemption clause. 13 14 2. History of Deregulation In 1978, Congress sought to deregulate the airline industry 15 by enacting the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”), now 16 codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713. 17 States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of 18 their own,’ that Act ‘included a pre-emption provision’ that said 19 ‘no State . . . shall enact or enforce any law . . . relating to 20 rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.’” 21 Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 368 (2008) (“Rowe”) 22 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 23 (1992)). 24 “In order to ‘ensure that the Rowe v. New In 1980, Congress sought to similarly deregulate the 25 trucking industry by enacting the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. As 26 initially drafted however, the statute did not contain a 27 preemption provision. 28 jurisdictions regulate[d], in varying degrees, intrastate prices, By 1994, Congress noted that “41 6 1 routes and services of motor carriers.” 2 at 86 (1994) (Humphrey Decl., Exh. A). 3 ten jurisdictions it found did not so regulate: Alaska, Arizona, 4 Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Maine, Maryland, New 5 Jersey, Vermont and Wisconsin. 6 typical forms of regulation as “entry controls, tariff filing and 7 price regulation, and types of commodities carried.” 8 9 Id. H.R. Conf. Rep. 103–677 The report identified the The report identified the Id. In response to this growing trend in the trucking industry, Congress passed the FAAA Act, which created a preemption 10 provision for the Motor Carrier Act nearly identical to that of 11 the ADA. 12 state “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other 13 provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, 14 route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the 15 transportation of property.” 16 Rowe, 552 U.S. at 368. The FAAA Act provides that a 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Due to the similarity in the language of the preemption 17 provisions, courts have relied on ADA case law in deciding 18 preemption cases under the Motor Carrier Act. See Rowe, 552 U.S. 19 at 370 (“[W]e follow Morales in interpreting similar language in 20 the 1994 Act before us here.”). 21 recent opinions involving the FAAA Act, the Supreme Court found 22 that Congress’ addition of the phrase “with respect to the 23 transportation of property” to the ADA’s preemption clause 24 language “massively limits the scope of preemption ordered by the 25 FAAAA.” 26 1778 (2013) (“Dan's City”). 27 it is not sufficient that a state law relates to the ‘price, 28 route, or service’ of a motor carrier in any capacity; the law However, in one of its most Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, “[F]or purposes of FAAAA preemption, 7 1 must also concern a motor carrier's ‘transportation of 2 property.’” 3 affects the price, route, or service of a motor carrier can be 4 preempted, the FAAAA “does not preempt state laws affecting 5 carrier prices, routes, and services ‘in only a “tenuous, remote, 6 or peripheral . . . manner.”’” 7 371). 8 9 3. Id. at 1778–79. Although a law that only indirectly Id. (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at IC Claims Defendant contends the IC Claims are an “attempt by 10 Plaintiff to dictate the terms of [Defendant’s] contractual 11 relationships with its owner-operators” and are thus “preempted 12 by the FAAA Act.” 13 In support of this contention, Defendant relies heavily on 14 American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 15 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (“ATA I”) and American Trucking 16 Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 660 F.3d 384 (9th Cir. 17 2011) (“ATA II”), as amended (Oct. 31, 2011) (rev'd in part sub 18 nom. Am. Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 133 19 S. Ct. 2096 (2013)). 20 However, as Plaintiff points out, these cases are inapposite. 21 the ATA action, the defendant trucking association challenged 22 concession agreements that the Port of Los Angeles was requiring 23 motor carriers to enter into in order to access the port. 24 II, at 390. 25 I and ATA II required the motor carriers to “cease using 26 independent owner-operators.” 27 Claims involve the illegal misclassification of an employee 28 driver as an independent contractor pursuant to California law. MTD at pp. 6, 8, 12-14, 16, 19, 22-24. In ATA The provision Defendant seeks to analogize to in ATA Id. at 407. 8 Here, Plaintiff’s IC 1 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant’s arguments 2 relying on these cases are misplaced. 3 require Defendant to use only employee drivers rather than 4 independently contracted drivers as attempted in the ATA action. 5 Rather, it seeks to hold Defendant accountable for its obligation 6 to properly classify its drivers. 7 issue presently before the Court is whether the California laws 8 governing the classification of workers as either employees or 9 independent contractors is enforceable as to Defendant’s business The FAC does not seek to The Court finds the primary 10 here in California, or whether it is preempted by the FAAA Act. 11 Defendant also spends a portion of its motion arguing that 12 the decision in Californians For Safe & Competitive Dump Truck 13 Transportation v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998) 14 is inapposite. 