Hyatt v. Chiang et al
Filing
35
ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 2/9/15 GRANTING 17 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without leave to amend. Further, the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this action. CASE CLOSED. (Meuleman, A)
1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7
8
GILBERT P. HYATT,
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
No. 2:14-CV-00849-GEB-DAD
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN CHIANG, JEROME E.
HORTON, and MICHAEL COHEN,
CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX
BOARD MEMBERS; BETTY T. YEE,
GEORGE RUNNER, MICHELLE
STEEL, JEROME E. HORTON, and
JOHN CHIANG, CALIFORNIA STATE
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
MEMBERS; and DOES 1 through
20,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION
Defendants.
18
Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that the manner in
19
which Defendants are processing his California administrative tax
20
appeal violates his federal constitutional rights under the due
21
process and equal protection clauses, and seeks an injunction
22
“forbidding Defendants. . . from continuing the investigation and
23
administrative
24
Defendants . . . from continuing to assess or threaten to assess
25
[Plaintiff], or collect or threaten to collect from [Plaintiff],
26
taxes, penalties or interest.” (Compl. Prayer ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 2.)
27
28
Each
proceedings
defendant
against”
seeks
him
dismissal
and
of
the
“forbidding
Complaint
arguing, inter alia, that it should be dismissed with prejudice
1
1
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of
2
Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1). Specifically Defendants argue
3
the federal Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) prevents Plaintiff from
4
challenging
5
federal court.
6
his
The
California
TIA
residency-based
prescribes:
“The
district
tax
assessment
courts
shall
in
not
7
enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of
8
any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
9
remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
10
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
11
The following allegations in the Complaint concern the
12
pending dismissal motions. Plaintiff Gilbert Hyatt moved from
13
California
to
14
California
Franchise
15
determine
16
taxes for the 1991 tax year. (Id.) The FTB initiated a second
17
audit
18
California income taxes for the 1992 tax year. (Id.) “The FTB
19
asserts [Plaintiff] . . . became a Nevada resident on April 3,
20
1992” and owes the following unpaid California income taxes: $1.8
21
million for the 1991 tax year and $5.6 million for the 1992 tax
22
year.
23
administrative
24
State Board of Equalization (“SBE”). (Id. ¶ 3.) Neither the 1991
25
nor 1992 audit has concluded. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges “the
26
delays . . . fall squarely and primarily at the feet of the FTB”
27
and the SBE. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 26.) Plaintiff further alleges that
28
Defendants “continue to threaten[] [him] with $55 million plus of
in
Nevada
whether
1996
(Id.
¶¶
to
11,
in
Tax
1991.
Board
Plaintiff
determine
21.)
appeal
has
For
(Compl.
(“FTB”)
owed
been
2
2.)
pending
six
1993,
an
audit
California
Plaintiff
last
In
commenced
additional
whether
the
¶
owed
years,
before
the
the
to
income
additional
Plaintiff‟s
California
1
unconstitutional exactions, specifically the assessed taxes and
2
penalties, for tax years 1991 and 1992.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
3
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
4
Each dismissal motion contains a facial and factual
5
attack on the federal court‟s jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
6
“A „facial‟ attack asserts that a complaint‟s allegations are
7
themselves insufficient to invoke jurisdiction, while a „factual‟
8
attack asserts that the complaint‟s allegations, though adequate
9
on their face to invoke jurisdiction, are untrue.” Courthouse
10
News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 780 at n.3 (9th Cir. 2014).
11
Only the facial attacks are reached herein.
12
“The
district
court
resolves
a
facial
attack
as
it
13
would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the
14
plaintiff‟s
15
inferences in the plaintiff‟s favor, the court determines whether
16
the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the
17
court‟s jurisdiction.”
18
(9th Cir. 2014).
19
as true all allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
20
to
21
(2009).
legal
22
allegations
as
true
and
drawing
all
reasonable
Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121
However, “the tenant that a court must accept
conclusions.”
Ashcroft
v.
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
662,
678
Federal
courts
are
courts
of
limited
jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute, which
is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It
is to be presumed that a cause lies outside
this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of
establishing the contrary rests upon the
party asserting jurisdiction.
