Hass v. County of Sacramento, et al.
Filing
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ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 4/17/14 GRANTING 20 Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's 20 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first and second causes of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendant's 20 Motion to Dismiss P laintiff's third cause of action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint must be filed within 20 days from the date of this order. Defendant's responsive pleading is due within 20 days thereafter. If Plaintiff elects not to file a Second Amended Complaint, the case will proceed without the Defendant County on the remaining causes of action. (Meuleman, A)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JAMES D. HASS,
No.
2:13-CV-01746 JAM KJN
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, ATTORNEY SEAN
GJERDE, AND DOES 1 through X,
inclusive,
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
SACRAMENTO COUNTY’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
Defendants.
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This matter is before the Court on Defendant Sacramento
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County’s (“Defendant” or “Defendant County”) Motion to Dismiss
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(Doc. #20) Plaintiff James Hass’ (“Plaintiff”) First Amended
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Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #18) for failure to state a claim
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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure.
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replied (Doc. #26). 1
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motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff opposed the motion (Doc. #24) and Defendant
For the following reasons, Defendant’s
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I.
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On December 8, 2010, Plaintiff was arraigned on charges of
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for March 19, 2014.
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contempt of court for violation of a court order to pay child
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support.
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Sacramento County Superior Court on February 7, 2011 for trial on
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the contempt matter.
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failed to appear in court.
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non-appearance, the court ordered that Plaintiff be incarcerated
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in the Sacramento County Jail for 55 days.
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February 8, 2011, Plaintiff appeared in Sacramento County
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Superior Court, under the mistaken belief that trial was set for
FAC ¶ 10.
Plaintiff was ordered to appear in
FAC ¶ 11.
On February 7, 2011, Plaintiff
FAC ¶ 12.
As a result of Plaintiff’s
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that date.
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On
remained in custody until March 5, 2011.
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FAC, Ex. 2.
FAC ¶¶ 18, 21.
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FAC ¶¶ 16-17.
Plaintiff was taken into custody, and
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant County was not authorized
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by the Sacramento County Superior Court to arrest, detain or
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incarcerate Plaintiff.”
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that “the Clerk’s minutes of the proceedings on February 7, 2011
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did not constitute a final order or judgment in the matter,” and
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the Sacramento County Court did not execute and file a “Warrant
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of Commitment” until March 4, 2011.
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FAC ¶ 23.
Plaintiff further alleges
FAC ¶¶ 15, 24.
On his first day in custody, Plaintiff was interviewed by a
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“medical staff person” to determine his health needs while in
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Sacramento County Jail.
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disclosed the following medical conditions: high blood pressure,
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acute sleep apnea, diabetes, and “diminished strength due to a
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major stroke.”
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he was originally provided with medication for his high blood
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pressure, but “at some point during his incarceration, Defendant
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County ceased providing” the medication.
FAC ¶ 42.
FAC ¶ 41.
Plaintiff alleges that he
While incarcerated, Plaintiff claims
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FAC ¶ 45.
While in
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custody, Plaintiff alleges he was not provided with any other
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medication, nor was he permitted to use a CPAP machine for his
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sleep apnea.
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allowed a single shower for 6 days,” was held in a cell with “no
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windows and . . . bags of old food/garbage,” and was not
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permitted “to exercise on a regular basis or to have time out of
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his cell.”
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alleges he was not brought in front of a judicial magistrate to
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challenge the legality of his confinement.
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FAC ¶¶ 46, 49.
FAC ¶¶ 47-48, 51.
Plaintiff was allegedly “not
While incarcerated, Plaintiff
FAC ¶¶ 32, 38-39.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant “has a policy of
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segregating those incarcerated pursuant to a civil matter from
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those in criminal matters.”
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that, “as a proximate result of this policy,” he suffered
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constitutional injuries in violation of the Fourth and Eighth
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Amendments.
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FAC ¶ 64.
Plaintiff further alleges
FAC ¶ 68.
