Schema v. United States Department of Agriculture, et al.

Filing 31

ORDER signed by Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., on 9/3/14 ORDERING that 23 the Findings and Recommendations are ADOPTED as to Plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim ONLY. Plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim is DISMISSED withou t prejudice to filing before the United States Court of Federal Claims. Defendants' 9 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim and DENIED without prejudice as to Plaintiff's Quiet Title Act claim. The action denominated John D. Schema v. United States Department of Agriculture, et al., 2:14-cv-0630-MCE-CKD-PS, is REASSIGNED to Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. and Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd for all further proceedings, and any dates curr ently set in this reassigned case only are hereby VACATED. Henceforth, the caption on documents filed in the reassigned case shall be shown as, 2:14-cv-0630-MCE-DAD-PS. This matter is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd for further proceedings. (Kastilahn, A)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

JOHN D. SCHEMA,

12
13
14
15
16
17

No. 2:14-cv-0630 MCE CKD PS

Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, et. al.,
Defendants.
On March 7, 2014, Plaintiff John D. Schema filed the instant action against

18

numerous Defendants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to quiet title. Compl.,

19

ECF No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges claims arising out of the alleged impairment by

20

Forest Service personnel of an easement to which Plaintiff claims a right. See generally

21

id. Plaintiff seeks compensation in the amount of $500,000 for alleged wrongful

22

interference with Plaintiff’s property right. See id. at 31. Plaintiff also seeks a judgment

23

“quieting plaintiffs’ title” and a declaration that “defendants have no right, title or interest

24

superseding plaintiffs’ title to the easement . . . .” Id. The parties agree that the Court

25

lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim, but dispute whether

26

Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleged a claim under the Quiet Title Act, and if so, whether that

27

claim is barred by the statute of limitations. On May 27, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion

28

to Dismiss (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ Motion. ECF Nos. 18, 24.
1

1

The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local

2

Rule 302(c)(21).1 On July 30, 2014, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and

3

Recommendations herein (ECF No. 23) which were served on the parties and which

4

notified the parties that any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be

5

filed within fourteen days. In the Findings and Recommendations, the Magistrate Judge

6

recommended granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Court

7

lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim. See ECF No. 23. Plaintiff

8

filed timely Objections to the Findings and Recommendations. See ECF No. 24. The

9

Defendants filed a Response. See ECF No. 26. In accordance with the provisions of

10

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, this Court has conducted a de novo review

11

of this case. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 9) is granted in

12

part and denied in part. As set forth below, the Findings and Recommendation (ECF

13

No. 23) is adopted to the extent it addresses Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim and

14

rejected to extent it does not address Plaintiff’s quiet title claim.

15
ANALYSIS

16
17
18
19
20

A. Takings Claim
Pursuant to the Tucker Act, the United States Court of Federal Claims has
exclusive jurisdiction of any claim based solely on the Constitution and which exceeds

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1

Plaintiff filed this action in propria persona. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff remained without counsel
until the filing of Objections to the Findings and Recommendation which were filed jointly by “Plaintiff pro
per” and by an attorney who represents Plaintiff in an ongoing criminal matter. See ECF No. 24 at 1, 15.
As discussed below, Plaintiff and his appointed counsel “in the criminal matter [request] that [the] court
appoint civil counsel to represent [Plaintiff] in the civil matter.” Id. at 15. Based on this representation, it
appears that Plaintiff’s criminal counsel does not intend to represent Plaintiff in this matter on an ongoing
basis. Therefore, at this time, the referral of this matter to the assigned Magistrate Judge remains in effect
pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21) pending a determination of whether Plaintiff already has (or should be
appointed) civil counsel. Nonetheless, to the extent that Plaintiff’s appointed criminal counsel has already
appeared in this civil action, the Court cautions him that he may be subject to Local Rule 182(d) regarding
withdrawal if he does not intend to continue to represent Plaintiff in this matter going forward. See E.D.
Cal. Local R. 182(a)(2) (explaining that “[a]ppearance as an attorney of record is made [among other
methods] . . . by signing and filing an initial document” or “by causing the attorney's name to be listed in
the upper left hand corner of the first page of the initial document”).

2

1

$10,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491. Here, Plaintiff seeks an award of $500,000.

2

Therefore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s

3

inverse condemnation claim be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

4

Plaintiff also agrees with this finding. See Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 2.

5

B. Quiet Title Claim
In his Objections, however, Plaintiff argues that his Complaint also asserted a

6
7

Quiet Title Act (“QTA”) claim which was not addressed in the Findings and

8

Recommendation and over which this Court maintains jurisdiction. See ECF No. 24.

