Hass v. County of Sacramento, et al.

Filing 53

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 1/22/2015 ORDERING that the Court GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant County's 44 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of action. As Plaintiff's sole cause of action against Defendant County is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, the matter will proceed without Defendant County. (Zignago, K.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAMES D. HASS,

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2:13-cv-01746 JAM KJN

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
DEPARTMENT OF SUPPORT
SERVICES, SACRAMENTO COUNTY
SHERIFF SCOTT JONES, ATTORNEY
SEAN GJERGE, and DOES 1
through X, inclusive,

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Defendants.
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This matter is before the Court on Defendant Sacramento

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County’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #44) the first

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cause of action in Plaintiff James Hass’ (“Plaintiff”) Third

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Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (Doc. #42).

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motion (Doc. #49) and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. #51).

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the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
I.

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Plaintiff opposes the
For

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

From February 8, 2011 to March 5, 2011, Plaintiff was

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for January 14, 2015.
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incarcerated in the Sacramento County Jail.

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alleges that “Defendant County deprived Plaintiff of a humane

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environment” during his incarceration.

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Plaintiff alleges that he was kept in a windowless cell along

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with “large bags of kitchen garbage,” and was not provided time

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to exercise, shower, or “access news.”

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TAC ¶ 9.

TAC ¶ 34.

Plaintiff

Specifically,

TAC ¶ 22.

Plaintiff also alleges that, on his first day in custody, he

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“went through the routine intake processing” at the jail, which

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included “an interview with a person from the medical staff or

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employee designated by Defendant County to obtain the medical

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information from Plaintiff.”

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interview, Plaintiff disclosed a number of medical conditions

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including hypertension, acute sleep apnea, diabetes, and a

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history of strokes.

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with blood pressure medication but, at some point during his

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incarceration, “Defendant County withdrew all medications from

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Plaintiff and deprived Plaintiff of access to a [sleep apnea]

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CPAP machine.”

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proximate result of Defendant’s deprivation to Plaintiff of his

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legally prescribed medications and medical equipment,” Plaintiff

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“became fearful for his life,” became “demoralized,” suffered

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“emotional distress, humiliation, depression and a decline in his

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physical health.”

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subsequently “became alienated from his wife and the marriage has

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not been restored.”

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TAC ¶ 39.

TAC ¶¶ 37-38.

TAC ¶¶ 45, 46.

During this

Plaintiff was originally provided

Plaintiff alleges that, “as a

TAC ¶¶ 58, 59.

Plaintiff also alleges that he

TAC ¶ 64.

Plaintiff was represented by Sean Gjerde (“Defendant

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Gjerde”) in the family court matter which gave rise to his civil

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confinement.

SAC ¶ 4.

Defendant Gjerde’s representation of
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Plaintiff is the subject matter of Plaintiff’s second through

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sixth causes of action.

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dismiss only addresses Plaintiff’s first cause of action, the

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facts of Defendant Gjerde’s representation are not relevant to

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its motion and are not summarized here.

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However, as Defendant County’s motion to

On March 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in

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Sacramento County Superior Court.

On August 22, 2013, Defendants

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removed the matter to this Court.

On August 29, 2013, Defendant

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County filed a motion to dismiss the initial complaint.

On

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December 20, 2013, the Court granted Defendant County’s motion to

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dismiss, but gave Plaintiff leave to amend his civil rights claim

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against the County.

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First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

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County filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC.

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2014, the Court granted Defendant County’s motion to dismiss,

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again giving Plaintiff leave to amend his civil rights claim.

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May 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint

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(“SAC”).

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dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC.

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Defendant County’s motion to dismiss, again with leave to amend.

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On October 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Third Amended

On January 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed his
On January 27, 2014, Defendant
On April 18,

On

On May 27, 2014, Defendant County filed a motion to
On October 8, 2014, the Court granted

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Complaint.

The TAC includes the following causes of action:

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(1) “Violation of Civil Rights – Defendant County;”

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(2) Malpractice in the family law matter; (3) Malpractice for

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failure to keep client advised; (4) Malpractice for loss of

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$70,000 from Home Depot; (5) Malpractice for loss of business,

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personal assets and home; and (6) “Fraud and Deceit/False

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Promise.”
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II.

OPINION

Plaintiff’s only claim against Defendant County alleges a

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“violation of [his] civil rights.”

