Robles v. Comtrak Logistics, Inc.
Filing
54
ORDER denying 25 Motion to Dismiss signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 12/18/14. (Kaminski, H)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SALVADOR ROBLES, individually
and on behalf of others
similarly situated,
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Plaintiffs,
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No.
2:13-cv-00161-JAM-AC
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS
v.
COMTRAK LOGISTICS, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,
14
Defendants.
15
Defendant Comtrak Logistics, Inc. (“Defendant”) moves to
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dismiss (Doc. #25) the first amended complaint (“the FAC”) (Doc.
18
#24).
19
violations of the California Labor Code (“Labor Code”) and the
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California Department of Industrial Relations’ Industrial Welfare
21
Commission’s Industry and Occupation Orders for the
22
Transportation Industry (“IWC Wage Orders”), Cal. Code Regs. tit.
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8, § 11090 (2001).
24
preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization
25
Act of 1994 (“FAAA Act” or “FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
26
For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is DENIED.
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The FAC states twenty-three causes of action for
I.
Defendant contends each cause of action is
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant is a major provider of full dray truckload
1
1
transportation services across the country.
2
Salvador Robles (“Plaintiff”) is a former driver for Defendant
3
who was initially classified as an independent contractor and
4
later hired as an employee driver by Defendant.
5
FAC ¶ 5.
Plaintiff
Id. ¶ 3.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant retained and exercised
6
significant and pervasive control over all of its drivers,
7
thereby making those drivers Defendant’s employees under
8
California law.
9
misclassified these drivers as independent contractors in order
FAC ¶ 6.
Plaintiff claims Defendant has
10
“to avoid various duties and obligations owed to employees” under
11
the Labor Code and the IWC Wage Orders.
12
FAC ¶ 1.
The FAC states the first twelve causes of action (“IC
13
Claims”) as a class action on behalf of Plaintiff and a class of
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drivers who (a) signed an independent contractor and/or equipment
15
lease contract with Defendant; (b) were assigned to an operating
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terminal in California; and (c) were residents of California
17
(“the Class”).
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(1) declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that Defendant
19
unlawfully misclassified members of the Class as independent
20
contractors; (2) reimbursement of business expenses based on
21
violations of Labor Code § 2802 and IWC Wage Order #9, §§ 8-9;
22
(3) & (4) failure to pay minimum wage pursuant to California law
23
for actual miles driven and certain other hours worked, including
24
but not limited to during “waiting time,” inspections, and
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fueling; (5) & (6) failure to pay wages in accordance with the
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designated wage scale in violation of Labor Code §§ 221, 223;
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(7) quantum meruit/unjust enrichment; (8) failure to provide or
28
pay wages required for meal periods; (9) failure to provide paid
The claims brought on behalf of the Class are:
2
1
rest periods; (10) failure to timely provide itemized wage
2
statements; (11) failure to timely pay compensation due and owing
3
upon discharge; (12) violations of California’s Unfair
4
Competition Law, Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.
5
(“UCL”).
6
an employee; therefore, each of these causes of action relies on
7
the premise that Defendant improperly classified the drivers as
8
independent contractors when legally they should have been
9
treated as employees under California law.
10
These claims involve obligations owed by an employer to
In addition, the FAC restates the same claims found in the
11
second through twelfth causes of action on behalf of Plaintiff
12
individually for labor and wage violations during his time
13
working for Defendant in which he was classified as an employee.
14
These eleven claims, the thirteenth through twenty-third causes
15
of action (“EE Claims”), allege that although Plaintiff was
16
properly classified as an employee by Defendant during the
17
relevant time period, Defendant still failed to abide by the
18
applicable provisions of the Labor Code and the IWC Wage Orders.
19
After the instant motion and responsive briefings were
20
filed, the Court exercised its discretion to stay the action
21
(Doc. #36) on August 5, 2013, pending resolution of appeals in
22
two federal district court cases in California regarding
23
preemption of California law by the FAAA Act.
24
Circuit’s resolution of the appeals, the Court lifted the stay
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(Doc. #39) on July 25, 2014.
26
supplemental briefing (Doc. #41); the Court granted the motion
27
(Doc. #42) on July 30, 2014, further allowing Plaintiff to file a
28
responsive brief.
