Hartnett v. Placer County Superior Court, et al

Filing 52

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 5/27/15 GRANTING 33 and 34 Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff's federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and the state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. CASE CLOSED. (Manzer, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STACEY VICTORIA HARTNETT,

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No. 2:13-cv-1636-GEB-KJN

Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF PLACER, a public
entity; PLACER COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES (CSOC), a
public entity; PLACER COUNTY
COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL
ADVOCATES (CASA), a public
entity; RICHARD J. BURTON,
M.D., M.P.H., director as an
individual and-in official
capacity; KEVIN HENDERSON, as
an individual and-in official
capacity; DIANA RYAN, program
supervisor, as an individual
and-in official capacity; H.
PAUL SANDERS, as an
individual and-in official
capacity; APRIL CAREW, as an
individual, and-in official
capacity; KATHY TANNER, as an
individual, and-in official
capacity; KAREN SCHLANGER, as
an individual and-in official
capacity; TOM LIND, as an
individual and-in official
capacity; ROMNEY LYNN, as an
individual and-in official
capacity; DON KLEINDER, casa
director, as an individual
and-in official capacity;
TAMARA LARSON, CASA worker as
an individual and-in official
capacity; CHRISTINE TAYLOR

ORDER GRANTING EACH DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
FEDERAL CLAIMS AND DECLINING TO
EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S
STATE LAW CLAIMS UNDER 28
U.S.C. § 1367

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BROWN, as an individual and
DOES 1 through 25 inclusive,
Defendants.

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The following Defendants seek dismissal of the claims
alleged in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”): Richard
Burton,

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Henderson,

Romney
Service

Lynn,

,

Placer

(“CSOC”),

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25

Ryan,

H.

Paul

Sanders,

April

Department

County

of

of

Health

Placer

and

(“the

Human

County”)

(collectively “the County Defendants”), Child Advocates of Placer
County,1 Tamara Larson, and Don Kleinder. Each Defendant seeks
dismissal with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s

TAC

concerns

allegations

that

each

Defendant deprived her of custody of her child during a child
custody dispute with her ex-spouse, Hartnett.
I.

17

19

County

the

16

18

Diana

Carew, Kathy Tanner, Karen Schlanger, Tom Lind, Candyce Skinner,

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Kevin

“To

survive

a

LEGAL STANDARD
motion

to

dismiss,

a

complaint

must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Caviness v.

Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.
2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

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27
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Since Child Advocates of Placer County argues it was erroneously sued as
“Placer County Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA),” it is referred to
herein as Child Advocates of Placer County.

2

1

(2007)). “For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept all

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well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe

3

them

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Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th

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Cir. 2012). However, “we do not accept legal conclusions in the

6

complaint

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allegations.” Lacano Inv., LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071

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(9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

in

the

light

as

true,

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most

favorable

even

if

to

cast

in

the

the

nonmoving

form

party.”

of

factual

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

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The TAC contains the following allegations that relate

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to the motion. Plaintiff and Hartnett had shared custody of their

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child,

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Plaintiff lost custody in 2010 as a result of a “Juvenile Court”

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removal order, which was overturned in 2012 by the California

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Third District Court of Appeal. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 45.) “The Juvenile

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Court officially removed A.H. from [Plaintiff’s custody] . . . on

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August 16, 2010 . . . [and] awarded full legal and physical

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custody . . . to Hartnett on June 1, 2011, when the . . .

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was terminated.” (TAC ¶ 43.) Plaintiff “appealed the Juvenile

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Court’s

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Appeals “reversed on August 8, 2012, . . . [in an order holding

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that] Placer County Children’s Systems of Care (CSOC) was not

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legally justified in taking [her] . . . child.” (TAC ¶¶ 45, 29.)

A.H.,

.

24

.

prior

.

their

decision,”

Plaintiff
and

to

which

alleges

each

the

(TAC

Third

Defendant

33.)

District

made

one

case

Court

or

more

health

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Juvenile

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rendered its wrongful decision to award sole custody of A.H. to

Court

relied

on

Court
these

3

proceedings

her

of

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Juvenile

about

However,

negligent

the

misrepresentations

¶

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during

intentional

divorce.

and

misrepresentations

mental

that
when

the
it

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Hartnett. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges she has been diagnosed

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with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and that

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this diagnosis is included in psychological evaluations performed

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during the custody proceedings; however these evaluations also

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contain “false information” from Hartnett that Plaintiff “was

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seriously mentally ill, [and was] bi-polar,” and that Defendants

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“fixated

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“intentionally repeated” them in reports submitted to the state

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court

on

and

in

[these]

.

testimony

.

