Starbucks Corporation v. Amcor Packaging Distribution, et al.,

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting 29 Motion to Dismiss signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 11/4/14: Pallets Unlimited has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file an amended third-party complaint, if it can do so consistent with this Order. (Kaminski, H)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 13 STARBUCKS CORPORATION, a corporation, CIV. NO. 2:13-1754 WBS CKD MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS CROSS-COMPLAINT Plaintiff, 14 15 16 v. AMCOR PACKAGING DISTRIBUTION, et al., 17 Defendants. 18 ----oo0oo---- 19 Plaintiff Starbucks Corporation (“Starbucks”) filed 20 21 this case against defendants Amcor Packaging Distribution, Amcor 22 Packaging (USA), Inc. (collectively “Amcor”), and Pallets 23 Unlimited after discovering mold on its coffee bags, coffee, and 24 several wooden shipping pallets provided to Starbucks by 25 defendants. 26 defendants supplied it with defective pallets that caused the 27 mold. 28 against each other, (Amcor Cross-cl. (Docket No. 14); Pallets (Id.) (Compl. ¶ 9 (Docket No. 1).) Starbucks alleges that Pallets Unlimited and Amcor filed cross-claims 1 1 Cross-cl. (Docket No. 15)), and Pallets Unlimited later filed a 2 “cross-claim”1 against third-party defendant Ozburn-Hessey 3 Logistics (“OHL”). 4 moves to dismiss the claims against it. 5 I. (Pallets Compl. (Docket No. 25).) OHL now Factual and Procedural History 6 Amcor allegedly sold Starbucks 9,480 wooden pallets, 7 used to store and transport almost 70,000 bags of unroasted 8 Starbucks coffee beans. 9 hired by Amcor to “manufacture[], assemble[] or provide” some or (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.) 10 all of the pallets. 11 Starbucks also hired OHL to provide warehouse services for 12 Starbucks products. 13 (Id. ¶ 8.) Pallets Unlimited was Under a separate contract, (Pallets Compl. ¶ 11.) Starbucks alleges the pallets used to transport and 14 store its beans were defective because they did not meet the 15 specifications in Starbucks’s contract with Amcor, and “as a 16 result, excessive moisture was present in the pallets, which 17 caused mold to develop in pallets and the coffee bags and 18 [coffee], which were in direct contact with the faulty pallets.” 19 (Compl. ¶ 9.) 20 Unlimited for strict product liability, breach of warranty, and 21 negligence, as well as a claim against Amcor for breach of 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Starbucks asserts claims against Amcor and Pallets Because OHL was not previously a party to the case and its liability is allegedly derivative of Pallets Unlimited’s, this pleading is more accurately called a “third-party complaint.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1) (“A defending party may, as a third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.”); see also United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[A] third-party claim may be asserted only when the third party’s liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim and the third party’s liability is secondary or derivative.”). 2 1 contract. 2 (Id. ¶¶ 13-38.) On July 22, 2014, Pallets Unlimited filed a third-party 3 complaint against OHL alleging that it delivered wooden pallets 4 to OHL’s warehouse starting in December 21, 2011, and at that 5 time, none of the pallets contained mold. 6 9.) 7 them out to various locations determined by Starbucks. 8 13) 9 they were “properly stored and protected from the elements such (Pallets Compl. ¶¶ 8- OHL then stored the pallets at its facility until sending (Id. ¶ During this time, OHL was allegedly responsible for ensuring 10 that they would not develop any mold.” (Id.) Pallets Unlimited 11 alleges that, because “the pallets and coffee beans at issue were 12 stored in the sole possession of OHL, . . . the mold likely 13 developed as a result of the storage conditions at the 14 [warehouse].” (Id. ¶ 14.) 15 Based on these allegations, Pallets Unlimited brings 16 four claims against OHL: (1) full indemnification, (2) partial 17 indemnification, (3) negligence, and (4) declaratory relief. 18 (Id. ¶¶ 15-27.) 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 20 claim upon which relief can be granted. 21 II. 22 OHL moves to dismiss all four claims pursuant to Legal Standard On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 23 under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations in the 24 pleadings as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 25 the third-party plaintiff. 