B.O.L.T. et al v. City of Rancho Cordova et al

Filing 26

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 13 Motion to Dismiss signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 12/5/14. (Kaminski, H)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

B.O.L.T., an unincorporated
association of motorcycle
riders and enthusiasts; MARK
TEMPLE, an individual; NOREEN
MCNULTY, an individual;
WARREN PEARL, an individual;
LYLE DUVAUCHELLE, an
individual; GLENN OSBORN, an
individual; JEFFREY RABE, an
individual; DAVID ZALITSKIY,
an individual; WILLIAM
LANGHORNE, an individual;
THOMAS BELL, an individual;
ROBERT BALTHORPE II, an
individual,

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

No. 2:14-CV-01588-GEB-DAD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DISMISSAL MOTION

Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA, a
political subdivision of the
state of California; COUNTY
OF SACRAMENTO, a political
subdivision of the state of
California; RANCHO CORDOVA
POLICE DEPARTMENT, an
independent legal agency of
the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO and
the CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA;
SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF‟S
DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL GOOLD, in
his official capacity as the
Chief of Police of the CITY
OF RANCHO CORDOVA; RANCHO
CORDOVA POLICE TRAFFIC
SERGEANT G. LANE, in his
1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

individual and official
capacity as Supervisor of the
Traffic Division; SCOTT R.
JONES, in his official
capacity as the SHERIFF of
the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO;
RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE OFFICER
S. CARRDOZZO (badge number
480); RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE
OFFICER M. JAMES (badge
number 507); RANCHO CORDOVA
POLICE OFFICER S. PADGETT
(badge number 1174),

8

Defendants.

9
Each

10

of

the

13

Rancho

14

Department (“collectively the Entity Defendants”), Michael Goold

15

sued in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the City

16

of Rancho Cordova, Rancho Cordova Police Traffic Sergeant G. Lane

17

sued as Supervisor of the Traffic Division in both his individual

18

and official capacities, Scott R. Jones as the Sheriff of the

19

County of Sacramento in his official capacity, Rancho Cordova

20

Police

21

Rancho Cordova Police Officer M. James sued in his individual

22

capacity, and Rancho Cordova Police Officer S. Padgett sued in

23

his

24

referenced

25

individual capacities are collectively referenced as “Individual

26

Defendants”).

28

Officer

individual
as

S.

Cardozzo

capacity
“Defendants”

sued

(all
and

of

Sacramento

in

his

County

individual

Defendants
the

Civil

of

(“Rule”) 12(b)(6): City of Rancho Cordova, County of Sacramento,
Department,

Rule

dismissal

12

Police

Federal

seek

Plaintiffs‟

Cordova

under

parties

11

27

Complaint

following

are

defendants

Procedure

Sheriff‟s

capacity,

collectively

sued

in

their

Plaintiffs‟ Complaint contains claims alleged under the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
2

1

I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

2

The dismissal motion concerns the following assertions

3

in the Complaint. Plaintiffs are California residents with “class

4

M1

5

Cordova

6

(Compl. Overview ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 1.) Defendants “engaged in a

7

pattern . . . of denying Plaintiffs . . . their constitutional

8

rights . . . [by] arresting [and citing them for non-compliance

9

with California helmet law] without specific probable cause to

10

believe that the motorcyclist has actual knowledge of [his or

11

her] helmet‟s non-compliance” with that law. (Id.)

12

motorcycle
and

license[s]”

the

County

who

of

“travel

Sacramento

through
on

their

.

.

.

Rancho

motorcycles.”

“The helmet law requires specific intent[,]” and “[a]

13

motorcyclist

who

is

wearing

a

helmet

that

was

certified

[as

14

compliant with that law] by the manufacturer at the time of sale

15

must have actual knowledge of the helmet‟s non-conformity to be

16

guilty of violating the helmet law.” (Id. ¶¶ 53-54.) Therefore,

17

“the ticketing officer must have probable cause to believe that

18

[a motorcyclist wearing a helmet that was certified as compliant

19

when purchased, had] actual knowledge of [his or her helmet‟s]

20

non-conformity” before a citation is issued to the motorcyclist.

21

(Id. ¶ 56.)

22

Each Plaintiff was “at all times riding a motorcycle

23

wearing a manufacturer certified helmet,” yet was cited for a

24

helmet law violation. (Id. ¶ 62.) “[P]laintiffs. . . [lacked]

25

actual knowledge of the[ir] helmet[s‟] non-conformity [with the

26

legal requirement and had no]. . . decertification information.”

27

(Id. ¶ 87.)

28

Plaintiffs allege they “have all been
3

[ticketed or]

1

arrested without probable cause” and suffered injury. (Id. ¶ 57.)

