Hyatt v. Chiang et al

Filing 35

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 2/9/15 GRANTING 17 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without leave to amend. Further, the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this action. CASE CLOSED. (Meuleman, A)

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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 GILBERT P. HYATT, 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 No. 2:14-CV-00849-GEB-DAD Plaintiff, v. JOHN CHIANG, JEROME E. HORTON, and MICHAEL COHEN, CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD MEMBERS; BETTY T. YEE, GEORGE RUNNER, MICHELLE STEEL, JEROME E. HORTON, and JOHN CHIANG, CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION MEMBERS; and DOES 1 through 20, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION Defendants. 18 Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that the manner in 19 which Defendants are processing his California administrative tax 20 appeal violates his federal constitutional rights under the due 21 process and equal protection clauses, and seeks an injunction 22 “forbidding Defendants. . . from continuing the investigation and 23 administrative 24 Defendants . . . from continuing to assess or threaten to assess 25 [Plaintiff], or collect or threaten to collect from [Plaintiff], 26 taxes, penalties or interest.” (Compl. Prayer ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 2.) 27 28 Each proceedings defendant against” seeks him dismissal and of the “forbidding Complaint arguing, inter alia, that it should be dismissed with prejudice 1 1 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 2 Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1). Specifically Defendants argue 3 the federal Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) prevents Plaintiff from 4 challenging 5 federal court. 6 his The California TIA residency-based prescribes: “The district tax assessment courts shall in not 7 enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of 8 any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 9 remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 10 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 11 The following allegations in the Complaint concern the 12 pending dismissal motions. Plaintiff Gilbert Hyatt moved from 13 California to 14 California Franchise 15 determine 16 taxes for the 1991 tax year. (Id.) The FTB initiated a second 17 audit 18 California income taxes for the 1992 tax year. (Id.) “The FTB 19 asserts [Plaintiff] . . . became a Nevada resident on April 3, 20 1992” and owes the following unpaid California income taxes: $1.8 21 million for the 1991 tax year and $5.6 million for the 1992 tax 22 year. 23 administrative 24 State Board of Equalization (“SBE”). (Id. ¶ 3.) Neither the 1991 25 nor 1992 audit has concluded. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges “the 26 delays . . . fall squarely and primarily at the feet of the FTB” 27 and the SBE. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 26.) Plaintiff further alleges that 28 Defendants “continue to threaten[] [him] with $55 million plus of in Nevada whether 1996 (Id. ¶¶ to 11, in Tax 1991. Board Plaintiff determine 21.) appeal has For (Compl. (“FTB”) owed been 2 2.) pending six 1993, an audit California Plaintiff last In commenced additional whether the ¶ owed years, before the the to income additional Plaintiff‟s California 1 unconstitutional exactions, specifically the assessed taxes and 2 penalties, for tax years 1991 and 1992.” (Id. ¶ 8.) 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Each dismissal motion contains a facial and factual 5 attack on the federal court‟s jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). 6 “A „facial‟ attack asserts that a complaint‟s allegations are 7 themselves insufficient to invoke jurisdiction, while a „factual‟ 8 attack asserts that the complaint‟s allegations, though adequate 9 on their face to invoke jurisdiction, are untrue.” Courthouse 10 News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 780 at n.3 (9th Cir. 2014). 11 Only the facial attacks are reached herein. 12 “The district court resolves a facial attack as it 13 would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the 14 plaintiff‟s 15 inferences in the plaintiff‟s favor, the court determines whether 16 the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the 17 court‟s jurisdiction.” 18 (9th Cir. 2014). 19 as true all allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable 20 to 21 (2009). legal 22 allegations as true and drawing all reasonable Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 However, “the tenant that a court must accept conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. 23 24 25 26 27 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 28 (1994). 