Mecklenberg v. Georgetown Divide Public Utility District

Filing 27

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 4/28/16 DENYING 15 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Jackson, T)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STACY MECKLENBERG,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:14-CV-00750-TLN-EFB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
GEORGETOWN DIVIDE PUBLIC
UTILITY DISTRICT; and DOES 1
through 10, Inclusive,

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Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Stacy Mecklenberg’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for

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summary judgment. (ECF No. 15.) Defendant Georgetown Divide Public Utility District

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(“Defendant”) opposes Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff has filed a reply with the

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Court. (ECF No. 19.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

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(ECF No. 15) is hereby DENIED.

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I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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This action arises from Plaintiff’s allegations that she is disabled and that Defendant has

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refused to accommodate her disability by ignoring her request for a large print billing statement.

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Plaintiff has alleged the following violations: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of

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1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794;

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Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code §§ 51 et seq.; and the Disabled Persons Act,
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California Civil Code §§ 54.1 et seq. Below are undisputed and disputed facts:

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A. Undisputed Facts

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Defendant is a special purpose district that provides public utilities to communities located

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in western El Dorado County. (Def’s Reply to Pl.’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material

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Fact (“UMF”), ECF No. 16-5, UMF No. 3.) Plaintiff is a customer of Defendant and receives

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notices and billing statements regarding her utilities. (ECF No. 16-5, UMF Nos. 3‒5.) Until

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recently, Defendant’s billing statements were sent on postcards measuring approximately 3 inches

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by 5 inches. (ECF No. 16-5, UMF No. 6.) Defendant admits that it allows notices and statements

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to be sent in large print format. (ECF No. 16-5, UMF No. 12.) Defendant has agreed to provide

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large format billing statements for the Plaintiff and has stated that providing Plaintiff with large

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print format statements does not impose an undue burden on Defendant. (ECF No. 16-5, UMF

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Nos. 12‒13.)

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B. Disputed Facts

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Plaintiff alleges that she is visually impaired and is a “qualified person with a disability”

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and a physically disabled person under the ADA and its implementing regulations. (Compl., ECF

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No. 1 at ¶ 4; Mecklenberg Decl., ECF No. 18 at ¶ 2.) Defendant disputes that Plaintiff is a

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disabled person under the ADA and avers that Plaintiff offers no evidence of her physical

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impairment other than a declaration that repeats the same allegations set forth in the Complaint:

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“Plaintiff offers no specifics or other supporting evidence through expert testimony or medical

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records regarding the scope of her physical impairments.” (ECF No. 16-5, UMF No. 1.)

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Plaintiff asserts that the 3 inch by 5 inch billing card utilized by Defendants contained

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print that was too small for Plaintiff to read.1 (ECF No. 16-5, UMF No. 2.) Plaintiff alleges that

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she first contacted Defendant in February 2013, to request large print format bills. (ECF No. 16-

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5, UMF No. 8.) Plaintiff asserts that she made numerous requests both verbal and in writing, but

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that Defendants failed to accommodate her until sometime in November 2015. (ECF No. 16-5,

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Defendant also disputes Plaintiff’s statements about her ability to read small print asserting that “Plaintiff
offers no evidence regarding the font or type size that is rendered ‘small print.’ A claim of a ‘severely diminished
ability to see’ without additional evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff
qualifies as a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.” (ECF No. 16-5, UMF No. 2.)

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UMF No. 9‒11.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not request accommodations until

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December 2013, and that Defendant immediately began conversing with Plaintiff about providing

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her with adequate enlarged billing statements. (ECF No. 16-5, UMF No. 9‒11.)

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Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on all of her claims.

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II.

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Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue

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as to any material fact exists, and therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

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of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Under

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summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing

LEGAL STANDARD

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the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any,”

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which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof

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at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance

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solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id. at

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324 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered against a party

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who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

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party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

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party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

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Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities

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Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

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dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to

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tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

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support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must

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demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

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suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that

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the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
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the nonmoving party. Id. at 251–52.

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In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

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establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

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dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

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trial.” First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 288–89. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to

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‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for

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trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

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amendments).

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In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits. Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence

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of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

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facts pleaded before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S.

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at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s

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obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v.

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Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.

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1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue that necessitates a jury trial, the opposing party

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“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of

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fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587.

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III.

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Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue

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as to any material fact exists, and therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

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of law. Adickes, 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). As catalogued in the Factual Background section of

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this order, the instant matter is plagued with disputed material facts. For example, the parties

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dispute the extent of Plaintiff’s disability, and most importantly, the time frame of Plaintiff’s

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request for accommodations and when Defendant made accommodations for Plaintiff.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

The Court is not convinced that Defendant’s arguments concerning the extent of
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Plaintiff’s disability raise a material issue of fact. Plaintiff has provided a signed declaration

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stating the extent of her disability. Although Defendant disputes that Plaintiff is disabled or the

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extent thereof, it offers no evidence to support its contention. Thus, Defendant has not raised a

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material issue of fact. See Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1131‒32 (C.D. Cal. 2005)

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(“Although defendants dispute that plaintiff is disabled, they offer no evidence to support this

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assertion in their supporting declarations or otherwise. Accordingly, the Court finds that

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defendants have not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff's disability status.”).

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However, Defendant’s other arguments―concerning when it was apprised of Plaintiff’s request

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for accommodations and when and if it offered accommodations―do create material issues of

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fact. Similarly, there are disputes as to whether Defendant in fact stopped sending Plaintiff

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billing statements sometime in 2014. Plaintiff states that “approximately 1.5 years ago, GDPUD

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[(Defendant)] stopped sending the plaintiff regular statements. However, three weeks ago she did

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receive a statement from GDPUD that was on an 8.5” x 11” piece of paper.” (ECF No. 16-5,

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UMF No. 11.) Defendant denies that it stopped sending Plaintiff statements: “At no time since

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Plaintiff has been a customer of GDPUD has GDPUD failed to send her any billing statements.”

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(ECF No. 16-5, UMF No. 11.)

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Simply put, these disputes make summary judgment inappropriate. It is clear from the

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parties’ briefing that in order to make a determination on Plaintiff’s summary judgment the Court

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would be required to make credibility determinations concerning the parties’ disputed allegation;

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that is not the province of the Court. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (“Credibility determinations,

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the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

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functions, not those of a judge ... ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . .”). Therefore,

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Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) is hereby DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 28, 2016

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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