State of Missouri, et al v. Harris
Filing
57
ORDER signed by Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 6/2/2014 GRANTING 27 , 33 Motions to Intervene. (Michel, G)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,
12
No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJM-KJN
Plaintiffs,
13
v.
ORDER
14
KAMALA D. HARRIS, et al.,
15
Defendants.
16
The separate motions to intervene brought by the Humane Society of the United
17
18
States (“HSUS”) and the Association of California Egg Farmers (“ACEF”) are currently pending
19
before the court. The motions were submitted without argument and the court now GRANTS the
20
motions.
21
I.
BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
On February 3, 2014, the State of Missouri initiated this action asserting two
22
23
alternative causes of action under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses. Compl., ECF No. 2.
24
On March 5, 2014, a first amended complaint was filed by the State of Missouri,
25
the State of Nebraska, the State of Oklahoma, the State of Alabama, the Commonwealth of
26
Kentucky and Terry Branstad, the Governor of the State of Iowa (collectively “plaintiffs”). First
27
Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 13.
28
/////
1
1
In the First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege as follows. In 2008, California
2
voters approved Proposition 2 (“Prop 2”) “‘to prohibit the cruel confinement of farm animals’
3
within California.” Id. ¶ 56. Starting in 2015, Prop 2 will prohibit California egg producers from
4
housing egg-laying hens in enclosures that prevent them from standing, lying down, turning
5
around and fully extending their limbs, effectively banning the use of the cage-systems that have
6
become conventional in the industry. Id. ¶ 57. The cost of complying with Prop 2 “would have
7
placed California egg producers at a significant competitive disadvantage when compared to egg
8
producers in Missouri and other states.” Id. ¶ 61. “Faced with the negative impact Prop 2 would
9
have on California’s egg industry,” the California Legislature passed AB 1437 in 2010, which
10
requires out-of-state egg farmers to comply with the same requirements set forth in Prop 2. Id. ¶¶
11
63–64. The California Department of Food and Agriculture promulgated regulations establishing
12
minimum dimensions, set forth in section 1350 of title 3 of the California Code of Regulations
13
(“section 1350”). Id. ¶ 65. “The stated purpose of AB 1437 is ‘to protect California consumers
14
from the deleterious, health, safety, and welfare effects of the sale and consumption of eggs
15
derived from egg-laying hens that are exposed to significant stress that may result in increased
16
exposure to disease pathogens including salmonella.’” Id. ¶ 68. Plaintiffs allege the purpose of
17
AB 1437 “was not to protect public health but rather to protect California farmers from the
18
market effects of Prop 2 by ‘leveling the playing field’ for out-of-state egg producers.” Id. ¶ 70.
19
Even assuming AB 1437 serves a legitimate public health purpose within
20
California by limiting the methods of egg production outside California, plaintiffs allege the
21
statute is “expressly and implicitly preempted by the Federal Egg Products Inspection Act,” 21
22
U.S.C. § 1031, because one of its express purposes “is to protect human health in connection with
23
the consumption of shell eggs.” Id. ¶¶ 76–81.
24
AB 1437 “imposes a substantial burden on interstate commerce by forcing
25
plaintiffs’ farmers either to forgo California’s markets altogether or accept significantly increased
26
production costs just to comply with California law.” Id. ¶ 84. The “necessary capital
27
improvements” in complying with AB 1437 and section 1350 “will cost Plaintiffs’ farmers
28
hundreds of millions of dollars.” Id. ¶ 86. Even choosing to forgo the California market will
2
1
impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce because plaintiffs’ farmers would produce a
2
surplus of eggs resulting in a decrease in the price of eggs. Id. ¶ 88.