Plaintiff was represented by Sean Gjerde (“Defendant
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Gjerde”) in the above-mentioned family court matter.
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Defendant Gjerde’s representation of Plaintiff is the subject
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matter of Plaintiff’s fourth through eighth causes of action.
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However, as Defendant County’s Motion to Dismiss only addresses
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Plaintiff’s first through third causes of action, the facts of
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Defendant Gjerde’s representation are not relevant and are not
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summarized here.
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FAC ¶ 71.
On December 19, 2013, this Court granted Defendant County’s
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Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. (Doc. #16) On January 8,
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2014, Plaintiff filed the FAC (Doc. #18) in this Court.
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Plaintiff’s FAC includes the following causes of action against
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the Defendant County: (1) False Imprisonment; (2) Negligence; and
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(3) “Violation of Civil Rights”.
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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff has
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asserted a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation
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of his federal civil rights.
This Court has original
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II.
OPINION
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A.
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for
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First Cause of Action—False Imprisonment
false imprisonment is barred by California Penal Code (“CPC”)
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section 847(b).
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847(b)(1) “precludes civil liability for false imprisonment
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against a peace officer for an act within the scope of his or her
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authority arising out of a lawful arrest, or an arrest that the
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officer had reasonable cause to believe was lawful.”
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Plaintiff does not directly respond to this argument, but argues,
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generally, that’s “Defendant’s assertion of immunity is an
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affirmative defense” and that “motions to dismiss . . . do not
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typically and/or necessarily embrace litigation of affirmative
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defenses.”
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Mot. at 4.
Defendant notes that CPC section
Mot. at 4.
Opp. at 1-2.
As an initial matter, immunity defenses are properly raised
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in a motion to dismiss.
See, e.g., Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court
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for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1387 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Plaintiff cites no case law in support of his position that the
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issue of immunity has been raised prematurely.
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Supreme Court has “stressed the importance of resolving immunity
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questions at the earliest possible stage of litigation.”
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v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
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does not “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief,” it would
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Opp. at 1-2.
The
Hunter
Accordingly, if the FAC
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be “unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the
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expense of discovery and continued litigation.”
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652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Starr v. Baca,
Under the California Government Code, Defendant County is
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generally liable for the actions of its employees under the
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theory of respondeat superior.
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Therefore, to state a cause of action against Defendant,
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Plaintiff must plead facts that, if true, would expose a County
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employee to civil liability for false imprisonment.
Cal. Gov’t. Code § 815.2.
However, CPC
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section 847(b) provides that “[t]here shall be no civil liability
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on the part of . . . any peace officer . . ., acting within the
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scope of his or her authority, for . . . false imprisonment
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arising out of any arrest” if “[t]he arrest was lawful or the
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peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to
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believe that the arrest was lawful.”
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jailer cannot be held liable for false imprisonment unless “he
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knew or should have known of the illegality of the imprisonment.”
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Sullivan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710, 717-18 (1974).
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Accordingly, Defendant is immune from civil liability for falsely
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imprisoning Plaintiff unless one of its employees lacked
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reasonable cause to believe that Plaintiff’s arrest was lawful,
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or knew or should have known that Plaintiff’s imprisonment was
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illegal.
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CPC § 847(b).
Similarly, a
On February 7, 2011, Plaintiff failed to appear at his
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scheduled court appearance and Commissioner Danny Haukedalen
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sentenced Plaintiff to 55 days in jail for his failure to appear.
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FAC ¶¶ 12, 14.
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arrested Plaintiff and took him into custody.
On February 8, 2011, a Deputy County Sheriff
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FAC ¶ 18.
The
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Commissioner’s February 7, 2011 order, as well as the Clerk’s
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minutes reflecting that order (FAC, Ex. 2), provided the
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arresting officer with “reasonable cause to believe that the
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arrest was lawful.”
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who subsequently served as Plaintiff’s “jailer” did not know or
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have reason to know that Plaintiff’s imprisonment was illegal.