Upon the Ninth
Defendant requested leave to file
Supplemental briefing was submitted by
3
1
Defendant (Doc. #43) on August 20, 2014, and by Plaintiff (Doc.
2
#50) on September 3, 2014.
3
notices of recent decisions (Doc. #26, 34, 51-53) they believe
4
are relevant to the Court’s resolution of the current motion,
5
most recently on October 29, 2014.
6
Both parties have filed multiple
II.
OPINION
7
A.
8
Plaintiff requests the Court take notice (Doc. #30) of three
9
documents, attached as Exhibits “A”, “B” and “C” (Doc. #29-2, 29-
10
Request for Judicial Notice
3, 29-4) to the Declaration of Christina Humphrey (Doc. #29-1).
11
Generally, the Court may not consider material beyond the
12
pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
13
claim.
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the complaint so long as authenticity is not disputed, or matters
15
of public record, provided that they are not subject to
16
reasonable dispute.
17
2241664 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (citing Lee v. City of
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Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) and Fed. R. Evid.
19
201).
20
The exceptions are material attached to, or relied on by,
E.g., Sherman v. Stryker Corp., 2009 WL
Exhibit A is a copy of the House of Representatives
21
Conference Report 103-677, discussing the intended application of
22
the FAAA Act.
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Statement on Signing the FAAA Act.
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take notice of the legislative history of relevant statutes,
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Plaintiff’s request is GRANTED as to these two documents.
26
v. McCormick & Schmick Rest. Corp., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155
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(C.D. Cal. 2006)
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Exhibit B is a copy of President Clinton’s
As the Court may properly
Louis
Exhibit C is a Department of Transportation notice in which
4
1
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) rejects
2
a petition for preemption.
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California meal and rest break laws should be preempted as
4
improper regulations “on commercial motor vehicle safety.”
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Court does not find the decision of the FMCSA to be relevant to
6
the issue presently before it.
7
therefore DENIED as to this document.
The document discusses whether
The
Plaintiff’s request for notice is
8
B.
Discussion
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Defendant has moved the Court to dismiss the entire FAC.
It
10
correctly points out that the IC Claims rely on the allegation
11
that Defendant improperly classified Plaintiff and the Class as
12
independent contractors.
13
is an “attempt by Plaintiff to dictate the terms of [Defendant’s]
14
contractual relationships” with its drivers, and is thus
15
preempted by the FAAA Act.
16
Claims are an attempt by Plaintiff to force Defendant to “alter
17
its compensation system for company drivers and provide these
18
drivers with meal and rest breaks.”
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actions are expressly preempted by the FAAA Act.
20
argues the Court should therefore dismiss the entire FAC with
21
prejudice.
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1.
MTD at pp. 2-3.
Defendant argues this
In addition, Defendant argues the EE
Defendant contends these
Defendant
Legal Standard
Federal law may preempt state law under the supremacy clause
24
either by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict
25
between federal and state law.
26
Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (citations omitted).
27
The motion before the Court is based on a claim of explicit
28
preemption.
MTD at p. 6.
N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross v.
When addressing preemption claims,
5
1
“the question whether a certain state action is preempted by
2
federal law is one of congressional intent.
3
Congress is the ultimate touchstone.”
4
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137–38 (1990).
5
said to bar state action in fields of traditional state
6
regulation,” it is assumed that “the historic police powers of
7
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
8
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
9
Cross, 514 U.S. at 655 (citations omitted).
The purpose of
Ingersoll–Rand Co. v.
“[W]here federal law is
Blue
The Court must look
10
to the history and context of the FAAA Act, in addition to the
11
statutory language used, in order to determine the intended scope
12
of its preemption clause.
13
14
2.
History of Deregulation
In 1978, Congress sought to deregulate the airline industry
15
by enacting the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”), now
16
codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713.
17
States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of
18
their own,’ that Act ‘included a pre-emption provision’ that said
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‘no State . . . shall enact or enforce any law . . . relating to
20
rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.’”
21
Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 368 (2008) (“Rowe”)
22
(quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378
23
(1992)).
24
“In order to ‘ensure that the
Rowe v. New
In 1980, Congress sought to similarly deregulate the
25
trucking industry by enacting the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.
As
26
initially drafted however, the statute did not contain a
27
preemption provision.
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jurisdictions regulate[d], in varying degrees, intrastate prices,
By 1994, Congress noted that “41
6
1
routes and services of motor carriers.”
