Goldsmith v. Cate et al

Filing 22

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 6/26/14 GRANTING 18 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff is granted 20 days to file an amended complaint. (Manzer, C)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
----oo0oo----

11
12

JAMES K. GOLDSMITH,
Plaintiff,

13
14
15
16
17

CIV. NO. 2:13-943 WBS KJN (PC)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S FINDINGS &
RECOMMENDATIONS

v.
MATTHEW CATE and CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER SMITH,
Defendants.

18
----oo0oo----

19
20

Plaintiff James K. Goldsmith, a former state prisoner

21

proceeding pro se, brought this action against defendants Matthew

22

Cate and Correctional Officer Smith arising out of injuries

23

plaintiff allegedly suffered while incarcerated.

24

referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

25

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

26

This action was

On February 24, 2014, defendants moved to dismiss

27

plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

28

relief could be granted.

(Docket No. 18.)
1

Plaintiff did not

1

file a timely opposition to that motion.

2

Magistrate Judge issued Findings and Recommendations in which he

3

recommended that plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed.

4

21.)

5

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304.

6

I.

On May 6, 2014, the

(Docket No.

The court now reviews those Findings and Recommendations

Allegations of the Complaint

7

On July 27, 2009, Correctional Officer Smith

8

transported plaintiff from California State Prison-Sacramento

9

(“CSP-Sacramento”) to California Medical Facility-Vacaville for a

10

liver biopsy.

(Compl. ¶ 5.)

11

classified as a disabled inmate and required the use of a cane

12

for mobility.

13

mobility was compounded by the sedative side effects of two

14

psychiatric medications he took that day.

(Id. ¶ 8.)

At that time, plaintiff was

Plaintiff alleges that his lack of

(Id. ¶ 7.)

15

After the completion of the biopsy, plaintiff informed

16

Officer Smith that he felt weak as a result of the procedure and

17

the side effects of his medication.

18

acknowledged plaintiff’s complaints, but nonetheless placed

19

mechanical wrist and ankle restraints upon plaintiff in

20

preparation for the trip back to CSP-Sacramento.

21

plaintiff walked through the facility, Officer Smith provided a

22

“visual escort” and maintained a distance of three to five feet

23

from him.

24

(Id. ¶ 11.)

Officer Smith

(Id.)

As

(Id. ¶ 13.)
When plaintiff reached the top of a staircase, Officer

25

Smith directed him to walk down the flight of stairs.

(Id. ¶

26

14.)

27

balance and began to fall down the stairs.

28

attempted to break plaintiff’s fall, but was unsuccessful.

After descending the first two steps, plaintiff lost his

2

(Id.)

Officer Smith
(Id.)

1

Plaintiff continued to fall until he reached the bottom of the

2

staircase.

3

(Id.)

On August 5, 2009, plaintiff filed a grievance against

4

Officer Smith in which he alleged that he was injured as a result

5

of Officer Smith’s negligence.

6

grievance was denied, as was each appeal of that denial.

7

Plaintiff’s last appeal was denied by Cate, the Director of the

8

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, on June

9

15, 2010.

10

(Id. Ex. A.)

Plaintiff’s
(Id.)

(Id.)
After he was released from prison, plaintiff brought

11

this action against Cate and Officer Smith on April 18, 2013,

12

alleging violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

13

Amendments.

14

II.

15

(Id. at 10.)

Discussion
On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

16

Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations in the

17

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

18

the plaintiff.

19

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183

20

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

21

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to

22

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

23

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

24

“plausibility standard,” however, “asks for more than a sheer

25

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and where a

26

complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with a

27

defendant’s liability,” it “stops short of the line between

28

possibility and plausibility.”

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974),

To survive a

Bell

This

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
3

1

678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

2

pro se pleadings are given the benefit of liberal construction,”

3

a pro se prisoner “is not entitled to the benefit of every

4

conceivable doubt; the court is obligated to draw only reasonable

5

factual inferences in [his] favor.”

6

952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

7
8
9
10
11
12

While “[p]risoner

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d

In relevant part, § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
. . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

13

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

14

substantive rights, it provides a cause of action against any

15

person who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of

16

federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory

17

rights.1

18

A.

19

While § 1983 is not itself a source of

Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
Claims Against Officer Smith
Plaintiff first alleges that Officer Smith’s failure to

20

prevent him from falling down the stairs violated his Fourth and

21

Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from injury.

(Compl. at

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1

In contrast, violations of regulations promulgated by a
state agency are not cognizable under § 1983. Baker v. Kernan,
795 F. Supp. 2d 992, 995 (E.D Cal. 2011) (Kozinski, J.) (citing
Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990); Ebmeier v.
Stump, 70 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 1995)); see generally West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1998) (noting that a § 1983 claim must
allege a violation of rights “secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States”). To the extent that plaintiff’s
claims are predicated on violations of the California Code of
Regulations, he fails to state a claim under § 1983.
4

1

10.)

2

based on the Fourth Amendment because the rights it safeguards

3

are “fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual

4

surveillance of inmates and their cells.”

5

U.S. 517, 527 (1984); see also Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251

6

F.3d 1230, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a “convicted

7

prisoner . . . cannot bring a Fourth Amendment claim, which

8

applies only to those not yet convicted”).

9

Fourteenth Amendment is not an appropriate vehicle to raise

As a general rule, a prisoner may not maintain a claim

Hudson v. Palmer, 468

Likewise, the

10

claims regarding prison-related injuries that “implicate a more

11

specific constitutional right” protected by the Eighth Amendment.

