Keith v. William, et al.

Filing 9

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 05/06/16 ordering plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Plummer, M)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

WILLIAM KEITH,

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

No. 2:14-cv-1596-WBS-CMK-P

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

GARRETT WILLIAM, et al.,
Defendant.
/
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

20

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

21

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

22

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

23

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

24

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

25

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

26

that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,
1

1

1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

2

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

3

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

4

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

5

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

6

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

7

and conclusory.

8
9

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff’s claims are difficult to decipher. He names nine different defendants,

10

varying from law enforcement officers, to medical personnel, and his prior attorney. He

11

complains about general “institutional systemic oppression,” including being taken advantage of

12

and the overall corruption of all the individuals associated with the penal system. He states his

13

parole agent falsified documents in an attempt to have his parole revoked, his attorney ordered an

14

MRI because his doctors would not, many are conspiring against him to sabotage his worker’s

15

compensation claim and compromise his health. He further claims that he received no treatment

16

for a knee injury while he was incarcerated, had surgery after he was released, but re-injured it

17

upon re-incarceration.

18
19

II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s allegations are so vague and conclusory that the court is unable to

20

determine whether the claims are frivolous, fanciful, or if the complaint fails to state a claim for

21

relief. Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

22

notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and

23

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff

24

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that

25

support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R.

26

Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. General allegations regarding the “institutional
2

1

systemic oppression” plaintiff has experienced are insufficient to state a claim.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

2
3

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations.

4

See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

5

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

6

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

7

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

8

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

9

conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations

10

are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the

11

plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

12

constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
The only actual claim the court can decipher from the complaint appears to be

13
14

related to the lack of treatment for a knee injury. However, there are so many unrelated and

15

fanciful allegations in the complaint, the court cannot adequately evaluate such a potential claim.

16

If the court’s reading the complaint is accurate, plaintiff is attempting to bring this action against

17

several unrelated individuals on separate and unrelated claims. The Federal Rules of Civil

18

Procedure allow a party to assert “as many claims as it has against an opposing party,” but does

19

not provide for unrelated claims against several different defendants to be raised on the same

20

action. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 18(a). “Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim

21

A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.

22

Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits.” George v. Smith, 507

23

F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). As far as the court can determine, plaintiff’s allegations against

24

the various defendants are unrelated. Thus, those unrelated claims against several different

25

defendants, should be separated into different actions.

26

///
3

1

Plaintiff also fails to provide any connection or link for any of the defendants. To

2

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link

3

between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t

4

of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person

5

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he

6

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act

7

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

8

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

9

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

10

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth

11

specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional

12

deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

13

In addition, plaintiff cannot state a claim against some of the defendants he has

14

named in the complaint. In general, § 1983 imposes liability upon any person who, acting under

15

color of state law, deprives another of a federally protected right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

16

Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

17

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

18

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

19

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunity secured by the Constitution and

20

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

21

proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Traditionally, the requirements for relief under

22

[§] 1983 have been articulated as (1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created

23

by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of

24

state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Generally, plaintiffs are

25

required to “plead that (1) the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of

26

rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334,
4

1

1338 (9th Cir. 1986); see also WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1999) (en

2

banc). Public defenders act as an advocate for their client and are not acting under color of state

3

law for § 1983 purposes, nor are attorneys appointed by the court to represent a defendant in

4

place of the public defender. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Polk County v.

5

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-25 (1981). Thus, plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 action against

6

either his attorney nor an insurance claims adjuster.

7

Finally, as stated above, the only potential claim the court can decipher in the

8

complaint relates to the allegations that he did not receive treatment for a knee injury. The

9

treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined

10

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual

11

punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

12

825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,

13

civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

14

Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

15

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing,

16

shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,

17

1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two

18

requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it

19

results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively,

20

the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm.

21

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must

22

have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

23

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

24

injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

25

105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

26

health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
5

1

sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

2

injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

3

1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).

4

Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

5

is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

6

activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

7

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

8
9

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

10

medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

11

974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

12

decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

13

1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

14

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

15

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference.

16

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

17

demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

18

Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

19

rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

20

difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

21

course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

22

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

23

Here, plaintiff fails to provide the court with sufficient facts related to this claim

24

for the court to evaluate it. While he states he was denied treatment originally, then had surgery

25

once he was released, it is possible his claims relates to a delay in treatment. He does not,

26

however, indicate that the delay led to further injury. It is also possible he is claiming denial of
6

1

treatment once the knee was re-injured. However, the facts relating to the second injury are

2

incomprehensible. In addition, plaintiff fails to identify who denied him the treatment he claims

3

was necessary. Certainly, his attorney would not have the means or ability to order an MRI of

4

plaintiff’s knee while he was incarcerated. Thus, if plaintiff wishes to proceed on the denial of

5

medical treatment claim, he will be required to plead sufficient facts for the court to understand

6

the claim.

7
8

III. CONCLUSION
Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

9

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

10

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

11

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

12

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

13

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

14

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

15

plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

16

plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

17

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

18

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

19

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

20

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

21

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

22

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

23

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

24

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

25

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

26

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
7

1

with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

2

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

3

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

4

1.

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

5

2.

Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

6

service of this order.

7
8
9
10

DATED: May 6, 2016
______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
8