15 found the FAAA Act does not preempt California’s prevailing wage 16 law. 17 related to and increased the defendant trucking company’s prices, 18 the effect was only indirect and tenuous, and therefore did not 19 fall within the FAAA Act’s preemptive range. 20 argues “the reasoning of Mendonca was largely invalidated” by the 21 United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370. 22 However, earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit specifically held 23 that Rowe did not “call into question [the Ninth Circuit’s] past 24 FAAAA cases, such as Mendonca.” 25 769 F.3d 637, 642-45 (9th Cir. 2014). 26 Rowe “simply reminds us that, whether the effect is direct or 27 indirect, ‘the state laws whose effect is forbidden under federal 28 law are those with significant impact on carrier rates, routes, Id. MTD at pp. 21-24. In Mendonca, the Ninth Circuit It found that although the wage law was, in a sense, Id. Defendant Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 9 It went on to state that 1 or services.’” 2 original). 3 Id. (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375) (emphasis in Defendant further argues Mendonca is inapplicable because 4 the law implicated there only affected the economic cost for 5 motor carriers to do business in California. 6 Defendant argues the outcome under state law that Plaintiff seeks 7 here would “require” it to use only employee drivers, “the very 8 type of conduct-regulating state action that the FAAA Act 9 forbids.” Id. MTD at pp. 22-23. Again, Defendant misstates the FAC, as it does 10 not seek to require Defendant to employ a certain business model. 11 Instead, it simply seeks to hold Defendant accountable for 12 following generally applicable labor laws in California. 13 The reasoning in Mendonca and Dan’s City was recently 14 considered by the California Supreme Court in People ex rel. 15 Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 772, 784-86 16 (2014), a case the Court finds most analogous to the current 17 action. 18 against a trucking company and its owner for misclassifying 19 drivers as independent contractors and for other alleged 20 violations of California’s labor laws. 21 government’s claim was based on violations of the Labor Code and 22 IWC Wage Orders nearly identical to those alleged by Plaintiff 23 here. 24 government’s claims. 25 in the current motion, the defendants in Harris argued the claim 26 would “significantly affect motor carrier prices, routes, and 27 services because its application [would] prevent their using 28 independent contractors, potentially affecting their prices and In Harris, the State of California brought a UCL action Id. at 775-76. The The defendants contended the FAAA Act preempted the Id. at 784-86. 10 Just as Defendant has done 1 services.” 2 because defendants sought to evade their legal responsibilities 3 and to “compete unfairly, by misclassifying their truck drivers 4 as independent contractors.” 5 Id. The government argued the claim was brought Id. The Harris court reasoned that the holding in Dan’s City 6 “strongly supports a finding that California labor and insurance 7 laws and regulations of general applicability are not preempted” 8 under the FAAA Act. 9 the government’s claims make no reference to motor carriers or Id. at 784-86. It found the laws underlying 10 the transportation of property, rather the laws “regulated 11 employer practices in all fields and simply require motor 12 carriers to comply with the labor laws that apply to the 13 classification of their employees.” 14 government’s action to enforce the labor laws of California was 15 not an attempt to restrict the defendants’ use of independent 16 contractors. 17 contending “that if defendants pay individuals to drive their 18 trucks, they must classify these drivers appropriately and comply 19 with generally applicable labor and employment laws.” 20 The Harris court noted: “Mendonca concluded that Id. The court found the Rather, it found the government was simply Id. 21 California's generally applicable prevailing wage laws were not 22 preempted by the FAAAA in part because several states Congress 23 identified as not having laws regulating interstate trucking had 24 prevailing wage laws in place at the time the FAAAA was enacted.” 25 Id. 26 jurisdictions identified in Mendonca had generally applicable 27 laws governing when a worker is an independent contractor (or the 28 equivalent) and when a worker is an employee.” The court then went on to observe that “eight out of the 10 11 Id. (citing 1 Alaska Stat. § 23.20.525; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23–902; Del. Code 2 Ann. tit. 19, § 3302; Fla. Stat. § 440.02; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 3 tit. 26, § 1043; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43.21–19; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 4 21, § 1301; Wis. Stat. §§ 102.07, 108.02.); see also H.R. Conf. 5 Rep. 103-677 at pp. 86-87. 