Rodriguez v. Goodrich Corporation et al

Filing 18

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 7/31/2014 GRANTING 9 Motion to Remand; REMANDING this action to the Superior Court for the State of California, County of Solano; DENYING as moot 12 Motion to Supplement or Amend; VACATING the Motion Hearing on 12 Motion to Supplement or Amend. Copy of remand order sent to other court. CASE CLOSED. (Michel, G)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RAPHAEL RODRIGUEZ, on behalf
of himself and others
similarly situated,

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Plaintiff,

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No.

2:14-cv-01026 JAM AC

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND

v.
GOODRICH CORPORATION, a
corporation; HAMILTON
SUNDSTRAND CORPORATION, a
corporation; UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, a
corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive,

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Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Raphael

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Rodriguez’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand (Doc. #9).

Defendants

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Goodrich Corporation, Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation, and United

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Technologies Corporation (“Defendants”) oppose the motion (Doc.

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#10) and Plaintiff filed a reply (Doc. #13).

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reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. 1

For the following

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for July 9, 2014.
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I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed as a non-exempt hourly employee by

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Defendants.

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and a putative class of similarly situated employees, that

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Defendants improperly calculated overtime rates, and thus failed

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to comply with various provisions of the California Labor Code.

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FAC ¶ 13.

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to include “awards, bonuses or other incentive compensation” in

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his “regular rate of pay,” for purposes of calculating the proper

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FAC ¶ 8.

Plaintiff alleges, on behalf of himself

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed

overtime premium rate of pay.

FAC ¶¶ 13-14.

On March 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed the First Amended

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Complaint (“FAC”) in Solano County Superior Court.

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alleges the following causes of action: (1) Failure to Pay

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Overtime Wages at Proper Rate When Paying Additional Remuneration

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in violation of Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194; (2) Failure to

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Properly Itemize Paystubs, in violation of Labor Code §§ 226(a)

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and 226(e); (3) Failure to Pay Wages Due at Time of Termination,

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in violation of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 203; (4) Unfair

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Business Practices, in violation of Business and Professions Code

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§ 17200; and (5) Civil Penalties Pursuant to the Private

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Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code § 2698.

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The FAC

On April 25, 2014, Defendants removed the matter to this

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Court, alleging original federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28

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U.S.C. § 1332(a), based on diversity of citizenship.

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Removal at 1.

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amount to $7,436.80, Defendants allege that the amount in

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controversy requirement is satisfied because “the attorneys’ fees

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here alone would exceed $75,000.”

Notice of

Although Plaintiff’s total individual damages only

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Notice of Removal at 12.

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II.

OPINION

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A.

Legal Standard

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Generally, a state civil action is removable to federal

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court only if it might have been brought originally in federal

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court.

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construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction.”

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Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing

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Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988); Takeda v.

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Northwestern National Life Insurance Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th

See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

The Ninth Circuit “strictly

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Cir. 1985)).

Thus, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if

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there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first

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instance.”

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F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)).

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against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has

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the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”

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Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Associates, 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.

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3 (9th Cir. 1990); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190,

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1195 (9th Cir. 1988)).

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defendant must show that complete diversity exists among the

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parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

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U.S.C. § 1332.

Id. (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592
“The ‘strong presumption’

Id. (citing

To establish diversity jurisdiction, the

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B.

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Discussion

Plaintiff argues that removal was improper because

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Defendants improperly calculated attorneys’ fees for purposes of

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Plaintiff’s individual amount in controversy.

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Plaintiff maintains that, in a putative class action, potential

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attorneys’ fees “cannot be attributed solely to the named

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plaintiffs for purposes of the amount in controversy.”
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Mot. at 5.

Mot. at 5

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(citing Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir.

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2001)).

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Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Kanter and Gibson v. Chrysler Corp.,

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261 F.3d 927, 942 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Plaintiff argues that this issue has been settled by the

Mot. at 5.

Defendants oppose this argument on several grounds.

First,

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Defendants argue that Kanter and Gibson do not apply to the

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present case, as Plaintiff seeks recovery under a statute that

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authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees to any individual who

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brings a successful claim.

