Hamidi et al v. Service Employees International Union Local 1000 et al

Filing 139

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 6/18/2019: IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 121 , 127 be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are DISMISSED as MOOT. The court DISMISSES the California State Controller from this lawsuit WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiffs' Motion to Reopen Discovery 126 be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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----oo0oo----

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KOUROSH HAMIDI, et al., and
the CLASS THEY SEEK TO
REPRESENT,
Plaintiffs,

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No. 2:14-cv-319 WBS KJN

v.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL
1000, and BETTY YEE,
California State Controller,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Defendants.

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----oo0oo---Fifteen employees of the State of California brought

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this class action against defendants Service Employers

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International Union Local 1000 and the California state

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controller, alleging that defendants’ ‘opt-out’ system for

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collecting optional union fees violates the First Amendment.

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(Compl. (Docket No. 1).)

On remand from the Ninth Circuit,

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defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for prospective

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relief.

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discovery.

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I.

(Docket Nos. 121 & 127.)

Plaintiffs move to reopen

(Docket No. 126.)

Background

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This court described much of the factual and procedural

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background to this lawsuit in its prior order on summary

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judgment.

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Order”) (Docket No. 94).)

(Mem. & Order Re: Cross-Mots. for Summ. J. (“Summ. J.
After the court entered judgment in

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favor of defendants, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal.

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(Docket No. 102.)

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appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Janus v.

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American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, 138

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S. Ct. 2448 (2018).

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After the parties had filed their briefs on

Because

the

parties

agreed

that

Janus

impacts

this

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case, the Ninth Circuit then vacated this court’s judgment and

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remanded the case for further proceedings in light of the Supreme

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Court’s decision.

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panel also noted that this court “may determine in the first

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instance whether any of [plaintiffs’] claims are moot.”

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Pursuant

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conference on remand, the court set a briefing schedule for the

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two motions at issue in this order: (1) defendants’ motion to

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dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief as moot and (2)

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plaintiffs’ motion to reopen discovery on the affirmative defense

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of good faith.

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these motions on June 17, 2019.

to

the

(Ninth Cir. Mem. at 2 (Docket No. 111).)

discussion

with

(Docket No. 118.)

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2

the

parties

at

the

The

(Id.)
status

The court held a hearing on

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II.

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
A.

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Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) provides that

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“[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-

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matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”

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Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

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and a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

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under Rule 12(b)(1) “is simply that the former may be asserted at

Fed. R.

The difference between a Rule 12(h)(3) motion

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any time and need not be responsive to any pleading of the other

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party.”

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874, 880 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Augustine v. United States,

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704 F.2d 1074, 1075 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that the issue

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of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by the parties at

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any time pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3)); Johnson v. Cal. Welding

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Supply, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-01669 WBS GGH, 2011 WL 5118599, at *2

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(E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011) (applying a single standard to a motion

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to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3)).

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Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II, 954 F.2d

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a

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complaint must be dismissed once the court determines that it

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lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims.

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R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

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jurisdiction until the party asserting jurisdiction proves

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otherwise, and once subject-matter jurisdiction has been

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challenged, the burden of proof is placed on the party asserting

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that jurisdiction exists.

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Am., 511 U.S. 375, 376 (1994); Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925,

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927 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that “the party seeking to invoke

Fed.

The court presumes that it has no

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

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the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that

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jurisdiction exists”).

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An attack on the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction

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may be facial or factual.

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373

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F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

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defendants bring a factual challenge to the court’s subject-

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matter jurisdiction, this court “may review evidence beyond the

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complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion

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for summary judgment.”

Id.

As is the case here where

The court “need not presume the

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truthfulness of plaintiffs’ allegations,” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d

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1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000), and “may review any evidence, such as

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affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning

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the existence of jurisdiction,” McCarthy v. United States, 850

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F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988).

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B.

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Mootness
Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the

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judicial power extends to “Cases” and “Controversies.”

Courts

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cannot decide legal disputes “in the absence of such a case or

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controversy.”

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(2013).

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proper role in the federal system.

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568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).

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plaintiffs have standing, that is “an actual injury traceable to

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the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial

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decision.”

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Article III necessitates that an actual controversy exist

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“through all stages of the litigation.”

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at 91 (quotations omitted).

Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90

No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,

This limitation requires that

Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990).

Already, LLC, 568 U.S.