6 “even though the [] action may have some indirect effect on 7 defendants’ prices or services, that effect is too tenuous, 8 remote, [and] peripheral . . . to have pre-emptive effect.” 9 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 10 This led the court to conclude that Id. In its supplemental brief, Defendant argues Harris is 11 inapplicable and wrongly decided. Def. Supp. Brief (Doc. #43) at 12 pp. 9-10. 13 of federal law is not binding, the Court finds the reasoning in 14 Harris persuasive and concurs in its holding that generally 15 applicable laws regarding the classification of employees are not 16 the type of regulation Congress was attempting to target in the 17 passage of the FAAA Act, as they do not seek to regulate the 18 “intrastate prices, routes and services of motor carriers.” 19 H.R. Conf. Rep. 103–677 at 86. Although the California Supreme Court’s interpretation See 20 A similar conclusion was reached in Schwann v. FedEx Ground 21 Package Systems, Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-11094-RGS, 2013 WL 3353776, 22 at *3 (D. Mass. 2013). 23 for the District of Massachusetts found the Massachusetts law 24 identifying the grounds under which a worker can be classified as 25 an independent contractor, “the Independent Contractor Statute,” 26 was not preempted by the FAAA Act. 27 laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Dan’s City, the 28 Schwann court held: “Even if the Independent Contractor Statute There, the United States District Court 12 Id. Applying the reasoning 1 prevents FedEx from implementing its preferred business model of 2 classifying its delivery drivers as independent contractors 3 (there is no reason to believe that it does not), this does not 4 create a sufficient relationship to its prices, routes, or 5 services to trigger preemption.” 6 statute had nothing to do with the transportation of property, 7 rather the statue “simply explains to businesses . . . who 8 operate in [Massachusetts] when a worker must be paid as an 9 employee.” 10 Id. at *4. The court found the Id. at *3. The Court finds the outcomes in both Harris and Schwann 11 appropriately effectuate Congress’ purpose in passing the FAAA 12 Act and avoid the perverse application of the law to circumvent 13 basic labor protections. 14 prevent Defendant from utilizing independent contractors in its 15 business model, but merely to comply with the applicable labor 16 laws of the State of California when compensating and classifying 17 its workers. 18 California’s laws regarding the classification of employees and 19 therefore does not preempt Plaintiff’s IC Claims. 20 Plaintiff’s action does not seek to The Court finds the FAAA Act does not preempt In its supplemental brief, Defendant discusses at length a 21 recent Supreme Court Case, Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. 22 Ct. 1422 (2014). 23 contends the case is “directly on point in this case and compels 24 a finding of FAAA Act preemption.” 25 Plaintiff, Ginsberg has little to no bearing on this case. 26 Plaintiff Supp. Brief (Doc. #50) at pp. 4-5. 27 addressed in Ginsberg were whether the ADA preempts a claim for 28 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing Def. Supp. Brief at pp. 1-6. 13 Defendant However, as pointed out by The issues 1 under Minnesota law. 2 connect the reasoning therein to its contention here that 3 Defendant should not be subjected to California’s generally 4 applicable labor laws. 5 134 S. Ct. at 1426. Defendant strains to Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, supra, explicitly 6 distinguished generally applicable background regulations such as 7 California’s labor laws that are “several steps removed from 8 prices, routes, or services” and those that directly affect the 9 price of services such as the law being applied in Ginsberg. 769 10 F.3d at 646. 11 decisions in other circuits making similar distinctions. 12 (citing S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., 697 13 F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir. 2012) (labor laws not preempted by ADA 14 and FAAA Act because they “operate one or more steps away from 15 the moment at which the firm offers its customer a service for a 16 particular price”) and DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 17 81, 88 (1st Cir. 2011) (differentiating law regulating how an 18 airline charges customers from a law that would regulate “merely 19 how the airline behaves as an employer or proprietor”)). 20 Court finds no merit in Defendant’s position. 21 22 4. In support of this reasoning, the Dilts court cites Id. The Meal and Rest Break Laws Defendant dedicates a significant portion of its motion 23 specifically attacking the application of California's Meal and 24 Rest Break laws to the trucking industry, citing a number of 25 federal district court opinions in California. 26 9-11, 15-21. 27 provisions. 28 MTD at pp. 1-3, The Court therefore addresses these specific As stated above, the Court stayed the action pending the 14 1 resolution of several cases addressing this very issue. 