26 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 27 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 28 survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “only enough See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 3 To 1 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 3 “plausibility standard,” however, “asks for more than a sheer 4 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and where a 5 plaintiff pleads facts that are “merely consistent with a 6 defendant’s liability,” it “stops short of the line between 7 possibility and plausibility.” 8 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 9 III. Pallets Unlimited’s Claims for Full or Partial Indemnity 10 A. This Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, Judicial Notice of the “OHL Agreement” 11 In general, a court may not consider items outside the 12 pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss, but it may consider 13 items of which it can take judicial notice. 14 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). 15 motion to dismiss may consider a document the authenticity of 16 which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff’s complaint 17 necessarily relies.” 18 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated 19 in Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681-82 (9th 20 Cir. 2006). 21 “[p]revent[] plaintiffs from surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by 22 deliberately omitting references to documents upon which their 23 claims are based.” 24 Barron v. Reich, 13 “A district court ruling on a Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 The policy underlying this rule seeks to Parrino, 146 F.3d at 706. Through the “incorporation by reference” doctrine, the 25 court may also “take into account documents . . . alleged in a 26 complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which 27 are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading . . . 28 even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents 4 1 of that document in the complaint.” 2 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citations 3 omitted). 4 complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are true for 5 purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).’” 6 HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2012) 7 (quoting United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 8 2003)). 9 Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d “A court ‘may treat such a document as part of the Davis v. In its third-party complaint, Pallets Unlimited alleges 10 that “OHL had a contract with [Starbucks] whereby OHL agreed to 11 store the wooden pallets at issue . . . at the [warehouse].” 12 (Pallets Compl. ¶ 11.) 13 the contract (“OHL Agreement”) which it represents contains the 14 terms by which “OHL provided warehouse services to Starbucks” 15 regarding the pallets and coffee at issue. 16 (Docket No. 29); OHL’s Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 5 (Docket No. 17 30-5)). 18 Unlimited’s pleading refers. 19 OHL has provided the court with a copy of (OHL’s Mem. at 3 OHL represents this is the contract to which Pallets (OHL’s Mem. at 3.) OHL and Starbucks both agree that the OHL Agreement is 20 authentic. In fact, they have provided the court with two 21 declarations affirming its authenticity: one from Frank Eichler, 22 chief administrative officer and general counsel of OHL, (OHL’s 23 Reply Ex. 1, Eichler Decl. (Docket No. 40-1)), and one from Jeff 24 Ferrell, sourcing category manager at Starbucks, (Starbucks’s 25 Response Ex. 1, Ferrell Decl. (Docket No. 42-1)). 26 Starbucks has requested that the court file the OHL Agreement 27 under seal, citing “proprietary, commercially sensitive and 28 private information regarding Starbucks vendor relationship, 5 Moreover, 1 facilities’ locations, operational specifications and procedures, 2 costs, metrics, pricing, business practices and other similar 3 proprietary information relating to Starbucks warehousing and 4 service requirements.” 5 Agreement is what it purports to be. 6 This request further suggests that the Nevertheless, despite the fact that its pleading makes 7 reference to “a contract . . . whereby OHL agreed to store the 8 wooden pallets” in its pleading, Pallets Unlimited does not agree 9 that the document which has been provided is the relevant 10 contract. 11 Unlimited argues that its allegation was a “speculative 12 reference” based only upon “information and belief” that “a 13 contract” existed. 