3
With regard to a violation of the Commerce Clause, plaintiffs allege (1) AB 1437
4
and section 1350 “are protectionist measures intended to benefit California egg producers at the
5
expense of Plaintiffs’ egg producers by eliminating the competitive advantage [their] producers
6
would enjoy once Prop 2 becomes effective;” (2) the provisions “have the purpose and effect of
7
regulating conduct” outside California; and (3) they “impose a substantial burden on interstate
8
commerce by forcing Plaintiffs’ egg producers either to increase their production costs . . . or
9
forgo the largest market in the United States” with no legitimate state purpose. Id. ¶¶ 96–101.
10
With regard to plaintiffs’ alternative Supremacy Clause claim, plaintiffs allege
11
even if the court finds AB 1437 and section 1350 serve a legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose,
12
“the statute and regulations would be in conflict with the express terms of 21 U.S.C. § 1052(b).”
13
Id. ¶¶ 103–105.
14
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR INTERVENTION
15
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides:
16
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who
. . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is
the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s
ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately
represent that interest.
17
18
19
20
The court applies a four-part test to determine whether intervention as of right is proper under
21
Rule 24(a): “(1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have a
22
‘significantly protectable’ interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
23
action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical
24
matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s
25
interest must not be adequately represented by the existing parties in the lawsuit.” Sw. Ctr. for
26
Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 24(a) is construed
27
“liberally in favor of potential intervenors.” Id. at 818. As plaintiffs do not dispute that the
28
/////
3
1
HSUS and ACEF motions were timely, ECF No. 46 at 13, the court considers only the last three
2
prongs of the Berg test.
3
With regard to the second prong of the Berg test, a proposed intervenor has “a
4
‘significant protectable interest’ in [the] action if (1) it asserts an interest that is protected under
5
some law, and (2) there is a ‘relationship’ between [that] legally protected interest and the
6
plaintiff’s claims.” United States v. City of L.A., 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
7
Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998)). “The ‘interest’ test is not a clear-cut
8
or bright-line rule, because ‘[n]o specific legal or equitable interest need be established.’” Id.
9
(quoting Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1993)). Under the interest test,
10
courts are required “to make a ‘practical, threshold inquiry’ to discern whether allowing
11
intervention would be ‘compatible with efficiency and due process.” Id. (citations omitted).
12
The third prong of the Berg test requires the proposed intervenor to show that
13
resolution of the action may practically impair its ability to protect its interest. Cal. ex rel.
14
Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2006). As the Ninth Circuit observes, “‘[i]f
15
an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an
16
action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene.’” Berg, 268 F.3d at 822 (quoting
17
FED. R. CIV. P. 24 Advisory Committee’s Note (1966 Amendments)).
18
Proposed intervenors generally have a low burden to show that their interests are
19
inadequately represented, as required by the fourth prong of the Berg test. Arakaki v. Cayetano,
20
324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts consider the following three factors in deciding
21
whether the burden is met: “(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will
22
undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is
23
capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer
24
any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect.” Id. (citing California
25
v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1986)). “The most important factor
26
in determining the adequacy of representation is how the interest compares with the interests of
27
existing parties.” Id. There is a presumption that an existing party to an action adequately
28
represents the proposed intervenor’s interest when both share the same ultimate objective. Id. To
4
1
rebut this presumption, the proposed intervenor must make a “very compelling” showing of
2
inadequacy otherwise “it will be presumed that a state adequately represents its citizens when the
3
applicant shares the same interest.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
4
If the proposed intervenor argues that its interpretation of a contested statute
5
differs from that of the government, “the proposed intervenor must demonstrate a likelihood that
6
the government will abandon or concede a potentially meritorious reading of the statute.”
7
Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 444.
8
9
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), the court may allow intervention of a
party who has made a timely motion and “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action
10
a common question of law or fact. . . . In exercising its discretion, the court must consider
11
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’
12
rights.” In the Ninth Circuit, “permissive intervention requires (1) an independent ground for
13
jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common question of law and fact between the
14
movant’s claim or defense and the main action.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.
15
Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 843 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
16
III.