Opp. at 8.

Second, Defendants argue

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that they have not improperly “aggregated” the attorneys’ fees

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for all members of the putative class, but rather “Defendants’

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calculation of attorneys’ fees is premised solely on the single

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named Plaintiff’s individual claims[.]”

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Defendants argue that Kanter and Gibson do not apply because the

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class has not yet been certified.

Opp. at 9.

Finally,

Opp. at 11.

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The Ninth Circuit has held that, “if a named plaintiff in a

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diversity class action has a claim with an amount in controversy

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in excess of $75,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 confers supplemental

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jurisdiction over claims of unnamed class members irrespective of

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the amount in controversy in those claims[.]”

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at 858.

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individual amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

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Kanter, 265 F.3d

Therefore, the entire action is removable if Plaintiff’s

Generally, “where an underlying statute authorizes an award

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of attorneys’ fees, . . . such fees may be included in the amount

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in controversy.”

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1156 (9th Cir. 1998).

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attorneys’ fees “cannot be allocated solely to [named] plaintiffs

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for purposes of amount in controversy,” unless the statute in

Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150,
However, in a putative class action,

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question authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees “solely to the

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named plaintiffs in a class action.”

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In Gibson, the Ninth Circuit noted that a California statute

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which authorized an award of attorneys’ fees “to a successful

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party” did not satisfy that condition, whereas a Louisiana

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statute, which awarded attorneys’ fees to “the representative

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parties” in a class action, did satisfy that condition.

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261 F.3d at 942.

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“potential attorneys’ fees [could not] be attributed solely to

Gibson, 261 F.3d at 942.

Gibson,

Soon thereafter, the Ninth Circuit held that

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the named plaintiffs for purposes of amount in controversy,”

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where the statute in question authorized an award of attorneys’

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fees “to a prevailing plaintiff.”

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both cases, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, in a putative class

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action, attributing attorneys’ fees solely to a named plaintiff

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for purposes of amount in controversy would be improper, because

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the plaintiff would not ultimately be entitled to the entirety of

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that award upon a favorable disposition of the case.

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F.3d at 942; Kanter, 265 F.3d at 858.

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Kanter, 265 F.3d at 858.

In

Gibson, 261

In the present case, Plaintiff would be entitled to

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attorneys’ fees upon a favorable disposition of the matter.

See

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Cal. Labor Code § 1194(a); Cal Labor Code § 226(e); Cal. Labor

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Code § 2699(g).

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Labor Code do not authorize awards of attorneys’ fees “solely to

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the named plaintiffs in a class action,” but rather to “an

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employee” or “any employee” who prevails on his or her claim.

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Gibson, 261 F.3d at 942.

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attorneys’ fees “cannot be allocated solely to [Plaintiff] for

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purposes of amount in controversy,” but rather must be divided by

However, the relevant sections of the California

Therefore, under Gibson and Kanter,

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the number of putative class members.

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see Davenport v. Wendy's Co., 2013 WL 6859009 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24,

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2013) (holding that, under CLC § 1194(a), § 226(e), and

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§ 2699(g), the “estimate of potential attorneys’ fees must be

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divided by the number of class members,” for purposes of amount

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in controversy).

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calculation, their allegation that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees

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will amount to “$77,500 - $220,000” is conclusory, and

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insufficient to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds

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$75,000.

Gibson, 261 F.3d at 942;

As Defendants have not attempted to make such a

Notice of Removal at 16.

Defendants’ argument that Gibson and Kanter do not apply

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because Plaintiff “is seeking fees under a statute that allows

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for individual recovery [of attorneys’ fees], absent any public

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benefit and absent any class-wide recovery,” is unpersuasive.

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Opp. at 8.

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distinction between a statute that permits the recovery of

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attorneys’ fees by each member of a successful class, and a

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statute that permits the named plaintiff in a successful class

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action to recover the entirety of attorneys’ fees on behalf of

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the entire class.