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The fact that the Warrant of Commitment was not issued and signed
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until March 4, 2011 is immaterial: both the arresting officer and
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the jailer could reasonably rely on the Clerk’s minutes to
CPC § 847(b).
Moreover, the County employee
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reflect the Commissioner’s order that Plaintiff be committed for
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55 days.
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held liable for false imprisonment of Plaintiff.
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FAC, Ex. 2.
Accordingly, Defendant County may not be
CPC § 847(b).
Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant is not immune from suit
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under the Eleventh Amendment is misplaced.
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Defendant claims statutory immunity, under CPC section 847(b)(1),
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rather than constitutional immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
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Reply at 2.
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to municipalities or political subdivisions of a state, such as
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Defendant County.
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Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
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Amendment arguments are non-responsive to Defendant’s claim of
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statutory immunity.
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Opp. at 2-3.
Indeed, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Eleventh
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s first cause of action
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for false imprisonment is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
As
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Defendant is entitled to statutory immunity under CPC section
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847(b), any attempts to amend the first cause of action would be
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futile.
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1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048,
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B.
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s second cause of action for
Second Cause of Action--Negligence
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negligence is barred by several sections of the California
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Government Code (“CGC”).
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argues that the CGC immunizes a public entity from liability
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stemming from (1) “an injury to any prisoner,” (2) interference
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with a prisoner’s right to obtain a judicial determination or
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review of the legality of his confinement, and (3) failure to
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furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner.
Mot. at 5.
Specifically, Defendant
Mot. at 5-6
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(citing CGC § 844.6(a)(2)).
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the issue of statutory immunity in his opposition brief.
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Plaintiff alleges two distinct forms of harm in his
Plaintiff does not directly address
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negligence claim.
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Defendant “was ignorant of material facts about his incarceration
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that would have provided him an opportunity” to obtain a judicial
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determination as to the legality of his confinement.
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Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide
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appropriate medical care despite its knowledge that Plaintiff
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suffered from high blood pressure, acute sleep apnea, diabetes,
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and “diminished strength due to a major stroke he suffered in
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early 2009.”
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FAC ¶ 33-61.
First, Plaintiff alleges that
FAC ¶ 39.
FAC ¶ 40-49.
Defendant cannot be held liable for “interfering with the
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right of a prisoner to obtain a judicial determination or review
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of the legality of his confinement,” unless such interference was
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“intentional and unjustifiable.”
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alleged that Defendant’s failure to bring him in front of a judge
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was an “intentional” interference with that right.
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based on the Clerk’s minutes of the February 7, 2011 proceeding,
CGC § 845.4.
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Plaintiff has not
Furthermore,
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it cannot be said that Defendant’s failure to provide Plaintiff
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with an opportunity to further challenge his confinement was
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“unjustifiable.”
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justified in concluding that Plaintiff had been sentenced to 55
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days of confinement, and that no further judicial hearing was
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necessary.
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liability for interfering with Plaintiff’s right to a judicial
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review of the legality of his confinement.
Relying on the Clerk’s minutes, Defendant was
Accordingly, Defendant is statutorily immune from
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Moreover, Defendant cannot be held liable for an injury
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caused by the failure of a County employee to “furnish or obtain
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medical care for a prisoner in his custody,” unless the prisoner
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is “in need of immediate medical care” and the employee “fails to
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take reasonable action to summon such medical care.”
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CGC § 845.6.
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were aware of his medical conditions, he does not allege that he
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was “in need of immediate medical care,” within the meaning of
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the statute.
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2006) (finding that an inmate with a fractured thumb required
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immediate medical care to set and cast the fracture).
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Although Plaintiff alleges that County employees
Cf., Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.
Furthermore, even if these conditions did require immediate
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medical care, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant County
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failed to summon such care.
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Rehab., 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1074 (2013) (distinguishing between
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the failure to summon medical care and negligence by those
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providing medical care, the latter of which the State may not be
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held liable for, under section 845.6).
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with a “medical staff person” upon booking into the Sacramento
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County Jail.