17
HSUS MOTION TO INTERVENE
HSUS is “a nonprofit animal protection organization “ that “has advocated against
18
inhumane practices that harm farm animals, including those raised for meat, milk, and eggs.”
19
ECF No. 27 at 9. It was a primary sponsor of AB 1437, one of the California provisions
20
challenged in this action. Id. at 8. HSUS requests intervention as of right under Federal Rule of
21
Civil Procedure 24(a), or in the alternative, permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil
22
Procedure 24(b). ECF No. 27. Plaintiffs Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Alabama, Kentucky,
23
and Governor Branstad oppose the HSUS motion. ECF No. 46. HSUS represents defendants do
24
not oppose. ECF No. 27 at 7 n.1.
25
For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS HSUS’s alternative request for
26
permissive intervention.
27
/////
28
/////
5
1
2
A.
Significantly Protectable Interest
HSUS contends it has two significantly protectable interests in plaintiffs’
3
challenge to AB 1437: it was one of the primary supporters of the legislation, and it is an
4
organization dedicated to preventing cruelty to egg-laying hens. ECF No. 27 at 13. HSUS avers
5
it worked with Assemblyman Jared Huffman, “testified in support of AB 1437 at bill hearings,”
6
“lobbied legislators, proposed amendments, urged newspaper editorial boards to support the bill,
7
submitted official comments in support, utilized email lists to generate support, and served as
8
media sources and spokespeople regarding AB 1437.” Id. HSUS further argues its
9
“organizational interest in preventing cruelty to egg-laying hens, and in supporting state sales
10
bans on cruelly produced products” also provides a significantly protectable interest, its having
11
invested substantial resources in educating the public. Id. at 14.
12
In opposition, plaintiffs argue HSUS is unlike other public interest groups who
13
have been granted leave to intervene as of right, because it was not the “‘architect’ or even a
14
‘sponsor’” of AB 1437. ECF No. 46 at 5.
15
A “public interest group is entitled as a matter of right to intervene in an action
16
challenging the legality of a measure it has supported.” Bates v. Jones, 127 F.3d 870, 874 (9th
17
Cir. 1997) (quoting Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995)). In
18
Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n, the Ninth Circuit approved the district court’s granting of a motion by
19
conservation groups to intervene as defendants under Rule 24(a) because the conservation groups
20
participated not in a voter-approved initiative, but in the administrative process leading to the
21
agency action challenged in the case. 58 F.3d at 1397–98; see also Nw. Forest Res. Council v.
22
Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996) (summarizing cases).
23
Here, HSUS supported the passing of AB 1437 and has an interest in the
24
protection of animal welfare. Even though HSUS was not the “architect” of AB 1437, its
25
sponsorship of AB 1437 is sufficient to show it has a significantly protectable interest in this
26
action. HSUS is not unlike other public interest groups who demonstrated a significant interest
27
through involvement in the enactment of a challenged regulation. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion,
28
Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527–28 (9th Cir. 1983) (conservation group’s interests in the
6
1
protection of animals and its active participation in proceedings establishing a conservation area
2
entitled it to intervene as of right in an action challenging the federal government’s establishment
3
of the area); Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980) (organization entitled to intervene in
4
litigation challenging Equal Rights Amendment it actively supported). HSUS meets this
5
threshold requirement.
6
7
B.
Impairment of Interest
HSUS argues an adverse judgment in this action would impair its protectable
8
interests because it would “impair or impede” its interest in the law’s “continued viability” and
9
“would undo” all of its “extensive work to pass AB 1437,” leaving HSUS with “‘no other avenue’
10
to protect its interest in AB 1437.” ECF No. 27 at 14 (quoting Tucson Women’s Ctr. v. Ariz.
11
Med. Bd., No. CV–09–1909–PHX–DGC, 2009 WL 4438933, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2009)).
12
HSUS further argues an adverse judgment would impair its interest in preventing cruelty to egg-
13
laying hens and the sale of cruelly produced products. ECF No. 27 at 14–15.