14 argues, “Pallets Unlimited was unaware of any actual contract 15 between OHL and Starbucks, much less the specific OHL Agreement 16 sought to be relied upon.” 17 OHL Agreement were quoted or paraphrased specifically in the 18 pleading, however, and Pallets Unlimited asserts that its limited 19 reference to “a contract” did not sufficiently refer to this 20 contract to consider it incorporated by reference.2 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (See Pallets’s Opp’n at 4-7 (Docket No. 38).) (Id. at 4-6.) Pallets At the time of pleading, it (Id. at 5.) None of the terms of the (Id. at 6.) Accordingly, although Pallets Unlimited has offered no 2 Pallets Unlimited also offers several “procedural and evidentiary objections” to considering the OHL Agreement. (Id. at 4, 6 n.1 (citing Fed. Rs. Evid. 401, 402, 803, 901, 902).) Presumably, these objections would become relevant if the court were to convert OHL’s motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Parrino, 146 F.3d at 706 n.4 (“[W]here a defendant attaches extrinsic evidence to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court ordinarily must convert that motion into one for summary judgment under Rule 56 to give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond.”). The court sees no reason to convert OHL’s motion, and thus, does not address these objections further. 6 1 concrete reason for doubting its authenticity, the parties’ 2 disagreement regarding whether the OHL Agreement applies to the 3 facts alleged prevents the court from considering it for purposes 4 of this motion to dismiss. 5 (allowing consideration of documents “whose authenticity no party 6 questions” on a motion to dismiss); Parrino, 146 F.3d at 706 7 (same). 8 B. 9 See Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1076 The court will thus not consider the OHL Agreement. Equitable Indemnity Under California law, indemnity may be either “express 10 indemnity,” which refers to an express contract term providing 11 for indemnification, or “equitable indemnity,” which embraces 12 traditional equitable indemnity and implied contractual 13 indemnity. 14 1157-60 (2009) (reviewing the historical forms of indemnity under 15 California law). Pallets Unlimited does not allege the existence 16 of a contract between it and OHL, leaving only the possibility of 17 equitable indemnity. 18 Prince v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 45 Cal. 4th 1151, See id. Equitable indemnity allows a defendant to “seek 19 apportionment of loss between the wrongdoers in proportion to 20 their relative culpability.” 21 of San Diego, Inc., 213 Cal. App. 3d 419, 426 (4th Dist. 1989). 22 To state a claim for equitable indemnity, plaintiff must make: 23 “(1) a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor and (2) 24 resulting damages to the indemnitee for which the indemnitor is 25 . . . equitably responsible.” 26 App. 4th 206, 217 (1st Dist. 2011). 27 28 Gem Developers v. Hallcraft Homes Bailey v. Safeway, Inc., 199 Cal. Crucially, California law requires that, “[w]ith limited exception, there must be some basis for tort liability 7 1 against the proposed indemnitor . . . generally based on a duty 2 owed to the underlying plaintiff.”3 3 Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Constr., Inc., 119 Cal. App. 4th 848, 852- 4 53 (4th Dist. 2004) (“Without any action sounding in tort, there 5 is no basis for a finding of potential joint and several 6 liability . . . thereby precluding a claim for equitable 7 indemnity.”); see Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland 8 Med. Grp., 143 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1040-41 (1st Dist. 2006) (“The 9 question is whether, with respect to the claims analysis, [the BFGC Architects Planners, 10 indemnitor] owed [the plaintiff] a duty of care sounding in 11 tort.”). 12 First, equitable indemnity requires two or more parties to share 13 a “joint legal obligation” or become “jointly or severally 14 liable” to the same plaintiff. 15 Stop Loss, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 1040. 16 does not permit equitable apportionment of damages for breach of 17 contract . . . .” 18 This rule appears to follow from two principles. See Prince, 5 Cal. 4th at 1158; Second, “California law Stop Loss, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 1041 n.2. Ordinary breach of contract, without something more, 19 will thus not support equitable indemnity because, “[a]lthough in 20 some circumstances the same act may support both contract and 21 tort liability, [the California Supreme Court] held that ‘breach 22 of contract becomes tortious only when it also violates a duty 23 independent of the contract arising from principles of tort 24 law.’” 25 No. 14-00930 JCS, 2014 WL 4364393, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co. LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Civ. 26 27 28 3 The exceptions apply to vicarious liability, strict liability, and implied contractual indemnity. See BFGC, 119 Cal App. 4th at 852. 8 1 2014) (quoting Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal. 4th 543, 551-52 2 (1999)). 