2 discussing the principles underlying FAAA Act preemption, the 3 Ninth Circuit held: 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 After California's meal and rest break laws plainly are not the sorts of laws “related to” prices, routes, or services that Congress intended to preempt. They do not set prices, mandate or prohibit certain routes, or tell motor carriers what services they may or may not provide, either directly or indirectly. They are “broad law[s] applying to hundreds of different industries” with no other “forbidden connection with prices[, routes,] and services.” Air Transp. Ass'n [of America v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco], 266 F.3d [1064,] 1072 [(9th Cir. 2001)]. Dilts, 769 F.3d at 647. In supplemental briefing, Defendant attempts to avoid the 12 effect of this holding by observing that Dilts involved employee 13 drivers and not independent contractors. 14 pp. 1, 6-9. 15 cases entirely unpersuasive, especially in light of the Court’s 16 holding above that California’s laws regarding the classification 17 of employees and independent contractors are not preempted by the 18 FAAA Act. Def. Supp. Brief at The Court finds this attempt to distinguish the 19 Defendant also argues the reasoning in ATA I and ATA II was 20 not considered in the Dilts opinion and should still control the 21 outcome here, where Plaintiff is attempting to mandate how 22 Defendant provides services. 23 the Ninth Circuit repeatedly cited to and relied upon the ATA 24 cases in its opinion. 25 In addition, the Court again rejects Defendant’s assertion that 26 the FAC seeks to mandate the use of employee drivers over 27 independent contractors. 28 First, contrary to this assertion, See Dilts, 769 F.3d at 644, 646-47, 649. Defendant further argues that the defendant in Dilts “did 15 1 not face a ‘patchwork’ of hour and break laws because the 2 employees drove exclusively within California and were not 3 covered by other state laws or federal hours-of-service 4 regulations.” 5 Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit specifically clarified that its 6 finding was that California’s meal and rest break laws are not 7 preempted as generally applied to motor carriers and did not rely 8 on the intrastate nature of the plaintiffs’ work in so holding. 9 Dilts, at 648 n.2. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 As pointed out by The court expressly concluded that: [A]pplying California's meal and rest break laws to motor carriers would not contribute to an impermissible “patchwork” of state-specific laws, defeating Congress' deregulatory objectives. The fact that laws may differ from state to state is not, on its own, cause for FAAAA preemption. In the preemption provision, Congress was concerned only with those state laws that are significantly “related to” prices, routes, or services. A state law governing hours is, for the foregoing reasons, not “related to” prices, routes, or services and therefore does not contribute to “a patchwork of state service-determining laws, rules, and regulations.” Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added). It is instead more analogous to a state wage law, which may differ from the wage law adopted in neighboring states but nevertheless is permissible. Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 1189. Dilts, 769 F.3d at 647-48. 20 21 Def. Supp. Brief at p. 8. 5. EE Claims Defendant contends Plaintiff’s EE Claims are “inextricably 22 intertwined” with the IC Claims, and for the same reasons are 23 likewise preempted. 24 additional support for its attack on the EE Claims outside of 25 that used in its arguments against the IC Claims. 26 has found the IC Claims are not preempted, Defendant’s contention 27 that the EE Claims are preempted for similar reasons is also 28 rejected. MTD at p. 24. Defendant does not cite any As the Court Defendant does briefly characterize these claims as 16 1 impermissible attempts to dictate how Defendant must compensate 2 its drivers and when they must be provided with meal and rest 3 breaks. 4 wage laws and meal and rest break regulations are not preempted 5 by the FAAA Act. 6 F.3d at 1189. The Ninth Circuit has already clearly determined that 7 8 9 6. See Dilts, 769 F.3d at 646-48; Mendonca, 152 Summary The Court finds Defendant’s characterization of this action as an attempt to mandate the precise contours of Defendant’s 10 provision of services and bind it to carry on its business in a 11 limited way to be misplaced. 12 in the controlling United States Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 13 precedent for its conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims are not 14 preempted. 15 “increase or change [Defendant’s] operating costs” they are 16 “‘broad law[s] applying to hundreds of different industries’ with 17 no other ‘forbidden connection with prices [, routes,] and 18 services’—that is, [they] do not directly or indirectly mandate, 19 prohibit, or otherwise regulate certain prices, routes, or 20 services,” and thus, they are not preempted by the FAAA Act. 21 Dilts, 769 F.3d at 647. Even if the state laws the FAC seeks to enforce may 22 23 24 The Court also finds ample support III. ORDER For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: December 18, 2014 27 28 17

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