14
Plaintiffs take issue with the argument that HSUS would have no other avenue to
15
protect its interest in AB 1437, suggesting HSUS’s interest “could be furthered much more
16
directly through the enactment” of similar legislation in other states. ECF No. 46 at 5. Plaintiffs
17
argue HSUS’s interests are not at issue in this action because AB 1437 was enacted “to protect
18
the health of California consumers, not the welfare of California animals.” Id. at 6 (emphasis
19
omitted). Finally, plaintiffs argue HSUS’s California supporters’ interests in consuming
20
humanely produced eggs will not be impaired because the relief sought by plaintiffs in this action
21
would not require Californians to purchase eggs produced using conventional cage methods, it
22
would simply permit them to if they choose. Id. at 6–7. As plaintiffs point out later in their brief,
23
however, California asserts the legislation at issue was passed, in part, for the protection of
24
animal welfare, ECF No. 46 at 9, so any argument that HSUS’s interests are not at issue in this
25
action is untenable.
26
Here, the court finds the position of HSUS is similar to that of conservation groups
27
devoted to the protection of animals and whose interests in the outcome of litigation challenging
28
the withdrawal of nearly 500,000 acres of land from a proposed conservation area could have
7
1
been impaired by an adverse decision. See, e.g., Sagebrush, 713 F.2d at 526–28 (citing Wash.
2
State Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982); Freeman, 625 F.2d at
3
886). HSUS dedicated significant resources as a primary supporter of AB 1437, the legislation at
4
issue in this action. ECF No. 27 at 13–14. While HSUS certainly has the option of supporting
5
similar legislation in other states, that does not diminish its efforts to protect animal welfare
6
through its support of AB 1437 in California.
7
Having determined HSUS has a significantly protectable interest in the outcome of
8
the action, the court similarly finds resolution of the action in plaintiffs’ favor may impair
9
HSUS’s ability to protect its organizational interests, namely its interest in protecting egg-laying
10
11
12
hens from cruel treatment.
C.
Inadequate Representation
HSUS argues California’s interests are broader than its own because California
13
“must balance animal welfare concerns with economic, political, and resource constraints.” ECF
14
No. 27 at 16. HSUS posits California government agencies “may perceive a financial incentive in
15
restricting the implementation of AB 1437.” Id. In that regard, HSUS argues defendants “may
16
not be willing to make” some of its arguments because California would “likely not welcome the
17
political ramifications of admitting to allowing acknowledged animal cruelty, or the sale of
18
unsafe eggs.” Id. at 16–17. Further, HSUS argues California may favor a narrow ruling while
19
HSUS seeks to defend all states’ rights to ban the sale of cruelly produced goods. Id. at 17.
20
Finally, HSUS argues, “[a]s one of the primary supporters of AB 1437, HSUS can best explain to
21
the Court the humane interests that drove passage of AB 1437” and “present this Court with the
22
necessary expertise on the animal welfare and public health effects of the relevant egg production
23
practices,” thus offering a necessary element that would otherwise be neglected. Id. at 17–18.
24
In reply, plaintiffs argue a difference in strategy is not sufficient to establish
25
HSUS’s interests will not be adequately represented by defendants. ECF No. 46 at 8 (citing
26
Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12–CV–02497–KJM–EFB, 2012 WL 6024387, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4,
27
2012)). Plaintiffs point to defendants’ motion to dismiss, arguing HSUS’s contention that
28
California may not be willing to make an argument regarding animal welfare is “unfounded.”
