Alston v. County of Sacramento Sheriff's Department et al

Filing 8

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd on 08/05/14 ordering plaintiff's amended complaint 7 is dismissed. Plaintiff is granted 30 days from the date of service of this order to file a second amended complaint. The clerk of the court shall send plaintiff the court's form for filing a civil rights action. (Plummer, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ERIC ALSTON,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et al.,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff is a former county jail inmate proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to

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No. 2:13-cv-1488 DAD P

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint.
SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of poverty is

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found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

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claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. See

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law

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or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,

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1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based

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on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

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Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however

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inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639,

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640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more

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than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

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allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550

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U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

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allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

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738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all

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doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

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Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

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(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of

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their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant

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holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

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violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);
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Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

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concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

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Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT
In plaintiff’s amended complaint, he has identified more than twenty-five defendants in

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this action. Plaintiff’s complaint is both verbose and yet conclusory in many respects. However,

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therein plaintiff appears to allege as follow. Plaintiff was arrested at the Sacramento County

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Traffic Court and injured by defendants when they arrested him. Plaintiff acknowledges that he

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was mentally unstable at the time because he had not taken his mental health medication for some

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time. Plaintiff alleges that he was housed in the medical unit at the Sacramento County Main Jail

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and began pushing his bed into the cell door creating significant damage to the cell and door.

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Officers arrived at his cell and transferred him to a psych location in the main jail because they

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believed he was a danger to himself. According to plaintiff, defendants shackled him to his bed,

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refused to feed him lunch, and forced him to urinate and defecate on himself. Plaintiff alleges

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that he subsequently had to go to court. Defendants knew he had a knee problem and needed a

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knee brace, but they housed him on the eighth floor of the jail and made him walk up and down

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the stairs each time he needed to leave or see a visitor. Plaintiff was transferred to Rio Cosumnes

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Correctional Center where he was also required to climb stairs to see visitors. Plaintiff claims

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that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, that they violated

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the Americans with Disabilities Act, and that they maintained unspecified unconstitutional

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policies and negligently supervised their staff. (Am. Compl. at 9-23.)

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DISCUSSION

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The allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint are so vague and conclusory that the

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court is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for

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relief. The amended complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must

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give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim

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plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants

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engaged in that support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the

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requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the amended complaint must be dismissed. In the interest

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of justice, the court will grant plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.

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If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff should clarify which of

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his constitutional rights he believes each defendant has violated and support each such claim with

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factual allegations about the defendant’s actions. Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating how

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the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s federal constitutional or

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statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). In addition, plaintiff must

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allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s

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rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

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connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

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362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

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743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

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violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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If plaintiff believes that defendants violated his right to adequate medical care by not

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providing him with certain devices for his knee, such as a knee brace, he should state so clearly in

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his second amended complaint and explain who was involved in administering medical care to

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him at the jail. Plaintiff is advised, however, that the Supreme Court has held that inadequate

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medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under § 1983 unless

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the mistreatment rose to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v.

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Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). See also Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017

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(9th Cir. 2010) (“Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the

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Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment, applies to pretrial

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detainees, we apply the same standards in both cases.”) (internal citations omitted). In general,

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deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere

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with medical treatment, or may be shown by the way in which prison officials provide medical

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care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Wood v.
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Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (“In determining deliberate indifference, we

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scrutinize the particular facts and look for substantial indifference in the individual case,

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indicating more than mere negligence or isolated occurrences of neglect.”).

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In any second amended complaint he may elect to file, plaintiff will need to allege facts

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demonstrating how any defendant’s actions rose to the level of “deliberate indifference.” Plaintiff

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is cautioned that mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

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cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429

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U.S. at 105-06). See also Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (“In

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determining deliberate indifference, we scrutinize the particular facts and look for substantial

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indifference in the individual case, indicating more than mere negligence or isolated occurrences

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of neglect.”).

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In addition, insofar as plaintiff wishes to proceed on a claim under the ADA he is advised
that Title II of the ADA provides that:

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no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subject to discrimination by such entity.

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To state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he or she is a qualified individual

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with a disability; (2) he or she was excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated

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against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and (3) such exclusion or

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discrimination was by reason of his or her disability. See O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional

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Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.

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2002).

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In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to provide him with

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certain devices for his knee and failed to house him on appropriate floors that would not require

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him to climb stairs. In this regard, however, plaintiff alleges that defendants have denied him

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adequate medical care for his knee. Plaintiff has not alleged that defendants discriminated against

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him or treated him differently because of a disability. In any second amended complaint plaintiff

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elects to file, he will need to include factual allegations that address how defendants’ refusal to
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provide him with certain devices for his knee or specific housing was because he is mobility-

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impaired or because he has a medical condition. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,

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1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (Title II of the ADA requires intentional discrimination); Rucker v. Trent,

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No. C 11-4312 YGR (PR), 2012 WL 4677741 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2012) (“the ADA

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prohibits discrimination because of a disability, not inadequate treatment for a disability”); Brown

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v. Castillo, No. 1:02-cv-06018-LJO-DLB PC, 2007 WL 3054165 at *16 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2007)

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(“plaintiff has a disability within the meaning of the ADA and the RA, however, plaintiff has not

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alleged that he was excluded from or denied a prison program based on his disability.”).

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Finally, the court observes that plaintiff has named Sacramento County and a number of

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supervisory officials as defendants. Neither municipalities nor supervisory personnel may be held

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liable for an injury inflicted by an employee under a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell,

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436 U.S. 691; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisory defendant may

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be held liable under § 1983 only “‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the

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constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful

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conduct and the constitutional violation.’”) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.

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1989)). If plaintiff wishes to proceed against these defendants in this action, he will need to

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allege a specific causal link between these defendants’ policies or actions and his claimed

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constitutional violations.

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Plaintiff is reminded that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to make his

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second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th

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Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the prior pleading no longer serves

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any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended complaint, as in an original complaint,

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each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

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CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 7) is dismissed;

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2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second

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amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules

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of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the

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docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”; failure

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to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation

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that this action be dismissed without prejudice; and

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3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a civil

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rights action.

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Dated: August 5, 2014

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DAD:9
alst1488.14am

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