2

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

3

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a [pleading] must

4

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a

5

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v.

6

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

7

Twombly,

8

plausible „when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

9

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

10

liable for the misconduct alleged.‟” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729

11

F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “Plausibility

12

requires pleading facts, as opposed to conclusory allegations.”

13

Id. “Factual allegations must . . .

14

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

550

U.S.

15
16
17

544,

570

(2007)).

Bell Atl. Corp. v.

“A

claim

is

facially

raise a right to relief

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Statute of Limitations
Defendants seek dismissal of all “claims asserted by

18

Plaintiffs

19

arguing the claims are barred by California‟s two-year statute of

20

limitations

21

claims accrued before July 4, 2012, which is more than two years

22

before the Complaint was filed. (Defs.‟ Mot. Dismiss (“Mot.”)

23

4:23-5:5, ECF No 11.) Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff

24

Temple‟s claim that is premised on a stop occurring on December

25

1, 2009. (Id. at 5:6-8.) “Plaintiffs . . . agree the statutory

26

period is 2-years from the date of accrual (i.e. arrest).” (Pls.‟

27

Opp‟n Mot. Dismiss (“Opp‟n”) 5:25-26, ECF No. 17.)

28

Dalke,

for

McNulty,

personal

Bell,

injury

Zalutskiy

actions

and

since

Balthorpe[,]”

the

challenged

“For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the
4

1

forum state‟s statute of limitations for personal injury actions,

2

along with the forum state‟s law regarding tolling, including

3

equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is

4

inconsistent with federal law.”

5

927, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).

6

for personal injury actions is two years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

7

335.1.

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918,

California‟s statute of limitations

8

Plaintiffs‟ Complaint reveals Dalke‟s claim accrued on

9

September 27, 2011 (Compl. ¶ 64); one of Temple‟s claims accrued

10

on

December

11

February 17, 2012 (Id. ¶ 68); Bell‟s claim accrued on April 29,

12

2010 (Id. ¶ 73); Zalutskiy‟s claim accrued on June 21, 2012 (Id.

13

¶ 74); and Balthorpe‟s claim accrued on October 27, 2010 (Id. ¶

14

75). Therefore, this portion of the motion is granted.

15

B.

1,

2009

(Id.

¶

67);

McNulty‟s

claim

accrued

on

Plaintiff B.O.L.T.

16

Defendants argue Plaintiff B.O.L.T.‟s claims should be

17

dismissed because B.O.L.T. “does not claim any direct injury to

18

itself”

19

standing to sue on behalf of its members. (Mot. 8:24-25.)

20

and

does

not

meet

the

requirements

for

associational

For an organization to sue on behalf of its members, it

21

must

22

standing: “(a) its membership would otherwise have standing to

23

sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are

24

germane to the organization‟s purpose; and (c) neither the claim

25

asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of

26

individual members of the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. Apple Advert.

27

Comm‟n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

28

.

.

satisfy

.

from

three

requirements

averments

in

the
5

to

secure

organizational

“[S]tanding cannot be inferred
pleadings,

but

rather

must

1

affirmatively appear in the record.” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of

2

Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).

3

The

Complaint

lacks

any

allegations

demonstrating

4

associational standing. Therefore, Defendants‟ motion to dismiss

5

B.O.L.T.‟s claims is granted.

6

C.

Official

Capacity

7

Defendants

Against

Jones,

and

Defendants

Goold,

Jones, and Lane

8

Claims

Goold,

Lane

each

argue

the

9

official capacity claims against him should be dismissed since a

10

suit against an officer in his official capacity is tantamount to

11

suing the municipality and a department thereof, thus making the

12

official capacity suit needlessly duplicative.

13

Plaintiffs

counter

their

official

capacity

claims

14

should not be dismissed because Plaintiffs seek equitable relief

15

and if successful, “the injunction will have to be served on

16

[Goold, Jones and Lane] themselves, and not the county.” (Opp‟n

17

9:19-20.)

18

Therefore, the motion is denied.

19

D.

Defendants Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department and

20

the Rancho Cordova Police Department

21

Sacramento County Sheriff‟s Department and the Rancho

22

Cordova Police Department seek dismissal of all claims alleged

23

against them, contending they are not subject to suit since a

24

department

25

amendable to suit for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §

26

1983, and because they are redundant parties. (Mot. 7:19-21, 8:1-

27

4.)

28

of

a

municipality

is

not

considered

a

“person”

Plaintiffs have not responded to the redundancy portion
6

1

of the motion. Therefore, this portion of the dismissal motion is

2

granted.

3

E.

