Conservation Congress v. United States Forest Service et al
Filing
142
FINAL JUDGMENT signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 5/26/2017. CASE CLOSED. (Zignago, K.)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
CONSERVATION CONGRESS,
12
Plaintiff,
13
14
15
v.
18
19
2:13-cv-01977-JAM-DB
FINAL JUDGMENT
UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,
and UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE,
16
17
No.
Defendants,
and
TRINITY RIVER LUMBER COMPANY,
Defendant
Intervenor.
20
21
On February 17, 2017, the Court entered its Order on the
22
Motions for Summary Judgment (“Merits Order”).
ECF No. 121.
The
23
Court granted Federal Defendants’ and Intervenor’s Motions with
24
respect to the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
25
Ninth Claims for Relief and the Supplemental Complaint and denied
26
Plaintiff’s Motion with respect to those claims.
27
granted Plaintiff’s Motion with respect to the First and Fourth
28
Claims for Relief.
The Court
The Court then ordered supplemental briefing
1
1
on the appropriate remedy in this case and held a hearing on this
2
issue on May 16, 2017.
3
briefs for the original and supplemental motions, the evidence
4
submitted therewith, as well as the proposed orders, and is fully
5
advised.
6
and conclusions contained in the Merits Order.
The Court has reviewed the parties’
This Judgment Order incorporates the facts, reasoning,
7
I.
Remand
8
The Court’s Merits Order found the Forest Service violated
9
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), for which the
10
presumptive remedy is a remand to the agency for additional
11
explanation or investigation.
12
470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
13
Court agrees, that a remand to the agency is appropriate.
14
No. 125 at 1; ECF No. 129 at 2-3; ECF No. 130 at 23.
15
Instructions on remand are included under “Final Judgment,”
16
infra.
Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,
The parties do not dispute, and the
ECF
17
II.
Vacatur
18
Whether to vacate an agency action “depends on how serious
19
the agency’s errors are ‘and the disruptive consequences of an
20
interim change that may itself be changed.’”
21
Toxics v. U.S. E.P.A., 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
22
Allied–Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d
23
146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
24
Cal. Cmtys. Against
The Court finds that vacatur of the Smokey Project Decision
25
Notice/Finding of No Significant Impact (DN/FONSI) is not
26
warranted.
27
its NEPA obligations; Plaintiff lost its Motion for Summary
28
Judgment on the majority of its claims.
On the whole, the Court found that USFS complied with
2
Two of the deficiencies
1
the Court found—the unclear LOPs and failure to address past
2
monitoring efforts—were not, in these circumstances, serious
3
errors.
4
have an opportunity to respond to the supplemental documents.
5
See Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics, 688 F.3d at 993 (“[A]ny
6
disadvantage petitioners suffered can be corrected on remand when
7
they will have an opportunity to comment meaningfully on the
8
documents.”).
9
design or decision.
The flaws will be cured on remand and Plaintiff will
The changes are unlikely to affect the project
See Pollinator Stewardship Council v. U.S.
10
E.P.A., 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We have also looked
11
at whether the agency would likely be able to offer better
12
reasoning or whether by complying with procedural rules, it could
13
adopt the same rule on remand, or whether such fundamental flaws
14
in the agency’s decision make it unlikely that the same rule
15
would be adopted on remand.”).
16
The Court does view the failure to consider a large diameter
17
cap as a serious error.
However, vacatur is subject to equitable
18
considerations and the Court does not find it just to vacate the
19
entire decision—which was largely supported by the administrative
20
record—on this basis.
21
F.3d at 532 (quoted above); Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 951
22
F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he determination of
23
when to remand without vacatur should not be limited to
24
situations where it is necessary to avoid environmental harm, but
25
should instead be based on a broader examination of the
26
equities.”); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics, 688 F.3d at 993 (“A
27
flawed rule need not be vacated.
28
the regulation can be left in place while the agency follows the
See Pollinator Stewardship Council, 806
Indeed, when equity demands,
3
1
necessary procedures to correct its action.”) (citations
2
omitted).
3
remedy tailored to the facts of this case and the Court’s Merits
4
Order is the more equitable and just result.
The broad consequences of vacatur are unwarranted.
5
III. Injunctive Relief
6
A
A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief to remedy a NEPA
7
violation must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
8
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
9
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
10
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
11
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
12
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
13
permanent injunction.
14
U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010).
15
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561
Although an injunction is a drastic remedy and generally
16
disfavored where vacatur is sufficient to redress a plaintiff’s
17
injury, see Monsanto Co., 561 U.S. at 165–66, a tailored
18
injunction is the appropriate remedy in these circumstances.
19
noted above, the failure to address or consider a large diameter
20
cap was a serious error.
21
analysis “is the heart of the environmental impact statement.”);
22
Merits Order at 31-37.
23
of large diameter trees while the agency corrects the NEPA
24
analysis will address this deficiency and ensure that the Project
25
does not proceed in a manner that precludes the possibility of
26
the agency adopting a diameter cap.
27
the agency’s error while also permitting some progress on the
28
Project in the interim.
As
See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Alternatives
An injunction that prevents the removal
4
This outcome accounts for
1
The Court finds that absent a narrow injunction Plaintiff
2
will suffer an irreparable injury not compensable by monetary
3
damages.
