Hass v. County of Sacramento, et al.

Filing 40

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 10/7/2014 GRANTING 31 Defendant County's Motion to Dismiss first cause of action with leave to amend; Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint must be filed within 20 days from the date of this Order. Defendant's responsive pleading is due within 20 days thereafter. If Plaintiff elects not to file a Third Amended Complaint, the case will proceed without Defendant County. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAMES D. HASS,

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2:13-cv-01746 JAM KJN

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
DEPARTMENT OF SUPPORT
SERVICES, SACRAMENTO COUNTY
SHERIFF SCOTT JONES, ATTORNEY
SEAN GJERDE, AND DOES 1
through X, inclusive,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
SACRAMENTO COUNTY’S MOTION TO
DISMISS

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Defendants.
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Defendant Sacramento County (“Defendant”) moves to dismiss

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the first cause of action for violation of his civil rights in

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Plaintiff James Hass’ (“Plaintiff”) Second Amended Complaint

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(“SAC”).

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GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 1

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For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for August 20, 2014.
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I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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From February 8, 2011 to March 5, 2011, Plaintiff was

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incarcerated in the Sacramento County Jail on an order of civil

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contempt, arising from a family court matter.

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Pursuant to California Penal Code (“CPC”) § 4001, Defendant

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County “separated Plaintiff from inmates who were [awaiting]

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pending trials or serving sentences for criminal convictions.”

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SAC ¶ 11.

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the de facto policy of discrimination against an inmate serving

SAC ¶ 9.

Plaintiff alleges that, “[a]s a proximate result of

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a civil commitment, Defendant County deprived Plaintiff of a

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humane environment” during his incarceration.

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Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was kept in a windowless

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cell along with “large bags of kitchen garbage,” and was not

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provided time to exercise, shower, or “watch the news.”

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¶¶ 15, 20.

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SAC ¶ 24.

SAC

Plaintiff also alleges that, on his first day in custody,

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he “went through the routine intake processing” at the jail,

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which included a medical interview.

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interview, Plaintiff disclosed a number of medical conditions

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including hypertension, acute sleep apnea, diabetes, and a

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history of strokes.

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provided with blood pressure medication but, at some point

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during his incarceration, “Defendant County withdrew all

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medications from Plaintiff and deprived Plaintiff of access to a

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[sleep apnea] CPAP machine.”

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Defendant knew or should have known that the failure to provide

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appropriate medical treatment “created a high risk of harm to

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Plaintiff.”

SAC ¶ 30.

SAC ¶¶ 28-29.

During this

Plaintiff was originally

SAC ¶ 36.

SAC ¶ 41.
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Plaintiff alleges that

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Plaintiff was represented by Sean Gjerde (“Defendant

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Gjerde”) in the above-mentioned family court matter.

SAC ¶ 4.

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Defendant Gjerde’s representation of Plaintiff is the subject

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matter of Plaintiff’s second through sixth causes of action.

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However, as Defendant County’s Motion to Dismiss only addresses

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Plaintiff’s first cause of action, the facts of Defendant

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Gjerde’s representation are not relevant to its motion and are

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not summarized here.

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II.

OPINION

Plaintiff’s only claim against the Defendant County

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alleges a “violation of [his] civil rights.”

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Although Plaintiff does not expressly invoke a statute, it is

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inferred that his claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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and takes the form of a § 1983 Monell claim.

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Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

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SAC at 3.

Monell v. Dep't of

A municipality can be sued under § 1983, but “it cannot be

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held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the

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constitutional injury.”

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Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993).

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order to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a

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plaintiff must allege (1) that an official policy or custom

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existed; (2) that the plaintiff suffered constitutional injury;

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and (3) the existence of a causal link between the policy/custom

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and the plaintiff’s injury.

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also be alleged with “sufficient particularity” and general or

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conclusory allegations will not suffice.

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Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1247 (9th

Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics

Id.

In

Each of these elements must

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See, e.g., Estate of

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Cir. 1999) (approving the dismissal of a Monell claim, on the

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grounds that “the complaint did not allege a deliberate County

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policy with sufficient particularity”).

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Plaintiff argues, generally, that his civil rights were

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violated during his confinement in Sacramento County Jail.

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¶¶ 9-45.

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. . . has two component parts.”

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that he was deprived of appropriate medical care due to

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Defendant’s failure to adequately train its employees.

SAC

Plaintiff notes that the alleged “inhumane treatment
Opp. at 5.

First, he alleges

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¶ 42.

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conditions due to his status as a civil inmate.

SAC

Second, he alleges that he was confined under inhumane
SAC ¶ 24.

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A.

Failure to Train Employees to Provide Medical Care

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Defendant moves to dismiss the claim against it because

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Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish

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municipality liability for failure to adequately train its

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employees to provide Plaintiff with medical care.