23
24
25
26
27
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
28
(1994).
3
1
III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK CONCERNING APPEAL OF A CALIFORNIA
2
RESIDENCY-BASED TAX ASSESSMENT
3
Under California law, a taxpayer seeking to “prevent or
4
enjoin the assessment or collection of” a California residency-
5
based income tax may not file suit in state court without first
6
exhausting the administrative remedies in California Revenue and
7
Taxation
8
administrative processes may be utilized by a taxpayer to contest
9
a tax assessment: a postdeprivation “pay-then-protest” process or
Code.
Cal.
predeprivation
Rev.
&
Code
of
19381.1
either
Two
separate
a
11
prerequisite to judicial review in a California state court.
A.
Exhaustion
§
10
12
process.
Tax.
process
is
a
Postdeprivation “Pay-Then-Protest” Process
13
The “pay-then-protest” process requires the challenging
14
taxpayer to make “payment of the tax,” following which a refund
15
claim can be filed with the FTB. § 19382. If the FTB “fails to
16
mail notice of action on [the] . . . refund claim within six
17
months after the claim [is] filed, the taxpayer may ... bring an
18
action [in state court] against the [FTB]. . . on the grounds set
19
forth in the claim for the recovery of . . . [the] overpayment.”
20
§ 19385. If the FTB acts on the challenger‟s refund claim and
21
denies
22
assessed is void . . .
23
upon the grounds set forth in that claim for refund . . . for the
24
recovery of the . . . amount paid” plus interest. §§ 19381,
25
19382.
26
///
it,
a
taxpayer
“claiming
that
the
tax
computed
and
may bring an action [in state court],
27
1
28
Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the California
Revenue and Taxation Code.
4
1
B.
Predeprivation Process
2
A
taxpayer
challenging
an
assessment
through
the
3
predeprivation process must “file with the [FTB] . . . a written
4
protest against the proposed deficiency assessment, specifying in
5
the protest the grounds upon which it is based.” § 19041. If the
6
protest
7
“reconsider
8
taxpayer may “appeal[] in writing from the action of the [FTB]...
9
to
is
[the
denied,
the
the
taxpayer
assessment
SBE].”
§
19045.
of
may
the
“The
request
that
deficiency.”
[SBE]
.
.
.
§
the
FTB
19044.
The
shall
hear
and
10
determine the appeal,” and an unsuccessful taxpayer may “file[] a
11
petition for rehearing.” §§ 19047-48. After rehearing before the
12
SBE, a taxpayer may seek review in a California state court. §
13
19381.
14
A taxpayer who initially challenges a residency-based
15
income
16
elect
17
paying the disputed tax. § 19335.
18
tax
to
assessment
use
the
through
the
“pay-then-protest”
predeprivation
process
at
process
any
may
point
by
Here, Plaintiff challenged his tax assessments using
19
the
predeprivation
20
protest” process.
21
process
IV.
and
has
not
used
the
“pay-then-
DISCUSSION
22
The TIA “limit[s] drastically federal district court
23
jurisdiction to interfere with [the] . . . important . . . local
24
concern” of tax collection. Ark. v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent.
25
Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 826 (1997). When passing the TIA, Congress
26
“expressed
27
states would bear if forced to defend the imposition of state
28
taxes in federal, rather than state courts.” May Trucking Co. v.
.
.
.
concern
regarding
5
the
increased
costs
that
1
Or.
2
(citation omitted). One of Congress‟ main objectives in enacting
3
the
4
injunction,
5
thereby disrupting state government finances.” Hibbs v. Winn, 542
6
U.S. 88, 104 (2004) (citation omitted). However, the TIA‟s limit
7
on federal court jurisdiction has “a narrow exception.” Redding
8
Ford v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 722 F.2d 496, 497 (9th
9
Cir. 1983). Congress vested federal courts with jurisdiction to
10
“enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection
11
of [a] tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
12
remedy may [not] be had in the courts of [the] State.” 28 U.S.C.
13
§ 1341.