4

Privileges and Immunities Clause
Defendants
of

dismissal

Plaintiffs‟

of

“right

Plaintiffs‟
to

travel

claims

5

alleging

6

Privileges and Immunities Clause of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”

7

(Compl. ¶ 121.) Defendants argue “Plaintiffs vaguely allege that

8

the enforcement of the Helmet Laws somehow impacts their right to

9

travel[, and] fail to present . . . facts . . . support[ing]...

10

violation

seek

under

the

this claim.” (Mot. 10:26-28.)

11

“The

word

travel

is

not

found

in

the

text

of

the

12

Constitution. Yet the constitutional right to travel from one

13

State to another is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.” Saenz

14

v.

15

omitted).

16

526

U.S.

489,

498

(1999)

(internal

quotation

marks

The “right to travel” . . . embraces at least
three different components. It protects the
right of a citizen of one State to enter and
to leave another State, the right to be
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in
the second State, and, for those travelers
who elect to become permanent residents, the
right to be treated like other citizens of
that State.

17
18
19
20
21
22

Roe,

Id. at 500.

23

Plaintiffs allege violation of their right to travel in

24

a conclusory manner, which is insufficient to plead plausible

25

right to travel claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs‟ right to travel

26

claims alleged under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the

27

Fourteenth Amendment are dismissed.

28

///
7

1

F.

First Amendment

2

Defendants

seek

dismissal

of

Plaintiffs‟

First

3

Amendment claims, arguing they are not supported by “the facts

4

contained in Plaintiffs‟ Complaint.” (Mot. 11:11-12.)

5

Plaintiffs‟ Complaint contains the following conclusory

6

allegations about the First Amendment claims: “Each individual

7

defendant specifically targeted Plaintiffs, and other motorcycle

8

enthusiasts, simply because of their association and/or how they

9

expressed themselves by the type of helmet they wore in violation

10

of the First Amendment.” (Compl. ¶ 135.)

11

The First Amendment protects certain “conduct intending

12

to express an idea . . . only if it is sufficiently imbued with

13

elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First

14

and Fourteenth Amendments, which means that an intent to convey a

15

particularized message is present, and the likelihood is great

16

that

17

Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.

18

2010)

19

omitted). Further “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage

20

in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an

21

inseparable

22

freedom of speech.” Nat‟l Ass‟n for Advancement of Colored People

23

v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).

the

message

(internal

aspect

will

be

understood

citations,

of

the

by

quotation

„liberty‟

.

those

marks,

.

.

,

who

view

and

which

it.”

brackets

embraces

24

However, Plaintiffs‟ conconlusory allegations fail to

25

allege plausible free speech or association claims. Therefore,

26

Defendants‟ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs‟ First Amendment claims

27

is granted.

28

///
8

1

G.

Individual Defendants

2

1.

3

The Individual Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs‟

4

Fourteenth Amendment claims, arguing Plaintiffs “fail to identify

5

any conduct by the officers that implicates Fourteenth Amendment

6

protections[;]” “a plaintiff cannot invoke . . . the Fourteenth

7

Amendment

8

right if that right has explicit constitutional protection under

9

a more specific provision[;]” and “Plaintiffs expressly contend

10

that the officers are responsible for issuing them citations,

11

which

12

California law.” (Mot. 12:10-15, 17-19.)

13

Fourteenth Amendment

to

prosecute

Plaintiffs

The

an

allege

gravamen

of

alleged

are

violation

tantamount

Plaintiffs‟

of

to

a

fundamental

arrests

allegations

under

is

that

14

Plaintiffs were ticketed without probable cause, and that this

15

constituted a seizure proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.

16

A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

17

See Del. v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).

18

has made clear that “we analyze[] the constitutionality of the

19

challenged

20

Amendment‟s

21

person,” “[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit

22

textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of

23

physically intrusive governmental conduct[; and] that Amendment,

24

not the more generalized notion of „substantive due process,‟

25

must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor,

26

490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

27
28

[seizures] . . . solely
prohibition

Plaintiffs‟

against

allegations

by

reference

unreasonable

do

The Supreme Court

not

to

the

seizures

allege

Fourth
of

the

plausible

Fourteenth Amendment claims, and rather assert that the citations
9

1

they

2

Compl. ¶¶ 46, 63-77, 84.) Accordingly, the Individual Defendants‟

3

motion

4

granted.

received

to

constitute

dismiss

arrests

Plaintiffs‟

under

California

Fourteenth

law.

Amendment

(See

claims

is

5

2.

Qualified Immunity

6

Each Individual Defendant argues his qualified immunity

7

defense

shields

him

8

Plaintiffs‟

9

clearly established law that would have placed. . . [him] on

Fourth

that.