“A case becomes moot--and therefore
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no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III--

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when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack

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a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”

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way, a case is moot if the dispute “is no longer embedded in any

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actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal

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rights.”

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Id.

Put another

Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93 (2009).
Defendants contend that the Supreme Court’s decision in

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Janus and subsequent actions taken by the state and the union

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have mooted plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief.

In Janus,

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the Supreme Court held that states and public-sector unions

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cannot compel the payment of agency fees from nonconsenting

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employees because such a practice violates the First Amendment.

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138 S. Ct. at 2486.

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decided, the California State Controller’s Office cancelled the

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deduction of agency fees from all nonconsenting public employees.

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(See State Controller’s Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 1 (Docket

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No. 128-1).)

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refund all June 2018 agency fees.

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the California Attorney General issued an advisory concerning the

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Supreme Court’s decision in Janus, explaining that the state “may

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no longer automatically deduct a mandatory agency fee from the

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salary or wages of a non-member public employee who does not

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affirmatively choose to financially support the union.”

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State Controller’s Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 2 (Docket No.

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128-2).)1

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On June 28, 2018, the day after Janus was

The Controller’s Office also said that it would
(Id.)

About a month later,

(See

Similarly, in-house counsel for the union defendant

The court GRANTS the state controller’s unopposed
request for judicial notice of Exhibit 1, the Personnel Letter
issued by State Controller’s Office on July 20, 2018, and Exhibit
2, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra’s advisory on labor
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has filed an affidavit stating that the union ceased collecting

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agency fees and using the opt-out procedure following Janus.

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(See Decl. of Anne M. Giese (“Giese Decl.”) ¶¶ 3, 8; see also id.

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Exs. 1 & 2 (Docket No. 124).)

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entire practice is unconstitutional in light of Janus and that

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this determination binds the union.

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Union counsel agrees that the

(Giese Decl. ¶ 8.)

Plaintiffs, inter alia, ask for declaratory and

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injunctive relief against the opt-out procedure defendants used

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to collect optional union dues.

(See Compl. at 13-14.)

Because

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defendants have abandoned this procedure because they can no

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longer collect union dues without an employees’ affirmative

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consent, see Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2448, they maintain that these

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claims for relief are now moot.

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that their claim for injunctive relief is now moot (see Pls.’

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Consolidated Opp’n at 2 n.3 & 4 (Docket No. 130)), but they

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insist that this change in policy does not render their claim for

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declaratory relief moot.2

In response, plaintiffs concede

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1.

Applicability of the Voluntary Cessation Exception

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At the outset, the court must decide whether the

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challenged conduct ended due to defendants’ “voluntary cessation”

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rights, since they are “sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also City of Sausalito
v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1223 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (Federal
courts “may take judicial notice of a record of a state agency
not subject to reasonable dispute.”).

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The test for mootness is “not relaxed in the
declaratory judgment context.” Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean,
Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Plaintiffs
must still “show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
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of collecting fees.

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conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot because a

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dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of the

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challenged conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.”

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Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012).

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Ninth Circuit precedent, “voluntary cessation must have arisen

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because of the litigation” for this exception to mootness to

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apply.

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F.3d 1451, 1460 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original).

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“The voluntary cessation of challenged

Knox v.
Under

Pub. Utilities Comm’n of State of Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 100

All available evidence indicates that defendants

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changed their position, not because of this lawsuit, but because

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the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus rendered the collection of

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union dues from nonconsenting public employees unconstitutional.

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Defendants cited Janus as the justification for their change in

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policy, and the timing of the change indicates that the decision

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was a significant motivating force.

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for Judicial Notice Ex. 1; Decl. of Anne M. Giese ¶ 3.)

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defendants vigorously defended against this lawsuit and employed

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the opt-out procedure up until Janus.

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motivating factor behind the change “tends to indicate that the

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change was not really voluntary at all.”

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Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Court’s broad new precedent “not only affected the rights of the

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parties immediately before it (the state of Illinois) but also

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announced a broad rule invalidating every state law permitting

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agency fees to be withheld.”

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Union, No. 3:15-CV-378 (VAB), 2018 WL 5115559, at *9 (D. Conn.

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Oct. 19, 2018).

(See State Controller’s Req.
Indeed,

Therefore, the real

See Smith v. Univ. of
The Supreme

Lamberty v. Conn. State Police

Because defendants’ decision to abandon the
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challenged conduct did not arise because of this litigation, the

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court finds that the voluntary cessation rubric does not apply,

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and thus that there is no longer a dispute between the parties as

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to the claims for prospective relief.