3 liability in tort where 4 5 6 7 8 9 For example, breach of contract may also give rise to (1) the breach is accompanied by a traditional common law tort, such as fraud or conversion; (2) the means used to breach the contract are tortious, involving deceit or undue coercion or; (3) one party intentionally breaches the contract intending or knowing that such a breach will cause severe, unmitigable harm in the form of mental anguish, personal hardship, or substantial consequential damages. Erlich, 21 Cal. 4th at 551-52. However, “mere negligent breach 10 of contract” is not sufficient to impose tort liability under 11 California law. 12 (rejecting the argument that “equitable indemnity is appropriate 13 for negligent performance of contractual obligations” under 14 California law). Id.; see also Tesoro, 2014 WL 4364393, at *4-5 Pallets Unlimited’s third-party complaint appears to 15 16 allege that OHL owed Starbucks a duty of care regarding the 17 storage conditions of the pallets, but it leaves the source of 18 this duty ambiguous. 19 an effort to support a duty of care as between OHL and Starbucks. 20 First, it alleges that “OHL had a contract with [Starbucks] 21 whereby OHL agreed to store the wooden pallets at issue . . . at 22 the [warehouse].”4 23 alleges that “OHL was responsible for ensuring that the wooden 24 pallets and coffee beans were properly stored and protected from 25 26 27 28 4 In particular, it makes two allegations in (Pallets Compl. ¶ 11.) And second, it As explained above, the court does not consider the specific terms of this alleged contract. It only assumes the truth of this allegation on its face--that is, it assumes that some contractual relationship existed between OHL and Starbucks with regard to storage of the wooden pallets at issue--as it must for purposes of this motion. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. 9 1 the elements such that they would not develop any mold,” (id. ¶ 2 13.), and through its “negligence or fault,” allowed mold to 3 develop, (id. ¶¶ 20, 22). 4 With regard to the alleged “contract . . . to store the 5 wooden pallets at issue,” (id. ¶ 11.), the third-party complaint 6 describes a contractual duty, not a duty “sounding in tort.” 7 Because California law does not recognize claims of equitable 8 indemnity premised on a contractual duty, the third-party 9 complaint does not state a claim for indemnity upon which relief 10 can be granted on that ground. See BFGC Architects, 119 Cal. 11 App. 4th at 852-53; Stop Loss, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 1040-41. 12 Setting the allegation of a contract aside, nothing in 13 Pallets Unlimited’s pleading supports any viable theory that OHL 14 owed and breached a duty to Starbucks in tort. 15 that “OHL was responsible for ensuring that the wooden pallets 16 and coffee beans were properly stored and protected from the 17 elements” is a conclusory allegation not entitled to deference 18 under Iqbal. 19 555). 20 “negligent” or at “fault.” 21 that might aid the court in uncovering a duty owed by OHL to 22 Starbucks. 23 allowing this court to identify the source for any such duty in 24 tort. 25 The allegation See 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at The same is true of the allegation that OHL was Neither allegation contains facts Pallets Unlimited thus fails to allege any facts The court finds this case comparable to the recent 26 situation faced by Magistrate Judge Spero in Tesoro. See Tesoro, 27 2014 WL 4364393. 28 & Marketing Company LLC (“Tesoro”) sued Pacific Gas and Electric In Tesoro, underlying plaintiff Tesoro Refining 10 1 Company (“PG & E”) after a loss of electrical power to its 2 refinery forced a temporarily shut down. 3 turn sued Foster Wheeler Martinez, Inc. and Martinez Cogen 4 Limited Partnership (collectively, “FWM”), which also provided 5 electricity to Tesoro’s refinery, for equitable indemnity. 6 FWM argued that equitable indemnity was not available because (1) 7 a contract between FWM and Tesoro absolved it of liability to 8 Tesoro and (2) PG & E had not adequately alleged that FWM was 9 liable to Tesoro in tort. Id. at *1. PG & E in Id. After concluding PG & E could not base 10 its claim upon the contract, id. at *3-5, the court set aside the 11 existence of the contract and surveyed California law for any 12 “independent tort duty” upon which to base equitable indemnity, 13 id. at *5-6. 14 in negligence for a duty in these circumstances. 15 Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a); Langley v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 41 16 Cal. 2d 655, 660 (1953)). 17 any source not considered in Tesoro. 18 12.) 