Donovan v. Woodbridge Maintenance Association, et al

Filing 33

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 3/16/15 DENYING IN ITS ENTIRETY 15 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Meuleman, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ALICE M. DONOVAN,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:14-cv-00995 JAM-EFB

v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

WOODBRIDGE MAINTENANCE
ASSOCIATION; FREI REAL
ESTATE SERVICES,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff Alice Donovan, a blind individual, brings this

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civil rights action against her homeowners’ association for

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refusing to provide documents in a readable (Word) format to

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reasonably accommodate her disability.

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nullify her claims in a motion for judgment on the pleadings on

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the basis that the claims are not sufficiently related to her

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“dwelling.”

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Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 1

Defendants attempt to

The Court finds her allegations are sufficient and

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for February 11, 2015.
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I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a blind individual who resides in “Woodbridge

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at Natoma Station,” a community of homes owned and managed by

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Defendants Woodbridge Maintenance Association and Frei Real

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Estate Services (collectively, “Defendants”).

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homeowner, Plaintiff is a member of Woodbridge at Natoma

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Station’s homeowners’ association.

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the association’s Board of Directors, which was charged with

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adopting “rules and regulations” and making decisions on topics

FAC ¶ 8.

FAC ¶¶ 7-9.

As a

She also served on

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including “certain vendors doing work on the property” and

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“disciplinary matters.”

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FAC ¶¶ 11-12.

Board members were required to “review and evaluate written

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material prior to Board meetings[.]”

FAC ¶ 14.

Plaintiff

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alleges that on numerous occasions, she requested that

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Defendants provide these documents to her in an accessible

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format, namely a format that is compatible with her screen

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reader, such as “Word” documents.

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Defendants attempted to comply on some occasions, but on other

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occasions refused.

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number of Plaintiff’s requests, Defendants asked Plaintiff to

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“educate the Board on its ‘legal obligations to make documents

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available and accessible’ to Plaintiff.”

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request led Plaintiff to retain a lawyer from Disability Rights

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California.

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and engaged in negotiations on Plaintiff’s behalf with

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Defendants.

See FAC ¶¶ 14-15, 21, 23.

See FAC ¶¶ 14-15, 18, 20-22, 24.

FAC ¶ 17.

FAC ¶ 16.

After a

This

The attorney provided an opinion letter

FAC ¶¶ 17, 23.

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In the months following the negotiations, Defendants’

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employees commented that providing accessible documents to
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Plaintiff would be expensive and time-consuming and that they

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had already spent too much money on legal fees in the matter.

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FAC ¶¶ 26, 28.

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Board.

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held a meeting with homeowners’ association members.

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31.

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“Plaintiff’s dispute would require a special assessment to cover

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legal expenses for providing her accommodation, which in turn

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would either result in an increase in monthly Association dues

They pressured Plaintiff to resign from the

FAC ¶ 30.

When Plaintiff declined to resign, the Board
FAC ¶¶ 30-

At the meeting, the Board members indicated that

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. . . or force the dissolution of the Association.”

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Board then called another meeting with all homeowners’

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association members to discuss recalling Plaintiff from the

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Board, allegedly citing the costs of providing Plaintiff with

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documents and Defendants’ legal liability if Plaintiff continued

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in her position.

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materials related to the recall campaign against her.

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¶¶ 30, 35-37.

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the Board.

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FAC ¶¶ 35, 37.

Id.

The

Plaintiff could not access
FAC

The meeting resulted in Plaintiff’s recall from

FAC ¶ 37.

Now off the Board, Plaintiff continues to be excluded from

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accessing materials and documents provided to all homeowners’

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association members.

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notices and agenda; notices of community events; Board election

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materials; Association financial documents, Association CC&R’s,

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By-laws, and Articles of Incorporation.”

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result, Plaintiff is limited in her “ability to abide by the

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Association’s rule and covenants, participate in Association

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meetings, engage in informed discussion of Association business,

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and make informed votes on issue impacting the Woodbridge

FAC ¶ 40.

These include “Board Meeting

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FAC ¶ 43.

As a

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community[.]”

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continual denial of this communication segregates and isolates

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[her] and makes her an unwanted member of the community[.]”

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¶ 43.

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FAC ¶ 40.

Plaintiff also claims that “[h]er

FAC

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants claiming that

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they discriminated against her on the basis of her disability,

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failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, and retaliated

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against her for requesting accommodation, under the Fair Housing

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Act Amendments (“FHAA”), California’s Fair Employment and

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Housing Act (“FEHA”), and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act

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(“Unruh Act”).

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stipulated to, and the court approved, filing of a first amended

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complaint (Doc. #11, “FAC”).