Dep‟t
TIA
14
of
was
Transp.,
“to
from
stop
388
1261,
taxpayers,
withholding
Defendants
F.3d
argue
with
large
the
1266
the
sums
(9th
aid
of
[from
Supreme
Cir.
a
the
Court
2004)
federal
states],
has
held
15
California‟s “pay-then-protest” process is “a plain, speedy, and
16
efficient remedy.” (Not. Mot. & Mot. Dismiss (“SBE Mot.”) 9:17-
17
18, ECF No. 15; FTB Mem. P. & A. ISO Mot. Dismiss (“FTB Mot.”)
18
12:6-7, ECF No. 17-1 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum,
19
493
20
constitute a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy”) and Cal. v.
21
Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 (1982) (“Because the
22
appellees
could
seek
23
insurance
taxes,
and
24
their
25
state law was „plain, speedy, and efficient‟ within the meaning
26
of the [TIA], and consequently, that the District Court had no
27
jurisdiction to issue injunctive or declaratory relief.”)).
28
U.S.
331,
338-39
constitutional
(1990)
a
(“California‟s
refund
thereby
claims,
refund
of
their
state
obtain
state
judicial
we
hold
that
their
procedures
unemployment
review
remedy
of
under
“It has consistently been held . . . that the refund
6
1
action
2
„plain,
3
restraints of [the TIA].” Arnoff v. Franchise Tax Bd. of the
4
State of Cal., 348 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir. 1965).
5
Court stated in Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. at 338: “To the
6
extent
7
constitute a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.”
provided
by
California
speedy
and
efficient
they
8
9
are
Plaintiff
available,
rejoins
Personal
remedy‟
Income
such
as
California‟s
even
if
Tax
to
law
invoke
a
the
As the Supreme
refund
the
is
procedures
“pay-then-protest”
process is “plain, speedy and efficient” on its face, the process
10
will
11
(Pl.‟s Mem. P. & A. ISO Consolid. Opp‟n Defs.‟ MTD (“Opp‟n”)
12
15:24-16:3, ECF No. 22.)
13
not
A.
14
provide
him
a
plain,
speedy
and
efficient
remedy.
Bait and Switch
Plaintiff
contends
that
the
precedent
on
which
15
Defendants rely is distinguishable from his situation because
16
“[n]one of those cases . . . involves a . . . [tax] assessment in
17
which the taxpayer . . . followed the prepayment administrative
18
process,” and California cannot now force him to “forgo” the
19
predeprivation
20
requiring him to use the “pay-then-protest” process before he can
21
“pursue
22
Plaintiff argues forcing him to change from the predeprivation
23
process to the “pay-then-protest” process amounts to a “bait and
24
switch” tactic, which the Supreme Court held illegal in Reich v.
25
Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994) and Newsweek v. Florida Dep‟t of
26
Revenue, 522 U.S. 442 (1998). (Opp‟n 23:10-12.)
a
administrative
constitutional
statutory
claim.”
option
(Opp‟n
he
25:21-23;
chose
by
26:1-3.)
27
Defendants reply that Plaintiff has not been subjected
28
to the “bait and switch” tactic involved in Reich and Newsweek
7
1
because “this is not a case where [California‟s] . . . statutory
2
scheme has changed midstream.” (FTB Reply ISO Mot. Dismiss “FTB
3
Reply” 6:5, ECF No. 27).
4
Newsweek “concern[:] (1) taxpayers who had paid their taxes, (2)
5
a subsequent finding that the tax was unconstitutional, [and] (3)
6
efforts by the state courts after the tax was paid and found
7
unconstitutional
8
generally applicable refund statute.” (SBE Reply ISO Mot. Dismiss
9
(“SBE Reply”) 4:8-12, ECF No. 26.)
to
restrict
Defendants contend both Reich and
the
application
of
a
previously
10
In Reich and Newsweek, the taxpayer challengers paid
11
the assessed taxes and then challenged the tax through a refund
12
action; however, after payment, the states changed their laws to
13
prevent the taxpayers from seeking refunds for the already paid
14
taxes. The Supreme Court held that states are not permitted to
15
“reconfigure [their] scheme[s], unfairly, in midcourse—to „bait
16
and switch‟” taxpayers. Reich, 513 U.S. at 111. The Supreme Court
17
further stated: “While [states] may be free to require taxpayers
18
to litigate first and pay [the tax] later, due process prevents
19
[them] from applying this requirement to taxpayers . . . who
20
reasonably relied on the apparent availability of a postpayment
21
refund when paying the [disputed] tax.” Newsweek, 522 U.S. at
22
445.
