Scott-George v. PVH Corporation

Filing 129

ORDER denying #121 Motion for Reconsideration signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 7/27/16. (Kaminski, H)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JODI SCOTT-GEORGE, individually and
on behalf of other members of the general
public similarly situated, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

v.
PVH CORP., a Delaware corporation, and
DOES 1 through 50 inclusive,
Defendant.

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No. 2:13–cv–00441-TLN-AC

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant PVH Corp.’s (hereafter,

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“Defendant”) Motion to Reconsider this Court’s November 20, 2015, Class Certification Order.

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(Def.’s Mot. to Recon., ECF No. 121.) Plaintiffs Jodi Scott-George and Melissa Wiggs on behalf

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of the certified class (hereafter, “Plaintiffs”) have filed an Opposition (Pl.s’ Opp’n., ECF No.

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122), to which Defendant has filed a Reply (Def.’s Rep., ECF No. 123). The Court has carefully

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considered the arguments raised by the parties’ briefing. For the reasons set forth below,

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Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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Defendant’s basis for its Motion for Reconsideration involves other recent class action

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settlements that may overlap with the instant class action. As such, the Court provides

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background information as to the related class actions below.
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A. Chavez Class Action Settlement

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In March of 2013, Plaintiff Jesse Chavez represented a class action against PVH Corp.

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(the same Defendant in the instant case) in the United States District Court for the Northern

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District of California. See Chavez, No. 5:15–CV–01797. The Chavez action alleged, among

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other things, that PVH Corp. failed to pay all wages under Labor Code Section 212 due to its

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payment of wages via paycards (“Paycard Claim”) and to provide complaint wage statements

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under Labor Code Section 226(a) (“Wage Statement Claim”). (ECF No. 121 at 2.) Chavez

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settled on January 21, 2015. The Settlement Agreement stated that those who failed to opt out

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would release “all claims, rights, demands, liabilities, and causes of action, whether in law or

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equity, arising from, or related to the facts occurring during the Settlement Class Period.” (ECF

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No. 122-1 at 15.) This settlement agreement defined the Settlement Class as “all current and

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former employees who worked for Defendant in California during any portion of the period from

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March 20, 2009 through July 17, 2014.” (ECF No. 122-1 at 11.) A declaration by the class

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administrator for Chavez stated that five people opted out of the settlement, including the two

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Named Plaintiffs in this case as well as those in the Lapan case.1

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B. Lapan Class Action Settlement

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In July of 2014, Plaintiff Jeffrey Lapan represented a class action against PVH Corp. in

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the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. See Lapan, No. 5:13–

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CV–05006. The Lapan case specifically addressed PVH Corp.’s alleged noncompliant use of

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paycards and settled on December 18, 2015. (ECF No. 122 at 3.) Similar to the Chavez

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agreement, the Lapan agreement stated that those who failed to opt out released “all claims,

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rights, demands, liabilities, and causes of action, whether in law or equity, arising from, or related

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to the facts occurring during the Class Period.” (ECF No. 122-1 at 82.) The settlement

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agreement stated that the California Settlement Class included all “current and former employees

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who worked for Defendant in California from July 17, 2014, through the date of preliminary

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approval [August 7, 2015]… and who affirmatively opted out of the settlement in Chavez v. PVH

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As stated in the Declaration of Cory Lefebvre, the class administrator for both the Chavez and Lapan cases,
those who opted out of Chavez are as follows: Ashwin Chandra, Ebert J. Lapan, Gemmalin Lorcha, Jodi ScottGeorge, and Melissa Wiggs. (ECF No. 121-3 at 2.)

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Corp.” (ECF No. 122-1 at 76.) A declaration by the class administrator for Lapan stated that

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eight people opted out of the settlement, including only one from the California Class, and did not

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include the named plaintiffs in this case.2

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C. Scott-George Class Action (The Instant Class Action)

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In January of 2013, Plaintiff Jodi Scott-George filed the initial complaint in this action

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against PVH Corp. for violations of various provisions of the California Labor Code. Plaintiff

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Class Members are retail store nonexempt employees of Defendant, an international clothing

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retailer. At issue is the certification of Subclass IV (“Paycard Subclass”) and Subclass VIII

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(“Wage Statement Subclass”). Defendant seeks to decertify the following classes:

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(4) Paycard Subclass: All nonexempt employees who received their earned wages
via the Money Network paycard system while working for Defendant in California
from March 20, 2009 to the present, and

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(8) Wage Statement Subclass: All nonexempt employees who received noncompliant wage statements while working for Defendant in California from March
20, 2009 to the present.