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complaints, Plaintiff does not expressly invoke a statute, but it

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can be inferred that his claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983.

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claim takes the form of a § 1983 Monell claim.

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of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

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TAC at 3.

As in his previous

As Plaintiff has sued Defendant County, his civil rights
Monell v. Dep't

Although a municipality can be sued under § 1983, “it cannot

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be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the

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constitutional injury.”

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Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993).

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Accordingly, to state a claim for municipal liability under

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§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that an official policy or

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custom existed; (2) that the plaintiff suffered constitutional

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injury; and (3) the existence of a causal link between the

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policy/custom and the plaintiff’s injury.

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these elements must be alleged with “sufficient particularity”

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and general or conclusory allegations will not suffice.

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e.g., Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d

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1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (approving the dismissal of a Monell

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claim, on the grounds that “the complaint did not allege a

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deliberate County policy with sufficient particularity”).

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Plaintiff argues that his civil rights were violated

Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics

Id.

Moreover, each of

See,

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because, “[d]uring his incarceration for 26 days in the

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Sacramento County Main Jail, he was denied prescription

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medications for high blood pressure and diabetes as well as his

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medical equipment for acute sleep apnea.”
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Opp. at 2.

Plaintiff

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argues that Defendant County should be held liable for this

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deprivation because it had an official policy of “provid[ing] a

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safe and humane environment” for inmates, and “the deficiencies

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in the execution of the policy stem from a lack of training

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and/or a lack of supervision.”

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Plaintiff argues that Defendant County was deliberately

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indifferent to the violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights.

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at 13.

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Opp. at 5-6.

Relatedly,

Opp.

Plaintiff’s continued reliance on the Mission and Goals

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Statement published by Defendant County demonstrates a

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fundamental misunderstanding of the Monell requirements.

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Court wrote in its October 8, 2014 order:

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As the

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[T]o the extent that Plaintiff’s Monell claim is based
on the failure to follow Defendant County’s statement
of “Mission and Goals,” the causal link is missing: it
cannot be said that an official policy is the “moving
force” behind an injury caused by a violation of that
policy. Order at 6 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694)
(emphasis in original).

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Plaintiff has provided no authority or reasons for the Court to

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reconsider this conclusion.

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on Defendant County’s Missions and Goals Statement as an official

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policy, for purposes of his Monell claim.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot rely

As Plaintiff has not alleged that an official County policy

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caused the violations, his Monell claim rests entirely on his

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allegations that Defendant County failed to adequately train its

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employees in providing medical care to inmates.

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Court has held that a municipality’s failure to train its

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employees may create § 1983 liability where the “failure to train

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amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with

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whom the [employees] come into contact.”
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The Supreme

City of Canton, Ohio v.

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Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).

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that, to establish a municipality’s deliberate indifference, a

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Plaintiff must show that “the need for more or different training

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is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the

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violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the

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city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent

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to the need.”

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the Supreme Court noted that “[a] municipality’s culpability for

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a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim

The Court further explained

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.

Subsequently,

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turns on a failure to train.”

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1350, 1359 (2011).

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occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little

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about the training program or the legal basis for holding the

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[municipality] liable.”

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Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct.

Moreover, “adequately trained officers

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.

Plaintiff makes the following allegations, which directly

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relate to his “failure to train” theory: “Defendant County failed

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to adequately train and/or supervise its agents and/or employees

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with respect to providing currently prescribed medications to

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inmates” (TAC ¶ 54); “Defendant County demonstrated ‘deliberate

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indifference’ to the welfare and health of Plaintiff” (TAC ¶ 55);

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and “Defendant [County] failed to either supervise and/or train

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staff at the Main Jail regarding identification [of] these

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[suicide] risk factors and/or the procedures to follow to reduce

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Plaintiff’s distress and/or prevent injury or death” (TAC ¶ 32).

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These allegations are precisely the type of “threadbare recitals

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of the elements of a cause of action” that the Supreme Court has

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cautioned will not withstand a motion to dismiss.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Ashcroft v.

The above statements are
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unsupported by any specific factual allegations, regarding the

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details of Defendant County’s alleged training program, precisely

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how that training program was deficient, or how such a deficiency

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caused Plaintiff’s injuries.

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allegations, Plaintiff’s “failure to train” theory of municipal

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liability cannot survive Defendant County’s motion to dismiss.

