Gordon v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company

Filing 24

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 12/3/14 DENYING 20 Motion for Attorney Fees. Plaintiff may submit a bill of costs. (Meuleman, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CHRISTOPHOROS GORDON,

No. 2:13-cv-02606-TLN-KJN

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Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.

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PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE
COMPANY & DOES 1 TO 50,

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Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Christophoros Gordon’s (“Plaintiff”) motion
for attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 20.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED.

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I.

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Plaintiff filed the complaint in Sacramento County Superior Court on October 15, 2013.

Background

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(ECF No. 1-1.) The complaint alleged that Defendant Pacific Bell Telephone Co.’s

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(“Defendant”) procedure for counting seniority days under its Family Care Leave (“FCL”) policy

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violated California’s Family Rights Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2(g). (ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 8–23.)

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The matter was removed to this Court on December 16, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant filed a

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motion to dismiss on December 20, 2013. (ECF No. 4.) The Court deferred ruling on the motion

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to dismiss pending a ruling on any remand motion filed by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 10.) On January

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14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand, which was granted by this Court on June 16, 2014.

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(ECF Nos. 14, 19.) Plaintiff now requests attorney fees on the basis that Defendant’s removal

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motion was improper. (ECF No. 20.)

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II.

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Where the court finds removal improper, it “may require payment of just costs and any

Discussion

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actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. §

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1447(c). “[T]he standard for awarding fees should turn on the reasonableness of the removal.

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Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the

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removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an

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objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,

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546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).
Defendant had an objectively reasonable basis for removal under the LMRA. Defendant

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implicated several components of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that define the

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FCL policy, including the California and Nevada Working Conditions, the AT&T Pension

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Benefit Plan, the AT&T West Bargained Leave of Absence Policy, and the Memorandum of

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Agreement that set forth the Family Care Leave Policy. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7–18.) This Court did not

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find that pointing to these documents required preemption, because Defendant had not identified

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any provision within the CBA that required this Court’s interpretation. (ECF No. 19 at 8.)

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However, the arguments raised by Defendant were reasonable and well-supported.

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With respect to preemption under ERISA, Defendant had to meet the Davila standard: that

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Plaintiff could at some point have brought the action under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, and that no

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legal duty independent of ERISA was implicated by Defendant’s actions (here, the action of

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adjusting an employee’s start date forward as a way of implementing the FCL policy). Aetna

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Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004). These arguments were not persuasive. Removal did

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not meet this standard because Plaintiff was seeking redress for any loss related to “layoff, recall,

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promotion, job assignment, and seniority-related benefits such as vacation.” Cal. Gov. Code §

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12945.2(g). There was no emphasis in the complaint on ERISA benefits.

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Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant should be penalized for attaching voluminous exhibits

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to its removal motion is unavailing. (ECF No. 20-1 at 6–7.) These were part of the CBA cited

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by Defendant in its opposition to the remand motion, and they explained Defendant’s removal

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motion. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant should be penalized for Defendants’ refusal to

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stipulate to a briefing schedule and hearing date for the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 20-1 at 7–

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8.) The Court did not require Plaintiff to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss before a

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ruling on the remand motion. The paperwork filed regarding the motion for a continuance on the

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dismissal motion was brief. (See ECF Nos. 5, 9.) Thus, Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the fees

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associated with litigating that motion are not persuasive.
There was an objectively reasonable basis for Defendant’s removal motion, and therefore

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Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees (ECF No. 20) is DENIED. Plaintiff may submit a bill of

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costs.

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Dated: December 3, 2014

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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