Brown v. Naseer

Filing 65

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 10/11/2016 GRANTING Naseer's 47 Motion for Summary Judgment. CASE CLOSED. (Zignago, K.)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9

----oo0oo----

10
11

DEXTER BROWN,
Plaintiff,

12
13
14
15

v.

CIV. NO. 2:14-0225 WBS CKD P
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SAHIR NASEER, et al.,
Defendants.

16
17
----oo0oo----

18
19

Plaintiff Dexter Brown (“Brown”), a prisoner proceeding

20

pro se, brought this action for violation of his civil rights

21

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 primarily alleging violations of his

22

Eighth Amendment rights.

23

Naseer’s (“Naseer”) motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 47).

24

The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge

25

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

26

Before the court is Defendant Sahir

On July 7, 2016, the magistrate judge filed findings

27

and recommendations (Docket No. 64) in which she recommended that

28

the action be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
1

1

remedies.

2

merits of Brown’s claim, the court expresses no opinion as to

3

whether Brown properly exhausted his administrative remedies.

4

The court also does not address whether Naseer is entitled to

5

qualified immunity.

6

I.

7

As the court will resolve the motion based on the

Factual Background and Procedural Background
In Brown’s Third Amended Complaint, he alleges that

8

between September 29 and October 1, 2013, he suffered from chest

9

pain, muscle weakness, nausea, vomiting, and other symptoms

10

consistent with too much potassium in the blood, a condition

11

known as hyperkalemia.

12

from these symptoms, Naseer, a physician at the California Health

13

Care Facility in Stockton, wrote medical orders placing him on

14

fluid restrictions, “thereby preventing plaintiff from

15

implementing counter-measures to abate the toxicity of potassium

16

in plaintiff’s blood.”

17

Brown alleges that while he was suffering

Third Am. Compl. ¶ 6.

Brown also alleges that Naseer directed medical staff

18

not to run various tests or send Brown to receive emergency

19

medical services.

20

other symptoms worsened and he was sent to San Joaquin General

21

Hospital, where tests revealed he was hyperkalemic with a

22

critical potassium level.

23

On October 1, 2013, Brown’s chest pain and

As a result of these actions, Brown filed a complaint

24

against Naseer and other defendants.

25

amended complaints, the magistrate judge screened the Third

26

Amended Complaint in her December 2, 2014 Findings and

27

Recommendations and found 1) it stated a claim upon which relief

28

can be granted under the Eighth Amendment against defendant
2

After Brown filed multiple

1

Naseer but 2) all other claims and defendants should be

2

dismissed.

3

February 24, 2015.

4

motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Brown’s Eighth

5

Amendment claim.

6

II.

The court adopted the Findings and Recommendations on
Defendant Naseer later filed the instant

Legal Standard

7

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that

8

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

9

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ.

10

P. 56(a).

A material fact is one that could affect the outcome

11

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

12

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's

13

favor.

14

(1986).

15

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

16

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

17

negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case.

18

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

19

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the

20

nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential

21

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.

22

Id.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

23

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

24

burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific

25

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

26

324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

27

the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is

28

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
3

Id. at

To carry this burden,

Matsushita

1

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

2

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be

3

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

4

reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].”

5

at 252.

Anderson, 477 U.S.

6

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must

7

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

8

party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor.

9

255.

Id. at

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,

10

and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

11

functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for

12

summary judgment . . . .”

13

Id.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on

14

inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff

15

must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference

16

to his serious medical needs.

17

97, 104 (1976).

18

standard,” and it requires more than a showing that prison

19

officials were negligent or even grossly negligent.

20

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).

21

show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s

22

pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the

23

indifference.”

24

2006).

25

treatment “does not amount to a deliberate indifference to [the

26

prisoner’s] serious medical needs.”

27

240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

28

III. Discussion

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal

Toguchi v.

The plaintiff must

See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

A difference of medical opinion regarding a prisoner’s

4

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d

1

Here, Brown has not shown anything more than a

2

difference of opinion as to the proper diagnosis and treatment of

3

his condition.

4

time of his treatment and that excessive fluid intake in dialysis

5

patients can lead to fluid retention, which can cause fluid to

6

accumulate in the lungs, respiratory failure, and subsequent

7

death.

8

amounts of water in the past in order to self-medicate himself,

9

and he further concedes that Naseer placed him on fluid

Brown concedes that he was on dialysis at the

Brown also concedes that he had engaged in drinking large

10

restrictions to prevent him from drinking copious amounts of

11

water.

12

respiratory failure or death from this practice and that Brown

13

believed Naseer intended to harm him do not raise a genuine issue

14

of material fact as to whether Naseer was deliberately

15

indifferent.1

The facts that Brown believed he was never at risk for

16

In essence, Brown contends that he should have been

17

allowed to self-medicate with water to treat hyperkalemia and

18

that he should have been tested and treated for hyperkalemia, in

19

light of his symptoms.

20

evidence that his preferred treatment was an appropriate

21

treatment for his condition, much less that Naseer was

22

deliberately indifferent by refusing such treatment, in light of

23

the undisputed risks of such treatment for dialysis patients.

24

Nor do the facts that a subsequent blood test showed an elevated

However, he provides no admissible

25
26
27
28

1

Similarly, Brown’s vague statements about individuals
adding potassium to his diet and similar claims that others
intended to harm him are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Naseer was deliberately indifferent.
5

1

potassium level, or that as Brown contends, he exhibited symptoms

2

consistent with hyperkalemia, show that Naseer was deliberately

3

indifferent by refusing to test his potassium levels or give him

4

an EKG, without any competent evidence showing, for example, how

5

other doctors would have responded to such symptoms.

6

facts in the light most favorable to Brown, the record supports

7

only a potential claim for negligence, not deliberate

8

indifference.2

9

Viewing the

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Naseer’s motion for

10

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

11

Dated:

October 11, 2016

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Brown contends in his amended response to Naseer’s
motion for summary judgment that Naseer did not address his
arguments regarding “compulsory medical treatment.” However,
while Brown’s Third Amended Complaint does mention his attempt to
refuse fluid restrictions, it is unclear how any compulsory
medical treatment in the form of fluid restrictions would
constitute a cognizable claim aside from the denial of adequate
medical care under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.
Moreover, the magistrate judge’s December 2, 2014 Findings and
Recommendations, which were adopted in full by the court, found
that Brown stated a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment
only, and thus only Brown’s Eighth Amendment claim is properly
before the court.
6