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now move for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. #15).

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opposes the motion (Doc. #23).

After Defendants answered, the parties

Defendants answered (Doc. #14) and
Plaintiff

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II.

OPINION

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A.

Legal Standard

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A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule

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of Civil Procedure 12(c) “is ‘functionally identical’ to Rule

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12(b)(6) and [] ‘the same standard of review’ applies to motions

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brought under either rule.”

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Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011)

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(quoting Dworkin v. Hustier Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192

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(9th Cir. 1989)).

Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen.

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B.

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Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of a

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Judicial Notice

letter from the Department of Fair Employment and Housing to
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Plaintiff entitled “Explanatory Closure Letter.”

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RJN at 2; id. Exh. A.

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. . . records.”

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notice of matters in the public record, but not conclusions of

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law, “unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of

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fact[.]”

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Coll. Dist., 2008 WL 170876, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008)

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(citing Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282

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(9th Cir. 1986) and Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d

Defendant’s

The letter is “kept in the Department[’s]

Hansen Decl. ¶ 2.

The Court may take judicial

Davenport v. Bd. of Trustees of State Center Cmty.

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618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)).

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notice of the letter, but does not take as true the conclusions

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it contains.

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(N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2014).

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C.

The Court therefore takes judicial

See Contreras v. UAL Corp., 2014 WL 551185, at *4

Discussion
1.

Plaintiff’s Declaration

As an initial matter, Defendants challenge the propriety of

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considering Plaintiff’s declaration that she filed with her

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opposition.

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motion to dismiss, the Court looks only to the pleadings and

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documents that have been properly judicially noticed.

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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 4378774, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept.

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3, 2014) (citation omitted).

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consider the facts contained in Plaintiff’s affidavit, but

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instead looks to the FAC to evaluate the factual basis and

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sufficiency of the claims.

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2.

On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as in a

Crosby v.

The Court therefore does not

The Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue for judgment on the pleadings because
Plaintiff’s causes of action are not based on the “use and
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enjoy[ment] [of her] dwelling.”

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responds that the reach of the remedial statutes supporting her

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claims is “not limited to being able to physically live in a

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building.”

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as they relate to each cause of action.

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Opp. at 6:1-2.

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Mot. at 4-8.

Plaintiff

These arguments are discussed below

First Cause of Action: FHAA

Plaintiff makes three claims under the FHAA: discrimination

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on the basis of disability, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2); failure to

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make a reasonable accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); and

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retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
The protections of the FHAA “must be given ‘a generous

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construction in order to carry out a policy that Congress

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considered to be of the highest priority.’”

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of Oregon v. Bookside Vill. Owners Ass’n, 2012 WL 8017842, at

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*16 (D. Or. Oct. 18, 2012) (quoting United States v. Cal. Mobile

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Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994)).

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Section 3604 defines many forms of prohibited discrimination.

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Subsection 3604(f)(2) proscribes “discriminat[ion] against any

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person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental

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of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in

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connection with such dwelling.”

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language, does not include a requirement that the discrimination

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interfere with “use and enjoyment of a dwelling.”

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Defendants’ arguments for judgment on the pleadings are

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inapplicable to this claim.

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Fair Hous. Council

This subsection, by its plain

Therefore

Subsection 3604(f)(3)(B) prohibits “refusal to make

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reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or

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services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford
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such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling[.]”

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To state a claim under section 3604(f)(3)(B), a plaintiff must

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allege that accommodation of the handicap “may be necessary to

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afford [her] an equal opportunity to use and enjoy [her]

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dwelling.”

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Cir. 2004) (quoting Giebeler v. M&B Associates, 343 F.3d 1143,

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1147 (9th Cir. 2003)) (quotation marks omitted).

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McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1262 (9th

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “does not articulate how

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her inability to serve on the Board of Directors of the

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Association interfered with her use and enjoyment of her

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dwelling or premises as a physical structure[.]”

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recite the elements of the statute, suggesting that Plaintiff

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merely stated the elements and included no facts going to her

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use and enjoyment of her property.

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Mot. at 6:24-

Defendants then cite to multiple portions of the FAC which

See Mot. at 6-8.

Defendants appear to misunderstand Plaintiff’s claims and

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ignore central allegations in the FAC.

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that she had a right to be on the Board.

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serve on the Board as part of her participation with the

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homeowners’ association, the Court concludes that the

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accommodation requested — reasonable access to documents in

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order to participate in Board decisions — “may be necessary” to

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equal use and enjoyment of her dwelling.

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a homeowners’ association is to improve the community as a whole

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to make living there more enjoyable for all inhabitants.

