Granite Outlet Inc. v. Baker

Filing 11

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 1/22/2014 DENYING plaintiff's 4 Petition for Temporary Restraining Order. (Marciel, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GRANITE OUTLET, INC,

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No. 2:14-cv-0124-TLN-EFB

Petitioner,
v.

ORDER

CHRISTINE BAKER in her official
capacity as DIRECTOR OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS (DIR),
Respondents.

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This matter is before the Court on a Petition for a Temporary Restraining Order filed by
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Plaintiff and Petitioner Granite Outlet, Inc. (“Plaintiff”). (See Pl.’s Compl. ECF No. 1; see also
Pl.’s Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF 4; Pl.’s Mem. in Support of Ex

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Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF 5.) Plaintiff seeks four specific items of
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relief. First, “[f]or the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the Defendant

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Christine Baker from enforcing the appeal bond requirements of labor code section 98.2(b), on
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the basis that the appeal bond constitutes a violation of Plaintiff's right to access to courts, a
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fundamental right secured by the First Amendment to the United States constitution, right to
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petition the government for redress of grievances. . . . And to permit the two labor appeal cases to
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go forward in Sacramento County on the substantive merits”; second, “[f]or the issuance of a

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temporary restraining order enjoining Defendant from objecting/opposing [its] demand for a jury

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trial in the Sacramento Superior Court Labor awards cases, presently set for trial March 6, 2014;

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and to permit the cases to proceed as jury trials”; third, “[f]or the issuance of a temporary

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restraining order enjoining Defendant Christine Baker in her official capacity as Director of the

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Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) from enforcing the previously issued awards against

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Plaintiff in Case Nos. 34-2013-00151101 and 34-2013-00151100”; and fourth, “[f]or the

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issuance of an Order to Show Cause requiring Defendant to appear in court and show cause why a

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preliminary injunction on the same terms as the temporary restraining order, or such other

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injunctive relief as the court deems proper, should not issue.” (ECF 4 at 1:7-24.)

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Plaintiff argues that enforcement of the bond requirement set forth in California Labor

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Code § 98.2(b) would impede its Constitutional right to access to courts. More specifically,

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Plaintiff maintains that the bond requirement impermissibly constrains its ability to pursue its

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pending state court appeal of an adverse decision of the California Labor Commission.

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According to Plaintiff, presently pending in its Sacramento County Superior Court wage order

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appeal is a January 23, 2014, hearing on the labor commissioner’s motion to dismiss the appeal

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for failure to post the Bond required by California Labor Code § 98.2(b).

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The court hereby denies Plaintiff’s application for a variety of reasons. First, Plaintiff

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failed to comply with the document checklist set forth in Eastern District Local Rule 231(c).

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Specifically, Plaintiff’s Proposed Order in support of its Ex Parte Application fails to “further

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notify the affected party of the right to apply to the Court for modification or dissolution on two

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(2) days’ notice or such shorter notice as the Court may allow.” L.R. 231(c)(8).

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Furthermore, Plaintiff has not articulated why it could not have sought injunctive relief at

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an earlier date. See L.R. 231(b) (“In considering a motion for a temporary restraining order, the

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Court will consider whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary

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injunction at an earlier date without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief by motion for

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temporary restraining order.”). More specifically, Plaintiff has not explained why it did not seek

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the relief it currently seeks until more than three months after the labor commission issued its

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decision in the underlying labor dispute on September 3, 2013. (ECF 1, Ex. A.); see also L.R.
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231(b) (“Should the Court find that the applicant unduly delayed in seeking injunctive relief, the

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Court may conclude that the delay constitutes laches or contradicts the applicant's allegations of

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irreparable injury and may deny the motion solely on either ground.”)

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The court also finds that principles of comity and federalism drastically undermine

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Plaintiff’s contention that there is a likelihood of success on the merits. See Winters v. Natural

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Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction

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must establish that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits. . . .”). “Generally, the Supreme Court's

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decision in Younger and its progeny direct federal courts to abstain from granting injunctive or

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declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings.” E.T. v. George,

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681 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1168 (2010); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1971); Samuels v.

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Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (holding that “where an injunction would be impermissible

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under these principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well”). The Younger

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doctrine “reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in state judicial processes in the

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absence of great and immediate injury to the federal plaintiff.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423

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(1979). When federal courts disrupt a state court's opportunity to “intelligently mediate federal

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constitutional concerns and state interests” and interject themselves into such disputes, “they

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prevent the informed evolution of state policy by state tribunals.” Moore, 442 U.S. at 429–30.

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The relief Plaintiff seeks is exactly the type of relief “Younger and its progeny directs

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federal courts to abstain from granting.” E.T., 681 F.Supp.2d at 1168. Plaintiff seeks injunctive

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relief that would directly impede the currently pending matter in Sacramento Superior Court.

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Such interference would seriously deprive the state court the opportunity to develop state policy

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concerning California Labor Code Section 98.2. Indeed, the Sacramento Superior Court has

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specifically requested briefing from the parties addressing whether it has “authority to dismiss the

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appeal if the bond is not posted at the time the appeal is filed” and whether the court “ha[s]

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authority to permit a posting of the bond after the appeal is filed.” (ECF 1, Ex. A.) As such, the

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court finds that, based on the important principles of comity and federalism, granting the relief

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Plaintiff seeks would be highly inappropriate, and thus, Plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of

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success on the merits.
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Finally, Plaintiff does not satisfy the stringent standard to justify ex parte injunctive relief.

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To qualify for a temporary restraining order, at minimum the moving party must demonstrate (1)

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a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, and (2) that the

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lawsuit raises serious questions and the balance of hardship tips sharply in the movant’s favor.

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See Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 1986); Regents of Univ. of

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Cal. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 747 F.2d 511, 515 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 65. Plaintiff’s Petition fails to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits, a

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possibility of irreparable harm, or that this lawsuit raises serious questions of public interest with

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the balance of hardships tipping in his favor.

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Therefore, Plaintiff’s Petition for a Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 22, 2014

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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