8
1
ECF No. 46 at 8–9 (citing ECF Nos. 36, 42). Plaintiffs note defendants assert in their motion to
2
dismiss both protection of animal welfare and protection of public health and safety were the
3
driving forces behind the enactment of AB 1437; and request judicial notice of, inter alia, a report
4
prepared by HSUS on the welfare of hens in battery cages and several letters of support from
5
animal welfare groups including HSUS. Id.; see ECF No. 36 at 8, 18. Plaintiffs argue that
6
because defendants apparently rely on HSUS’s arguments and research, HSUS fails to
7
demonstrate a likelihood plaintiffs will abandon a potentially meritorious position. ECF No. 46 at
8
8 (quoting Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 444). Plaintiffs argue the suggestion that defendants may accept
9
a narrow interpretation of AB 1437 is unavailing because defendants have not advanced a narrow
10
interpretation. Id.
11
Here, while HSUS argues defendants may not be willing to make certain
12
arguments because of potential political ramifications, or may favor a narrow interpretation of AB
13
1437, HSUS fails to demonstrate a likelihood that defendants will “abandon or concede a
14
potentially meritorious reading of the statute.” Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 444; see ECF No. 36 at 8
15
(California’s motion to dismiss sets forth the state’s two main goals in passing AB 1437 and
16
section 1350: “protection of farm animal welfare and protection of public health and safety
17
through the prevention of salmonella”). In Lockyer, the proposed intervenor satisfied this
18
requirement because the government expressly advocated a narrow interpretation of the
19
challenged statute in its brief, which contradicted the broad interpretation supported by the
20
proposed intervenors. 450 F.3d at 444. Likewise, in California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v.
21
Nichols, the court granted intervention as of right in part because the defendant indicated it was
22
“further considering amending” the challenged regulation “to make its application less stringent.”
23
275 F.R.D. 303, 308 (E.D. Cal 2011) (internal quotations omitted). In Freedom from Religion
24
Found., Inc., on the other hand, the court rejected the motion to intervene of a party who argued
25
the federal defendants might press a narrowing interpretation of the statute they were defending,
26
based on the government’s policy of “construing a statute so as to avoid constitutional doubt.”
27
644 F.3d at 841–42 (internal citation removed). The court explained there was no indication the
28
/////
9
1
federal government planned to make the narrowing argument or that it was even a useful
2
argument. Id. at 842.
3
Similarly, HSUS argues it can best explain the humane interests that drove passage
4
of AB 1437. But, defendants have not indicated a willingness to amend the challenged legislation
5
or their favoring a narrow ruling by the court. Indeed, defendants explicitly assert animal welfare
6
and public safety as reasons for the challenged legislation and provide documentation in support
7
of the underlying motivations. HSUS fails to make the requisite “very compelling” showing to
8
overcome the presumption defendants will adequately represent its interests in this action.
9
Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086.
10
Accordingly, HSUS’s motion to intervene as of right is DENIED.
11
D.
12
Permissive Intervention
As noted, plaintiffs concede HSUS timely filed its motion to intervene and it
13
satisfies any jurisdictional requirements. ECF No. 46 at 13. Plaintiffs also concede the position
14
of HSUS that it shares a common question of law and fact with the State of California. Id. The
15
court therefore considers whether to exercise its discretion and grant HSUS’s motion to intervene
16
under Rule 24(b).
17
HSUS argues intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice this action because
18
its motion was brought before California responded and it is not asserting new claims. ECF No.
19
27 at 19. HSUS also argues its “participation will help ensure a complete consideration of the
20
issues raised in this case and the best opportunity to serve the ends of justice” because of the
21
unique perspective it will bring to the litigation. Id. HSUS further avers it will bring “substantial
22
expertise in animal welfare to this litigation, as an advocate for the humane treatment of animals
23
for sixty years.” Id.
24
Plaintiffs argue HSUS’s intervention will likely cause undue delay because of its
25
focus on the confinement of egg-laying hens, which will lead to irrelevant discovery. ECF No. 46
26
at 10–11. Plaintiffs contend the crux of the litigation concerns “the power of states to restrain
27
trade based on conduct that occurs beyond their borders” and “[n]o amount of research on hen
28
/////
10
1
housing or expertise in animal welfare will help the Court determine the proper scope of the
2
dormant Commerce Clause.” Id. at 11.