3 1 III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK CONCERNING APPEAL OF A CALIFORNIA 2 RESIDENCY-BASED TAX ASSESSMENT 3 Under California law, a taxpayer seeking to “prevent or 4 enjoin the assessment or collection of” a California residency- 5 based income tax may not file suit in state court without first 6 exhausting the administrative remedies in California Revenue and 7 Taxation 8 administrative processes may be utilized by a taxpayer to contest 9 a tax assessment: a postdeprivation “pay-then-protest” process or Code. Cal. predeprivation Rev. & Code of 19381.1 either Two separate a 11 prerequisite to judicial review in a California state court. A. Exhaustion § 10 12 process. Tax. process is a Postdeprivation “Pay-Then-Protest” Process 13 The “pay-then-protest” process requires the challenging 14 taxpayer to make “payment of the tax,” following which a refund 15 claim can be filed with the FTB. § 19382. If the FTB “fails to 16 mail notice of action on [the] . . . refund claim within six 17 months after the claim [is] filed, the taxpayer may ... bring an 18 action [in state court] against the [FTB]. . . on the grounds set 19 forth in the claim for the recovery of . . . [the] overpayment.” 20 § 19385. If the FTB acts on the challenger‟s refund claim and 21 denies 22 assessed is void . . . 23 upon the grounds set forth in that claim for refund . . . for the 24 recovery of the . . . amount paid” plus interest. §§ 19381, 25 19382. 26 /// it, a taxpayer “claiming that the tax computed and may bring an action [in state court], 27 1 28 Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the California Revenue and Taxation Code. 4 1 B. Predeprivation Process 2 A taxpayer challenging an assessment through the 3 predeprivation process must “file with the [FTB] . . . a written 4 protest against the proposed deficiency assessment, specifying in 5 the protest the grounds upon which it is based.” § 19041. If the 6 protest 7 “reconsider 8 taxpayer may “appeal[] in writing from the action of the [FTB]... 9 to is [the denied, the the taxpayer assessment SBE].” § 19045. of may the “The request that deficiency.” [SBE] . . . § the FTB 19044. The shall hear and 10 determine the appeal,” and an unsuccessful taxpayer may “file[] a 11 petition for rehearing.” §§ 19047-48. After rehearing before the 12 SBE, a taxpayer may seek review in a California state court. § 13 19381. 14 A taxpayer who initially challenges a residency-based 15 income 16 elect 17 paying the disputed tax. § 19335. 18 tax to assessment use the through the “pay-then-protest” predeprivation process at process any may point by Here, Plaintiff challenged his tax assessments using 19 the predeprivation 20 protest” process. 21 process IV. and has not used the “pay-then- DISCUSSION 22 The TIA “limit[s] drastically federal district court 23 jurisdiction to interfere with [the] . . . important . . . local 24 concern” of tax collection. Ark. v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. 25 Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 826 (1997). When passing the TIA, Congress 26 “expressed 27 states would bear if forced to defend the imposition of state 28 taxes in federal, rather than state courts.” May Trucking Co. v. . . . concern regarding 5 the increased costs that 1 Or. 2 (citation omitted). One of Congress‟ main objectives in enacting 3 the 4 injunction, 5 thereby disrupting state government finances.” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 6 U.S. 88, 104 (2004) (citation omitted). However, the TIA‟s limit 7 on federal court jurisdiction has “a narrow exception.” Redding 8 Ford v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 722 F.2d 496, 497 (9th 9 Cir. 1983). Congress vested federal courts with jurisdiction to 10 “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection 11 of [a] tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 12 remedy may [not] be had in the courts of [the] State.” 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1341. Dep‟t TIA 14 of was Transp., “to from stop 388 1261, taxpayers, withholding Defendants F.3d argue with large the 1266 the sums (9th aid of [from Supreme Cir. a the Court 2004) federal states], has held 15 California‟s “pay-then-protest” process is “a plain, speedy, and 16 efficient remedy.” (Not. Mot. & Mot. Dismiss (“SBE Mot.”) 9:17- 17 18, ECF No. 15; FTB Mem. P. & A. ISO Mot. Dismiss (“FTB Mot.”) 18 12:6-7, ECF No. 17-1 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum, 19 493 20 constitute a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy”) and Cal. v. 21 Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 (1982) (“Because the 22 appellees could seek 23 insurance taxes, and 24 their 25 state law was „plain, speedy, and efficient‟ within the meaning 26 of the [TIA], and consequently, that the District Court had no 27 jurisdiction to issue injunctive or declaratory relief.”)). 28 U.S. 331, 338-39 constitutional (1990) a (“California‟s refund thereby claims, refund of their state obtain state judicial we hold that their procedures unemployment review remedy of under “It has consistently been held . . . that the refund 6 1 action 2 „plain, 3 restraints of [the TIA].” Arnoff v. Franchise Tax Bd. of the 4 State of Cal., 348 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir. 1965). 