12

See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393.

13

emphasized that the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual

14

punishments clause is the appropriate mechanism for raising

15

claims that challenge inhumane or unsafe conditions of

16

confinement.

17

Rather, the Supreme Court has

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).

In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth

18

Amendment, a prisoner must allege that a prison official acted

19

with “deliberate indifference”--in other words, that he knew of

20

and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.

21

Id. at 837.

22

and it requires more than a showing that prison officials were

23

negligent.

24

2004); see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.

25

2002) (holding that “[a]n official’s failure to alleviate a

26

significant risk that he should have perceived but did not” does

27

not constitute deliberate indifference (citation and internal

28

quotation marks omitted)).

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,”

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.

Rather, a prisoner must allege that
5

1

“the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a

2

substantial risk of serious harm.”

3

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.

In certain circumstances, a prison official’s failure

4

to prevent an inmate from falling on slippery floors may

5

constitute deliberate indifference.

6

Agnos, the plaintiff had repeatedly injured himself upon slippery

7

floors at a pretrial detention facility and had filed several

8

grievances complaining of unsafe conditions.

9

(9th Cir. 1998).

For instance, in Frost v.

152 F.3d 1124, 1129

Although a doctor recommended that jail

10

officials transfer the plaintiff to the handicapped unit, they

11

refused to do so and did not take any measures to remedy the

12

slippery floors.

13

prison floors were unsafe, the court held that the plaintiff was

14

entitled to proceed to trial on his deliberate indifference

15

claim.

16

Id.

In light of repeated indications that the

Id.
Here, by contrast, plaintiff has not alleged any facts

17

showing that Officer Smith was deliberately indifferent to the

18

risk that plaintiff would fall down the stairs.

19

plaintiff alleges that he walked with a cane and that he informed

20

Officer Smith that he felt weak after he underwent a liver

21

biopsy, (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11), those allegations alone are not

22

sufficient to establish that Officer Smith knew plaintiff needed

23

physical assistance walking down the stairs, let alone that

24

Officer Smith knew of and disregarded the possibility that

25

plaintiff would fall.

26

lost his balance, Officer Smith attempted to break his fall but

27

was unable to do so.

28

nothing more than an “isolated occurrence” of possible neglect by

Although

In fact, plaintiff alleges that when he

(Id. ¶ 14.)

6

Those allegations establish

1

Officer Smith, which does not amount to deliberate indifference.

2

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

3

on other grounds by WMX Techs, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

4

1136 (9th Cir. 1997).

5

This case is akin to Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327

6

(1988).

7

when he slipped on a pillow that a prison official negligently

8

left on the stairs.

9

even if plaintiff’s allegations were correct, those allegations

10

could not sustain a claim because a prison official’s negligence

11

is neither sufficient to establish deliberate indifference nor

12

cognizable under § 1983 more generally.

13

plaintiff in Daniels, plaintiff has not alleged more than mere

14

negligence; in fact, his administrative grievance explicitly

15

characterized Officer Smith’s failure to assist him down the

16

stairs as “negligent.”

17

plaintiff has not stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment violation

18

based on Officer Smith’s conduct.

19

There, the plaintiff alleged that he sustained injuries

Id. at 328.

The Supreme Court held that

Id. at 330-31.

(See Compl. Ex. A.)

Like the

Accordingly,

Finally, plaintiff alleges that Officer Smith’s conduct

20

violated a constitutional duty independent of the Eighth

21

Amendment to “protect[] plaintiff from danger and harm.”

22

at 10.)

23

Constitution is not a freestanding “font of tort law” and

24

therefore does not give rise to a general duty to prevent harm.

25

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); accord Town of Castle

26

Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).

27

such a duty exists in the prison context, it is an extension of

28

the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual

(Compl.

As the Supreme Court has made clear, however, the

7

To the extent that

1

punishment rather than a broader constitutional right to be free

2

from harm.

3

489 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1989) (citing cases).

4

has failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the court

5

must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims

6

against Officer Smith.

7

B.

8
9

See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
Because plaintiff

Claims Against Director Cate
Plaintiff alleges that Cate is liable for his injuries

in his capacity as Director of the California Department of

10

Corrections and Rehabilitation.

11

liable under § 1983 for the conduct of his subordinates.

12

556 U.S. at 676.

13

only “if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement

14

in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal

15

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

16

constitutional violation.”

17

(9th Cir. 2011).

18

personally involved in Smith’s decision to require him to walk

19

down the stairs without assistance, and does not allege that

20

Cate’s conduct otherwise led to or was causally connected to his

21

injuries.

22

claim against Cate based on Smith’s conduct.

23

A defendant is not vicariously
Iqbal,

A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207

Plaintiff does not allege that Cate was

Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable

Plaintiff also alleges that Cate deprived him of his

24

constitutional “right to be free from unnecessary harm or danger”

25

by erroneously denying plaintiff’s appeal of his grievance

26

against Smith.

27

was cognizable under § 1983--which it is not, see Gonzales, 545

28

U.S. at 768--the denial of plaintiff’s grievance does not give

(Compl. at 10.)

Even assuming that such a right

8

1

rise to a § 1983 claim because a prisoner has no right to any

2

specific grievance procedure above and beyond the standards

3

established by the Due Process Clause.

4

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988).

5

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against Cate.

6
7

See Mann v. Adams, 855

Accordingly, the court must grant

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to
dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

8

Plaintiff is granted twenty days from the date this

9

Order is signed to file an amended Complaint, if he can do so

10

consistent with this Order.

11

Dated:

June 26, 2014

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
9