19 It concluded that California law afforded no basis Id. (citing Pallets Unlimited fails to point to (See Pallets’s Opp’n at 11- While some set of facts may allow Pallets Unlimited to 20 show that OHL’s actions at the facility give rise to an 21 independent tort or even “both contract and tort liability,” id. 22 at *4, it has not done so on the facts alleged. 23 is no “joint legal obligation” or basis for “joint and several 24 liability” to Starbucks in these allegations. 25 4th at 1158; Stop Loss, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 1040. 26 the court will grant OHL’s motion to dismiss these claims. 27 IV. 28 That is, there See Prince, 5 Cal. Accordingly, Pallets Unlimited’s Negligence Claim To state a claim for negligence under California law, a 11 1 plaintiff must allege duty, breach, causation, and damages. 2 Conroy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 45 Cal. 4th 1244, 1250 3 (2009). 4 negligence is the existence of a duty to use due care toward an 5 interest of another . . . . 6 has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law.” 7 Glenn K. Jackson, Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 8 2001) (quoting Adelman v. Associated International Insurance Co., 9 90 Cal. App. 4th 352, 360 (2001)). 10 “[T]he threshold element of a cause of action for Whether this essential prerequisite Because the court need not simply accept “a conclusory 11 assertion that [OHL] ‘owed a duty of care,’” see Fimbres v. 12 Chapel Mortgage Corp., Civ. No. 09-0886 IEG POR, 2009 WL 4163332, 13 at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.), it 14 must determine whether Pallets Unlimited alleges facts sufficient 15 to establish that OHL actually owed it a duty. 16 alleges two possible duties on which it predicates its negligence 17 claim: (1) a general duty of care owed by all owners of property- 18 -sometimes called “premises liability”--and (2) a duty to notify. 19 20 21 A. Pallets Unlimited Pallets Unlimited Fails to Allege Facts Supporting Premises Liability Pallets Unlimited alleges that “OHL owed a duty . . . 22 to store the coffee beans and pallets at issue at its [warehouse] 23 at or above the standard of care in the industry, which includes 24 storing them in such a way that mold would not develop . . .” 25 (Pallets Compl. ¶ 18.) 26 “premises liability” faced by all property owners in California. 27 (See Pallets’s Opp’n at 10.) 28 this duty, Pallets Unlimited alleges that it “suffered damages This duty arises, it contends, from And as a result of OHL’s breach of 12 1 including, but not limited to, potential liability to 2 [Starbucks].” 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (Pallets Compl. ¶ 18). California Civil Code section 1714(a) provides, in part: Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a); see also Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 51 Cal. 4th 764, 771 (2011) (“The general rule in California is that ‘[e]veryone is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person.’” (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a))). Courts have understood this subsection to impose a “duty to use ordinary care,” which makes an individual “liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances.” Cabral, 51 Cal. 4th at 771 (quoting Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 15 Cal. 4th 456, 472 (1997)). “Premises liability” is generally invoked for the idea that landowners or possessors have a duty to avoid subjecting others to a risk of bodily injury or property damage. See, e.g., Brooks v. Eugene Burger Mgmt. Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1611, 161924 (5th Dist. 1989) (involving bodily injury to a child allegedly caused by inadequate fencing around a roadway); Wilson v. Rancho Sespe, 207 Cal. App. 2d 10, 17 (2d Dist. 1962) (stating that premises liability “is applicable also with respect to liability for damage to property”); see also Cal. Civ. Prac. Torts § 16:1 (“The term ‘premises liability’ refers to the liability of 13 1 certain persons for injuries and damages to others arising from 2 the ownership or possession of real property.”). 3 However, Pallets Unlimited does not allege injury to 4 its person or property. 5 over the wooden pallets at issue while they were stored at OHL’s 6 warehouse.5 7 “constructed by” Pallets Unlimited, (Pallets Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, 11, 8 13-14, 18), but makes no mention of whether it retained ownership 9 of the pallets or transferred them to Starbucks upon delivery. 10 In fact, it does not allege ownership It repeatedly alleges that the pallets were Moreover, and perhaps more tellingly, Pallets Unlimited 11 does not allege that it suffered damages in the form of harm to 12 its pallets. 