2
at 86 (1994) (Humphrey Decl., Exh. A).
3
ten jurisdictions it found did not so regulate: Alaska, Arizona,
4
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Maine, Maryland, New
5
Jersey, Vermont and Wisconsin.
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typical forms of regulation as “entry controls, tariff filing and
7
price regulation, and types of commodities carried.”
8
9
Id.
H.R. Conf. Rep. 103–677
The report identified the
The report identified the
Id.
In response to this growing trend in the trucking industry,
Congress passed the FAAA Act, which created a preemption
10
provision for the Motor Carrier Act nearly identical to that of
11
the ADA.
12
state “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
13
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
14
route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the
15
transportation of property.”
16
Rowe, 552 U.S. at 368.
The FAAA Act provides that a
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
Due to the similarity in the language of the preemption
17
provisions, courts have relied on ADA case law in deciding
18
preemption cases under the Motor Carrier Act. See Rowe, 552 U.S.
19
at 370 (“[W]e follow Morales in interpreting similar language in
20
the 1994 Act before us here.”).
21
recent opinions involving the FAAA Act, the Supreme Court found
22
that Congress’ addition of the phrase “with respect to the
23
transportation of property” to the ADA’s preemption clause
24
language “massively limits the scope of preemption ordered by the
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FAAAA.”
26
1778 (2013) (“Dan's City”).
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it is not sufficient that a state law relates to the ‘price,
28
route, or service’ of a motor carrier in any capacity; the law
However, in one of its most
Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769,
“[F]or purposes of FAAAA preemption,
7
1
must also concern a motor carrier's ‘transportation of
2
property.’”
3
affects the price, route, or service of a motor carrier can be
4
preempted, the FAAAA “does not preempt state laws affecting
5
carrier prices, routes, and services ‘in only a “tenuous, remote,
6
or peripheral . . . manner.”’”
7
371).
8
9
3.
Id. at 1778–79.
Although a law that only indirectly
Id. (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at
IC Claims
Defendant contends the IC Claims are an “attempt by
10
Plaintiff to dictate the terms of [Defendant’s] contractual
11
relationships with its owner-operators” and are thus “preempted
12
by the FAAA Act.”
13
In support of this contention, Defendant relies heavily on
14
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559
15
F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (“ATA I”) and American Trucking
16
Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 660 F.3d 384 (9th Cir.
17
2011) (“ATA II”), as amended (Oct. 31, 2011) (rev'd in part sub
18
nom. Am. Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 133
19
S. Ct. 2096 (2013)).
20
However, as Plaintiff points out, these cases are inapposite.
21
the ATA action, the defendant trucking association challenged
22
concession agreements that the Port of Los Angeles was requiring
23
motor carriers to enter into in order to access the port.
24
II, at 390.
25
I and ATA II required the motor carriers to “cease using
26
independent owner-operators.”
27
Claims involve the illegal misclassification of an employee
28
driver as an independent contractor pursuant to California law.
MTD at pp. 6, 8, 12-14, 16, 19, 22-24.
In
ATA
The provision Defendant seeks to analogize to in ATA
Id. at 407.
8
Here, Plaintiff’s IC
1
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant’s arguments
2
relying on these cases are misplaced.
3
require Defendant to use only employee drivers rather than
4
independently contracted drivers as attempted in the ATA action.
5
Rather, it seeks to hold Defendant accountable for its obligation
6
to properly classify its drivers.
7
issue presently before the Court is whether the California laws
8
governing the classification of workers as either employees or
9
independent contractors is enforceable as to Defendant’s business
The FAC does not seek to
The Court finds the primary
10
here in California, or whether it is preempted by the FAAA Act.
11
Defendant also spends a portion of its motion arguing that
12
the decision in Californians For Safe & Competitive Dump Truck
13
Transportation v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998)
14
is inapposite.
15
found the FAAA Act does not preempt California’s prevailing wage
16
law.
17
related to and increased the defendant trucking company’s prices,
18
the effect was only indirect and tenuous, and therefore did not
19
fall within the FAAA Act’s preemptive range.
20
argues “the reasoning of Mendonca was largely invalidated” by the
21
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370.
22
However, earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit specifically held
23
that Rowe did not “call into question [the Ninth Circuit’s] past
24
FAAAA cases, such as Mendonca.”
