The Mountain Club Owner's Association v. Graybar Electric Company, Inc.

Filing 23

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 1/13/14 ORDERING that defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file an amended complaint, if it can do so consistent with this Order. (Becknal, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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THE MOUNTAIN CLUB OWNER’S
ASSOCIATION,

CIV. NO. 2:13-1835 WBS KJN
MEMORANDUM & ORDER RE: MOTION TO
DISMISS

Plaintiff,

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v.
GRAYBAR ELECTRIC COMPANY,
INC.,
Defendant.

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Plaintiff The Mountain Club Owner’s Association brought

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this action against defendant Graybar Electric Company, Inc.,

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arising out of an electrical fire at plaintiff’s property located

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at 1399 Kirkwood Meadows Drive in Kirkwood, California.

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Plaintiff brings a claim for strict products liability and a

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claim for negligence, both of which are premised on the

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allegation that “the defective cable supplied by Defendant

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Graybar caused a fire.”

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now moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of

(Compl. ¶ 9 (Docket No. 2).)

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Defendant

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which

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relief may be granted or, alternatively, for a more definite

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statement pursuant to Rule 12(e).

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(Docket No. 8.)

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court

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must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all

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reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

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Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

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Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.

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319, 322 (1972).

Scheuer v.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff

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must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.”

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544, 570 (2007).

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for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

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unlawfully,” and where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

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consistent with a defendant’s liability,” it “stops short of the

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line between possibility and plausibility.”

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556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

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to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a

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plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

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entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

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conclusions . . . .”

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original) (citations omitted).

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elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

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statements, do not suffice.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the

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framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

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allegations.”).

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in
“Threadbare recitals of the

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also

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I.

Strict Products Liability
“California recognizes strict liability for three types

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of product defects -- manufacturing defects, design defects, and

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warning defects (inadequate warnings or failure to warn).”

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v. City of Visalia, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2010)

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(Ishii, J.) (citing Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Co., 53

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Cal. 3d 987, 995 (1991); Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co., 140 Cal.

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App. 4th 1202, 1208 (2d Dist. 2006)).

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products liability claim alleges that defendant either

Lucas

Plaintiff’s strict

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“manufactured” and/or “designed” the allegedly defective cable.

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(Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.)

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To state a manufacturing defect claim, a plaintiff must

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“identify [or] explain how the [product] either deviated from

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[defendant’s] intended result [or] design or how the [product]

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deviated from other seemingly identical . . . models.”

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726 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (alterations in original).

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design defect claim, a plaintiff must either “describe how the

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[product] failed to meet the minimum safety expectations of an

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ordinary consumer” or “allege that the risks of the design

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outweigh the benefits, and then ‘explain how the particular

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design of the [product] caused [plaintiff] harm.”

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omitted) (alterations in original).

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allegation” that the cable had a manufacturing and/or design

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defect “is an insufficient legal conclusion.”

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Lucas,

To state a

Id. (citations

Under either theory, a “bare

Id.

Here, plaintiff’s three-and-a-half page complaint

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simply asserts that the cable that allegedly caused the fire is

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“defective and unreasonably dangerous.”

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not identify the particular type of cable or the alleged defect,
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(Compl. ¶ 13.)

It does

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let alone explain how the cable was defective or how that defect

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resulted in a fire on plaintiff’s property.

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to identify the alleged defect in the electrical cable is fatal

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to its strict liability claim.

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Pac. Asian Enters., No. C-07-5749 SC, 2008 WL 2951277, at *6

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(N.D. Cal. Jul. 28, 2008) (dismissing a strict products liability

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claim arising out of an electrical fire because the complaint

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“did not identify which product or products are alleged to have

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been defective [or] what the defect is”); Altman v. HO Sports

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Co., CIV. NO. 1:09-1000 AWI SMS, 2009 WL 4163512, at *8 (E.D.

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Cal. Nov. 23, 2009) (dismissing a products liability claim

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because plaintiff failed to “identif[y] what aspect of the

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[products] makes their design . . . defective”).

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Plaintiff’s failure

See, e.g., Markel Am. Ins. Co. v.

Even if plaintiff were correct that its allegations

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were sufficient to satisfy the liberal notice pleading standard

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set forth by Conley v. Gibson, 455 U.S. 41 (1957), that standard

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is no longer the law.

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Conley’s notice pleading standard does not define “the minimum

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standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival”).

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As a number of post-Twombly cases make clear, a complaint that

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“simply tracks the general elements of strict products liability

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and contains no pertinent factual allegations” cannot survive a

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motion to dismiss.

See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (holding that

Lucas, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.

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Nor is plaintiff correct that defendant should “seek

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additional information . . . through the discovery process” in

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lieu of bringing this motion to dismiss.

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Mot. to Dismiss at 4:17-18 (Docket No. 16).)

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the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that Twombly’s pleading
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(Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s
On the contrary,

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standards serve to protect defendants from being “subjected to

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the expense of discovery and continued litigation” absent

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“factual allegations that . . . plausibly suggest an entitlement

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to relief.”

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Accordingly, because plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to

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state a plausible claim for relief, the court must grant

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defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s strict products

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liability claim.

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II.

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Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

Negligence
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant negligently

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“manufactur[ed], design[ed], distribut[ed], suppl[ied], and/or

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s[old] electric cables that were defective, and . . . fail[ed] to

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warn Plaintiff of such defect.”

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negligent design or manufacture theory, a plaintiff must allege,

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at a minimum, that a defect in the product caused the plaintiff’s

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injury and that “the defect in the product was due to the

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negligence of the defendant.”

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4th 465, 479 (2001) (citations omitted).

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defendants were negligent in their design is an insufficient

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legal conclusion.”

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13-331 GPC KSC, 2013 WL 4401437, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013).

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(Compl. ¶ 22.)

Under a

Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal.
“A bare allegation that

Fontalvo v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., CIV. NO.

Under a negligent failure-to-warn theory, a plaintiff

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must allege “that a manufacturer or distributor did not warn of a

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particular risk for reasons which fell below the acceptable

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standard of care . . . .”

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1104, 1112 (1996).

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warn, a complaint should at least identify which danger was not

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warned against, that the danger was substantial, that the danger

Carlin v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th

“To state a plausible claim for failure to

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was not readily recognizable to an ordinary consumer, that the

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manufacturer knew or should have reasonably known of the danger,

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and causation.”

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omitted).

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Altman, 2009 WL 4163512, at *9 (citations

Like its strict liability claim, plaintiff’s negligence

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claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss because plaintiff has

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not identified any defect in the electric cable, let alone

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explained how its manufacture, design, and/or failure to warn of

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the cable’s alleged defects breached the applicable standard of

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care.

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claim because the complaint did “not identify which specific

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danger [defendant] should have been warning against”); Fontalvo,

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2013 WL 4401437, at *5 (dismissing a negligent manufacturing

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claim because the “[p]laintiff fails to plead any facts

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suggesting how . . . any of the defendants negligently designed

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or manufactured the product”).

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defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim.

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See, e.g., id. (dismissing a negligent failure-to-warn

Accordingly, the court must grant

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to
dismiss the Complaint be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

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Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is

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signed to file an amended complaint, if it can do so consistent

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with this Order.

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Dated:

January 13, 2014

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