9

Defendants contend that “the fact that the Findings and Recommendations do not

10

separately address the Quiet Title Act [is] immaterial” because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s

11

Complaint was for inverse condemnation. ECF No. 26. Defendants further argue that

12

while it is unclear whether Plaintiff pled a separate QTA claim, that even if he did, any

13

such claim should be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations based

14

on Plaintiff’s own Complaint. The Court first turns to whether Plaintiff alleged a QTA

15

claim.

16

“Generally, a takings claim brought under § 1346(a)(2) is an inverse

17

condemnation suit, and it is filed by the landowner after the government enters into

18

physical possession of his property without the authority of a court order.” LaFargue v.

19

United States, 4 F. Supp. 2d 580, 586 (E.D. La. 1998); see San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.

20

v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981). “There is a clear distinction between

21

a claim brought under the QTA and one based upon the Tucker Act: a takings claim

22

under the Tucker Act concedes the government's ownership and seeks to obtain just

23

compensation for the landowner, while a quiet title claim under the QTA disputes

24

ownership and provides the landowner with a declaration of title and recovery of the

25

land.” LaFargue, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 586. To determine whether the Court has jurisdiction

26

over a claim under the QTA or under the Tucker Act, it “must examine the nature of the

27

rights plaintiffs assert in their complaint to determine which statute the plaintiffs' case

28

falls under.” Id. (emphasis added); see United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 850-51
3

1

(1986) (examining jurisdictional grounds of case involving disputed title and reaffirming

2

that “the plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction he will appeal to,” and that

3

“[j]urisdiction generally depends upon the case made and relief demanded by the

4

plaintiff”) (internal citation omitted).

5

As to whether Plaintiff pled a QTA claim, Defendants argue that merely “labeling

6

something a Quiet Title Act claim does not make it so” and that because the gravamen

7

of Plaintiff’s claim is for inverse condemnation, Plaintiff’s sole remedy is an inverse

8

condemnation action in the Court of Federal Claims. ECF No. 26. Although inartfully

9

pled, it appears Plaintiff seeks to vindicate his rights and seeks corresponding relief

10

under both the Tucker Act and the QTA. Compare ECF No. 1 at 31 (requesting a

11

“[j]udgment providing just compensation and punitive damages for said wrongful taking”

12

and “pray[ing] for an amount of $500,000”) with id. (seeking a “[j]udgment quieting

13

plaintiffs’ title to the easement, and [declaring that] defendants have no right, title or

14

interest superseding plaintiffs’ title to the easement”); see also ECF No. 1 at 3 (“Plaintiff

15

respectfully appears before this court in order to seek redress for the Forest Service’s

16

unlawful acts and omissions, and [to] quiet Plaintiff’s title to subject land.”) (emphasis

17

added). Moreover, Defendants have not cited any authority for the proposition that a

18

Plaintiff may not simultaneously pursue both Tucker Act and Quiet Title Act claims in this

19

instance at this stage in the proceeding. Cf. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 848

20

(1986) (expressing "no opinion on the question whether . . . an appeal in a case raising

21

both Tucker Act and Quiet Title Act claims would have to be bifurcated and sent in part

22

to the regional circuit and in part to the Federal Circuit”); Bourgeois v. U. S., 545 F.2d

23

727, 732-35 (Ct. Cl. 1976).2

24
25
26
27
28

2

There does not appear to be a clear answer to this question. While “[i]t is now well-established
that the [United States Court of Federal Claims] has jurisdiction to make independent factual
determinations of a claimant's specific property interest as a matter of course in adjudicating takings
claims,” Dwen v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 76, 81 (Fed. Cl. 2004), any awarded “equitable relief must be
incidental to and collateral to a claim for money damages.” Bobula v. United States Dep't of Justice, 970
F.2d 854, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1992). On the record before it, the Court cannot conclude that the equitable relief
sought by Plaintiff through his QTA claim is merely “incidental to and collateral to” his inverse
condemnation claim. Thus, at this time the Court rejects without prejudice Defendants’ request that it
dismiss Plaintiff’s QTA claim for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that it must be alleged before the Court of

4

1

Therefore, the Court finds that, although inartfully pled, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains

2

causes of action under the Tucker Act and under the QTA.3

3

According to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, however, even if this Court finds

4

Plaintiff adequately set forth a QTA cause of action, any such claim as set forth in the

5

Complaint is nonetheless barred by the statute of limitations. Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 3. “A

6

district court may dismiss a claim if the running of the statute is apparent on the face of

7

the complaint. However, a district court may do so only if the assertions of the

8

complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the

9

statute was tolled.” Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1045

10

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980)