25
769 F.3d 637, 642-45 (9th Cir. 2014).
26
Rowe “simply reminds us that, whether the effect is direct or
27
indirect, ‘the state laws whose effect is forbidden under federal
28
law are those with significant impact on carrier rates, routes,
Id.
MTD at pp. 21-24.
In Mendonca, the Ninth Circuit
It found that although the wage law was, in a sense,
Id.
Defendant
Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC,
9
It went on to state that
1
or services.’”
2
original).
3
Id. (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375) (emphasis in
Defendant further argues Mendonca is inapplicable because
4
the law implicated there only affected the economic cost for
5
motor carriers to do business in California.
6
Defendant argues the outcome under state law that Plaintiff seeks
7
here would “require” it to use only employee drivers, “the very
8
type of conduct-regulating state action that the FAAA Act
9
forbids.”
Id.
MTD at pp. 22-23.
Again, Defendant misstates the FAC, as it does
10
not seek to require Defendant to employ a certain business model.
11
Instead, it simply seeks to hold Defendant accountable for
12
following generally applicable labor laws in California.
13
The reasoning in Mendonca and Dan’s City was recently
14
considered by the California Supreme Court in People ex rel.
15
Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 772, 784-86
16
(2014), a case the Court finds most analogous to the current
17
action.
18
against a trucking company and its owner for misclassifying
19
drivers as independent contractors and for other alleged
20
violations of California’s labor laws.
21
government’s claim was based on violations of the Labor Code and
22
IWC Wage Orders nearly identical to those alleged by Plaintiff
23
here.
24
government’s claims.
25
in the current motion, the defendants in Harris argued the claim
26
would “significantly affect motor carrier prices, routes, and
27
services because its application [would] prevent their using
28
independent contractors, potentially affecting their prices and
In Harris, the State of California brought a UCL action
Id. at 775-76.
The
The defendants contended the FAAA Act preempted the
Id. at 784-86.
10
Just as Defendant has done
1
services.”
2
because defendants sought to evade their legal responsibilities
3
and to “compete unfairly, by misclassifying their truck drivers
4
as independent contractors.”
5
Id.
The government argued the claim was brought
Id.
The Harris court reasoned that the holding in Dan’s City
6
“strongly supports a finding that California labor and insurance
7
laws and regulations of general applicability are not preempted”
8
under the FAAA Act.
9
the government’s claims make no reference to motor carriers or
Id. at 784-86.
It found the laws underlying
10
the transportation of property, rather the laws “regulated
11
employer practices in all fields and simply require motor
12
carriers to comply with the labor laws that apply to the
13
classification of their employees.”
14
government’s action to enforce the labor laws of California was
15
not an attempt to restrict the defendants’ use of independent
16
contractors.
17
contending “that if defendants pay individuals to drive their
18
trucks, they must classify these drivers appropriately and comply
19
with generally applicable labor and employment laws.”
20
The Harris court noted: “Mendonca concluded that
Id.
The court found the
Rather, it found the government was simply
Id.
21
California's generally applicable prevailing wage laws were not
22
preempted by the FAAAA in part because several states Congress
23
identified as not having laws regulating interstate trucking had
24
prevailing wage laws in place at the time the FAAAA was enacted.”
25
Id.
26
jurisdictions identified in Mendonca had generally applicable
27
laws governing when a worker is an independent contractor (or the
28
equivalent) and when a worker is an employee.”
The court then went on to observe that “eight out of the 10
11
Id. (citing
1
Alaska Stat. § 23.20.525; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23–902; Del. Code
2
Ann. tit. 19, § 3302; Fla. Stat. § 440.02; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
3
tit. 26, § 1043; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43.21–19; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
4
21, § 1301; Wis. Stat. §§ 102.07, 108.02.); see also H.R. Conf.
5
Rep. 103-677 at pp. 86-87.
6
“even though the [] action may have some indirect effect on
7
defendants’ prices or services, that effect is too tenuous,
8
remote, [and] peripheral . . . to have pre-emptive effect.”
9
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
10
This led the court to conclude that
Id.
In its supplemental brief, Defendant argues Harris is
11
inapplicable and wrongly decided.
Def. Supp. Brief (Doc. #43) at
12
pp. 9-10.