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(Mem. of P&A in Supp’t of Mot. for Class Cert., ECF No. 55-1 at 1.) Plaintiff Jodi Scott-George

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is the Class Representative for subclass (1), (2), (5), (6) and (7). Plaintiff Melissa Wiggs is the

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Class Representative for the subclass (3), (4) and (8). The classes currently encompass all

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nonexempt employees of PVH Corporation (which owns Van Heusen; and owned but sold G. H.

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Bass). (ECF No. 55-1 at 2.)

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II.

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STANDARDS OF LAW
A. Motion for Reconsideration

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A court should be loath to revisit its own decisions unless extraordinary circumstances

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show that its prior decision was clearly erroneous or would work a manifest injustice.

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Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988). “A court is generally

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precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by the same court, or a

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higher court in the identical case.” Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993).

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The only person within the California Class who opted out of the Lapan settlement was Gabriela Tafoya.
(ECF No. 121-3 at 3.)

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However, Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order.

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“Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule

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offers an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation

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of judicial resources.’” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir.

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2000) (quoting 12 James William Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 59.30(4) (3d ed.

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2000)). Therefore, a district court should not grant a motion for reconsideration “unless the

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district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an

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intervening change in the controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F .3d 656.

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665 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.

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1993)). Disagreement with a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment will not

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support a motion to alter or amend the judgment. See United States ex rel. Becker v.

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Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002).

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“There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the motion is

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necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) the

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moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is

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necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an “intervening change in controlling

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law.” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal

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quotations omitted). Moreover, Local Rule 230(j) requires a party filing a motion for

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reconsideration to show that “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist which did

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not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.”

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Motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) are addressed to the sound discretion of

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the district court. Exp.Grp. v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995).

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B. Class Certification
Before certifying a class, the trial court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to determine

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whether the party seeking certification has met the prerequisites of Rule 23. Wal-Mart Stores,

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Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Gen. Telephone Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457

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U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). “While the trial court has broad discretion to certify a class, its discretion

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must be exercised within the framework of Rule 23.” Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253
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F.3d 1180, 1186, amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell,

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Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977)). A court may certify a class if a plaintiff demonstrates

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that all of the prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) have been met and that at

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least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) have been met. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; see also Wal-Mart

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Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2548–49 (stating that class certification is governed by Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 23 and that (a) and (b) must be demonstrated by the party seeking certification).

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Rule 23(a) states that one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if:

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(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable [the “numerosity” requirement]; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class [the
“commonality” requirement]; (3) the claims or defenses of
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class [the “typicality” requirement]; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class [the “adequacy of representation”
requirement].

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition, Rule 23(b) requires a plaintiff to establish one of the following:

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(1) that there is a risk of substantial prejudice from separate actions; (2) that declaratory or

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injunctive relief benefitting the class as a whole would be appropriate; or (3) that common

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questions of law or fact predominate and the class action is superior to other available methods of

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adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). The court has broad discretion to certify a class, and

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district courts are accorded “noticeably more deference” when they grant certification versus

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when they deny certification. Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1171

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(9th Cir. 2010).

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III.

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Defendant argues that the Chavez and Lapan cases have effectively mooted the litigation

ANALYSIS

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of Plaintiffs’ paycard and wage settlement subclasses. The Court first addresses Subclass IV, the

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“Paycard Subclass,” regarding the relevant class period and class members in the wake of the

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Chavez and Lapan settlements as well as the standing of the Named Plaintiffs as it applies to the

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subclass. The Court then addresses the same issues as they apply to Subclass VIII, the “wage

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statements” class.
A. Subclass IV “Paycard Subclass”

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i. Overlap of Classes

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Defendant argues that the Chavez and Lapan settlements have resolved the issues

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pertaining to the alleged paycard violations, and thus Subclass IV should be decertified to avoid

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Plaintiffs recovering double damages. (See generally ECF No. 121.) In response, Plaintiffs argue

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that the Chavez and Lapan cases only covered the dates up to the end of the Lapan litigation, and

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therefore class members in the instant case may recover from the time subsequent to Lapan.