11

(noting that if “the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint, the

12

defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss”)).4

13
14

A quiet title action is “barred unless . . . commenced within twelve years of the
date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Federal Claims as a claim incidental to and collateral to his inverse condemnation claim. See ECF No. 26
at 2-4; cf. Oak Forest, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 90, 98 (1991) (explaining that the district court would
determine the present title to the subject land while the claims court would hear the Tucker Act claim and
also noting that because “Congress has clearly stated its instructions that the remedy of a declaration of
present title as against the United States should be litigated in the district court,” the claims court would
suspend the action before it until the district court issued its rulings in the quiet title action). Defendants, of
course, may raise this point again upon further development of the record. Cf. Chittenden v. United
States, 2013 WL 6199195, *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs’ tort claims because the
“gravamen” of the complaint was for inverse condemnation in a case that did not raise a QTA claim) (citing
Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir.1963)). Similarly, the Court also rejects without
prejudice Defendants contention that Plaintiff’s QTA claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) “because the
Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to a claim that was or could have been brought under
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)” because the Court finds that Plaintiff seeks remedies under the Tucker Act and the
QTA making it unclear whether both of Plaintiff’s claims could have been brought under
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) and because Defendants first raised this issue in their Response to Plaintiff’s
Objections. See ECF No. 26 at 3.
3

This conclusion is further supported by the fact that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
4

As to whether the statute of limitations was tolled, the Court notes that “[t]he Supreme Court has
. . . held that Congress intended the QTA's limitations period to serve interests of finality, and therefore it
may not be tolled.” Kingman Reef Atoll Investments, L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2008). In any event, Plaintiff did not argue that the relevant limitation was tolled. See ECF Nos. 18,
24.

5

1

the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the

2

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). Courts “treat the statute of limitations in the QTA

3

as jurisdictional.” Fid. Exploration & Prod. Co. v. United States, 506 F.3d 1182, 1186

4

(9th Cir. 2007). Courts “must strictly construe the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations in

5

favor of the government.” Shultz v. Dep't of Army, U.S., 886 F.2d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.

6

1989). The Ninth Circuit “has rejected explicitly [the] contention that the cause of action

7

accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run only when the United States acts in a

8

manner openly hostile and adverse to a landowner's interest. . . . The statute of

9

limitations is not triggered, however, when the United States' claim is ambiguous or

10

vague.” Id. at 1160 (internal citation omitted). “The statutory term ‘should have known’

11

imparts a test of reasonableness.” Id. Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative

12

defense, the burden is on Defendants to show that the applicable time period has

13

passed.

14

Here, Defendants contend that “[Plaintiff’s] Complaint alleges that the Forest

15

Service made his easement impassable more than 12 years before filing this lawsuit in

16

August of 2013.” ECF No. 26 at 4; see also ECF No. 9-1 at 4. In support of this

17

argument, Defendants point to several passages in Plaintiff’s Complaint. For instance,

18

Defendants aver that “[t]he Complaint also alleges that the ‘old recorded easement’ had

19

been ‘washed out’ since 2000, meaning that it was totally impassable.” Mot., ECF

20

No. 9-1 at 4 (citing ECF No. 1 at 21). However, an examination of the Complaint reveals

21

that Plaintiff’s reference to an “old recorded easement” that had been “washed out” since

22

2000 appears to be a reference to an easement over a neighbor’s land rather than the

23

easement claimed by Plaintiff. See ECF No. 1 at 21, ¶ 106 (referring to Lacey

24

McFarland’s land east of Plaintiff’s land and noting that “an old recorded easement that

25

passes her land has been washed out since date of purchase”) (emphasis added).

26

Thus, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s easement was also washed out at that time.5

27
28

5

The Court notes that the claimed easement over Plaintiff’s land may have also been become
impassable in or before 2000 for the same reasons, but Defendants’ have not met their burden on this
point. Defendants may, of course, raise the issue of whether the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s claim

6

1

Defendants also argue that “Plaintiff alleges, for example, that a map from the 1960s

2

refers to, but no longer shows, the unused former road.” Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 4. With

3

respect to this contention, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the map “contains [the]

4

subject properties; and [the] documented right-of-way, or the easement. Albeit not

5

shown in its’ [sic] ‘precise’ location.” ECF No. 1 at 20, ¶ 103. However, this statement

6

does not establish that the United States' claim was unambiguous or that Plaintiff (or, if

7

applicable, his predecessor in interest) knew or should have known of the adverse

8

actions of the United States at that time – particularly where “[t]he statutory term ‘should