13
of federal law is not binding, the Court finds the reasoning in
14
Harris persuasive and concurs in its holding that generally
15
applicable laws regarding the classification of employees are not
16
the type of regulation Congress was attempting to target in the
17
passage of the FAAA Act, as they do not seek to regulate the
18
“intrastate prices, routes and services of motor carriers.”
19
H.R. Conf. Rep. 103–677 at 86.
Although the California Supreme Court’s interpretation
See
20
A similar conclusion was reached in Schwann v. FedEx Ground
21
Package Systems, Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-11094-RGS, 2013 WL 3353776,
22
at *3 (D. Mass. 2013).
23
for the District of Massachusetts found the Massachusetts law
24
identifying the grounds under which a worker can be classified as
25
an independent contractor, “the Independent Contractor Statute,”
26
was not preempted by the FAAA Act.
27
laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Dan’s City, the
28
Schwann court held: “Even if the Independent Contractor Statute
There, the United States District Court
12
Id.
Applying the reasoning
1
prevents FedEx from implementing its preferred business model of
2
classifying its delivery drivers as independent contractors
3
(there is no reason to believe that it does not), this does not
4
create a sufficient relationship to its prices, routes, or
5
services to trigger preemption.”
6
statute had nothing to do with the transportation of property,
7
rather the statue “simply explains to businesses . . . who
8
operate in [Massachusetts] when a worker must be paid as an
9
employee.”
10
Id. at *4.
The court found the
Id. at *3.
The Court finds the outcomes in both Harris and Schwann
11
appropriately effectuate Congress’ purpose in passing the FAAA
12
Act and avoid the perverse application of the law to circumvent
13
basic labor protections.
14
prevent Defendant from utilizing independent contractors in its
15
business model, but merely to comply with the applicable labor
16
laws of the State of California when compensating and classifying
17
its workers.
18
California’s laws regarding the classification of employees and
19
therefore does not preempt Plaintiff’s IC Claims.
20
Plaintiff’s action does not seek to
The Court finds the FAAA Act does not preempt
In its supplemental brief, Defendant discusses at length a
21
recent Supreme Court Case, Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S.
22
Ct. 1422 (2014).
23
contends the case is “directly on point in this case and compels
24
a finding of FAAA Act preemption.”
25
Plaintiff, Ginsberg has little to no bearing on this case.
26
Plaintiff Supp. Brief (Doc. #50) at pp. 4-5.
27
addressed in Ginsberg were whether the ADA preempts a claim for
28
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
Def. Supp. Brief at pp. 1-6.
13
Defendant
However, as pointed out by
The issues
1
under Minnesota law.
2
connect the reasoning therein to its contention here that
3
Defendant should not be subjected to California’s generally
4
applicable labor laws.
5
134 S. Ct. at 1426.
Defendant strains to
Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, supra, explicitly
6
distinguished generally applicable background regulations such as
7
California’s labor laws that are “several steps removed from
8
prices, routes, or services” and those that directly affect the
9
price of services such as the law being applied in Ginsberg.
769
10
F.3d at 646.
11
decisions in other circuits making similar distinctions.
12
(citing S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., 697
13
F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir. 2012) (labor laws not preempted by ADA
14
and FAAA Act because they “operate one or more steps away from
15
the moment at which the firm offers its customer a service for a
16
particular price”) and DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d
17
81, 88 (1st Cir. 2011) (differentiating law regulating how an
18
airline charges customers from a law that would regulate “merely
19
how the airline behaves as an employer or proprietor”)).
20
Court finds no merit in Defendant’s position.
21
22
4.
In support of this reasoning, the Dilts court cites
Id.
The
Meal and Rest Break Laws
Defendant dedicates a significant portion of its motion
23
specifically attacking the application of California's Meal and
24
Rest Break laws to the trucking industry, citing a number of
25
federal district court opinions in California.
26
9-11, 15-21.
27
provisions.
28
MTD at pp. 1-3,
The Court therefore addresses these specific
As stated above, the Court stayed the action pending the
14
1
resolution of several cases addressing this very issue.
2
discussing the principles underlying FAAA Act preemption, the
3
Ninth Circuit held:
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
After
California's meal and rest break laws plainly are not
the sorts of laws “related to” prices, routes, or
services that Congress intended to preempt. They do
not set prices, mandate or prohibit certain routes, or
tell motor carriers what services they may or may not
provide, either directly or indirectly. They are
“broad law[s] applying to hundreds of different
industries” with no other “forbidden connection with
prices[, routes,] and services.” Air Transp. Ass'n [of
America v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco], 266 F.3d
[1064,] 1072 [(9th Cir. 2001)].
