Mohsin v. California Department of Water Resources et al

Filing 158

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 9/19/2022 GRANTING 141 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in Defendants' favor and close the case. CASE CLOSED (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SYED MOHSIN,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:13-cv-01236-TLN-JDP

v.

ORDER

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
WATER RESOURCES; DAVID
GUTIERREZ, in his personal and official
capacity as Chief of Division of Safety of
Dams; and DOES 1–10,

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Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Defendants California Department of Water Resources

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(“DWR”) and David Gutierrez’s (“Gutierrez”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary

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Judgment. (ECF No. 141.) Plaintiff Syed Mohsin (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No.

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155.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 156.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court

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GRANTS Defendants’ motion.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

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I.

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DWR employed Plaintiff as an Assistant Engineering Specialist in its Division of Safety

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of Dams (“DSOD”) beginning in August 2000.2 (ECF No. 155-2 at 2.) The DSOD is charged

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with protecting life and property from dam failure in accordance with California Water Code §§

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6000–6470 and serves as the regulatory agency over 1200 unique dams that fall within its

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jurisdiction. (Id.) Gutierrez was in Plaintiff’s supervisory chain of command, first as the Design

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Branch Chief and later as the DSOD Division Chief. (Id.)

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Plaintiff has a seizure disorder (epilepsy). (Id. at 7.) DWR hired Plaintiff knowing he
suffered from a seizure disorder (epilepsy). (Id.) In August 2002, Plaintiff had brain surgery to

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reduce or lessen the impact of his uncontrollable epileptic seizures. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff contends

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that the 2002 brain surgery lessened the degree of his seizures but negatively impacted his mental

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processing speed and the use of his executive functions. (ECF No. 38 at ¶¶ 38–39.) Plaintiff

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alleges that he attempted to receive accommodations for his condition following the surgery but

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Gutierrez “effectively refused” to provide those accommodations. (Id. at ¶¶ 45–46.) Defendant

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ultimately terminated Plaintiff effective April 13, 2012. (ECF No. 155-2 at 2.)
Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on December 9, 2015.

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(ECF No. 38 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) retaliation and discrimination in

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violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Gutierrez; (2)

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retaliation and discrimination in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against DWR; (3) a

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) claim against Gutierrez based on violations of the Equal Protection

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Clause and Due Process Clause; (4) disability discrimination in violation of California’s Fair

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Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Government Code § 12940(a), against

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DWR; (5) a FEHA violation for failure to reasonably accommodate a disability, California

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Government Code § 12940(m), against DWR; (6) a FEHA violation for failure to engage in the

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The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

Plaintiff argues he was hired as an “Assistant Engineering Specialist Civil (AES).” (ECF
No. 155-2 at 2.) Plaintiff states there was another position titled “Assistant Engineering
Specialist Electrical.” (Id.) Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that the distinction is material to
the Court’s ruling.
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interactive process, California Government Code § 12940(n), against DWR; and (7) a FEHA

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violation for disability harassment, California Government Code § 12940(j) against both

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Defendants.3 (Id. at 14–28.) Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on

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August 20, 2020. (ECF No. 141.)

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II.

STANDARD OF LAW

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Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue

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of any material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 56(a); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Under summary

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judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

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district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any,”

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which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof

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at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance

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solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id. at

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324 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered against a

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party who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

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that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

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party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

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Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

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Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute,

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the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings but is required to tender

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evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

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support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must

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demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

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The Court previously dismissed the remaining claims in the SAC without leave to amend.
(ECF No. 43.)
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suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that

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the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

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the nonmoving party. Id. at 251–52.

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In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

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establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

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dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

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trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 288–89. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is

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to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for

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trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.

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In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits. Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence

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of the opposing party is to be believed and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

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facts pleaded before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S.

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at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s

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obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v.

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Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.

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1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue that necessitates a jury trial, the opposing party

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“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead

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a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id.

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III.

ANALYSIS

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Defendants move for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) DWR provided

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Plaintiff with reasonable accommodations for his physical disability; (2) Plaintiff cannot show he

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is a qualified individual with a disability; (3) Plaintiff cannot show that a reasonable

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accommodation existed for his cognitive disability that would have permitted him to perform all

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of the essential functions of an engineering position; (4) Plaintiff refused DWR’s reasonable

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accommodation offers that would have enabled him to remain employed with DWR; (5)
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Defendants had legitimate business reasons for their actions; (6) Plaintiff’s FEHA disability

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harassment claim fails because it is based only on managerial acts; (7) the Ex parte Young ADA

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claim against Gutierrez fails because he is no longer employed by DWR; and (8) Plaintiff cannot

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establish his due process or equal protection claims under § 1983. (ECF No. 141-1.) Defendants

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cite legal authority and specific portions of the record to support their arguments. (See id.)