4
adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at
5
least of long duration, i.e., irreparable.”
6
Def. v. Connaughton, 752 F.3d 755, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2014).
7
felling of the large diameter trees cannot be remedied easily if
8
at all.
9
incorrect in law, cannot be remedied easily if at all.”).
“[E]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be
League of Wilderness
The
See id. (“The logging of mature trees, if indeed
The
10
Court acknowledges that, as Defendants and Intervenor argue,
11
Plaintiffs have not established that cutting those trees will
12
result in irreparable harm to the northern spotted owl.
13
contrary finding could not flow from the Court’s conclusion that
14
the decision not to prepare an EIS was not arbitrary or
15
capricious.
16
satisfied that the irreparable harm prong is met by the
17
procedural harm Plaintiff suffered coupled with the permanent
18
removal of trees that may be unnecessary to achieve the Project’s
19
purpose and need.
20
2014 WL 5313943, at *20–22 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2014)
21
(“[P]rocedural harm is insufficient by itself to warrant an
22
injunction.”) (finding irreparable harm where agency failed to
23
adequately address alternative constructive methods; construction
24
would preclude later use of the plaintiffs' preferred
25
alternative, construction would be disruptive, and plaintiffs
26
would be denied an opportunity to participate in a meaningful
27
NEPA process).
28
judgment motions and that submitted with the supplemental briefs,
Merits Order at 24–28.
A
Instead, the Court is
See Today’s IV, Inc. v. Fed. Transit Admin,
Between the evidence submitted on the summary
5
1
the irreparable harm prong is met.
2
(Declarations of Conservation Congress members); ECF No. 125-1,
3
2, 4, & 5 (Supplemental Declarations).
4
See ECF No. 103-1, 2, & 3
The balance of the hardships and public interest support a
5
narrow injunction.
The injunction will address Plaintiff’s
6
interests in seeing the agency consider (briefly or in detail) a
7
large diameter cap and receiving an opportunity to participate in
8
that analysis.
9
seeing the Project move forward are accounted for in the narrow
The Defendants’ and Intervenor’s interests in
10
scope of the injunction.
11
injunction once USFS satisfies its NEPA obligations.
A narrow
12
injunction also accounts for the public’s interest.
The Court
13
makes no finding with respect to the competing accounts of
14
whether the removal of large trees will abate fire risk.
15
However, in the absence of an imminent threat and because the
16
Project may proceed in limited form, the public’s interest in
17
requiring agencies to follow NEPA procedures and make well-
18
informed decisions in managing the nation’s forests favors
19
injunctive relief.
20
The parties may apply to dissolve the
There is a concern, however, that an injunction imposing an
21
18 inch dbh diameter cap will hurt the Project’s economic
22
viability and effectively halt all operations this year.
23
Taylor Decl., ECF No. 131; Williams Decl., ECF No. 129-1.
24
Defendants submitted evidence that USFS is presently considering
25
diameter caps of 18, 20, and 24 inches and—based on preliminary
26
analysis and assuming the Project’s other parameters stay the
27
same—has found that an 18 inch cap would drastically reduce the
28
timber volume.
Williams Decl. at ¶¶ 28–31.
6
See
Increasing the
1
diameter cap by 2 inches is expected to increase the number of
2
acres treated from 18 acres to 246 acres and the timber produced
3
from 3,189 CCF to 4,368 CCF.
4
Although the Court cannot determine that this difference is
5
sufficient to ameliorate the economic harm Intervenor is
6
concerned with, a 20 inch dbh diameter cap should at least afford
7
Defendants and Intervenor more leeway in finding ways to move
8
forward with the Project while USFS completes the NEPA analysis.
9
At the May 16, 2017 hearing, Defendants and Intervenor also
Williams Decl. at ¶¶ 28–31.
10
indicated that if the Court were to grant limited injunctive
11
relief, they preferred a 20 inch dbh cap over an 18 inch dbh cap.
12
IV.
Final Judgment
13
Based on the foregoing, the Court remands the Project to
14
USFS.
15
issuing instructions on remand, the parties each proposed
16
instructions which were discussed in detail at the hearing.
17
Based on those recommendations the Court instructs as follows:
18
ECF No. 121.
1.
Although courts typically refrain from
USFS shall prepare supplemental NEPA analysis that
19
cures the NEPA violations identified in the Court’s Merits Order
20
and complies with the applicable statutes;
21
2.
Should USFS conclude that no EIS is required, USFS
22
shall circulate the analysis and draft revised DN/FONSI to the
23
public;
24
3.
USFS shall accept objections for a 20-day period from
25
any party eligible to object under 36 C.F.R. § 218.5 (USFS is not
26
required to accept public comment during remand other than during
27
the objection period specified herein); and
28
4.
USFS shall complete its supplemental NEPA documentation
7
1
2
and public involvement process no later than December 1, 2017.
The Court further orders that Defendants and Intervenor are
3
enjoined from removing any trees with 20 inches dbh or greater in
4
implementing the Project.
5
dissolve this limited injunction upon a showing that USFS has
6
complied with this Court’s Order and satisfied its obligations
7
under NEPA.
8
USFS to cancel its contract with Intervenor.
9
10
The Court will retain jurisdiction to
The Court declines to vacate the DN/FONSI or require
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 26, 2017
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?