3
Here, California proffers one of the main reasons for passage of the legislation was
4
for the welfare of animals. As discussed above, plaintiffs focus on this reason in arguing
5
California will adequately represent HSUS’s interests in the litigation. See ECF No. 46 at 10
6
(HSUS offers no reason to assume California “lacks the expertise to make arguments about the
7
welfare of laying hens”). Thus, information on egg-laying hen confinements may be a relevant
8
focus during discovery, with all the protections of the Federal Rules. Furthermore, the question
9
here is not, as plaintiffs argue, whether California will adequately represent HSUS’s interests, but
10
rather whether HSUS satisfies the requirements under Rule 24(b). The court finds HSUS’s
11
interests in animal welfare are germane to the legislation at issue and to the outcome of this
12
action. See City of L.A., 288 F.3d at 404 (“[T]he idea of ‘streamlining’ the litigation . . . should
13
not be accomplished at the risk of marginalizing those . . . who have some of the strongest
14
interests in the outcome.”). Further, HSUS has demonstrated it will bring a unique perspective to
15
this action that will enable the court to make a well informed decision regarding the claims at
16
issue.
17
Accordingly, the court GRANTS HSUS’s motion for permissive intervention
18
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).
19
IV.
20
ACEF’S MOTION TO INTERVENE
ACEF is “a California nonprofit trade organization comprised of family-owned
21
and operated egg farms.” ECF No. 33-1 at 9. “ACEF’s principal purposes are to engage in
22
advocacy regarding policies affecting the egg farming industry . . . .” Id. It participated in the
23
rulemaking process of one of the California provisions challenged in this action, section 1350,
24
and “worked for many years to clarify the requirements of Proposition 2, the California voter
25
initiative enacted in 2008 that adopted the standard subsequently referenced in AB 1437.” Id. at
26
9–10. Its members are subject to both of the California regulations challenged in this action. Id.
27
at 9. ACEF requests intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), or in
28
the alternative, permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). ECF No.
11
1
33-1. Plaintiffs Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Governor Branstad oppose ACEF’s motion.
2
ECF No. 46. ACEF represents defendants do not oppose. ECF No. 33-1 at 6 n.1.
3
4
5
For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS ACEF’s request for
intervention as of right.
A.
Significantly Protectable Interest
6
ACEF argues it has a significantly protectable economic interest in the litigation
7
challenging AB 1437 and section 1350 because its members comprise a considerable portion of
8
the California egg industry and “any disruptions to the market that decrease consumption of eggs
9
has a direct and significant impact” on them. ECF No. 33-1 at 13; see also ECF No. 47 at 2. In
10
support of this argument, ACEF explains AB 1437 and section 1350 were passed in the wake of a
11
salmonella outbreak in 2010 that resulted in a decrease in the demand for eggs. Id. Responding
12
to the decrease in demand, the “hen enclosure requirements” in the legislation are “designed to
13
help mitigate the health risks associated with eggs” and help protect against future outbreaks. Id.
14
In other words, the legislation will help prevent contamination, which in turn will help prevent a
15
decrease in egg consumption in California, thus benefitting ACEF and its members.
16
In opposition, plaintiffs argue ACEF fails to explain how its interests differ from
17
California’s, arguing ACEF’s goal in defending AB 1437 is equivalent to California’s and it
18
should therefore not be permitted to intervene as of right. ECF No. 46 at 12:8–15. This argument
19
is more appropriately considered in determining whether California will adequately represent
20
ACEF’s interests.
21
Here, accepting ACEF’s well-pleaded allegations, Berg, 268 F.3d at 819–20,
22
ACEF establishes it has a significantly protectable economic interest in the outcome of the
23
litigation. Its members directly benefit from the protections of AB 1437 and section 1350 by way
24
of a stable consumer egg demand in California, less threatened by potential salmonella outbreaks.