5 Court stated in Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. at 338: “To the 6 extent 7 constitute a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.” provided by California speedy and efficient they 8 9 are Plaintiff available, rejoins Personal remedy‟ Income such as California‟s even if Tax to law invoke a the As the Supreme refund the is procedures “pay-then-protest” process is “plain, speedy and efficient” on its face, the process 10 will 11 (Pl.‟s Mem. P. & A. ISO Consolid. Opp‟n Defs.‟ MTD (“Opp‟n”) 12 15:24-16:3, ECF No. 22.) 13 not A. 14 provide him a plain, speedy and efficient remedy. Bait and Switch Plaintiff contends that the precedent on which 15 Defendants rely is distinguishable from his situation because 16 “[n]one of those cases . . . involves a . . . [tax] assessment in 17 which the taxpayer . . . followed the prepayment administrative 18 process,” and California cannot now force him to “forgo” the 19 predeprivation 20 requiring him to use the “pay-then-protest” process before he can 21 “pursue 22 Plaintiff argues forcing him to change from the predeprivation 23 process to the “pay-then-protest” process amounts to a “bait and 24 switch” tactic, which the Supreme Court held illegal in Reich v. 25 Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994) and Newsweek v. Florida Dep‟t of 26 Revenue, 522 U.S. 442 (1998). (Opp‟n 23:10-12.) a administrative constitutional statutory claim.” option (Opp‟n he 25:21-23; chose by 26:1-3.) 27 Defendants reply that Plaintiff has not been subjected 28 to the “bait and switch” tactic involved in Reich and Newsweek 7 1 because “this is not a case where [California‟s] . . . statutory 2 scheme has changed midstream.” (FTB Reply ISO Mot. Dismiss “FTB 3 Reply” 6:5, ECF No. 27). 4 Newsweek “concern[:] (1) taxpayers who had paid their taxes, (2) 5 a subsequent finding that the tax was unconstitutional, [and] (3) 6 efforts by the state courts after the tax was paid and found 7 unconstitutional 8 generally applicable refund statute.” (SBE Reply ISO Mot. Dismiss 9 (“SBE Reply”) 4:8-12, ECF No. 26.) to restrict Defendants contend both Reich and the application of a previously 10 In Reich and Newsweek, the taxpayer challengers paid 11 the assessed taxes and then challenged the tax through a refund 12 action; however, after payment, the states changed their laws to 13 prevent the taxpayers from seeking refunds for the already paid 14 taxes. The Supreme Court held that states are not permitted to 15 “reconfigure [their] scheme[s], unfairly, in midcourse—to „bait 16 and switch‟” taxpayers. Reich, 513 U.S. at 111. The Supreme Court 17 further stated: “While [states] may be free to require taxpayers 18 to litigate first and pay [the tax] later, due process prevents 19 [them] from applying this requirement to taxpayers . . . who 20 reasonably relied on the apparent availability of a postpayment 21 refund when paying the [disputed] tax.” Newsweek, 522 U.S. at 22 445. 23 Plaintiff has not shown that the reasoning of Reich and 24 Newsweek supports his jurisdiction taxpayers who challenged 25 concern 26 making payment and then were prevented from seeking a refund by 27 intervening changes in state law. 28 /// 8 argument; their tax these decisions assessment after 1 B. Access to a “Speedy” Remedy 2 Plaintiff also rejoins the “pay-then-protest” process 3 does not provide him a “speedy” remedy because it “would return 4 [him] to the FTB and its administrative process” before he is 5 able to seek relief in the state court. He contends that if the 6 FTB‟s investigation lasts longer than six months, and Plaintiff 7 elects to proceed with a state-court refund action [before the 8 FTB investigation concludes], he risks having the state court 9 find that he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies 10 available,” and refuse to consider his claims as happened to the 11 plaintiff in Barnes v. State Bd. of Equalization, 118 Cal. App. 12 3d 994 (1981). (Opp‟n 30:1-12.) However, the plaintiff in Barnes 13 did not file suit in state court until after the SBE denied his 14 claim, and the court did not find his claim waived because the 15 plaintiff filed suit in state court before the administrative 16 process had closed. 118 Cal. App. 3d at 1002 (stating that “the 17 board properly refused and denied the [taxpayer‟s] claim. . . . 18 Plaintiff then approached the superior court”) (emphasis added). 19 Defendants reply that “the longest [Plaintiff] . . . 20 would have to wait [in order to bring his claim in state court] 21 after switching to the „pay-then-protest‟ [process] . . . 22 be six months,” and a six month waiting period does not call into 23 question whether the remedy is speedy. (SBE Reply 8:15-17.) would 24 “Speedy” is a “relative concept.” Rosewell v. LaSalle 25 Nat‟l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 518 (1981). A state remedy is “„speedy‟ 26 if 27 corresponding federal procedure.” U.S. West, Inc. v. Nelson, 146 28 F.3d it does 718, not 725 entail (9th a Cir. significantly 1998) 9 greater (interpreting delay an than a identical 1 exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (public utility rate-payer suits)). 2 “The state remedy need not be the best of all possible remedies, 3 . . . . [and] [a]lthough delay in reviewing a taxpayer‟s claim 4 may be troubling, . . . nowhere in the [TIA] . . . did Congress 5 suggest that the remedy must be the speediest.” Colonial Pipeline 6 Co. v. Morgan, 474 F.3d 211, 218-19 (6th Cir. 2007). 