McColgan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company

Filing 20

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 3/4/2014 is GRANTED defendant's 4 Motion to Dismiss. Court finds plaintiff's Complaint can NOT be saved by amendment and, therefore, DISMISSES this action with prejudice. (Marciel, M)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 SANDRA C. MCCOLGAN, 13 2:13-cv-02417-JAM-DAD Plaintiff, 14 15 No. v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY, 16 Defendant. 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Mutual of Omaha 18 19 Insurance Company’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #4) 20 Plaintiff Sandra C. McColgan’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (Doc. #1). 21 Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. #11). 22 #15). 1 23 declarations submitted by Defendant (Doc. #4-2, 4-4). 24 responded to those objections (Doc. #16). 25 reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Defendant replied (Doc. Plaintiff submitted objections (Doc. #9) to the Defendant For the following 26 27 28 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for January 22, 2014. 1 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 According to the allegations in the Complaint, in November 3 2006, Plaintiff’s husband, Michael McColgan (“Decedent”), entered 4 into a contract with Defendant insuring him against death due to 5 accidental causes. 6 beneficiary under the terms of the policy. 7 Decedent accidentally suffered a fatal fall. 8 timely payments of the premiums up until his death. 9 Comp. ¶ 6. Plaintiff was the named In September 2012, Decedent made Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was thereupon obligated to 10 pay her the sum of $500,000 pursuant to the agreement. 11 8. 12 only $100,000. 13 copy of the application completed by Decedent and the certificate 14 of insurance. 15 not in possession of the entire policy, but alleges that it is in 16 Defendant’s possession. 17 Comp. ¶ Despite her demand for full payment, Defendant has received Id. ¶ 9. She has attached to the Complaint a Id. Exh. A. Plaintiff acknowledges that she is Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges two causes of action against Defendant: 18 (1) Breach of Insurance Contract (Bad Faith) and (2) Fraud in the 19 Inducement. 20 failing to pay the full amount of the policy, $500,000. 21 Plaintiff further alleges Defendant fraudulently induced Decedent 22 to purchase the policy, misrepresenting to him that the policy 23 would provide Plaintiff with $500,000 upon his accidental death, 24 regardless of the exact nature of it, when in fact there were 25 varying benefits depending on the cause of death. 26 alleges that Decedent justifiably relied on these material 27 misrepresentations and that Plaintiff has been damaged in the 28 amount of $400,000, the difference between the amount paid out by She first argues Defendant breached the contract by 2 Plaintiff 1 Defendant and the full coverage of the policy as represented to 2 Decedent. 3 II. ANALYSIS 4 A. Legal Standard 5 A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a 6 claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule 7 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 8 plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief 9 that is plausible on its face.” To survive a motion to dismiss a Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 10 556 U.S. 662, 570 (2007). In considering a motion to dismiss, a 11 district court must accept all the allegations in the complaint 12 as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 13 plaintiff. 14 overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 15 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 16 entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint 17 or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 18 action, but must sufficiently allege underlying facts to give 19 fair notice and enable the opposing party to defend itself 20 effectively.” 21 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101, 182 L. Ed. 2d 882 (U.S. 22 2012). 23 must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is 24 not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the 25 expense of discovery and continued litigation.” 26 that are mere “legal conclusions” are therefore not entitled to 27 the presumption of truth. 28 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), “First, to be Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. “Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true Id. Assertions Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 3 Dismissal is 1 appropriate when a plaintiff fails to state a claim supportable 2 by a cognizable legal theory. 3 Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 4 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 5 claim, a court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 6 complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 7 “Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 8 appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not 9 be saved by amendment.” 10 Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 11 B. Judicial Notice and Evidentiary Objections 12 Defendant requests the Court to consider documents attached 13 to two declarations of its employees, submitted in support of 14 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 15 declarations and the documents attached. 16 Plaintiff objects to both In his declaration (Doc. #4-2), Paul Biler, a senior program 17 manager in Defendant’s marketing department, asserts that the 18 documents attached as Exhibit A to his declaration are true and 19 correct copies of the marketing materials used by Defendant to 20 solicit customers in California during the time Decedent applied 21 for his policy. 22 In her declaration (Doc. #4-4), Nicki Showalter, a senior 23 claims analyst, asserts that attached as Exhibit A to her 24 declaration is a true and correct copy of the Certificate 25 Schedule and Accidental Death Insurance Certificate issued by 26 Defendant to Decedent. 27 Defendant’s records, the document was mailed to Decedent in 28 November 2006. She asserts that, according to 4 1 Generally, the Court may not consider material beyond the 2 pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 3 claim. 