9

have known’ imparts a test of reasonableness.” Shultz, 886 F.2d at 1159. Thus, the

10

Court cannot conclude that the statute of limitations bars this claim on the basis of

11

Plaintiff’s Complaint alone as argued by Defendants.6

12

C. Related Case 7
Finally, the Court is in receipt of Plaintiff’s Notice of Related Cases (ECF No. 25)

13
14

in which he seeks to have the same Magistrate Judge preside over his criminal matter

15

and the instant civil action. In the criminal case, Plaintiff stands charged with three

16

counts by way of a superseding information filed September 27, 2013. See United

17

States v. John D. Schema, 2:13-mj-00087-DAD. Count One of the superseding

18

information charges Plaintiff with damaging timber, trees, or other forest products on

19

National Forest Service Land in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.6(a). Count Two charges

20

Plaintiff with constructing, placing, or maintaining a road of National Forest Service

21

Lands in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a). Count Three charges Plaintiff with

22

Damaging a Natural Feature or Other Property of the United States in violation of

23

36 C.F.R. § 261.9(a). According to Plaintiff, “paramount to the civil case and the defense

24
25
26
27

at a later point in this proceeding.
6

In his Objections, Plaintiff also requests the appointment of civil counsel and that leave be
granted to allow the filing of an amended complaint. The Court declines to address these requests as they
are not properly before the Court. These requests must be made in a noticed motion on the calendar of
the assigned Magistrate Judge. See E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(a), (k); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
7

28

These facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Notice of Related Case, ECF No. 25, unless otherwise

noted.

7

1

of the criminal case is the existence of what has been known as a R.S.- 2477 easement

2

for the benefit of [Plaintiff] across USFS land.”

3

An examination of the two actions, John D. Schema v. United States Department

4

of Agriculture, et al. (2:14-cv-0630-MCE-CKD-PS) and United States v. John D. Schema

5

(2:13-mj-00087-DAD) reveals that these actions are related within the meaning of Local

6

Rule 123(a) (E.D. Cal. 1997). The actions involve some of the same parties and involve

7

some of the same or related claims, defenses, and property, as well as similar questions

8

of fact and would therefore entail a substantial duplication of labor if heard by different

9

magistrate judges. Accordingly, the assignment of the matters to the same magistrate

10

judge is likely to effect a substantial savings of judicial effort and is also likely to be

11

convenient for the parties. The parties should be aware that relating the cases under

12

Local Rule 123 merely has the result that both actions are assigned to the same judge;

13

no consolidation of the action is effected. Under the regular practice of this court, related

14

cases are generally assigned to the magistrate judge to whom the first filed action was

15

assigned, which is the criminal matter in this instance. Therefore, the instant civil action

16

will be assigned to Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd for all further proceedings.

17
18

CONCLUSION

19
20

Therefore, having carefully reviewed the entire case file, the Court finds the

21

Findings and Recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis

22

with respect to Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim. However, as set forth above, the

23

Court finds that Plaintiff’s Quiet Title Act claim is not barred by the applicable statute of

24

limitations on the basis of Plaintiff’s Complaint alone. Finally, the Court finds that the

25

assignment of the matters to the same magistrate judge is likely to effect a substantial

26

savings of judicial effort and is also likely to be convenient for the parties. Accordingly,

27
28

1. The Findings and Recommendations filed July 30, 2014 (ECF No. 23) are
ADOPTED as to Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim only;
8

1
2
3

2. Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim is DISMISSED without prejudice to filing
before the United States Court of Federal Claims;
3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s

4

inverse condemnation claim and DENIED without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s Quiet Title

5

Act claim;

6

4. As set forth above, it is ORDERED that the action denominated John D.

7

Schema v. United States Department of Agriculture, et al., 2:14-cv-0630-MCE-CKD-PS,

8

is REASSIGNED to Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. and Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd

9

for all further proceedings, and any dates currently set in this reassigned case only are

10

hereby VACATED. Henceforth, the caption on documents filed in the reassigned case

11

shall be shown as, 2:14-cv-0630-MCE-DAD-PS. However, this order SHALL NOT

12

AFFECT the related action, United States v. John D. Schema, 2:13-mj-00087-DAD,

13

which SHALL REMAIN assigned only to Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd. See E.D. Cal.

14

Local R. 302(b);

15

5. It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court make appropriate

16

adjustment in the assignment of cases to compensate for this reassignment of this civil

17

matter to a different Magistrate Judge; and

18
19
20

6. Pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and this Order, this matter is REFERRED to
Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd for further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

21
22

Dated: September 3, 2014

23
24
25
26
27
28
9