23
Plaintiff has not shown that the reasoning of Reich and
24
Newsweek
supports
his
jurisdiction
taxpayers
who
challenged
25
concern
26
making payment and then were prevented from seeking a refund by
27
intervening changes in state law.
28
///
8
argument;
their
tax
these
decisions
assessment
after
1
B.
Access to a “Speedy” Remedy
2
Plaintiff also rejoins the “pay-then-protest” process
3
does not provide him a “speedy” remedy because it “would return
4
[him] to the FTB and its administrative process” before he is
5
able to seek relief in the state court. He contends that if the
6
FTB‟s investigation lasts longer than six months, and Plaintiff
7
elects to proceed with a state-court refund action [before the
8
FTB investigation concludes], he risks having the state court
9
find
that
he
failed
to
exhaust
the
administrative
remedies
10
available,” and refuse to consider his claims as happened to the
11
plaintiff in Barnes v. State Bd. of Equalization, 118 Cal. App.
12
3d 994 (1981). (Opp‟n 30:1-12.) However, the plaintiff in Barnes
13
did not file suit in state court until after the SBE denied his
14
claim, and the court did not find his claim waived because the
15
plaintiff filed suit in state court before the administrative
16
process had closed. 118 Cal. App. 3d at 1002 (stating that “the
17
board properly refused and denied the [taxpayer‟s] claim. . . .
18
Plaintiff then approached the superior court”) (emphasis added).
19
Defendants reply that “the longest [Plaintiff] . . .
20
would have to wait [in order to bring his claim in state court]
21
after switching to the „pay-then-protest‟ [process] . . .
22
be six months,” and a six month waiting period does not call into
23
question whether the remedy is speedy. (SBE Reply 8:15-17.)
would
24
“Speedy” is a “relative concept.” Rosewell v. LaSalle
25
Nat‟l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 518 (1981). A state remedy is “„speedy‟
26
if
27
corresponding federal procedure.” U.S. West, Inc. v. Nelson, 146
28
F.3d
it
does
718,
not
725
entail
(9th
a
Cir.
significantly
1998)
9
greater
(interpreting
delay
an
than
a
identical
1
exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (public utility rate-payer suits)).
2
“The state remedy need not be the best of all possible remedies,
3
. . . . [and] [a]lthough delay in reviewing a taxpayer‟s claim
4
may be troubling, . . . nowhere in the [TIA] . . . did Congress
5
suggest that the remedy must be the speediest.” Colonial Pipeline
6
Co. v. Morgan, 474 F.3d 211, 218-19 (6th Cir. 2007).
7
The “pay-then-protest” process requires a taxpayer to
8
file a claim with the FTB “for refund” and “[i]f the FTB fails to
9
mail notice of an action . . .
within six months . . . , the
10
taxpayer may . . . bring an action against the FTB” in state
11
court. §§ 19382, 19385.
12
Plaintiff has not shown how, if he elected to use the
13
“pay-then-protest”
14
significantly
15
procedure.”
16
Plaintiff does not prevail on this portion of his jurisdiction
17
argument.
18
C.
19
process,
greater
U.S.
its
delay
West,
timetable
than
Inc.,
a
146
“entails
corresponding
F.3d
at
725.
a
federal
Therefore,
Uncertainty
Further,
Plaintiff
his
the
constitutional
federal
21
uncertain whether these claims could be presented through the
22
“pay-then-protest”
23
California‟s state court remedy from being “plain,” as the term
24
is used in the TIA. (Opp‟n 14:19-24.)
“„[U]ncertainty‟
26
prevents
it
27
federal-court
28
Supreme
from
Court
being
not
this
surrounding
plain
jurisdiction.”