4 the complaint so long as authenticity is not disputed, or matters 5 of public record, provided that they are not subject to 6 reasonable dispute. 7 2241664 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (citing Lee v. City of 8 Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) and Fed. R. Evid. 9 201). 10 The exceptions are material attached to, or relied on by, E.g., Sherman v. Stryker Corp., 2009 WL In its motion, Defendant specifically relies on the “incorporation by reference” doctrine used in the Ninth Circuit: 11 Under the “incorporation by reference” doctrine in this Circuit, “a court may look beyond the pleadings without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.2002). Specifically, courts may take into account “documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff's] pleading.” Knievel [v. ESPN], 393 F.3d [1068,] 1076 [(9th Cir. 2005)], (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 19 2012). 20 Defendant argues the solicitation materials attached to 21 Biler’s Declaration can be judicially noticed because Plaintiff’s 22 allegations of fraudulent inducement make all of the documents 23 used to solicit Decedent’s application a central issue. 24 p. 8. 25 application Plaintiff attached to the Complaint and should thus 26 be considered by the Court. 27 /// 28 MTD at Defendant argues these materials accompanied the one-page Defendant further argues that the full policy, the document 5 1 attached to Showalter’s Declaration, is both alleged in the 2 Complaint and central to Plaintiff’s claims. 3 therefore argues the Court can properly consider it. 4 MTD at p. 7. It Plaintiff contests whether or not the documents attached to 5 Defendant’s declarations were actually the documents used in 6 conjunction with Decedent’s policy or ever sent to or received by 7 Decedent. 8 the allegations in the complaint. 9 a sufficient challenge to their authenticity has been made. 10 The Court finds the documents are clearly relied on by The issue remaining is whether Defendant cites two cases dealing with evidence introduced 11 at the motion to dismiss stage. 12 4. 13 Cir. 2005), where the court considered materials submitted by the 14 defendant in support of its motion to dismiss. 15 Knievel, the plaintiff never made any challenge to the 16 authenticity of the documents and thus it does not bear on the 17 specific issue now before the Court. 18 MTD at pp. 7-8; Reply at pp. 1- The first is Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th However, in The second case referenced by Defendant is Davis v. HSBC 19 Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d at 1160. In Davis, the Ninth Circuit 20 found the district court had properly incorporated documents 21 referenced in the complaint and later submitted by the defendant 22 in support of its motion to dismiss. 23 plaintiff’s only objection to the evidence was a single sentence 24 in their opposition to the motion to dismiss. 25 concluded that the plaintiff’s statement that there was “‘no 26 evidence that [the] documents were ever reviewed by Plaintiff or 27 made available to Plaintiff’” did not constitute a challenge to 28 the documents’ authenticity. Id. at 1161. Id. at 1160-61. 6 Id. The The court The court found 1 the plaintiff had numerous opportunities to properly challenge 2 the evidence, but held that “where the party opposing 3 incorporation by reference argues only that he did not review or 4 have access to the proffered copies, this does not amount to a 5 challenge to those documents' authenticity.” 6 Id. Here, Plaintiff challenges the authenticity of the marketing 7 materials attached to the Biler declaration, arguing that there 8 is not credible evidence that these were the only marketing 9 materials used by Defendant; that they were always sent to 10 consumers such as Decedent; or, most importantly, whether they 11 were the materials actually sent to Decedent. 12 Pl. Obj. at pp. 1-2. 13 attached to the Biler declaration as marketing materials used by 14 Defendant, the Court finds the declaration and documents fail to 15 conclusively prove, beyond reasonable dispute, that these 16 documents were received by Decedent in conjunction with the 17 application form submitted by Plaintiff. 18 denies the request for judicial notice as to the marketing 19 materials. Moreove, these materials are irrelevant to the 20 adjudication of the matter now before the Court. 21 Opp. at pp. 3-4; Although the Court can notice the documents Therefore, the Court However, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections to the 22 materials attached to the Showalter declaration. 23 contends the Court should not consider the Certificate Schedule 24 and Accidental Death Insurance Certificate because Showalter does 25 not have personal knowledge the documents were sent to or 26 received by Decedent, she does not describe the records she 27 reviewed, and she does not know whether they were actually 28 received or reviewed by Decedent. 7 Plaintiff Pl. Obj. at pp. 2-3. The 1 Court finds the documents are properly authenticated business 2 records, which the Court will view as the operative policy 3 underlying the claims in this action and relied on in the 4 Complaint. 5 evidence does not prove Decedent reviewed the documents or that 6 they were made available to him are unavailing as a challenge to 7 the authenticity of the documents. 8 Accordingly, the Court takes notice of the documents attached to 9 the declaration of Showalter as the Certificate of Insurance and 10 insurance Policy underlying Plaintiff’s claims and referenced in 11 the Complaint. 12 C. 13 As stated in Davis, Plaintiff’s contention that the Discussion 1. 14 Davis, 691 F.3d at 1160-61. Breach of Contract – Bad Faith Defendant contends Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract 15 fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff has not shown any 16 factual or legal basis indicating a breach occurred. 17 9. 18 Showalter Declaration for its contention that the benefit owed to 19 Plaintiff was $100,000, the amount already paid out. 20 MTD at p. Defendant relies on the certificate schedule attached to the The Complaint alleges that the insurance application 21 (attached thereto as Exhibit A) indicated Decedent was purchasing 22 an insurance policy that would obligate Defendant to pay the sum 23 of $500,000 to Plaintiff in the event of Decedent’s accidental 24 death. 