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2.

Applying the Voluntary Cessation Exception

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Even if the voluntary cessation exception were to

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apply, a claim may still be moot “if subsequent events made it

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absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not

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reasonably be expected to recur.”

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

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Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)

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(citations and quotations omitted).

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reflected in statutory changes or changes in ordinances or

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regulations, as is conceded here, mootness is “more likely” if:

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(1) language indicating the change is “broad in scope and

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unequivocal in tone”; (2) the policy fully addresses the

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challenged conduct; (3) the case in question was the catalyst for

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the change in policy; (4) the new policy has been in place for a

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long time; and (5) since implementing the new policy, defendants

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have not engaged in conduct similar to that being challenged in

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the present litigation.

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(9th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotations omitted).

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hand, mootness is less likely where the new policy could be

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easily abandoned or changed in the future.

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asserting mootness based on voluntary cessation bear a heavy

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burden in satisfying this standard.

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Where a policy change is not

Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 972

Id.

On the other

The parties

Id.

Weighing the Rosebrock factors, the court determines

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that defendants have carried this heavy burden.3

First, the

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California Attorney General has clearly indicated that the state

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may no longer collect fees from employees who do not

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“affirmatively choose to financially support the union.”

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State Controller’s Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 2.)

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this statement, the letter from the State Controller’s Office, or

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the affidavit submitted by the union’s counsel is tentative.

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Second, the new practice fully addresses the challenged conduct.

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Because defendants no longer collect any fees absent an

(See

Nothing in

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employee’s affirmative consent, they no longer use the opt-out

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system at issue in this case.

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Janus decision, not this litigation, catalyzed the change in

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policy.

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applies to this lawsuit.

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factors, the change in policy occurred almost a year ago and

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there is no indication that defendants have employed the

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challenge opt-out system in that time.4

Third, as explained above, the

Regardless, the parties agree that Janus squarely
And finally, under the fourth and fifth

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This conclusion aligns with other district courts that
have found similar claims for prospective relief moot after
Janus. See, e.g., Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, No. 1:17CV-100, 2019 WL 2160404, at *7 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2019); Wholean
v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001, No. 3:18-CV-1008 (WWE), 2019 WL 1873021,
at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 26, 2019); Carey v. Inslee, 364 F. Supp. 3d
1220, 1226-27 (W.D. Wash. 2019); Cook v. Brown, 364 F. Supp. 3d
1184, 1189-90 (D. Or. 2019); Lamberty, 2018 WL 5115559, at *7-*9;
Yohn v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 17-cv-202-JLS-DFM, 2018 WL
5264076, at *3-*4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018); Danielson v.
Inslee, 345 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1339-40 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
3

The weighing of the Rosebrock factors distinguishes
this case from Guppy v. City of Los Angeles, No. SA 18-cv-360
JVS(ADSx) (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (Docket No. 67). In Guppy,
the defendants continued to automatically deduct agency fees from
plaintiff’s wages even after the Supreme Court’s decision in
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3.

Plaintiffs’ Remaining Arguments

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It is true that the provisions of California law that

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authorize the opt-out procedure and the collection of agency fees

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remain on the books.

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(k), 3515, 3515.7 & 3515.8.

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any authority that requires that the challenged statute be

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repealed before a claim for declaratory relief can be considered

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moot.

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at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2016) (same).

See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 3513(i) &
However, this court is unaware of

See Manbeck v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-2132 (VB), 2016 WL 29631,
As some circuits have

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held, “[t]he mere presence on the statute books of an

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unconstitutional statute, in the absence of enforcement or

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credible threat of enforcement, does not entitle anyone to sue.”

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Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2006); see also

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Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir.

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2004) (“[A] case is moot when a state agency acknowledges that it

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will not enforce a statute because it is plainly

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unconstitutional, in spite of the failure of the legislature to

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remove the statute from the books.”).

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court to “provide a belt-and-suspenders opinion on a downstream

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controversy.”

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2010).

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longer constitutional “would simply reiterate a fact that is not

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in dispute.”

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prompted [plaintiffs’] . . . request for declaratory relief,” see

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Janus. (Id. at 3.) Only after the plaintiff brought a lawsuit
did the defendants in Guppy stop these deductions. (See id. at
4.) By contrast, defendants in this case immediately stopped
collecting agency fees after Janus and readily acknowledged that
the Supreme Court’s decision now prohibits the challenged
conduct.
10

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It is not the job of this

See Kittel v. Thomas, 620 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir.

