McCloud v. Farrow et al

Filing 33

ORDER denying 23 Motion to Dismiss signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 11/13/14. (Kaminski, H)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

SHANA MCCLOUD, an individual,

12

15
16

2:13-cv-02404-JAM-KJN

Plaintiff,

13
14

No.

v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS

JOSEPH A. FARROW,
individually and in his
official capacity as
California Highway Patrol
Commissioner; RUDY BRIONES;
JOHN EDWARDS,

17
Defendants.
18
Defendants California Highway Patrol Officers John Edwards

19
20

and Rudy Briones (collectively “the Defendant Officers”) move to

21

dismiss (Doc. #23) Plaintiff Shana McCloud’s (“Plaintiff”) first

22

amended complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #19) as barred by the statute of

23

limitations. 1

24

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) allows the FAC to “relate

25

back” to the filing of the original complaint, placing it within

Plaintiff opposes the motion, contending that

26
27
28

1

This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled
for October 15, 2014.
1

1

the limitations period.

2

finds the FAC, naming the Defendant Officers, is not time barred.

For the reasons stated below, the Court

3
4
5

I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an incident that occurred on

6

November 19, 2011.

FAC ¶ 8.

Plaintiff was riding as a passenger

7

in a car driven by her friend (“the driver”) when the Defendant

8

Officers attempted to pull him over.

9

attempted to evade the Defendant Officers and eventually crashed

FAC ¶¶ 8-11.

The driver

10

into a fence.

11

Officers allegedly opened fire on Plaintiff and the driver,

12

killing the driver instantly and inflicting multiple gunshot

13

wounds upon Plaintiff.

14

Officers then ignored her urgent medical condition for some time,

15

before finally transporting Plaintiff to a local medical center.

16

Immediately after the crash, the Defendant

According to Plaintiff, the Defendant

Plaintiff filed the original complaint (Doc. #1) against

17

California Highway Patrol Commissioner Joseph A. Farrow

18

(“Commissioner Farrow”), both in his official capacity and

19

individually, and against DOES 1-50.

20

filed on November 19, 2013, exactly two years after the incident,

21

alleging a Monell claim against Commissioner Farrow in his

22

official capacity and a claim against DOES 1-25 for

23

constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§1983).

24

Comp. ¶¶ 12-19.

25

with leave to amend.

26

The original complaint was

The Court dismissed the complaint (Doc. #18)

The FAC drops the claim against Commissioner Farrow and

27

reasserts the §1983 cause of action against the Defendant

28

Officers for violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to
2

1

be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to

2

be free from excessive force.

3

April 14, 2014.

FAC ¶ 14.

The FAC was filed on

4
5

II.

6

OPINION

Defendants contend the FAC must be dismissed because the

7

claims are time barred by California Code of Civil Procedure

8

§ 335.1 (“§335.1”), which is the applicable two-year statute of

9

limitations in California.

10

MTD at pp. 3-4.

“A party may raise a statute of limitations argument in a

11

motion to dismiss if it is apparent from the face of the

12

complaint that the complaint was not timely filed and that

13

plaintiff will be unable to prove facts that will establish the

14

timeliness of the claim.”

15

Quality Mgmt. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (E.D. Cal. 2013)

16

(citing Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th

17

Cir. 2010); Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204,

18

1206 (9th Cir. 1995)).

19

Hardesty v. Sacramento Metro. Air

Civil rights actions brought under §1983 are governed by the

20

statute of limitations for personal injury actions of the forum

21

state.

22

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).

23

provides for a two-year statute of limitations for personal

24

injury, applicable to civil rights claims brought under §1983.

25

§335.1; Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1174 (E.D.

26

Cal. 2005).

27
28

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279–80 (1985); Jones v.
California law

Therefore, based on §335.1, Defendants are correct in noting
that the claims against the Defendant Officers in the FAC were
3

1

filed outside of the limitations period.

2

dispute this, but rather contends the relation back doctrine of

3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) (“Rule 15(c)”) applies,

4

tying the filing of the FAC back to the date the original

5

complaint was filed.

6

the relation back doctrine of Rule 15(c) only applies if the

7

newly named Defendants had notice of the actual lawsuit “within

8

the time period provided by Rule 4(m),” which is 120 days.

9

at p. 2.

10

Opp. at pp. 4-5.

Plaintiff does not

Defendants respond that

Reply

They argue this was clearly not the case.

Plaintiff’s analysis of Rule 15(c) states the FAC should

11

relate back because the Defendant Officers “received notice of

12

the institution of the action; will not be prejudiced in

13

maintaining their defense on the merits; and knew or should have

14

known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the

15

proper parties, the action would have been brought against them.”

16

Opp. at p. 5.

17

fail to discuss relevant state statutes and case law applicable

18

to the relation back doctrine.

19

woefully inadequate and their application of the circumstances of

20

this case to the applicable law is entirely conclusory, simply

21

tracking the elements of Rule 15(c).