.

given

unfounded

during

the

allegations,”

custody

and

proceedings,

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without mentioning Plaintiff’s ADHD diagnosis. (TAC ¶¶ 4, 36-38,

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40-41, 100, 127, 157, 173.) Plaintiff alleges the Juvenile Court

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used each Defendant’s “fraudulent misrepresentations, falsified

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evidence

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Plaintiff’s child custody rights. (TAC ¶¶ 28, 56, 163, 173.)

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and

omission

of

exculpatory

evidence”

to

take

away

Plaintiff alleges the district court has subject-matter

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jurisdiction

over

her

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1343(a)(3)-(4), 1331(a), and supplemental jurisdiction over her

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state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (TAC ¶ 2.)

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federal

claims

under

28

U.S.C.

§§

III. DISCUSSION
A. Familial Association and Free Exercise Claims

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Defendants

argue

Plaintiff’s

claim,

in

which

she

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alleges she was deprived of her First Amendment right to familial

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association with her child, is barred by the applicable two year

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statute

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Henderson and Ryan also argue that Plaintiff’s First Amendment

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right to the free exercise of her religion claim is barred by

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this same limitations period.

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of

limitations.

The

County,

Schlanger,

Lynn,

Burton,

“State law determines the statute of limitations for
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[claims] brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Usher v. City of Los

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Angeles,

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statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983 is the forum state's statute of limitations for personal

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injury actions.” Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa

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Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir. 2003). “[T]he applicable

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statute of limitations under California law is two years” since

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California's statute of limitations for personal injury actions

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is two years. Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir.

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828

F.2d

556,

558

(9th

Cir.

1987).

“The

applicable

2014) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1).

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1. Familial Association

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Defendants

argue

Plaintiff’s

familial

association

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claims accrued no later than when Plaintiff lost custody of her

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daughter,

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Plaintiff alleges the Defendants acted to take A.H. from her] or

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in any case no later than June 1, 2011” when Plaintiff alleges

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the Juvenile Court awarded Hartnett custody. (Mem. P&A Supp. Mot.

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Dismiss (“County Mot.”) 4:25-27, ECF No. 34-1.)

“which

occurred

on

either

August

16,

2010

[when

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Plaintiff argues her familial association claims did

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not accrue until August 8, 2012 when the “Third District Court of

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Appeals [decision] revealed. . . that CSOC did not have the right

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to remove [Plaintiff’s] child from her custody.” (Opp’n 15:22-23,

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ECF No. 36.)

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Plaintiff

alleges

in

the

TAC

that

each

Defendant

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violated her right to familial association when “on August 16,

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2010, [each Defendant] acted, or knew and agreed and conspired,

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to

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[Plaintiff] . . . and [when] on November 10, 2010, instead of

continue

to

unlawfully

seize

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.

.

.

or

remove

A.H.

from

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dismissing all charges and returning the child to [Plaintiff],

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defendants’ acted, or knew and agreed and conspired, to continue

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to unlawfully seize... or remove A.H. from her mother.” (TAC ¶

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182.)

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“Although California law determines the length of the

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[statute of] limitations period, federal law determines when a

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civil rights claim accrues. Accrual is the date on which the

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statute of limitations begins to run; under federal law, a claim

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accrues when the plaintiff knows of or has reason to know of the

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injury which is the basis of the action.” Lukovsky v. City and

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Cnty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal

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quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted).

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“The basis of [Plaintiff’s] lawsuit is the unlawful

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removal of her child[] . . . [which she alleges occurred no later

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than November 10, 2010].” Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of

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Children & Family Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 307 (6th Cir. 2010).

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Plaintiff’s

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abeyance pending final resolution of the state custody case [is

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not supported by federal tolling law and does not provide a basis

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for] toll[ing] or otherwise chang[ing] the date of the accrual of

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her claim[].” Id. “Once a plaintiff knows that harm has been done

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to

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limitations

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judgment that other tort claimants must make.” Lukovsky, 535 F.3d

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at 1050. Therefore, Plaintiff’s alleged harm occurred no later

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than November 10, 2010 when Plaintiff alleges A.H. “continued to

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be removed from [her] care and custody,” as a result of the

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Juvenile Court order. (TAC ¶ 83.)

[her,

contention

she]

.

.

whether

that

.

must

to

sue

her

claims

determine
or

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not,

were

“held

within

which

is

the

.

.

.

period

precisely

in

of
the

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Plaintiff’s action was “commenced in federal district

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court

for

purposes

3

complaint [was] filed.” Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1128

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(9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on August

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8, 2013; since her familial association claims were commenced

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“well

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claim[s]

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prejudice. Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 308.

outside

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.

.

the
.

of

the

two-year

[are]

statute

of

limitations

untimely”

and

limitations

period

therefore

.

when

.

.

dismissed

the

[the]
with

2. Free Exercise Claim

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The County, Schlanger, Lynn, Burton, Henderson and Ryan

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argue Plaintiff’s free exercise claim also accrued more than two

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years before she filed her complaint. Plaintiff did not respond

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to this argument in her opposition brief.