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Plaintiff’s opposition, on the other hand, is shockingly deficient. (ECF No. 155.) In the

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six-page opposition — which contains only two pages of what can be loosely described as

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“argument” — Plaintiff repeatedly proclaims there are triable issues of material fact that preclude

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summary judgment. (Id. at 4–6.) Rather than provide citations to the record or clear arguments

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to support his claims, Plaintiff generically points the Court to his 50-page affidavit (ECF No. 155-

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1), his 99-page response to Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts (ECF No. 155-2), and over

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550 pages of exhibits (ECF No. 155-3) and essentially asks the Court to do the work for him.

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The Ninth Circuit has consistently expressed that courts are not required “to scour the

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record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.

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1996) (affirming grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor and stating “[w]e rely on the

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nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary

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judgment”); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming

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grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor and stating “[t]he district court need not examine

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the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth

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in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found”); Indep.

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Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When reading [appellant’s]

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brief, one wonders if [appellant], in its own version of the ‘spaghetti approach,’ has heaved the

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entire contents of a pot against the wall in hopes that something would stick. We decline,

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however, to sort through the noodles in search of [appellant’s] claim.”); Greenwood v. FAA, 28

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F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)

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(per curiam) (“[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”).

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In the absence of any meaningful opposition, the Court concludes Plaintiff fails to create a
triable issue of material fact as to any of his claims. As to his ADA and Rehabilitation Act
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discrimination claims, Plaintiff fails to set forth the elements of those claims, other than a general

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description of what the ADA prohibits and that the Rehabilitation Act applies the same standard.

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(ECF No. 155 at 4–5.) Plaintiff fails to address his prima facie burden, fails to cite specific

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evidence showing he has met that burden, and fails to respond to Defendants’ arguments that

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Plaintiff was not a qualified individual who could perform the essential functions of an

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engineering position with or without reasonable accommodations. (Id.) To the extent Plaintiff

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alleges ADA and Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims, Plaintiff fails to mention his retaliation

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claims anywhere in his opposition. (See id. at 1–6.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not address

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Defendants’ argument that they had legitimate business reasons for their actions, nor does he cite

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evidence showing such reasons were pretextual. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also fails to address

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Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff cannot bring an ADA claim against Gutierrez under the Ex

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parte Young doctrine because Gutierrez is no longer employed by DWR.4 (Id.)
As to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, Plaintiff fails to address the elements of his due process

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and equal protection claims, fails to cite evidence showing there is a triable issue of fact as to

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those claims, and fails to address Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff’s termination satisfied due

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process and Defendants had a rational basis for their actions. (Id. at 5.)
As to Plaintiff’s FEHA claims for discrimination, failure to reasonably accommodate, and

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failure to engage in the interactive process under California Government Code §§ 12940(a), (m),

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and (n), respectively, Plaintiff summarily states there are triable issues precluding summary

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judgment for these claims. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff does not address the unique elements of each

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claim, fails to cite evidence showing there is a triable issue of fact as to each claim, and fails to

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address Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff was not a qualified individual who could perform

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the essential functions of his position with or without reasonable accommodations. (Id.)

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As to Plaintiff’s FEHA claim for disability harassment under California Government Code

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§ 12940(j), Plaintiff fails to address the elements of the claim, fails to cite evidence showing there

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Plaintiff also argues Defendants “discriminated against him as a person of Pakistani origin
after the fall of the Twin Towers in New York City on September 11, 2001.” (ECF No. 155 at 4.)
However, Plaintiff does not cite — nor can the Court locate — any reference to discrimination
other than disability discrimination as a basis for Plaintiff’s claims in the SAC.
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is a triable issue of material fact, and fails to respond to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s

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claim should be dismissed because it is based only on managerial acts. (Id. at 6.)

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In sum, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to any of his claims.

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Plaintiff asks the Court to “carefully scrutinize” hundreds of pages of documents to find a triable

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issue of material fact for him. (ECF No. 155 at 6.) The Court declines to do so in a case with

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such extremely deficient briefing, especially considering the high caseload in this district and the

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Court’s limited resources. In re Approval of Jud. Emergency Declared in E. Dist. of Cal., 956

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F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting the Eastern District of California had the highest

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weighted filings per judgeship in the Ninth Circuit and ranked eighth nationally and finding the

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District’s high caseload qualified as a “judicial emergency”).

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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to all Plaintiff’s claims.

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IV.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary

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Judgment. (ECF No. 141.) The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in Defendants’ favor

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and close the case.

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CONCLUSION

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 19, 2022

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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