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Defendant notes that both the SAC and Plaintiff’s opposition

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brief “fail[] to explain the medical consequences of the

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County’s alleged failure to provide him with his medications.”

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Reply at 4.

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appears to argue that exposure to the risk of harm is sufficient

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to state a civil rights violation.

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v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993)).

Mot. at 4.

Plaintiff does not directly address this issue, but

Opp. at 3-4 (citing Helling

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Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not specifically

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alleged any harm suffered as a result of Defendant’s failure to

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provide him with adequate medical treatment.

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Plaintiff did allege that Defendant’s employees failed to

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provide him access to his CPAP sleep apnea machine, and failed
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SAC ¶ 41.

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to provide him with his blood pressure medication during his

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incarceration.

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that “the deprivation of currently prescribed medications and

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medical equipment to Plaintiff created a high risk of harm to

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Plaintiff.”

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Plaintiff has not alleged any actual injury that resulted from

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the risk created by Defendant’s employees.

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allegation that that he “suffered injury to his person” is

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insufficient in this regard.

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SAC ¶ 36.

SAC ¶ 41.

However, Plaintiff merely alleged

Even taking this allegation as true,

His conclusory

Brooks, 197 F.3d at 1247.

Actual injury – or a continuing risk of harm – is a

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necessary element of a Monell claim.

Leatherman, 507 U.S. at

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166; see also, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1993)

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(holding that a prisoner had stated a cause of action for

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injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment where he alleged

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that he was being exposed to a cellmate who smoked five packs of

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cigarettes per day).

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he cannot allege that he is currently being exposed to a

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continuing risk of harm (i.e., Defendant continues to deprive

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him of his medication).

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injury or a continuing risk of harm is fatal to his Monell

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claim, insofar as it is based on Defendant’s failure to provide

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Plaintiff with proper medical care.

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does not need to address the parties’ arguments as to whether

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Plaintiff has adequately alleged the remaining elements of his

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Monell claim for “failure to train” its employees in providing

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medical treatment, or for “deliberate indifference” to his

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medical needs.

Since Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated,

Plaintiff’s failure to allege actual

For this reason, the Court

Mot. at 4-7; Opp. at 6-17.

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B.Inhumane Treatment due to Classification as Civil Prisoner

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Plaintiff has also alleged that he suffered constitutional
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harm due to the inhumane conditions of his confinement.

SAC

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¶ 24.

Specifically, he claims that he was “not allowed regular

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exercise time, not allowed regular shower time, not allowed to
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watch the news,” and was held in a windowless cell that was
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“being used to store large bags of kitchen garbage.”

SAC ¶¶ 14,

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20.

Plaintiff alleges that that these deprivations were the

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“proximate result of the de facto policy of discrimination
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against an inmate serving a civil commitment.”

SAC ¶ 24.

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Plaintiff appears to be referring to California Penal Code
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§ 4001.

SAC ¶ 11.

CPC § 4001 merely mandates that criminal and

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civil prisoners be “confined separately and distinctly.”
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Notably, § 4001 does not address the conditions of confinement.
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Section 4001 is facially unrelated to the conditions of
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Plaintiff’s confinement, and Plaintiff has failed to allege the
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requisite causal link between the official policy and the harm
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suffered.

Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166.

His conclusory

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allegation that the conditions of his confinement were the
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“proximate result” of the official policy is insufficient.
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Brooks, 197 F.3d at 1247.

Similarly, to the extent that

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Plaintiff’s Monell claim is based on the failure to follow
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Defendant County’s statement of “Mission and Goals,” the causal
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link is missing: it cannot be said that an official policy is
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the “moving force” behind an injury caused by a violation of
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that policy.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

The Court therefore

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finds that allegedly inhumane conditions of Plaintiff’s
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incarceration cannot form the basis for Plaintiff’s Monell

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claim.

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For these reasons, Plaintiff’s first cause of action is

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insufficient to state a Monell claim.

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component parts” of Plaintiff’s alleged mistreatment is

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sufficient grounds for his § 1983 action against Defendant

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County.

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foreclosed by Plaintiff’s failure to allege any actual harm

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resulting from the deprivation of medical treatment, and by

Opp. at 5.

Neither of the “two

Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are

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Plaintiff’s failure to allege a causal nexus between an official

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policy and the conditions of his confinement.

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of

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action is GRANTED.

As amendment of the complaint would not

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necessarily be futile, the motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

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AMEND.

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1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048,

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III.

ORDER

The Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant County’s

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Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action. Plaintiff’s

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Third Amended Complaint must be filed within twenty

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the date of this Order.

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within twenty days thereafter.

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a Third Amended Complaint, the case will proceed without

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Defendant County.

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Defendant’s responsive pleading is due
If Plaintiff elects not to file

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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days from

Dated: October 7, 2014

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