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In the absence of more specific

Plaintiff also fails to identify any individuals at a

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policymaking level with Defendant County who acted with

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“deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s medical needs.

As noted

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above, a finding of deliberate indifference by a municipality is

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only appropriate where “the need for more or different training

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is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the

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violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the

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city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent

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to the need.”

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relevant actions (or lack thereof) are those taken by individuals

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at the policymaking level.

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that policymakers were aware of his medical condition and failed

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to provide proper care.

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“Defendant County withdrew all medications from Plaintiff” and

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that “Defendant County had actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s

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medical needs and conditions at the time that he was processed

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into the Main Jail.”

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that an individual at the policymaking level was personally

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responsible for inmate intake or dispensation of medication, nor

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would such an allegation be credible.

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appear to refer to the actions of individual non-policymaking

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employees of Defendant County.

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.

Thus, the

At no point does Plaintiff allege

Plaintiff generally alleges that

TAC ¶¶ 42, 46.

Plaintiff does not allege

Rather these allegations

Such actions are not relevant in
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determining municipal liability.
For precisely the same reason, Plaintiff’s argument that his

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medical needs were obvious to Defendant County is misplaced.

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Opp. at 9.

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non-policymaking individuals at the County Jail is irrelevant.

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Rather, Plaintiff needs to have alleged that Defendant County’s

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policymakers were aware that their training program was

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deficient, and that these policymakers made a “conscious or

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deliberate” choice to ignore that deficiency.

Whether Plaintiff’s medical needs were obvious to

Rimac v. Duncan,

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319 F. App'x 535, 538 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged such conduct.

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As discussed above,

Similarly, Plaintiff’s argument as to the “risk factors for

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suicide” identified by then-Jail Commander Scott Jones fails.

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TAC ¶ 18.

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reduce Plaintiff’s distress or exposure to Defendant’s identified

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risk factors for suicide,” primarily solitary confinement for a

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first-time inmate.

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sufficiently alleged policy or custom of placing first-time

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inmates in solitary confinement, such actions can only be

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attributed to individual, non-policymaking employees of Defendant

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County.

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liability.

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Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant took no actions to

TAC ¶ 31.

Again, in the absence of a

These actions are not relevant in determining municipal

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to argue that

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Defendant County had developed an unofficial custom of failure to

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properly provide medications to inmates, his allegations are

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insufficient to establish such a custom.

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allegation in this regard is that “[b]etween 2007 and 2013, at

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least 12 inmates in the custody of Defendant died as a result of
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Plaintiff’s sole

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medical issues that arose while the inmate was in custody.”

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¶ 36.

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as to the details of these 12 deaths.

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occurred “as a result of medical issues that arose while the

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inmate was in custody” does not necessarily mean that such deaths

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resulted from improper care or failure to provide medication.

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Without more, this barebones allegation is insufficient to

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establish an unofficial County custom.

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TAC

This statement is unaccompanied by any further allegations
The fact that these deaths

Finally, as to Plaintiff’s continued reliance on the Supreme

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Court’s recent ruling in Brown v. Plata, the Court refers to the

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finding made in its April 18, 2014 Order:

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Plaintiff relies heavily on Brown v. Plata, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court examined various Eighth
Amendment violations in the California state prison
system. However, Plaintiff fails to draw a connection
between the conditions described in Plata, and those
encountered by him while incarcerated in the entirely
separate prison system run by Defendant County.
Plaintiff’s conclusion that the Plata ruling on state
prison conditions placed Defendant on “constructive
notice” of the alleged violations in Sacramento County
Jail does not follow.” Order at 12-13 (citations
omitted).

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Plaintiff has presented no authority or reasons for the Court to

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reconsider this finding.

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Dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate only where

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it is “clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by

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amendment.”

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1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

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leave to amend his complaint three times, and each time Plaintiff

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has been unable to successfully do so.

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each of Defendant County’s repeated motions to dismiss, Plaintiff

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has continued to make arguments that have been consistently

Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d
The Court has granted Plaintiff

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Moreover, in opposing

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rejected by the Court.

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concludes that allowing Plaintiff leave to file a fifth complaint

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would be inappropriate, as amendment would be futile.

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

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See supra at 4-5, 8-9.

III.

The Court

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT

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LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant County’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

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first cause of action.

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against Defendant County is dismissed without leave to amend, the

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As Plaintiff’s sole cause of action

matter will proceed without Defendant County.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 22, 2015

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