25
Further, ACEF members’ participation in the egg industry through the production and sale of egg
26
products within California demonstrate an economic interest in the outcome of this action. See,
27
e.g., Californians For Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184,
28
1190 (9th Cir. 1998) (union had right to intervene in action challenging law guaranteeing
12
1
prevailing wages because members had a significant interest in receiving the prevailing wage).
2
Accordingly, ACEF meets this threshold requirement.
3
B.
4
Impairment of Interest
ACEF argues its “interest in ensuring that contaminated eggs are not sold in
5
California would be undermined by an adverse judgment because AB 1437 and Section 1350 are
6
designed to help protect” against the contamination of eggs in California. ECF No. 33-1 at 14. If
7
these provisions are invalidated, ACEF contends, its members will lose the benefits of the
8
protections the legislation provides. Plaintiffs do not address this argument in their opposition.
9
ACEF has established a significantly protectable interest. Generally, after
10
determining a party has a protectable interest, courts have “little difficulty concluding” the
11
disposition of the case may affect the interest. Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 442. Here, ACEF meets the
12
third requirement for intervention as of right, as an adverse decision will impair its interest in
13
preventing the sale of contaminated eggs in California.
14
15
C.
Inadequate Representation
ACEF argues California will not adequately represent its interests because it
16
represents the broader public interest whereas ACEF is concerned solely with economic and food
17
safety issues. ECF No. 33-1 at 15–16. ACEF relies on Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1203, 1207–
18
08 (5th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that the government will not adequately represent the
19
economic concerns of a proposed intervenor. ACEF also argues it “adds a necessary element to
20
the proceedings” in that it can provide “the perspective of private businesses that are well-versed
21
in the need for food safety and that support the positive health effects of AB 1437 and Section
22
1350.” ECF No. 33-1 at 16. Finally, as ACEF points out in its reply brief, “[t]o the extent the
23
asserted burden on commerce allegedly posed by AB 1437 turns on what precisely the
24
Proposition 2 standard requires, ACEF could well part ways with California” considering it
25
currently has a pending case against the State of California challenging “the vagueness of
26
Proposition 2’s standards.” ECF No. 47 at 2–3.
27
28
Plaintiffs’ only argument in opposition is that ACEF fails to make a compelling
showing that its interests will be inadequately represented by California. ECF No. 46 at 12–13.
13
1
Here, ACEF’s economic concerns with the safety of eggs consumed within
2
California may not be adequately represented by California. While California and ACEF both
3
share a common interest in defending AB 1437 and section 1350, California may not focus on
4
ACEF’s economic interests in contrast to the broad public interest in ensuring egg products are
5
safe for consumption in California. Californians For Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Transp.,
6
152 F.3d at 1190 (“because the employment interests of [union’s] members were potentially more
7
narrow and parochial than the interests of the public at large, [union] demonstrated that the
8
representation of its interests by the named defendants-appellees may have been inadequate”).
9
Indeed, California’s motion to dismiss does not address the economic interests of California egg
10
farmers who benefit from the legislation, suggesting it may not pursue this argument. Berg, 268
11
F.3d at 822–24 (noting defendants “cannot be expected” to protect intervenor’s private interests);
12
In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 2:10–cv–01852–MCE–DAD, 2011 WL 1085991,
13
at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011) (intervenor’s members had “specific interests . . . that may not be
14
shared by the Federal Defendants, who represent a wide variety of sometimes competing interests
15
held by various segments of the general public”). ACEF makes a very compelling showing that
16
California may not be willing to advance ACEF’s arguments in defending AB 1437.
17
18
Accordingly, ACEF’s motion to intervene as of right is GRANTED.
V.
CONCLUSION
19
For the foregoing reasons, HSUS’s alternative motion for permissive intervention,
20
ECF No. 27, is GRANTED; and ACEF’s motion for intervention as of right, ECF No. 33, is
21
GRANTED.
22
DATED: June 2, 2014.
23
24
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25
26
27
28
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?