25 submitted with the Showalter declaration and noticed by the 26 Court, due to the nature of Decedent’s accidental death, 27 Plaintiff was only entitled to a $100,000 benefit. 28 Plaintiff concedes that sum was paid out to her by Defendant, the Comp. ¶¶ 6, 9-12. However, according to the policy 8 Because 1 2 Complaint fails to state a claim for breach of contract. Plaintiff argues the classifications in the policy should 3 not be enforced because they were not clear and conspicuous and 4 they were not received by Decedent until after he purchased the 5 policy. 6 the Complaint that Decedent applied for a policy. 7 application indicates that Decedent was applying for a policy and 8 that it was not effective until the date indicated on the 9 Certificate of Insurance, which would be sent to Decedent. Opp. at pp. 13-14, 18-19. However, Plaintiff admits in The When 10 Defendant approved the application, the certificate and policy 11 were issued to Decedent. 12 Plaintiff admits Decedent received) clearly identifies three 13 levels of coverage under the plan. 14 lays out the three classifications. 15 no good cause to disregard the clear provisions in the policy 16 which indicate that an insured suffering an accidental and fatal 17 injury would receive $100,000 under Classification 3. 18 19 The Policy itself clearly Therefore, the Court finds Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss the first cause of action for breach of contract. 20 21 The Certificate Schedule (which even 2. Fraud in the Inducement Defendant contends Plaintiff’s second cause of action for 22 fraud in the inducement must also fail as a matter of law. 23 at pp. 10-12. 24 MTD A claim for fraud in the inducement requires the following 25 elements: “(a) a misrepresentation (false representation, 26 concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its 27 falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; 28 and (e) resulting damage.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr., 135 9 1 Cal. App. 4th 289, 294 (2005) (citing Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 2 Cal.4th 631, 638 (1996). 3 is ordinarily a question of fact, “[e]xcept in the rare case 4 where the undisputed facts leave no room for a reasonable 5 difference of opinion.” 6 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1475 (1990). 7 Justifiable reliance in a fraud action Blankenheim v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 217 Defendant argues that even if Decedent only received the 8 application form, isolated from the rest of the marketing 9 materials, the Complaint fails to properly allege Decedent 10 justifiably relied on the terms of that form to conclude he was 11 purchasing a policy that would pay out $500,000 in the event of 12 his accidental death without any further terms or conditions. 13 MTD at pp. 10-12. 14 misrepresented the coverage offered under the plans through the 15 language on the application. 16 Plaintiff argues Defendant intentionally Opp. at pp. 20-23. Generally, “the receipt of a policy and its acceptance by 17 the insured without an objection binds the insured as well as the 18 insurer and he cannot thereafter complain that he did not read it 19 or know its terms.” 20 3d 1102, 1111-12 (1987). 21 his policy.” 22 Richmond, 76 Cal.App.3d 645, 652 (1977). 23 not serve to defeat any liability for misrepresenting the terms 24 of an insurance policy. 25 (1993). 26 /// 27 28 Hackethal v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 189 Cal. App. “It is a duty of the insured to read Id. (citing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. However, this rule does Clement v. Smith, 16 Cal.App.4th 39, 45 Plaintiff argues Decedent justifiably relied on the monetary figure next to the box he checked on the application for the 10 1 final and complete terms of his policy. 2 Court should not consider the terms of the Policy which was later 3 delivered to Decedent. 4 assume that the full details of an insurance policy will be 5 detailed in one small paragraph on an application form. 6 Univ. Partners, LLC v. John O. Bronson, C058893, 2009 WL 2247459, 7 at *7 (2009) (finding the plaintiff’s reliance on a single form 8 initially presented to him “for purposes of assessing the precise 9 coverage provided is unreasonable as a matter of law”); but see Plaintiff argues the However, it is unreasonable for one to See 10 Navarro v. Sears Life Ins. Co., 2:08-CV-00527-GEBEFB, 2008 WL 11 3863451 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss 12 where insurance agent made oral misrepresentations to induce the 13 plaintiff’s deceased husband to purchase a policy despite clear 14 terms in policy). 15 will read the terms of an insurance policy to determine the 16 extent of its coverage. 17 24 Cal. App. 4th 1578, 1586-88 (1994). 18 Court has found an “insured bound by clear and conspicuous 19 provisions in [a] policy even if evidence suggests that the 20 insured did not read or understand them.” 21 Shield of California, 43 Cal. 3d 1, 15 (1987). 22 Courts have found that a reasonable person Hadland v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., The California Supreme Sarchett v. Blue The Court finds the Certificate Schedule and the policy 23 clearly provide three categories of coverage. 24 reliance on the one-page application to determine the extent of 25 the policy’s coverage is unreasonable given the clear provisions 26 provided in the policy and the Certificate schedule, a document 27 the application notified Decedent he would be receiving. 28 Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss the 11 Decedent’s 1 second cause of action. 2 3 4 I. ORDER For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 5 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in its entirety. The Court finds 6 that Plaintiff’s Complaint can not be saved by amendment and, 7 therefore dismisses this action with prejudice. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: March 3, 2014 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12

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