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in Gibson, it is immaterial that the relevant sections of the

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California Labor Code permit recovery of attorneys’ fees by an

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individual plaintiff suing only on his own behalf.

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fact that the relevant sections of the California Labor Code do

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not award attorneys’ fees solely to the named plaintiff in a

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successful class action places this case squarely within the

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holding of Gibson.

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relevant statute in Kanter - § 1780 of the California Civil Code

This argument misreads Gibson, which emphasizes the

Gibson, 261 F.3d at 942.

Gibson, 261 F.3d at 942.

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Under the reasoning

Rather, the

Moreover, the

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– provides for an award of attorneys’ fees to successful

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individual plaintiffs, even in the absence of a class action

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lawsuit.

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attempt to distinguish the present case from Gibson and Kanter is

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unavailing.

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Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(e).

Therefore, Defendants’

Defendants’ argument that they “did not aggregate attorneys’

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fees recoverable for the putative class” is similarly

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unpersuasive.

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calculation of attorneys’ fees is based solely on those fees

Opp. at 9.

Although Defendants claim that their

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applicable to Plaintiff as an individual, the calculation itself

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belies this contention.

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is substantially based on legal work that, in a class action,

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would be performed on behalf of the entire class.

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Removal at 15.

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preparation of motions in limine, motions to bifurcate, witness

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list, exhibit list, jury instructions, special verdict questions,

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witness testimony outlines, an opening statement, and a closing

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argument,” would be conducted on behalf of the entire putative

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class, not merely Plaintiff as an individual.

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at 15.

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be entitled to these fees if he were to pursue the action as an

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individual, it is abundantly clear from the FAC that Plaintiff

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will be pursuing the matter as a class action.

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Under Gibson and Kanter, the Court need not close its eyes to

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Plaintiff’s ultimate class action aspirations: it would defy

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common sense to treat the matter as an individual action for

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purposes of removability, with the specter of a class action

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looming in the immediate future.

Defendants’ estimate of attorneys’ fees

Notice of

For example, “pretrial activities” such as “the

Notice of Removal

Although Defendants appear to argue that Plaintiff would

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FAC ¶¶ 23-25.

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Defendants’ final attempt to distinguish the present case

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from Gibson and Kanter on the grounds that the class has not yet

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been certified, also fails to convince this Court that

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Plaintiff’s request to remand this case should be denied.

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at 11.

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that, in putative class actions, motions to remand are generally

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heard prior to the Rule 23 hearing on class certification.

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28 U.S.C. 1447(c), a party seeking remand must file its motion

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within 30 days of the matter’s removal to federal court.

Opp.

As an initial matter, this argument ignores the reality

Under

Due to

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this compressed timeline, classes are rarely (if ever) certified

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prior to a court’s consideration of a motion to remand.

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in Gibson, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the putative class

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had not yet been certified.

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the ultimate amount of attorneys’ fees “if removal to federal

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court were upheld and class certification were granted”)

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(emphasis added).

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with equal force whether the motion to remand is brought before

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or after the class is certified.

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Indeed,

Gibson, 261 F.3d at 941 (predicting

Accordingly, the rationale of Gibson applies

The amount of Plaintiff’s individual damages in controversy

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is $7,436.80.

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to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

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Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees would exceed $67,563.20.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED. The Court

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need not and does not reach Plaintiff’s remaining arguments in

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support of his motion herein.

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Notice of Removal at 12.

Defendants have failed

In their opposition, Defendants seek leave to amend their

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notice of removal "to include jurisdiction under the [Class

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Action Fairness Act], 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).”
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Opp. at 18.

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Defendants did not file their Motion to Amend (Doc. #12) as a

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cross-motion to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, and Defendants’

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Motion to Amend is not set for hearing until August 20, 2014.

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The Court declines to address this issue prematurely, especially

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in light of the fact that it has not yet been fully briefed by

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both parties.

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III.

ORDER

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS
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Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.

Consistent with this Order,

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Defendants’ Motion to Amend is now moot, and the August 20, 2014
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hearing date is vacated:
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: July 31, 2014
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