Magers v. Jones

Filing 17

ORDER denying defendant's 13 Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Answer and Counterclaims, signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr., on 2/25/15. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WILLIAM L. MAGERS,
Plaintiff,

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No. 2:14-CV-1184-GEB-EFB

v.
SUZANNE M. JONES,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS

Defendant.

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Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to file eight

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counterclaims sixty-eight days after expiration of the pleading

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leave period prescribed in the scheduling order filed October 17,

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2014. The amended pleading deadline portion of the scheduling

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order states:

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Defendant states in the [Joint Status Report]
. . . that she “anticipates filing a cross
complaint on or before October 31, 2014.”
(JSR 2:3-4.)
Defendant has until October 31, 2014, to file
the referenced pleading.
No further service, joinder of parties, or
amendments to the pleadings is permitted,
except with leave of Court for good cause
shown.
(Status (Pretrial Scheduling) (“Scheduling Order”) Order 3:3-9,
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ECF No. 12.)

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Defendant‟s motion to amend is in essence a de facto

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motion to amend all dates prescribed in the scheduling order that

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would have to be amended if Defendant‟s amended pleading motion

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is granted: specifically, the April 30, 2015 discovery completion

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date, the June 15, 2015 last hearing date for motions, and the

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August

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3:11; 3:23; 4:2-3.)

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10,

2015

final

pretrial

conference.

(Scheduling

Order

Defendant argues her motion should be granted for the
following reasons:
At the time of the Joint Scheduling Report
and this Court's order, Defendant and her
counsel did not have all of the facts
sufficient
to
plead
the
counterclaims
contained in the [proposed amended pleading].
However, Defendant and her counsel were
working diligently to obtain the necessary
information and documents, including police
reports and court documents from prior
proceedings. Defendant and her counsel did
not anticipate the length of time it would
take to receive the documents and information
requested from other institutions, despite
their best efforts to gather the information
before
the
deadline.
Defendant
recently
obtained the facts to plead her counterclaims
with sufficient specificity to show that
Defendant is entitled to relief.
(Mot. 1:26-2:6, ECF No. 13) (citations omitted.)
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing:
Defendant offers no compelling reason why the
proposed new pleading could not have been
presented earlier. Defendant clearly knew the
alleged facts on which the counterclaims are
based at the time of filing the original
answer, but did not assert them before the
[s]cheduling [o]rder's deadline.
Motions for leave to add new claims are not
reviewed favorably when the facts supporting
the claims have been known to the party since
before the pleading deadline . . . . The
counterclaims are unquestionably based on
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conduct and events that allegedly occurred
from approximately July 2012 to February
2013.
Presumably
these
are
the
same
counterclaims that Defendant “anticipated”
filing in the Joint Status Report dated
October 10, 2014.
Yet, in her motion,
Defendant points to no specific facts that
she could not have alleged before the
pleading deadline. She fails to explain what
necessary
information
was
contained
in
“police reports and court documents” that she
previously lacked. Presumably the information
contained in the police reports was obtained
directly from Defendant, given that she
herself reported the alleged thefts on
December 20, 2012, December 24, 2012 and
February 8, 2013. It is questionable whether
obtaining
“police
reports
and
court
documents” was indeed necessary for Defendant
“to plead her counterclaims with sufficient
specificity,” but even if that were the case,
the
Rule
16(b)(4)
inquiry
focuses
on
diligence.
Defendant reasonably should have
foreseen or anticipated the issue at the time
of
the
Rule
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scheduling
conference.
Defendant's failure to raise the issue or
seek modification of the Scheduling Order
until December 15, 2014, nearly two months
after the Scheduling Order issued, reinforces
the conclusion that Defendant has not been
diligent.
(Opp‟n to Mot. 1:24-27; 3:27-28; 4:21-5:8, ECF No. 14.)

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Defendant rejoins: “she was not aware of all the facts

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to support her counterclaims at the time of filing her original

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answer and . . . . [that the information she obtained] include[s]

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the details of the” events forming the basis of her counterclaims

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including “the dates of the alleged events [and] the estimated

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amounts of . . . stolen property,” which are “necessary [for her

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counterclaims] to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,”

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given that she “did not wish to rely solely on her recollection

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of the events to craft her counterclaims.” (Def.‟s Reply 3:1-10,

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ECF No. 15.)