7 The “pay-then-protest” process requires a taxpayer to 8 file a claim with the FTB “for refund” and “[i]f the FTB fails to 9 mail notice of an action . . . within six months . . . , the 10 taxpayer may . . . bring an action against the FTB” in state 11 court. §§ 19382, 19385. 12 Plaintiff has not shown how, if he elected to use the 13 “pay-then-protest” 14 significantly 15 procedure.” 16 Plaintiff does not prevail on this portion of his jurisdiction 17 argument. 18 C. 19 process, greater U.S. its delay West, timetable than Inc., a 146 “entails corresponding F.3d at 725. a federal Therefore, Uncertainty Further, Plaintiff his the constitutional federal 21 uncertain whether these claims could be presented through the 22 “pay-then-protest” 23 California‟s state court remedy from being “plain,” as the term 24 is used in the TIA. (Opp‟n 14:19-24.) “„[U]ncertainty‟ 26 prevents it 27 federal-court 28 Supreme from Court being not this surrounding plain jurisdiction.” “has and and hesitated 10 uncertainty a “lifts Rosewell, to because 450 it has jurisdiction process, claims court 20 25 over argues is prevents state-court remedy” the bar [TIA‟s] U.S. declare a at 516. state to The refund 1 provision 2 opportunity 3 proceedings is uncertain.” Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 414 4 n.31. 5 inadequate 1. 6 to raise to bar his federal relief constitutional if claims the in taxpayer‟s the state Uncertainty Whether A Claim To Enjoin A Tax Is A Claim To Void A Tax 7 Plaintiff argues “[b]y its terms. . . [the “pay-then- 8 protest” 9 „taxpayer claiming that the tax computed and assessed is void,‟” it process is only] unclear permits whether a state-court Plaintiff‟s action attempt to for a 10 and enjoin 11 collection of the taxes assessed against him is an action to void 12 the taxes. (Opp‟n 26:20-21) (emphasis added). 13 Defendants reply that Plaintiff plainly seeks to void 14 the taxes assessed against him since Plaintiff alleges the tax 15 assessments are unconstitutional as applied to him and “a tax 16 assessment that is unconstitutional as applied is every bit as 17 „void‟ as an assessment that is unconstitutional on its face.” 18 (FTB Reply 8:16-17.) 19 It is evident that Plaintiff seeks to void the tax or 20 taxes assessed against him. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his 21 burden of demonstrating that the “pay-then-protest” process fails 22 to provide him a plain remedy. 23 24 2. Raising Claims in State Court That Were Not Presented to the SBE 25 Plaintiff also argues it is uncertain whether the “pay- 26 then-protest” process permits him to raise in state court the 27 constitutional claims he alleges in his federal Complaint because 28 he did present those claims to the SBE, and the Revenue and 11 1 Taxation Code prevents a taxpayer from raising claims in state 2 court that were not included in an SBE appeal. (Opp‟n 29:4-16.) 3 Defendants rejoin that even assuming Plaintiff is 4 correct, the TIA still prevents the federal court from exercising 5 jurisdiction 6 plain, speedy, and efficient remedy was available in state court 7 “at some time” even if the chance to utilize it has been lost 8 because of the taxpayer‟s own action or inaction. (SBE Reply 2:2- 9 4; 3:1-3.) 10 over Plaintiff‟s Application was TIA whether existence 14 Cunningham, 578 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1978). “A number of 15 courts have . . . unanimously concluded that failure to utilize a 16 remedy does not render that remedy insufficient under [the TIA].” 17 Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Dep‟t of Treasury of State of Mich., 522 18 F.2d 1120, 1125 (6th Cir. 1975). When a plaintiff‟s own actions 19 foreclose an otherwise “plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” the 20 TIA precludes federal court jurisdiction over the claims. See 21 Jerron West, Inc. v. State of Cal., State Bd. of Equalization, 22 129 23 jurisdiction in the face of an “as applied” challenge to TIA‟s 24 application because “[t]he Taxpayers‟ failure . . . d[id] not 25 render the[] state remedies ineffective”); Wood v. Sargeant, 694 26 F.2d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding an “inability to pay the 27 tax [to initiate a refund action] does not avoid the [TIA‟s] 28 jurisdictional 1334, 1338 bar”). (9th Cir. Therefore, 12 Bros. the state 13 Sacks and a failure . . . to use the remedy . . . does not negate the remedy.” taxpayer[,] on a 12 the the “depends where remedy of to the claims 11 F.3d available of constitutional Loan 1997)(declining even if Co. to Plaintiff taxpayer‟s Inc. v. exercise failed to 1 present his constitutional claims during the state administrative 2 proceeding, 3 federal 4 constitutional claims. that court failure exercising 5 V. 6 For the has stated not been shown jurisdiction to over justify the Plaintiff‟s CONCLUSION reasons, Plaintiff‟s Complaint is 7 dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without leave 8 to amend. Further, the Clerk of Court shall close this action. 9 Dated: February 9, 2015 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13

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