13 liability” to Starbucks, (id. ¶ 18), which would presumably 14 consist of a money judgment against it, as well as “damages 15 relating to attorney’s fees and costs of suit herein,” (id. 16 ¶ 17). 17 better understood as a duty to protect it from the prospect of 18 purely economic loss it now faces as a result of Starbucks’s 19 claims against it. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 It alleges damages solely in the form of “potential Any duty allegedly owed to Pallets Unlimited is thus Pallets Unlimited has not provided, and the court cannot find, any basis in California law for such a duty.6 5 If Pallets Unlimited states in its opposition brief that OHL breached its duty as a premises owner “to ensure that Pallets Unlimited’s wooden pallets and Starbuck’s [sic] coffee beans” were properly stored. (Pallets’s Opp’n at 9.) While this could be construed as a statement of ownership, the court may not consider any material other than the challenged pleadings for purposes of this motion, see Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001), and no similar allegations appear in Pallets Unlimited’s complaint. 6 During oral argument, Pallets Unlimited points to 14 1 anything, California law appears to point in the opposite 2 direction. 3 Guaranty Co., the California Supreme Court stated that For instance, in Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title 8 In the business arena it would be unprecedented to impose a duty on one actor to operate its business in a manner that would ensure the financial success of transactions between third parties. With rare exceptions, a business entity has no duty to prevent financial loss to others with whom it deals directly. A fortiori, it has no greater duty to prevent financial losses to third parties who may be affected by its operations. 9 19 Cal. 4th 26, 59 (1998) (considering whether CPA auditors’ duty 4 5 6 7 10 of care in the preparation of an independent audit of a client's 11 financial statements extends to persons other than the client); 12 see also Glenn K. Jackson Inc., 273 F.3d at 1196-99 (surveying 13 California law on the existence of a legal duty of one party to 14 another in the absence of privity of contract between them). In fact, a California Court of Appeal recently rejected 15 16 a similar attempt to raise a negligence claim “through the 17 backdoor.”7 18 1338 (4th Dist. 2014). 19 motorhome sued both the manufacturer of an allegedly defective 20 Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 206 Cal. App. 4th 15 (2012), for support. The court finds no support for its position in Campbell. In fact, Campbell declined to find a duty in the circumstances of that case, holding that “a property owner has no duty to protect family members of workers on its premises from secondary exposure to asbestos used during the course of the property owner’s business.” Id. at 34. 21 22 23 24 7 25 26 27 28 Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal. App. 4th 1318, In Mega RV Corp., the owners of a The court also noted that the claim of negligence it analyzed arose “in an indemnity cause of action . . . in a case in which there was nothing to indemnify” because the other defendant had settled with the underlying plaintiff. Mega RV Corp., 225 Cal. App. 4th at 1338 n.15. Pallets Unlimited’s claim can be construed as a similar tactic, attempting to salvage its indemnity claim using allegations of negligence. 15 1 hydraulic part and a company that provided ineffective repair 2 services. 3 complaint against the repairer for negligence, equitable 4 indemnity, and declaratory relief--the same claims at issue here. 5 Id. at 1324. 6 claim of negligence on an alleged duty that the repairer owed to 7 it and breached while servicing the owner’s motorhome. 8 1338. 9 Id. at 1322-24. The manufacturer filed a cross- Also like here, the manufacturer predicated its Id. at The court rejected this position “as a matter of law” 10 because “[the manufacturer] did not suffer personal injury or 11 injury to other property as a result of [the repairer’s] alleged 12 tort.” 13 only asserted that it “suffered consequential economic damages” 14 by being forced to defend against the owner’s claim. 15 Pallets’s Compl. ¶ 18). 16 under those circumstances, “where the wrong has resulted only in 17 economic loss rather than damage to person or property.” 18 Corp., 225 Cal. App. 4th at 1338 (citing Robinson Helicopter Co., 19 Inc. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 988–993 (2004) (discussing 20 tort claims for economic loss generally)). 21 declined to create one. 22 from J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799 (1979)). 