Dilts, 769 F.3d at 647.
In supplemental briefing, Defendant attempts to avoid the
12
effect of this holding by observing that Dilts involved employee
13
drivers and not independent contractors.
14
pp. 1, 6-9.
15
cases entirely unpersuasive, especially in light of the Court’s
16
holding above that California’s laws regarding the classification
17
of employees and independent contractors are not preempted by the
18
FAAA Act.
Def. Supp. Brief at
The Court finds this attempt to distinguish the
19
Defendant also argues the reasoning in ATA I and ATA II was
20
not considered in the Dilts opinion and should still control the
21
outcome here, where Plaintiff is attempting to mandate how
22
Defendant provides services.
23
the Ninth Circuit repeatedly cited to and relied upon the ATA
24
cases in its opinion.
25
In addition, the Court again rejects Defendant’s assertion that
26
the FAC seeks to mandate the use of employee drivers over
27
independent contractors.
28
First, contrary to this assertion,
See Dilts, 769 F.3d at 644, 646-47, 649.
Defendant further argues that the defendant in Dilts “did
15
1
not face a ‘patchwork’ of hour and break laws because the
2
employees drove exclusively within California and were not
3
covered by other state laws or federal hours-of-service
4
regulations.”
5
Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit specifically clarified that its
6
finding was that California’s meal and rest break laws are not
7
preempted as generally applied to motor carriers and did not rely
8
on the intrastate nature of the plaintiffs’ work in so holding.
9
Dilts, at 648 n.2.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
As pointed out by
The court expressly concluded that:
[A]pplying California's meal and rest break laws to
motor carriers would not contribute to an impermissible
“patchwork” of state-specific laws, defeating Congress'
deregulatory objectives. The fact that laws may differ
from state to state is not, on its own, cause for FAAAA
preemption. In the preemption provision, Congress was
concerned only with those state laws that are
significantly “related to” prices, routes, or services.
A state law governing hours is, for the foregoing
reasons, not “related to” prices, routes, or services
and therefore does not contribute to “a patchwork of
state service-determining laws, rules, and
regulations.” Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added).
It is instead more analogous to a state wage law, which
may differ from the wage law adopted in neighboring
states but nevertheless is permissible. Mendonca, 152
F.3d at 1189.
Dilts, 769 F.3d at 647-48.
20
21
Def. Supp. Brief at p. 8.
5.
EE Claims
Defendant contends Plaintiff’s EE Claims are “inextricably
22
intertwined” with the IC Claims, and for the same reasons are
23
likewise preempted.
24
additional support for its attack on the EE Claims outside of
25
that used in its arguments against the IC Claims.
26
has found the IC Claims are not preempted, Defendant’s contention
27
that the EE Claims are preempted for similar reasons is also
28
rejected.
MTD at p. 24.
Defendant does not cite any
As the Court
Defendant does briefly characterize these claims as
16
1
impermissible attempts to dictate how Defendant must compensate
2
its drivers and when they must be provided with meal and rest
3
breaks.
4
wage laws and meal and rest break regulations are not preempted
5
by the FAAA Act.
6
F.3d at 1189.
The Ninth Circuit has already clearly determined that
7
8
9
6.
See Dilts, 769 F.3d at 646-48; Mendonca, 152
Summary
The Court finds Defendant’s characterization of this action
as an attempt to mandate the precise contours of Defendant’s
10
provision of services and bind it to carry on its business in a
11
limited way to be misplaced.
12
in the controlling United States Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
13
precedent for its conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims are not
14
preempted.
15
“increase or change [Defendant’s] operating costs” they are
16
“‘broad law[s] applying to hundreds of different industries’ with
17
no other ‘forbidden connection with prices [, routes,] and
18
services’—that is, [they] do not directly or indirectly mandate,
19
prohibit, or otherwise regulate certain prices, routes, or
20
services,” and thus, they are not preempted by the FAAA Act.
21
Dilts, 769 F.3d at 647.
Even if the state laws the FAC seeks to enforce may
22
23
24
The Court also finds ample support
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
25
IT IS SO ORDERED.
26
Dated: December 18, 2014
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17
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