Delgado v. Santana, et al.

Filing 10

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 11/2/15 ORDERING that plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.(Dillon, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ALEXANDER DELGADO,

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No. 2:14-cv-0634-CMK-P

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

JERRY SANTANA, et al.,
Defendant.
/
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

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that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,

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1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

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complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
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rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

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with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

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claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges he was subjected to the use of excessive force

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and was denied medical treatment for the injuries he sustained. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that

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while his cell was being searched, he was placed in handcuffs. Defendant Santana put the

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handcuffs on too tight, then forced his arms up too high causing pain, and when plaintiff

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complained defendant Santana forced plaintiff to the ground. Once on the ground, defendants

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Santana, Young and Fish all jumped on his back, Santana kneeling on his neck. Defendants

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Young and Fish then grabbed his legs and put him in leg irons, and carried or drug him across the

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yard, dropping him on his face at one point. Once plaintiff was secured in a holding cell,

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defendant La Grange completed a medical report, but refused plaintiff’s requests for treatment.

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Defendant Beck similarly refused to allow plaintiff medical treatment for his injuries, even after

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being made aware of them. Finally, he alleges defendant Vegas continually harassed and mocked

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plaintiff once he was returned to his cell.

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Plaintiff names several other defendants but alleges no facts indicating they were
involved in the incidents, including Rodriguez, Frackrell, and Miranda.
II. DISCUSSION

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To the extent plaintiff alleges defendants Santana, Young and Fish used excessive

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force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, plaintiff’s complaint appears to state a claim.

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However, any other claims plaintiff is attempting to state are unclear.

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To the extent plaintiff alleges a violation of his Eighth Amendment right for
failure to provide medical treatment, he has not provided the court with sufficient facts for the
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court to evaluate this claim.
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

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when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

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such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

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105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

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health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

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injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

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1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference.

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See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

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demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
Here, it appears that the injuries plaintiff sustained from the handcuff incident

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were some cuts and bruises. It does not appear that the injuries were sufficiently serious that the

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failure to treat could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction

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of pain. However, it is possible that plaintiff suffered from other more serious injuries that he

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failed to allege in his complaint. If so, the defect in this claim may be cured.

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In addition, plaintiff names other individuals as defendants to this action, but fails

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to allege any facts related to the actions of those individuals. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

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1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the named

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defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658

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(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of

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a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in

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another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

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causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

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Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

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in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

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Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s
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causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th

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Cir. 1988). This defect is also potentially curable if these other individuals were somehow

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involved in the alleged incident, but plaintiff simply failed to allege their involvement.

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However, plaintiff’s claim against defendant Vegas for harassment fails as a

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matter of law. As stated above, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two

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requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it

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results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively,

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the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm.

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See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must

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have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. Allegations of verbal harassment do not state a

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claim under the Eighth Amendment unless it is alleged that the harassment was “calculated to . . .

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cause [the prisoner] psychological damage.” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th

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Cir. 1987); see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d

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1318 (9th Cir. 1998). In addition, the prisoner must show that the verbal comments were

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unusually gross, even for a prison setting, and that he was in fact psychologically damaged as a

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result of the comments. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1092. Plaintiff’s allegations that defendant

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Vegas kicked his door and asked if he still wanted to kill him, with a smile and laugh, do not

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raise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. This claim does not appear to be curable.

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III. CONCLUSION
Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be

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cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith,

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203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule,

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an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

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1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer

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to the prior pleading in order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. See Local Rule

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220. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.
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See id.
Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by

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amendment, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now

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has the following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the

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claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and

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the court will address the remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which

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continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the court will issue findings and

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recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders

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and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no

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amended complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the court will issue findings and

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recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such

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further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file an amended
complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

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DATED: November 2, 2015
______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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