FAC ¶ 41.
Castaneda v. Dep't of Corr. &
Plaintiff had contact
Plaintiff was originally provided with
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his medication for high blood pressure, but “at some point during
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his incarceration,” this medication ceased; Plaintiff was never
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provided with medication or treatment for diabetes or sleep
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apnea.
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“as a matter of statutory interpretation, . . . the act of a
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doctor or other such professional who, in the course of treatment
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of a prisoner, fails to prescribe and/or provide the correct
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medication is [not] the legal equivalent to a failure to summon
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medical care” under § 845.6.
FAC ¶¶ 43-49.
California state courts have held that,
Nelson v. State of California, 139
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Cal.App.3d 72, 80-81 (1982) (emphasis added).
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alleged failure to provide medication to Plaintiff does not
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expose Defendant to liability under CGC section 845.6.
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Defendant’s
As CGC sections 844.6(a)(2), 845.4, and 845.6 preclude
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Defendant’s liability for injuries to Plaintiff resulting from
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the negligence of Defendant or Defendant’s employees, Plaintiff
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has failed to state a claim for relief in his second cause of
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action.
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DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
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statutory immunity under the California Government Code, any
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attempts to amend the second cause of action would be futile.
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Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second cause of action is
As Defendant is entitled to
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C.
Third Cause of Action—Civil Rights Claims
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In his third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a “violation
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of [his] civil rights.”
Although Plaintiff does not expressly
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invoke a statute, it can be inferred that Plaintiff’s claim is
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brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Defendant County, his civil rights claim takes the form of a
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As Plaintiff has sued
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§ 1983 Monell claim.
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New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
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Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action purport to state
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constitutional (rather than common law) claims, the analysis is
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identical to that set forth below.
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Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of
To the extent that
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s third cause of action must
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be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Mot. at 7.
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Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to
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allege a policy or custom that was the cause of any
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constitutional violations.
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the “de facto policies and customs of incarceration in
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California” violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and
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Fourteenth Amendments.
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Defendant’s policy of “segregating those incarcerated pursuant to
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a civil matter from those in criminal matters” resulted in the
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constitutional violations.
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Mot. at 7.
Opp. at 19.
Plaintiff responds that
Plaintiff also alleges that
FAC ¶ 64.
Although a municipality can be sued under § 1983, “it cannot
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be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the
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constitutional injury.”
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Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993).
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Furthermore, the complaint must allege the policy, as well as its
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causal relationship to the constitutional injury, in sufficient
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detail.
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See, e.g., Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197
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F.3d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (approving the dismissal of a
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Monell claim, on the grounds that “the complaint did not allege a
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deliberate County policy with sufficient particularity”).
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Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
General or conclusory allegations will not suffice.
The only policy expressly alleged in the FAC is the County’s
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“policy of segregating those incarcerated pursuant to a civil
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matter from those in criminal matters.”
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is also described as “discriminating between an inmate being
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housed in the county jail pursuant to a civil matter rather than
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a criminal matter.”
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“[a]s a proximate result of this policy,” he suffered various
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constitutional harms.
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brief, Plaintiff largely ignores this policy and does not explain
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the causal nexus between the policy and the constitutional harms
FAC ¶ 63.
FAC ¶ 64.
This policy
Plaintiff further alleges that,
FAC ¶ 66-68.
However, in his opposition
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alleged.
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causal relationship between a policy of separating individuals
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incarcerated in criminal and civil matters, and allegedly
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inhumane prison conditions.
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allegation of a causal relationship between the policy and his
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constitutional injuries is insufficient to withstand Defendant’s
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motion to dismiss.
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(elements of a Monell claim must be alleged with “sufficient
18
particularity”).
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Opp. at 9-10.
Moreover, there is no self-evident
Plaintiff’s mere conclusory
See Estate of Brooks, 197 F.3d at 1247
Plaintiff’s argument that his incarceration violated the
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Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is unpersuasive.