“has
and
and
hesitated
10
uncertainty
a
“lifts
Rosewell,
to
because
450
it
has
jurisdiction
process,
claims
court
20
25
over
argues
is
prevents
state-court
remedy”
the
bar
[TIA‟s]
U.S.
declare
a
at
516.
state
to
The
refund
1
provision
2
opportunity
3
proceedings is uncertain.” Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 414
4
n.31.
5
inadequate
1.
6
to
raise
to
bar
his
federal
relief
constitutional
if
claims
the
in
taxpayer‟s
the
state
Uncertainty Whether A Claim To Enjoin A Tax Is A
Claim To Void A Tax
7
Plaintiff argues “[b]y its terms. . . [the “pay-then-
8
protest”
9
„taxpayer claiming that the tax computed and assessed is void,‟”
it
process
is
only]
unclear
permits
whether
a
state-court
Plaintiff‟s
action
attempt
to
for
a
10
and
enjoin
11
collection of the taxes assessed against him is an action to void
12
the taxes. (Opp‟n 26:20-21) (emphasis added).
13
Defendants reply that Plaintiff plainly seeks to void
14
the taxes assessed against him since Plaintiff alleges the tax
15
assessments are unconstitutional as applied to him and “a tax
16
assessment that is unconstitutional as applied is every bit as
17
„void‟ as an assessment that is unconstitutional on its face.”
18
(FTB Reply 8:16-17.)
19
It is evident that Plaintiff seeks to void the tax or
20
taxes assessed against him. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his
21
burden of demonstrating that the “pay-then-protest” process fails
22
to provide him a plain remedy.
23
24
2.
Raising
Claims
in
State
Court
That
Were
Not
Presented to the SBE
25
Plaintiff also argues it is uncertain whether the “pay-
26
then-protest” process permits him to raise in state court the
27
constitutional claims he alleges in his federal Complaint because
28
he did present those claims to the SBE, and the Revenue and
11
1
Taxation Code prevents a taxpayer from raising claims in state
2
court that were not included in an SBE appeal. (Opp‟n 29:4-16.)
3
Defendants
rejoin
that
even
assuming
Plaintiff
is
4
correct, the TIA still prevents the federal court from exercising
5
jurisdiction
6
plain, speedy, and efficient remedy was available in state court
7
“at some time” even if the chance to utilize it has been lost
8
because of the taxpayer‟s own action or inaction. (SBE Reply 2:2-
9
4; 3:1-3.)
10
over
Plaintiff‟s
Application
was
TIA
whether
existence
14
Cunningham, 578 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1978). “A number of
15
courts have . . . unanimously concluded that failure to utilize a
16
remedy does not render that remedy insufficient under [the TIA].”
17
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Dep‟t of Treasury of State of Mich., 522
18
F.2d 1120, 1125 (6th Cir. 1975). When a plaintiff‟s own actions
19
foreclose an otherwise “plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” the
20
TIA precludes federal court jurisdiction over the claims. See
21
Jerron West, Inc. v. State of Cal., State Bd. of Equalization,
22
129
23
jurisdiction in the face of an “as applied” challenge to TIA‟s
24
application because “[t]he Taxpayers‟ failure . . . d[id] not
25
render the[] state remedies ineffective”); Wood v. Sargeant, 694
26
F.2d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding an “inability to pay the
27
tax [to initiate a refund action] does not avoid the [TIA‟s]
28
jurisdictional
1334,
1338
bar”).
(9th
Cir.
Therefore,
12
Bros.
the
state
13
Sacks
and
a
failure . . . to use the remedy . . . does not negate the
remedy.”
taxpayer[,]
on
a
12
the
the
“depends
where
remedy
of
to
the
claims
11
F.3d
available
of
constitutional
Loan
1997)(declining
even
if
Co.
to
Plaintiff
taxpayer‟s
Inc.
v.
exercise
failed
to
1
present his constitutional claims during the state administrative
2
proceeding,
3
federal
4
constitutional claims.
that
court
failure
exercising
5
V.
6
For
the
has
stated
not
been
shown
jurisdiction
to
over
justify
the
Plaintiff‟s
CONCLUSION
reasons,
Plaintiff‟s
Complaint
is
7
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without leave
8
to amend. Further, the Clerk of Court shall close this action.
9
Dated:
February 9, 2015
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?