Darwin v. Social Security Administration

Filing 29

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 12/3/2015 ORDERING 27 the the Commissioner's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is DENIED. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOHN DARWIN IV,

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No. 2:14-cv-0740 AC

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
This case was referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(15). Before the court is

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defendant Colvin’s (“the Commissioner”) motion to reconsider the court’s order granting

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plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanding for the determination of benefits. ECF

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No. 27. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny the Commissioner’s motion.

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

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In general, there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e)
motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct
manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if
such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or previously
unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent
manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an
intervening change in controlling law.

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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing McDowell v. Calderon,

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197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1082 (2000)).

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However, “amending a judgment after its entry remains an extraordinary remedy which should be
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used sparingly.” Allstate, 634 F.3d at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted). Amendment of

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judgment is sparingly used to serve the dual “interests of finality and conservation of judicial

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resources.” See Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000).

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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On March 21, 2014, plaintiff filed this action seeking reversal of the Commissioner’s

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decision to deny him benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

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§§ 401-34, 1381-1383f. ECF No. 1. On July 6, 2015, the court granted plaintiff’s subsequent

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motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment,

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reversed the Commissioner’s decision, and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for the

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immediate calculation and award of benefits. ECF No. 25. The court found that the

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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) improperly rejected the opinion of plaintiff’s treating

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physician, and improperly rejected plaintiff’s testimony regarding his limitations. The court

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further concluded that, crediting the testimony and opinion as true, plaintiff was disabled. The

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court therefore remanded for payment of benefits, principally under the authority of Benecke v.

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Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 2004) and Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1995).

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On August 3, 2015, the Commissioner moved to alter or amend the court’s judgment.

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ECF No. 27. The motion argues only the first Allstate ground, and is based upon the

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Commissioner’s view that it was legal error to remand for payment of benefits rather than for

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further proceedings. Plaintiff opposes the motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 28.

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III. ANALYSIS

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The court will deny the Commissioner’s motion because its order remanding for the

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payment of benefits is not based on a manifest error of law. As the Commissioner correctly

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argues, the Ninth Circuit law governing remand for payment of benefits has been further

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developed beyond the cases cited by the court in its decision. However, that further development

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does not compel a different result in this case. The Ninth Circuit has devised a three-part credit-

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as-true standard, each part of which must be satisfied in order for a court to remand to the

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Commissioner with instructions to calculate and award benefits:

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(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative
proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed
to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether
claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly
discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be
required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

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Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). There is “flexibility” built into the rule,

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however. Specifically, even if all three above factors are satisfied, the court should still remand

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for further proceedings, rather than for an award of benefits “when, even though all conditions of

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the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt

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that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Id. at 1021.

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However, “where the record has been fully developed and where further administrative

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proceedings would serve no useful purpose,” remand for the payment of benefits is warranted.

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Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2012) (remanding for

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immediate payment of benefits where, as here, “there are no outstanding issues to be resolved,”

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the complete record shows that plaintiff “is likely to miss multiple days of work per month,” and

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“[t]he vocational expert testified that a person with Brewes’ characteristics who would miss that

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much work was not employable.”)

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Although the court’s decision did not specifically list the Garrison factors, the court

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considered those factors in determining that the matter should be remanded for the immediate

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calculation and payment of benefits. See ECF No. 25 at 27 (citing the equivalent Benecke

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standard requiring that “there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

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determination of disability can be made”), 23 (finding the ALJ rejected medical opinion without

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meeting the applicable standard of Tomasettit v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2008)), 26-27

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(crediting the opinion and testimony as true, plaintiff is disabled). The record as a whole does not

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create “serious doubt” that plaintiff is, in fact, disabled, warranting dismissal under Garrison.

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The Commissioner’s motion offers no reason for the court to alter its judgment other than

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disagreement with the court’s decision. This court has already rejected the Commissioner’s

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argument, offered in her cross-motion for summary judgment, that “[s]hould the Court overturn

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the agency’s decision, the proper remedy is a remand for further administrative proceedings.”
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See ECF No. 21 at 21-22. The motion for reconsideration will be denied where, as here, the

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Commissioner offers mere disagreement with the court’s decision, and recapitulates the

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arguments it made before the court in its cross-motion for summary judgment. See Arteaga v.

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Asset Acceptance, LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1237 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (rejecting Rule 59(e)

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motion where plaintiff’s “arguments on reconsideration simply recapitulate her original

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argument”).

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IV. CONCLUSION

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For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s

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Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (ECF No. 27), is DENIED.
DATED: December 3, 2015

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