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This argument focuses on Plaintiff’s allegations that the
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“Warrant of Commitment” did not issue until March 4, 2011, and
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that Plaintiff was never brought before a judicial magistrate
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after his confinement began.
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assuming that these circumstances were improper, Plaintiff simply
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does not allege or argue that a County policy was the driving
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force behind these events.
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standard, Plaintiff erroneously cites the standards for the good-
Opp. at 4-9.
Opp. at 4-9.
However, even
In lieu of citing the correct Monell
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faith exception to the exclusionary rule and qualified immunity
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for individual government officials.
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States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and Anderson v. Creighton,
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483 U.S. 635 (1987)).
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is misplaced.
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(9th Cir. 1992).
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policy of inaction and deliberate indifference existed, where the
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County failed to take remedial action despite the fact that the
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Sheriff “knew of at least 19 incidents . . . in which individuals
Opp. at 7-8 (citing United
Moreover, Plaintiff’s reliance on Oviatt
Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470
In Oviatt, the Ninth Circuit determined that a
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sat in jail for periods of undetermined length after they missed
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arraignment.”
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markedly different, as there is no allegation that a policy-
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making County employee had knowledge of a similar pattern of
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incidents.
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Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1478.
The case at bar is
Likewise, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant violated his
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Eighth Amendment rights is unavailing.
Opp. at 9-17.
Plaintiff
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cites a number of cases in which prison conditions were found to
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violate the Eighth Amendment, and attempts to draw parallels to
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the conditions he allegedly endured in the present case.
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14-17.
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these conditions or that a County employee at the policy-making
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level had actual or constructive knowledge of these conditions.
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Without doing so, Plaintiff cannot maintain a Monell claim based
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on a policy of inaction or deliberate indifference.
25
F.2d at 1477.
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which the U.S. Supreme Court examined various Eighth Amendment
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violations in the California state prison system.
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Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011).
Opp. at
However, he fails to allege that a County policy caused
Oviatt, 954
Plaintiff relies heavily on Brown v. Plata, in
Brown v.
However, Plaintiff fails to draw a
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1
connection between the conditions described in Plata, and those
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encountered by him while incarcerated in the entirely separate
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prison system run by Defendant County.
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that the Plata ruling on state prison conditions placed Defendant
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on “constructive notice” of the alleged violations in Sacramento
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County Jail does not follow.
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contention that the “denial of medical care and deprivation of
8
exercise and basic necessities” are the “de facto policies and
9
customs of incarceration in California” is unsupported by the
Plaintiff’s conclusion
Opp. at 13.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s
10
FAC.
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mistreatment suggests “a practice so permanent and well settled
12
as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law,”
13
would eviscerate the requirements of Monell altogether.
14
436 U.S. at 691.
15
unhelpful in this regard, given the heightened pleading
16
requirements that have subsequently developed.
17
(citing Atchinson v. D.C., 73 F.3d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1996) and
18
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
19
Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)).
Opp. at 19.
To find that an isolated instance of alleged
Monell,
Plaintiff’s citation to pre-Twombly case law is
Opp. at 20
20
Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant violated his
21
procedural and substantive due process rights is unconvincing.
22
Opp. at 9, 17-18.
23
support of this argument is a case involving § 1983 liability of
24
an individual government official.
25
523 U.S. 833 (1998).
26
acknowledged that “the issue of municipal liability is not before
27
us.”
28
arguments, it ultimately fails because Plaintiff fails to connect
The only legal authority cited by Plaintiff in
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,
Indeed, in Lewis, the Court expressly
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 838 n. 2.
13
As with Plaintiff’s other
1
the alleged constitutional violations to an official County
2
policy.
3
cause of action is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third
4
5
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III.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
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GRANTED.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s first and
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second causes of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action
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is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
11
Complaint must be filed within twenty (20) days from the date of
12
this order.
13
(20) days thereafter.
14
Amended Complaint, the case will proceed without the Defendant
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County on the remaining causes of action.
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Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Defendant’s responsive pleading is due within twenty
If Plaintiff elects not to file a Second
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
April 17, 2014
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