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Defendant has not responded to Plaintiff‟s assertion
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that

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contained

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failed to state when she first realized she could not file an

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amended pleading before the deadline expired, failed to explain

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why she did not seek to amend the scheduling order before she

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filed her motion sub judice, and failed to “specify what new and

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previously

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[her] to believe that [her counterclaims]” could not have been

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filed on or before the pleading amendment deadline.

Defendant
in

herself

the

police

unavailable

source

reports.”

information

Storage,

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Behl,

of

(Opp‟n

[she]

Defendant

did

943

“the

information

4:26-28.)

obtained

not

F.

Supp.

Defendant

that

leads

Eckert Cold

(E.D.Cal.1996)(emphasis added).
Since

v.

the

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Inc.

is

comply

with

1230,

“the

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[amended

13

pleading] deadline established in the scheduling order, . . .

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[she is] required to demonstrate „good cause‟ pursuant to Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 16, justifying [her] . . . untimely

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request

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Izaguirre v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., 523 Fed. App‟x. 482,

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483

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Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608–09 (9th Cir. 1992)).
A court's evaluation of good cause is not
coextensive
with
an
inquiry
into
the
propriety of the amendment under . . .
[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 15.
Unlike Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy
which focuses on the bad faith of the party
seeking to interpose an amendment and the
prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)'s
“good cause” standard primarily considers the
diligence of the party seeking the amendment.
The district court may modify the pretrial
schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met
despite the diligence of the party seeking
the extension.” Moreover, carelessness is not
compatible with a finding of diligence and
offers no reason for a grant of relief.

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Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (citations omitted). Prejudice from a

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(9th

[for

Cir.

leave

2013)

to

file]

.

.

(unpublished)

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.

an

(citing

amended

Johnson

pleading.”

v.

Mammoth

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delayed motion to amend “is not required” to deny a motion for

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leave to file an amended pleading under Rule 16.

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Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1295 (9th Cir. 2000).

Coleman v.

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“Careful review of [Defendant‟s] motion to amend . . .

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reveals that [she] . . . did not [demonstrate] . . . with any

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specificity the good cause [she allegedly] . . . had for untimely

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moving

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deadline. Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361, 1367

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(11th Cir. 2014). Specifically, Defendant fails to explain “what

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[previously unknown] facts support[] [her counterclaims] . . .

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and why those facts previously were undiscoverable” or unknown

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before the amended pleading deadline. Id. Defendant indicates she

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was

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counterclaims before the amended pleading deadline and that she

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“did not wish to rely solely on her recollection of the events to

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craft

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concerning precisely what facts Defendant references and whether

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she had personal knowledge of the essential facts necessary to

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plead

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expired. (Reply 3:9-10.) “„The good cause standard typically will

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not be met where the party seeking to modify the scheduling order

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has been aware of the facts and theories supporting amendment

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since the inception of the action.‟” In re W. States Wholesale

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Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2014)

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(determining the district court‟s use of this language was not an

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abuse of discretion); Acri v. International Ass'n of Machinists &

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Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[L]ate

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amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when

to”

aware

her

the

file

of

counterclaims

certain

unspecified

counterclaims;”

counterclaims

after

however,

before

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the

the

facts

amended

supporting

conjecture

amended

pleading

is

pleading

her

required

deadline

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the facts and theories have been known to the party seeking

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amendment since the inception of the action.”)

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Lastly,

Defendant‟s

conclusory

and

unsupported

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assertions of diligence do not satisfy her burden to demonstrate

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precisely

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under the circumstances.

what

she

did

that

she

opines

constitutes

diligence

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Since “the focus of the [the good cause] inquiry is

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upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification,” and

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Defendant

has

not

shown

non-conclusory

to

the

scheduling

order

justifying

amendments

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established that good cause justifies granting her motion. See

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Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (holding that even “carelessness is not

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compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a

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grant of relief.”) Therefore, Defendant‟s motion is DENIED.

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Dated:

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seeks,

she

has

the

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February 25, 2015

she

facts

not