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Plaintiff alleges:

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Karen Schlanger told Plaintiff that A.H.
could not attend catechism thus restricting
plaintiff’s rights to exercise her free
choice of religion. During a supervised visit
at the Catholic Church in Tahoe, Plaintiff
and A.H., were walking up to the alter to
light candles and pray. Romney Lynn followed
them to the alter, interfered with them
lighting
candles,
prevented
them
from
praying, interfered with and prevented mother
and daughter from exercising their rights to
religious expression.

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(TAC ¶ 227.) The TAC does not state the date on which this

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alleged free exercise violation occurred, but does allege that

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Schlanger

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“January 2002 to on or about August 30, 2010,” at which point

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Schlanger was replaced. (TAC ¶ 12.) Even assuming the alleged

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violative conduct occurred on the last day that Plaintiff alleges

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Schlanger was assigned as “the case worker in this case,” the

was

the

social

worker

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assigned

to

Plaintiff

from

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conduct underlying her claim occurred more than two years before

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she filed her initial complaint. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel

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stated at the January 20, 2015 hearing on the motions that the

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conduct

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limitations period. See Johnson v. America Online, Inc., No. C-

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01-21083-RMW, 2002 WL 1268397, at *2 n.1 (“[C]ounsel is competent

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to make representations to the court which are binding upon his

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clients.”); Laird v. Air Carrier Engine Serv., Inc., 263 F.2d

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948, 953 (5th Cir. 1959)(“Lawyers can and frequently do make

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statements which, had the client made them, would be admissible

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as admissions.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s free exercise claim is

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dismissed with prejudice.

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underling

this

claim

occurred

outside

the

statute

of

B. Plaintiff’s Second Claim Titled Violation of the ADA

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Defendants seek dismissal of what Plaintiff states in

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the title of her second claim is a claim alleged under section

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12182 of the A[mericans] with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). However,

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the text of this claim reveals it is alleged under the California

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Unruh Act, which is prescribed in Civil Code § 51 et. seq.; this

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is also evinced by the following damages Plaintiff seeks in this

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claim:

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[Plaintiff is] entitled to recover statutory
damages of 3 times the minimum actual damages
of $46,000 or at least $138,000 plus past
attorney fees in a total amount yet to be
determined plus current attorney’s fees, as
provided in California Civil Code Section 52.
Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the
claimed amount to include additional costs
and expenses that have and are accruing but
not yet calculated.

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(TAC Prayer for Relief, ¶ 2) (emphasis added). Although it is

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unclear why Plaintiff titles this claim a federal ADA claim,
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California’s

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federal ADA can be used to state an Unruh Act claim as follows:

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“A violation of the right of any individual under the federal

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Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . also constitute[s]

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a violation” of the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). However,

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this

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California state law claim under the Unruh Act, not a federal ADA

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claim.2 Therefore, there is no federal ADA claim pled in the TAC,

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and thus, no surviving federal claims for the purpose of subject-

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Unruh

incorporation

Act

of

prescribes

the

federal

that

section

ADA

12812

concerns

of

the

pleading

a

matter jurisdiction.

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C. State Claims

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County Defendants argue the Court should decline to

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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims

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since the TAC does not contain a viable federal claim. (County

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Mot.

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district court had original jurisdiction had been dismissed. The

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TAC contains the following state claims: falsification of court

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records; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent

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infliction of emotional distress; abuse of process; failure to

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discharge

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accusing Plaintiff of a criminal act; placing false information

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in a government file; negligence; and discrimination under the

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California Civil Code section 51(f).

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13:2-7.)

a

Each

claim

mandatory

in

duty;

Plaintiff’s

negligent

TAC

over

which

supervision;

the

falsely

A district court may assess whether it should continue

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2

Plaintiff stated through counsel during the January 20, 2015
hearing on the motions that she would request leave to amend the TAC “if it
means keeping [her] case alive.” This conditional request is not considered a
motion to amend the TAC to add a federal ADA claim since, as explained below,
Plaintiff’s “case [is still] alive” because Plaintiff’s state claims will be
dismissed without prejudice.

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exercising supplemental jurisdiction “at every stage of . . .

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litigation,” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S.

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156,

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jurisdiction

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judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.” United

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Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Further,

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“[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a

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matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by

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procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Id.

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173

(1997),

The

over

and
a

Gibbs

may

state

factors

decline

claim

weigh

based

in

exercising
on

supplemental

“considerations

favor

of

declining

of

the

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exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining

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state claims. Therefore, Plaintiff’s state claims are dismissed

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without prejudice under section 1367(c)(3).

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IV. CONCLUSION

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For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s federal claims are

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dismissed with prejudice and her state law claims are dismissed

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without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

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Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants on

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Plaintiff’s federal claims, and this action shall be closed.

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Dated:

May 27, 2015

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