Declaring that these provisions of California law are no

Id.

Janus has “eviscerated the dispute that

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Gator.com, 398 F.3d at 1131, because defendants concede that the

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decision renders any statutory authorization unconstitutional.

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Finally, the court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that

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the union’s supposed record of changing its behavior to evade

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judicial review is sufficient to overcome mootness.

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Knox, the union does not continue to defend the legality of the

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challenged practice.

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“not clear why the union would necessarily refrain from

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collecting similar fees in the future” when it continued to

Unlike in

See 567 U.S. at 307 (observing that it was

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“defend the legality” of the practice).

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think that the Union would resort to conduct that it had admitted

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in writing was constitutionally deficient.”

13

United Acads., 265 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2001); see also

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Cummings v. Connell, 316 F.3d 886, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).

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And contrasted with this case, the change in position in Knox was

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not motivated by a directly applicable Supreme Court decision.

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“It is unreasonable to

See Carlson v.

Even if the union’s past conduct was relevant,

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plaintiffs concede that the union has no power to compel the

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payment of fees absent approval by the state controller.

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Pls.’ Consolidated Opp’n at 13-14; see also Giese Decl. ¶ 9

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(“Local 1000 has no authority or practical means of deducting

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fair share fees from state employees’ pay, as their pay is

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administered by the State of California through the [State

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Controller’s Office], not by Local 1000.”).)

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unequivocally indicated that it will no longer employ the opt-out

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procedure and collect fees.

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Judicial Notice Exs. 1 & 2.)

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government entity is acting in good faith when it changes its

(See

Here, the state has

(See State Controller’s Req. for
And this court must “presume that a

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1

policy.”

2

forth any legitimate reason for why the state would otherwise

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deviate from this stated policy, and thus has not overcome this

4

presumption of good faith.

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Rosebrock, 745 F.3d at 971.

Plaintiffs have not put

Accordingly, because the allegedly wrongful behavior

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could not reasonably be expected to recur, the court will dismiss

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plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief as moot.

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9

Plaintiffs previously conceded, and this court so held,
that “they are barred from recovering monetary damages against

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the state controller under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”

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(Summ. J. Order at 6 (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

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Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).)

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upset this prior holding.

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no claims remaining against the state controller, the court will

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dismiss the state controller from this lawsuit.

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III.

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The court sees no reason to

Accordingly, because plaintiffs have

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reopen Discovery
A.

Legal Standard
A moving party must show good cause to modify a

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scheduling order.

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this good cause standard to a motion to reopen discovery, this

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court may examine the following factors:

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26

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).

In applying

1) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is
opposed, 3) whether the non-moving party would be
prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party was diligent in
obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the
court, 5) the foreseeability of the need for additional
discovery in light of the time allowed for discovery by the
district court, and 6) the likelihood that the discovery
will lead to relevant evidence.

27

U.S. ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1526

28

(9th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
12

1

However, the good cause inquiry “primarily considers the

2

diligence of the party seeking the amendment.”

3

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992).

4

the movant did not act diligently, the court’s “inquiry should

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end.”

6

Johnson v.
If

Id.
B.

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Analysis
Plaintiffs seek to reopen discovery on the union

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defendant’s good faith defense.

The union raised this

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affirmative defense in its answer filed on April 25, 2014.

10

(Answer at 15 (Docket No. 18).)

11

deadline of June 1, 2015 in the Rule 16 scheduling order.

12

(Docket No. 21.)

13

And this court set a discovery

The court resolves this motion solely under the

14

diligence factor.

Although the union raised this affirmative

15

defense in its answer, plaintiffs concede that they failed to

16

satisfy the deadline for completion of discovery.5

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Reply at 5 (Docket No. 136).)

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to conduct discovery, almost eleven months, yet they simply

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failed to diligently pursue evidence relevant to this affirmative

20

defense.

21

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that it is not an abuse of the district

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court’s discretion to refuse to reopen discovery where the movant

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had “ample opportunity to conduct discovery” prior to its request

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to reopen).

(See Pls.’

