Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 29

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd on 10/29/2015 DENYING 28 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. (Michel, G.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LOIS MARTIN,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:13-cv-2671 DAD

v.

ORDER

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,

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Defendant.

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This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on

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defendant’s motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of

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Civil Procedure, (“Rule”).1

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A district court may alter or amend its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure. However, reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used

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sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani,

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342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice

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§ 59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000)). The Ninth Circuit has explained

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Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See Dkt. Nos. 8 & 10.)
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There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be
granted: 1) the motion is “necessary to correct manifest errors of
law or fact upon which the judgment is based;” 2) the moving party
presents “newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;” 3)
the motion is necessary to ‘prevent manifest injustice;” or 4) there
is an “intervening change in controlling law.”

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Turner v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003)

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(quoting McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1254 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1999)). A motion to amend

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judgment under Rule 59(e) “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or

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present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co.

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v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n. 5 (2008) (quoting 11 C. Wright & A Miller, Federal Practice and

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Procedure § 2810.1, pp. 127-28 (2d ed. 1995)).
Here, the defendant asserts that she seeks to alter or amend the court’s August 31, 2015

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order to “correct manifest errors of law and fact and to prevent a manifest injustice.” (Def.’s

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MTA (Dkt. No. 28) at 2.2) Specifically, defendant argues that “[e]ven if this Court found error in

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the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence, under the clear direction of the most recent and

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relevant Ninth Circuit law on its so-called credit-as-true rule, the Court committed errors of law

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and fact by remanding for payment of benefits rather than allowing the agency, as the proper fact

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finders, to correct any errors.”3 (Id.)
That argument, however, is the same argument defendant raised in her April 6, 2015

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cross-motion for summary judgment, which this court denied. (See Def.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 22) at

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18-20.) As noted above, “Rule 59(e) may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise

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arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” U.S.

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Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lee Investments LLC, 551 F. Supp.2d 1069, 1080-81 (E.D. Cal. 2008).

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See also Milano v. Carter, 599 Fed. Appx. 767, 768 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district court did not

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abuse its discretion in denying Milano’s motion for reconsideration because Milano did not

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Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF
system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.
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In this regard the “Commissioner has chosen to limit this motion to the remedy . . . .” (Def.’s
MTA (Dkt. No. 28) at 2.
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present newly discovered evidence, show that the district court committed clear error, or identify

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an intervening change in controlling law. Instead, Milano simply rehashed her previously-

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rejected arguments.”).4
Moreover, for the same reasons noted in the court’s order filed August 31, 2015, the

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Commissioner’s argument is incorrect. In this regard, a case may be remanded under the “credit-

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as-true” rule for an award of benefits where:

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(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative
proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed
to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether
claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly
discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be
required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

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Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even where all the conditions for the “credit-as-true” rule are met,

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the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates

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serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social

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Security Act.” Id. at 1021.

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Here, the record has been fully developed, the ALJ failed to provide a legally sufficient

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reason for rejecting the medical opinions of a treating and examining physician and the vocational

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expert testified that if those opinions were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find

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plaintiff disabled on remand. Accordingly, the court finds, again, that all the conditions for the

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“credit-as-true” rule have been met, there is not serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in

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fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and, therefore, it was appropriate to

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remand this matter with the direction to award benefits. See Mendoza v. Colvin, ___Fed. Appx.

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___, ___, 2015 WL 6437337, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2015) (remanding for award of benefits

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where ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reason for rejecting medical opinion, as well as

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plaintiff’s testimony, and vocational expert testified that individual with plaintiff’s physical

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limitations would be unable work); Behling v. Colvin, 603 Fed. Appx. 541, 543 (9th Cir. 2015)

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(“Based on the vocational expert’s hearing testimony, who responded that a person with

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Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule
36-3(b).
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Behling’s limitations would be precluded from sustained work activity, there is substantial

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evidence to support a conclusion that further proceedings are not required to determine Behling’s

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RFC.”); Martinez v. Colvin, 585 Fed. Appx. 612, 613 (9th Cir. 2014) (“if Martinez’s testimony

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and Dr. Novak’s opinion were properly credited, Martinez would be considered disabled. We

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therefore reverse the decision of the district court and remand with instructions to remand to the

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ALJ for the calculation and award of benefits”); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1022, n.28 (“Here, the ALJ

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and counsel posed questions to the VE that matched both Garrison’s testimony and the opinions

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of Wang, Anderson, and General, and in response the VE answered that a person with such an

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RFC would be unable to work. On that basis, we can conclude that Garrison is disabled without

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remanding for further proceedings to determine anew her RFC.”); Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for payment of benefits where the ALJ

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improperly rejected the testimony of the plaintiff’s examining physicians); Ghokassian v. Shalala,

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41 F.3d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) (awarding benefits where the ALJ “improperly discounted the

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opinion of the treating physician”); cf. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 798 F.3d 749, 759 (9th Cir.

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2015) (“Although medical reports of adequate pain control on medication do not foreclose the

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possibility that Brown-Hunter still needs to lie down as often and as unpredictably as she alleged,

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they do create a significant factual conflict in the record that should be resolved through further

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proceedings on an open record before a proper disability determination can be made by the ALJ

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in the first instance.”); Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105

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(9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and

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ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).5

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See fn. 4, above.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s

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motion to alter or amend the judgment (Dkt. No. 28) is denied.

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Dated: October 29, 2015

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DAD:6
Ddad1\orders.soc sec\martin2671.mtr.den.ord.docx

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