Moore v. Sacramento County Sheriffs Department et al

Filing 11

ORDER to SHOW CAUSE signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 10/30/14 ordering plaintiff is ordered to show cause in writing within 30 days from the date of this order why this action should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Plummer, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ADRIAN EUGENE MOORE,

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No. 2:13-cv-2182-CMK-P

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFFS
DEPARTMENT,

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Defendant.
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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

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U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

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636(c) and no other party has been served or appeared in the action. Pending before the court is

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plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

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if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

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which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

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allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

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the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges false information was included in his re-arrest

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report, the District Attorney’s office is refusing to provide him a copy of a video recording from

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the officer’s dash cam which would exonerate him, and the Sacramento County Sheriff’s

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Department custodian of records failed to appear and produce records at his hearing. He also

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appears to be claiming some violations of his rights during his trial or pre-trial proceedings, but

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those are unclear.

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II. DISCUSSION
When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks

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is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not

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cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ

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of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda,

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131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir.

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1995) (per curiam). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief

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alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s

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underlying conviction or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in

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imposition of a sanction affecting the overall length of confinement, such a claim is not
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cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal,

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by habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

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483-84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to

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malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding

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was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects were an

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attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding

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that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and

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not to any particular parole determination); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005)

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(concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in procedures for determining when an inmate is

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eligible for parole consideration not barred because changed procedures would hasten future

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parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole determination under the prior procedures).

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In particular, where the claim involves the loss of good-time credits as a result of

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an adverse prison disciplinary finding, the claim is not cognizable. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520

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U.S. 641, 646 (1987) (holding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural

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defects and a biased hearing officer implied the invalidity of the underlying prison disciplinary

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sanction of loss of good-time credits); Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997); cf.

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Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th. Cir. 2003) (holding that the favorable termination

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rule of Heck and Edwards does not apply to challenges to prison disciplinary hearings where the

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administrative sanction imposed does not affect the overall length of confinement and, thus, does

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not go to the heart of habeas). If a § 1983 complaint states claims which sound in habeas, the

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court should not convert the complaint into a habeas petition. See id.; Trimble, 49 F.3d at 586.

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Rather, such claims must be dismissed without prejudice and the complaint should proceed on

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any remaining cognizable § 1983 claims. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 649; Heck, 512 U.S. at 487;

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Trimble, 49 F.3d at 585.

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Here, plaintiff alleges falsified statements on a re-arrest report, violations of his

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rights during pre-trial proceedings, and potential errors made during his trial. If he was able to

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prove his allegations, they would necessarily imply the invalidity of his underlying conviction.

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Indeed, plaintiff even specifically alleges in his complaint that he would be exonerated if the

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evidence had been properly turned over to him. Thus, it appears that plaintiff’s claims sound in

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habeas, not in a complaint under § 1983.

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III. CONCLUSION
Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be
cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

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the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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However, before final dismissal of this action, plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to

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explain to the court how this case would not impact the validity of his underlying conviction.

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Thus, plaintiff is ordered to show cause in writing, within 30 days of the date of this order, why

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this action should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is warned that failure to

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respond to this order may result in dismissal of the action for the reasons outlined above, as well

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as for failure to prosecute and comply with court rules and orders. See Local Rule 110.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: October 30, 2014
______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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