Plaintiffs had ample opportunity

See Panatronic USA v. AT&T Corp., 287 F.3d 840, 846

Such a failure to act, despite having proper notice,

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28

On May 25, 2015, plaintiffs served interrogatories and
requests for production on the union. (See Decl. of Jeffrey
Demain ¶ 2 (Docket No. 129-1).) The union then objected to the
discovery as untimely and plaintiffs took no action to compel
further responses. (See id.)
13
5

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dooms plaintiffs’ belated request.

The court is unaware of any

2

authority that holds that the mere fact that an affirmative

3

defense may have been buried among other affirmative defenses

4

would otherwise excuse plaintiffs’ failure to act diligently.

5

Plaintiffs are the ones with the burden to prosecute their case

6

properly.

7

Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The use

8

of orders establishing a firm discovery cutoff date is

9

commonplace, and has impacts generally helpful to the orderly

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610; see also Cornwell v. Electra

10

progress of litigation, so that the enforcement of such an order

11

should come as a surprise to no one.”).

12

Plaintiffs argue, however, that the basis for the

13

union’s affirmative defense was unknown to them prior to the

14

Supreme Court’s decision in Janus, and thus they had no reason to

15

anticipate this discovery need.

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affirmative defense remains largely unaffected by Janus.

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union’s affirmative defense has remained constant throughout the

18

lawsuit.

19

law when it collected agency fees.

20

the parties briefed and argued the existence of a good faith

21

defense on summary judgment, irrespective of the

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constitutionality of the challenged opt-out procedure.

23

Local 1000’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 28-30 (Docket No. 68);

24

Pls.’ Corrected Consol. Resp. at 12-13 (Docket No. 87); Local

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1000’s Reply at 13-15 (Docket No. 88).)

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27

This argument fails because this
The

It has always argued that it followed then-applicable
(See Answer at 15.)

In fact,

(See

Similarly, the authority plaintiffs rely on to argue
that a good faith defense depends on the private defendant’s

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14

1

“subjective state of mind”6 existed before plaintiffs brought

2

this lawsuit.

3

696 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Karlton, J.);

4

Robinson v. City of San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 992 F. Supp.

5

1198, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 1998)).

6

clear that a good faith defense may be available to private

7

parties in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.

8

Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008).

9

existing case law gave plaintiffs ample notice of this defense

(See Pls.’ Reply at 7 (citing Ambrose v. Coffey,

The Ninth Circuit had also made it

See Clement v. City of
Therefore,

10

and what may constitute relevant evidence.

11

argue that only a few courts discussed this defense in the

12

context of public-sector union cases prior to Janus, Janus itself

13

said nothing about the good faith defense, and thus cannot

14

constitute a relevant change in the law for the purpose of

15

renewed discovery.

16

While plaintiffs

Accordingly, because the contours of the union’s

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affirmative defense and relevant case law have not changed since

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the outset of the litigation, plaintiffs’ failure to diligently

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pursue discovery is not otherwise excused and the court will deny

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plaintiffs’ motion to reopen discovery.

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Although the court does not decide this issue for the
purposes of this motion, the court expresses skepticism that the
good faith defense depends on more than the union’s actual
compliance with then-existing law. Predicating this defense “on
the subjective anticipation of an unpredictable shift in the law
undermines the importance of observing existing precedent.”
Danielson v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, 340 F.
Supp. 3d 1083, 1086 (W.D. Wash. 2018); see also Cook, 364 F.
Supp. 3d at 1192 (“[R]eading the tea leaves of Supreme Court
dicta has never been a precondition to good faith reliance on
governing law.”).
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT defendants’ Motions to

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Dismiss (Docket Nos. 121 & 127) be, and the same hereby are,

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GRANTED.

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relief are DISMISSED as MOOT.7

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California State Controller from this lawsuit WITH PREJUDICE.

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Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory
The court DISMISSES the

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiffs’ Motion to Reopen

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Discovery (Docket No. 126) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

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Dated:

June 18, 2019

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At the hearing on these motions, counsel for plaintiffs
framed the request for declaratory relief retrospectively,
stating that it also includes a request for a declaration that
defendant’s conduct prior to Janus was illegal. As described,
plaintiffs’ request is not a free standing claim for declaratory
relief. See Mendia v. Garcia, 165 F. Supp. 3d 861, 894 (N.D.
Cal. 2016) (finding that claims for retrospective declaratory
relief are often duplicative of claims for damages). Instead, it
amounts to a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability for plaintiffs’ damages claim. Nothing within this
order prevents plaintiffs from properly making such a motion
later in this case.
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