.

from

being

Amendment

.

claims,

liability

contending

required

is

particular

12

evaluation of evidence should include prior to issuing citations

13

regarding helmet use.” (Mot. 7:5-8.)

or

what

investigate

no

11

procedure

to

“there

for

notice

or

w[as]

to

10

manner

[he]

exposed

that

in

investigation

a
or

14

Plaintiffs rejoin the “law was clearly established in

15

Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir.

16

1996).” (Opp‟n 7:22-24.)

17

In Rodis v. City, Cnty. of S.F., 558 F.3d 964, 969 (9th

18

Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit summarized a holding in Easyriders

19

as

20

motorcyclist‟s actual knowledge that a certified helmet does not

21

comply with helmet safety laws before ticketing [him or her].”

follows:

22

“[an]

officer[]

“The . . .
officer

have

probable

cause

of

a

qualified immunity [affirmative defense]

23

shield[s]

24

reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the

25

law.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009); see also

26

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “[T]he Supreme

27

Court

28

contours

has

an

must

mandated
of

the

from

that,
right

personal

in

liability

qualified

[at
10

issue]

when

immunity
must

an

officer

cases,
be

the

clearly

1

established . . . ,

2

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

3

he confronted.‟”

4

(9th Cir. 2013). In other words, “qualified immunity protects

5

[an]

6

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

7

he confronted.” Chavez v. U.S., 683 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir.

8

2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

officer

9

it

must

be

„clear

to

a

liability

each

fails

to

show

be

that

a

to

a

reasonable

12

Plaintiff was ticketed without probable cause, and was “wearing a

13

manufacturer certified helmet” at the time of the citation and

14

did not have actual knowledge of the helmet‟s non-compliance with

15

California law. (Compl. ¶¶ 62, 87-89.)

18

Individual

cause

clear

situation here where Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint that each

each

probable

would

11

Therefore,

believe

it

police

17

could

movant

unless

10

16

officer

that

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 711 F.3d 941, 951

from

Here,

meaning

existed

Defendant‟s

in

the

qualified

immunity motion is denied.
H.

Plaintiffs’ Request for Leave to Amend

19

Lastly, Plaintiffs request in their opposition brief

20

that they be granted “leave to file an amended and supplemental

21

complaint.” (Opp‟n 13:9.) Plaintiffs state:

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

A supplemental pleading is required to
allege relevant facts occurring after the
original pleading was filed. F.R.C.P. Rule
15(d). Supplemental pleadings are favored
because they enable the court to award
complete relief in the same action, avoiding
the costs and delays of separate suits.
Therefore,
absent
a
clear
showing
of
prejudice to the opposing parties, they are
liberally allowed. Keith v. Volpe, 858 F2d
467, 473–474 (9th Cir. 1988); Carolina Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Lanahan & Reilley, LLP, 2011 WL
3741004, (ND CA 2011) (citing text)] A
11

1

supplemental pleading is designed to bring
the action “up to date” and to set forth new
facts affecting the controversy that have
occurred since the original pleading was
filed. Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F2d
1355, 1359–1360 (11th Cir. 1992).

2
3
4

As new actions accrued after this action
was filed, plaintiffs request leave to file
an amended and supplemental complaint based
upon these new facts, and this court‟s order
on defendants‟ motion.

5
6
7
8

(Id. at 13:10-23.)

9

This request is essentially a motion for leave to amend

10

under Rule 15. However, the request does not provide the notice

11

prescribed in Local Rule 230(b). Even assuming arguendo that the

12

request is considered a “related or counter-motion,” under Local

13

Rule 230(e), the request is still defective. Rule 7 prescribes,

14

in relevant part: “A request for a court order must be made by

15

motion. The motion must: . . . state with particularity the

16

grounds

17

7(b)(1)(B). Further, Local Rule 137(c) prescribes: “If filing a

18

document requires leave of court, such as an amended complaint

19

after

20

counsel shall attach the document proposed to be filed as an

21

exhibit

to

moving

22

Plaintiffs‟

request

23

opposition to Defendants‟ dismissal motion does not comply with

24

these requirements.

for

the

seeking

time

to

the

amend

order

as

papers
for

.

a

.

matter

seeking

leave

.

to

.”

of

course

such

amend

26

///

27

///

28

///
12

R.

has

leave
contained

Therefore, this request is denied.

25

Fed.

.

Civ.

P.

expired,

.

.

.”

within

its

1

///

2

IV.

3

For

the

stated

CONCLUSION

reasons,

the

motion

to

dismiss

is

4

GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. Plaintiffs are granted forty

5

(40) days from the date on which this order is filed to file a

6

First

7

identified here.

8

Dated:

Amended

Complaint

addressing

December 5, 2014

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13

the

pleading

deficiencies