McKenzie v. Truckee Tahoe Airport District

Filing 17

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 10/7/2014 GRANTING 13 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss second cause of action, with prejudice; Plaintiff's action will proceed consistent with this Order. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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AUDREY McKENZIE,

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2:14-cv-00480 JAM DAD

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.
TRUCKEE TAHOE AIRPORT
DISTRICT, a public entity,
and DOES 1-20, inclusive,

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant.

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Defendant Truckee Tahoe Airport District’s (“Defendant”)

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seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Audrey McKenzie’s (“Plaintiff”)

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second cause of action in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure.

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GRANTED.

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///

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///

For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for August 20, 2014.
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I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a resident of Nevada.

FAC ¶ 3.

Defendant is a

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public entity, organized and operating under the constitution and

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laws of the State of California.

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Plaintiff was attending the Truckee Tahoe Air Show with her son

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and fiancé.

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Truckee Tahoe Airport, which was owned and controlled by

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Defendant.

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when she tripped over “airplane chocks (wheel blocks tied

FAC ¶ 9.
FAC ¶ 15.

FAC ¶ 2.

On July 6, 2013,

This event occurred on the premises of the
Plaintiff alleges that she was injured

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together with rope) and she fell backwards[.]”

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Plaintiff alleges that this constituted a “dangerous condition”

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and Defendant is liable for her injuries.

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FAC ¶ 11.

FAC ¶ 18.

On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed her original complaint

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and four months later filed her FAC.

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of action: (1) “Dangerous Condition of Public Property –

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Government Code § 835;” and (2) “Vicarious Liability of Public

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Employees – Gov. Code §815.2”).

The FAC includes two causes

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II.

OPINION

Plaintiff’s second cause of action should be dismissed,

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according to Defendant, because “the general rule of vicarious

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liability of public entities for employee negligence (Government

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Code section 815.2) does not apply in dangerous condition cases.”

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Mot. at 2.

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law that a public entity’s liability in a dangerous condition

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case is exclusively governed by Government Code §§ 830 – 835.4.

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Mot. at 4 (citing Longfellow v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 144

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Cal.App.3d 379 (1983) and Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park etc.

Defendant contends that it is well-settled California

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Dist., 23 Cal.App.3d 822 (1972)).

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opposition to this motion that Longfellow has been criticized as

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“anomalous” and “internally inconsistent” and should not be

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followed by this Court

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California, 74 Cal.App.4th 68 (1999) and Pfleger v. Superior

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Court, 172 Cal.App.3d 421 (1985)).

Plaintiff responds in her

Opp. at 3 (citing Paterno v. State of

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Section 815 of the California Government Code provides:

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“Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity

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is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an

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act or omission of the public entity or a public employee[.]”

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Gov’t. Code § 815(a).

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must be based on a statutory provision.

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170 Cal.App.3d 1238, 1241 (1985).

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statutory authority for the vicarious liability of a public

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entity, for the negligence of one of its employees.

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Specifically, section 815.2 provides: “A public entity is liable

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for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an

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employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment

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if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given

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rise to a cause of action against that employee[.]”

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§ 815.2(a).

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public entity cannot be found vicariously liable for the acts of

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its employee, unless that employee could be found individually

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liable for those acts.

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In California, governmental tort liability
Fox v. Cnty. of Fresno,

Section 815.2 is the general

Gov’t. Code

By its plain terms, section 815.2 dictates that a

Importantly, section 840 limits the liability of public

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employees in “dangerous condition” cases.

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840 states: “Except as provided in this article, a public

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employee is not liable for injury caused by a condition of public
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Specifically, section

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property where such condition exists because of any act or

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omission of such employee within the scope of his employment.”

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Gov’t. Code § 840.

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set out in section 815.2(a) –therefore does not apply in

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“dangerous condition” cases.

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Obispo, 144 Cal.App.3d 379, 383 (1983); Van Kempen v. Hayward

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Area Park etc. Dist., 23 Cal.App.3d 822, 825 (1972).

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liability of a public entity and a public employee in dangerous

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condition cases is governed, respectively, by section 835 and

The general rule of vicarious liability – as
See Longfellow v. Cnty. of San Luis
Rather, the

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section 840.2.

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case, plaintiff may not bring her vicarious liability claim

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against Defendant pursuant to section 815.2 because such a cause

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of action may only be brought pursuant to section 835, which

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“sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is

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liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public

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property.”

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(1993).

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second cause of action for vicarious liability, pursuant to

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section 815.2, does not state a viable claim for relief.

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This means that in this “dangerous condition”

Brown v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 4 Cal.4th 820, 829

For this reason, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

This is consistent with well-settled California case law.

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In Longfellow, a California appellate court held that the

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plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action under section 815.2

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for vicarious liability of a public entity in a dangerous

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condition case.

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Longfellow court specifically noted that “public entity liability

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for property defects is not governed by the general rule of

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vicarious liability provided in section 815.2, but rather by the

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provisions in sections 830 to 835.4 of the Government Code.”

Longfellow, 144 Cal.App.3d at 383.

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The

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Longfellow, 144 Cal.App.3d at 383; see also, Van Kempen, 23

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Cal.App.3d at 825 (noting that “public entity liability for

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property defects is not governed by the general rule of vicarious

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liability provided in section 815.2, but instead by the specific

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provisions set forth in sections 830-835.4”).

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Plaintiff’s criticism of Longfellow is unpersuasive.

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at 1.

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characterized Longfellow as “anomalous” and “internally

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inconsistent.”

Opp.

Plaintiff notes that several California courts have
Opp. at 1 (citing Paterno v. State of California,

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74 Cal.App.4th 68 (1999) and Pfleger v. Superior Court, 172

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Cal.App.3d 421 (1985)).

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Longfellow is irrelevant to the present case, as it concerns the

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Longfellow court’s dismissal of a separate cause of action for

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nuisance.

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Cal.App.3d at 429-30.

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issue.

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relationship between sections 815.2 and 830 - 835.4 is supported

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by the text of those statutes.

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This criticism that has been leveled at

Paterno, 74 Cal.App.4th at 103-04; Pfleger, 172
In the present case, nuisance is not at

Also, as discussed above, Longfellow’s analysis of the

Finally, Plaintiff’s argument regarding the “general rule

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permitting pleading of causes of action in the alternative”,

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Opp. at 3 (citing Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal.3d 575

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(1970)), necessarily assumes that a claim for vicarious liability

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of a public entity in a “dangerous condition” case, brought

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pursuant to section 815.2, is a legally viable cause of action.

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As discussed above, that is not the case and so the general rule

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that a party may plead alternative theories of relief does not

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help Plaintiff in opposing this motion.

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For all of these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
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Plaintiff’s second cause of action is GRANTED.

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the complaint would be futile, the motion is GRANTED WITH

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PREJUDICE.

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1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

As amendment of

Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d

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III.

ORDER

The Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendant’s Motion to

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Dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action.

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will proceed consistent with this Order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: October 7, 2014

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Plaintiff’s action