23 Id. at 1338. Like Pallets Unlimited, the manufacturer Id.;(see No previously recognized tort existed Mega RV And the court Id. at 1340-42 (applying the six factors Similarly, this court concludes there is no basis in 24 California law or in the facts alleged by Pallets Unlimited for 25 such a duty. 26 B. 27 28 Pallets Unlimited Fails to Allege Facts Supporting a Duty to Notify Pallets Unlimited further alleges that OHL owed a duty 16 1 to notify it “of any specifications required of the pallets that 2 are unique to the pallets ordered by Starbucks,” such as a 3 limited moisture content. 4 Unlimited makes no mention of this allegation in its opposition 5 brief, raising the possibility that it abandons this position. 6 The court thus gives only brief consideration to this theory. 7 See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1211 8 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (offering only brief consideration to a claim 9 “[w]here plaintiffs fail to provide a defense for a claim in (Pallets Compl. ¶ 17.) Pallets 10 opposition”) (citing Locricchio v. Office of U.S. Trustee, 313 11 Fed. Appx. 51, 52 (9th Cir. 2009)). 12 “A duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties 13 are in a relationship that gives rise to the duty, such as 14 ‘seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and 15 patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual 16 agreement.’” 17 2000) (citing Wilkins v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 71 Cal. App. 4th 1066, 18 1082 (2d Dist. 1999)). 19 real estate agents an affirmative duty to disclose certain 20 information to those who “enter into a discussion with a real 21 estate agent regarding a real estate transaction” even in the 22 absence of a contract between them. 23 § 2079.16. 24 Shin v. Kong, 80 Cal. App. 4th 498, 509 (1st Dist. For example, California law imposes on See Cal. Civ. Code Pallets Unlimited’s complaint fails to allege facts 25 supporting a special relationship between it and OHL. 26 only that a duty to disclose “was owed to [it] by OHL 27 individually and as an agent of [Starbucks].” 28 17.) Its states (Pallets Compl. ¶ Even assuming that OHL was an agent of Starbucks, however, 17 1 this allegation asserts a relationship between OHL and Starbucks, 2 not between OHL and Pallets Unlimited. 3 App. 4th 498 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff’s action must be founded on a 4 duty owed to the plaintiff; not a duty owed only to some other 5 person. . . . ‘Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.’” 6 (quoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 53 (5th ed. 1984))). 7 alleged facts that support some kind of special relationship 8 between Pallets Unlimited and OHL, the court cannot conclude that 9 OHL owed a duty to disclose. 10 See Shin v. Kong, 80 Cal. Absent Accordingly, because Pallets Unlimited fails to allege 11 facts that support a duty of care owed to it by OHL, the court 12 must grant OHL’s motion to dismiss this claim. 13 V. Pallets Unlimited’s Claim for Declaratory Relief 14 A court may grant declaratory relief where there is “a 15 case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,” subject to 16 certain exceptions. 17 the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 18 seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or 19 could be sought.” 20 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The court may “declare Id. However, “[c]laims for declaratory relief are not 21 independent causes of action, but rather the ultimate prayer for 22 relief.” 23 TLN DA, 2013 WL 6491528, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013) (Nunley, 24 J.). 25 viable underlying claim, so when the underlying claim is 26 dismissed, the declaratory relief cause of action must be 27 dismissed as well.” 28 Harris, Inc., Civ. No. 2:13-00325 WBS, 2013 WL 2145961, at *7 Bates v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc., Civ. No. 2:13-01402 “A plaintiff is not entitled to such relief without a Id.; Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dick 18 1 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2013) (dismissing a claim for declaratory 2 relief because plaintiff could not state any other claim). 3 Accordingly, because Pallets Unlimited has not stated a 4 claim for relief against OHL, its request for declaratory 5 judgment must also be dismissed. 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that third-party defendant 7 Ozburn-Hessey Logistics’s motion to dismiss be, and the same 8 hereby is, GRANTED. 9 Pallets Unlimited has twenty days from the date this 10 Order is signed to file an amended third-party complaint, if it 11 can do so consistent with this Order. 12 Dated: November 4, 2014 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19

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