22

discussed below and not found in either party’s briefs, the

23

Court, as required by law, finds Rule 15(c) does allow Plaintiff

24

to substitute the Defendant Officers for Does 1 and 2.

25

Defendants’ motion is therefore DENIED.

26

Defendants’ arguments in support of their motion

Both parties’ arguments are

However, for reasons

Prior to the 1991 amendments to Rule 15(c), the Ninth

27

Circuit found that the relation back provisions of state law,

28

rather than Rule 15(c) govern a federal cause of action for
4

1

§1983.

2

Cir. 1989); Cabrales v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1463

3

(9th Cir. 1988).

4

amended version of Rule 15(c) state that the new provision “is

5

intended to make it clear that the rule does not apply to

6

preclude any relation back that may be permitted under the

7

applicable limitations law.”

8

notes (1991).

9

those amendments on the law of this circuit:

10

Merritt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th

The advisory committee notes accompanying the

Rule 15(c)(1) advisory committee

The Ninth Circuit recently discussed the impact of

14

Rule 15(c)(1) incorporates the relation back rules of
the law of a state when that state’s law provides the
applicable statute of limitations and is more lenient.
As a result, if an amendment relates back under the
state law that provides the applicable statute of
limitations, that amendment relates back under Rule
15(c)(1) even if the amendment would not otherwise
relate back under the federal rules.

15

Butler v. Nat'l Cmty. Renaissance of California, 766 F.3d 1191,

16

1198-1201 (9th Cir. 2014).

11
12
13

17

Defendants essentially argue that the amendment does not

18

relate back under Rule 15 because it does not meet the 120-day

19

requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

20

Plaintiff’s amendment relates back under California law, it will

21

relate back pursuant to Rule 15(c) despite the fact a different

22

outcome would result if based solely on the federal rules.

23

However, if

Based on the circumstances of this case, California Code of

24

Civil Procedure § 474 (“§474”) is the applicable relation back

25

rule.

26

three years of the filing date of the original complaint if: (1)

27

the complaint states a cause of action against each DOE

Section 474 “allows DOE defendants to be added within

28
5

1

defendant; (2) the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is

2

ignorant of the true name of each DOE defendant; (3) the

3

plaintiff is actually ignorant of the true name at the time of

4

filing; and (4) the plaintiff amends once the true name of the

5

defendant is discovered.”

6

01141 TLN, 2014 WL 2918850, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“Jones”)

7

(citing Fireman's Fund. Ins. Co. v. Sparks Const., Inc., 114 Cal.

8

App. 4th 1135, 1143 (2004)).

9

Jones v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 2:12-CV-

If the requirements of §474 are fulfilled, the amendment

10

naming new parties is said to relate back to the original

11

complaint for the purposes of the statute of limitations.

12

Jones, 2014 WL 2918850, at *4; Tandel v. Cnty. of Sacramento,

13

2:11-CV-00353-MCE-AC, 2014 WL 202740, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 2014).

14

Therefore, although §474 would alter the statute of limitations

15

by allowing a relation back that would not otherwise be permitted

16

under the federal rules, Rule 15(c) would allow the amendment to

17

relate back if the requirements of §474 were met.

18

F.3d at 1198-1201; Jones, at *4.

See

Butler, 766

19

As to the first requirement of §474, the original complaint

20

specifically asserts the first cause of action against DOES 1-25

21

pursuant to §1983.

22

“Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and/or capacities of

23

Defendants sued herein as DOES 1-50” and will “amend this

24

complaint to allege their true names and capacities when

25

ascertained.”

26

construed” (Dieckmann v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 345,

27

355 (1985)), the Court finds the second requirement has also been

28

satisfied.

Comp. ¶ 13.

Comp. ¶ 5.

The complaint states that

As the statute should be “liberally

6

1

The third and fourth requirements provide that a plaintiff

2

must be actually ignorant of the names of the DOE defendants when

3

the original complaint is filed and amend that complaint once the

4

identities have been discovered.

5

not presented any evidence or argument indicating Plaintiff was

6

aware of the Defendant Officers’ identities when the original

7

complaint was filed or that Plaintiff unreasonably delayed naming

8

the Defendant Officers once their identities were determined.

9

Jones, at *3.

Defendants have

In fact, in its previous order (Doc. #18), the Court found

10

the “difficulty facing plaintiff at the time she filed the

11

Complaint was that she did not know the identities of the

12

[California Highway Patrol] officers involved.”

13

noted that at oral argument the parties agreed that Plaintiff was

14

then aware of the actual names of the officers and was “in a

15

position to amend the Complaint to name those officers.”

16

Plaintiff filed the FAC, specifically naming the Defendant

17

Officers, five days after the Court’s order was issued.

18

Court finds the requirements of §474 have been met, and thus, the

19

amended complaint relates back to the original filing under Rule

20

15(c).

The Court also

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.

21
22
23
24
25
26

III.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 13, 2014

27
28
7

The