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(ECF No. 122 at 2.) As the Court understands it, the Class Period covered in Chavez for paycard

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violations was March 20, 2009 to July 17, 2014. The Class Period for the subsequent Lapan

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litigation was July 17, 2014 to August 7, 2015. In contrast the instant Subclass Period is from

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March 20, 2009 to the present.

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Following the Plaintiffs’ assertions, members of Subclass IV who are part of the Chavez

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or Lapan settlements, may still recover from paycard violations occurring from August 7, 2015

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(the end of the Lapan class period) to the commencement of this Subclass in March 2016. The

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Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. Thus, Subclass IV will remain certified, with the clarification

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that those who chose not to opt out of Chavez and/or Lapan will be barred from recovering for the

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dates covered in those respective class settlement periods. All members may still be eligible to

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recover for alleged paycard violations between August 7, 2015, and the filing of this litigation in

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March 2016.

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ii. Named Plaintiff Standing
Defendant argues that because the Named Plaintiffs in this action did not opt out of the

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Lapan litigation, they have lost standing to bring their paycard claims. (ECF No. 121 at 9.)

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Defendant maintains that because Plaintiffs have released their paycard claims, they cannot

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represent Subclass IV, and thus the subclass must be decertified. Id.

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In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the

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requirements. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 860 (9th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff class

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bears the burden of showing that the Article III standing requirements are met. See id. at 860–61.

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Standing requires that “(1) the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact, i.e., one that is sufficiently

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‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,’ (2) the

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injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the challenged conduct, and (3) the injury is ‘likely’ to be ‘redressed

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by a favorable decision.’” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007)

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(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). Standing must be shown

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with respect to each form of relief sought, whether it be injunctive relief, damages or civil

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penalties. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185

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(2000).

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The Ninth Circuit has stated that once a class has been certified, the members may remain

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within the class, even if the named plaintiff loses standing. See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

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511 F.3d 974, 986 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Even if [the named plaintiff’s] claim is either not redressable

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or is moot… the remaining class members are not foreclosed from attaining relief since the class

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was long ago duly certified.”).

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The United States Supreme Court has also addressed this issue, stating that once a class

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action has been certified, “the class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquire[s] a

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legal status separate from the representative.” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975). The

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Court clarified this in a later case, stating that “the claims of the class members would not need to

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be mooted or destroyed because subsequent events or the proof at trial had undermined the named

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plaintiffs’ individual claims.” E. Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406

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n. 12 (1977) (noting that it would be error for a district court to dismiss class allegations where it

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had already certified a class and “only later had it appeared that the named plaintiffs were not

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class members or were otherwise inappropriate class representatives.”).

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It is not disputed that Plaintiffs Jodi Scott-George and Melissa Wiggs had standing at the

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time of certification as neither the Chavez nor Lapan cases had been settled at that time. It is also

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not disputed that while both Named Plaintiffs opted out of the Chavez litigation, neither opted out
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of the Lapan litigation. (ECF No. 121-3 at 2–3.) Based on both US Supreme Court and Ninth

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Circuit precedent, this Court finds that, in the event Plaintiffs Wiggs and Scott-George released

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their paycard claims in Lapan, Subclass IV will remain a proper subclass since it was already

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certified.
B. Subclass VIII “Wage Statement Subclass”

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Similar to the claim above, Defendant claims that Subclass VIII may not recover for any

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alleged violations of wage statements since that issue was already litigated in the Chavez

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settlement. (ECF No. 122.) Since Lapan only litigated the paycard claim and did not litigate the

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issue of wage statement violations, that time period is irrelevant to Subclass VIII.

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Following the same reasoning as the paycard subclass, Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider

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certification of Subclass VIII is denied. As previously addressed, the Chavez settlement applied

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to class members who worked for Defendant from March 20, 2009 to July 17, 2014. Thus, in an

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effort to eliminate double recovery of damages, any Subclass VIII members who did not opt out

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of Chavez would be precluded from recovering on wage statement claims in the instant case from

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March 20, 2009 to July 17, 2014. Since violations occurring after July 17, 2014 were not

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included in the Chavez Settlement Class, all Subclass VIII members would still be eligible to

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recover for alleged wage statement violations in the instant case from July 17, 2014, to the filing

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of this litigation in March 2016.

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IV.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider (ECF No. 121) is

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CONCLUSION

DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: July 27, 2016

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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