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FAC ¶ 11 (“The stated purpose of Woodbridge’s [Homeowners’]

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Association is to own, repair, maintain and manage the common

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areas and common facilities within Woodbridge . . . and to
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Plaintiff does not argue
But given that she did

Indeed, the purpose of

See

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otherwise enhance and promote the use and enjoyment of the

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common areas and common facilities by the Owners in common at

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Woodbridge.”).

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“rules and regulations” to govern homeowners and their homes.

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Id.

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as to preclude equal enjoyment of participation in decisions

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about one’s home.

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Court to no case for the proposition that the FHAA does not

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protect participation in such decisionmaking.

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Moreover, the Board’s tasks included adopting

This Court is not inclined to construe the FHAA so narrowly

Defendants argue otherwise, but point the

In their reply, Defendants argue that the accommodation

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requested related to “materials . . . that were only available

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to members of the Board.”

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that Plaintiff is only entitled to accommodation related to her

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role as a homeowner and not to her role as a Board member.

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Mot. at 6; Reply at 5.

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Reply at 5:7-8.

Defendants’ argument fails.

Defendants suggest

See

As explained above, the Court

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rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s participation in

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the Board’s decisionmaking is not sufficiently related to her

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dwelling.

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that this lawsuit cannot be based on materials Plaintiff

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received solely for her position on the Board, Defendants’

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argument contains a further flaw: contrary to Defendants’

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interpretation of the FAC, Plaintiff did allege that she was

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denied access to materials available to all association members.

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See FAC ¶¶ 35-37, 43.

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deprivation of these materials affected her use and enjoyment of

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her home.

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respond to documents that all other association members received

But even if the Court accepted Defendants’ position

And Plaintiff further alleged how

See FAC ¶ 37 (describing Plaintiff’s inability to

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related to her proposed recall from the Board); id. at 40

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(“Without accessible communication of Association rules,

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business and board agenda, Plaintiff’s ability to abide by the

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Association’s rules and covenants, participate in Association

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meetings, engage in informed discussions of Association

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business, and make informed votes on issues impacting the

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Woodbridge community, not only as a Board member, but as a

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member of the Association in which she resides has been and is

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significantly impaired; thereby effecting her quiet enjoyment of

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her home.”); id. ¶ 43 (“Her continual denial of []

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communication[s] segregates and isolates Plaintiff and makes her

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an unwanted member of the community as she is not able to

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respond to Association business or show up to community

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events.”).

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For these reasons the Court holds that the accommodation

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Plaintiff sought “may be necessary” to ensure equal opportunity

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to use and enjoy her dwelling.

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Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to

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Plaintiff’s section 3604(f)(3)(B) claim.

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The Court accordingly denies

As to Plaintiff’s final claim under the FHAA, section 3617
makes it unlawful to
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person
in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his
having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having
aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [certain
other sections of the FHAA].

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This section protects plaintiffs who were “engaged in [a]

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protected activity.”

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1192 (9th Cir. 2003).

Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181,
Protected activities include “the request
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for a reasonable accommodation for handicapped persons.”

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v. Camacho, 2014 WL 2215911, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2014).

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Bezi

Defendants argue that Plaintiff was not engaged in a

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protected activity because her requests for accommodation “were

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not related to the use and enjoyment of her dwelling.”

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9:23.

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documents “may be necessary” to Plaintiff’s equal use and

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enjoyment of her dwelling.

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section 3617 claim is denied.

The Court disagrees.

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4.

Mot. at

As indicated above, access to the

Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s

Second Cause of Action: FEHA

FEHA mirrors the FHAA in regard to claims for disability

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discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and retaliation.

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Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1131 n.8 (9th Cir.

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2001); Sturm v. Davlyn Inv., Inc., 2013 WL 8604662 at *10 (C.D.

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Cal. Sept. 30, 2013); Garza v. Raft, 1999 WL 33882969, at *3-*4

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(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1999). Because the same standards apply to

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both statutes, the Court reaches the same conclusions for

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Plaintiff’s FEHA claims as it did for her FHAA claims.

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Court thus denies Defendant’s motion as to the second cause of

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action.

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5.

The

Third Cause of Action: Unruh Act

Plaintiff asserts an Unruh Act claim under California Civil

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Code Section 51(b).

This section provides that “[a]ll persons

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. . . are free and equal, and no matter what their . . .

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disability[] [or] medical condition . . . are entitled to the

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full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,

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privileges, or services in all business establishments of every

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kind whatsoever.”

This language does not contain a requirement
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that Plaintiff plead a connection to “use and enjoyment of her

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dwelling”. Defendants’ arguments are therefore inapplicable and

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the Court denies Defendants motion as to this claim.

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III.

ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 16, 2015

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