California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. Northern Recycling & Waste Services et al

Filing 13

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 2/18/15 ORDERING that Plaintiff's MOTION to SET ASIDE Judgment for excusable neglect 7 is GRANTED. The Judgment 6 is VACATED and the Order 5 is rescinded. (Mena-Sanchez, L)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING PROTECTION ALLIANCE, a nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff, 12 15 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT FOR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT v. 13 14 No. 2:14-CV-1601-GEB-CKD NORTHERN RECYCLING & WASTE SERVICES, a California corporation; and DOUGLAS SPEICHER, an individual, 16 Defendants. 17 Plaintiff moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (“Rule”) 60(b) for an order setting aside the order filed on November 21, 2014 (ECF No. 5), that dismissed this lawsuit. The dismissal any order issued after Plaintiff failed to serve defendant within the period prescribed in Rule 4(m) and failed to comply with an order to show cause concerning this failure. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff excusable neglect, argues and its that failure under Rule was due 60(b) to counsel‟s this excusable neglect authorizes it to now seek an order vacating the judgment entered against it following the November 21, 2014 order and a decision rescinding the dismissal order. 1 dismissal 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “Rule 60 regulates the procedures by which a party may 3 obtain relief from a final judgment . . . . [,and] attempts to 4 strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that 5 litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be 6 done.” Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007). 7 Rule 60(b) states in pertinent part: “On motion and just terms, 8 the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, 9 or proceeding for . . . excusable neglect.” The question of 10 whether neglect is excusable “is at bottom an equitable one, 11 taking 12 party‟s omission.” Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunkswich Assoc. 13 Ltd. P‟ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). account 14 of all relevant circumstances surrounding the 21 Inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute “excusable” neglect. Nonetheless, [the Ninth Circuit] . . . ha[s] held that there may be some circumstances in which simple inadvertence could be excusable neglect. To determine whether the inadvertence can be excusable, [courts] . . . apply the Pioneer factors: (1) the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party; (2) the length of delay; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; and (4) whether the moving party‟s conduct was in good faith. 22 Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 746 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 23 Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395)). “Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and 24 . . . must be liberally applied.” Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, 25 Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 26 omitted). 15 16 17 18 19 20 27 28 II. DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues Defendants would not be prejudiced if 2 1 the lawsuit is reinstated since “the [D]efendants were aware of 2 and participated in the case from its onset . . . . [and] the 3 parties 4 dispute even before the complaint was filed.” (Mot. 6:9-11, ECF 5 No. 7; Tuerck Decl. ¶¶ 2, 9, 12, 24, ECF No. 7-1.) 6 counsel Robert Tuerck declares that before filing suit, Plaintiff 7 sent Defendants a Notice of Violations and Intent to Sue in May 8 2014 and since that time, “counsel for both parties [have] had 9 numerous were actively working conversations towards regarding the a resolution to their Plaintiff‟s allegations and the 10 likelihood of settlement.” (Tuerck Decl. ¶¶ 2, 8; Brady Decl. Ex. 11 1, ECF No. 10-1.) Defendants do not identify any prejudice they 12 would suffer if the motion is granted. 13 The delay factor favors granting the motion since a 14 “short delay” of twenty-six days exists between the entry of 15 final 16 reconsideration. TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 17 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a motion filed less than 18 one month after final judgment was entered was a “short delay”). judgment and when Plaintiff filed its motion for 19 Plaintiff asserts the reason for its initial decision 20 to “delay service of the complaint [was] so the [D]efendants 21 could avoid the time and expense of filing a responsive pleading 22 while settlement negotiations were underway”, and that failure to 23 respond 24 extraordinary confluence of circumstances that were beyond the 25 control 26 Plaintiff‟s 27 [D]efendants and their counsel that [Plaintiff] . . . would be 28 filing a complaint . . . [but] would delay service . . . to of the the court‟s Rule Plaintiff.” counsel declares 4(m) (Tuerck that 3 notice Decl. in resulted ¶ June, 11; he from Mot. “an 2:2-7.) “informed the so the 1 [D]efendants 2 responsive pleading while settlement negotiations were underway;” 3 and that Defendants agreed to this. (Tureck Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10-11.) 4 Counsel also declares he did not respond to the Rule 4(m) notice 5 because his “father was hospitalized, [and] his health began to 6 rapidly decline”, so counsel was “travel[ing] . . . for the 7 funeral” on the same day “the court filed” the Rule 4(m) notice; 8 and because “the job of making arrangements for [his father‟s]... 9 funeral and taking over . . . “[i]n could the avoid midst and expense of filing a matters left by his death fell to” him, 11 arrangements, 12 (Tuerck Decl. ¶ 18, 20-21, 22, 25.) . . the time 10 [he]. of the loss, missed travel, the and court‟s” the funeral communication. 13 Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not clearly shown 14 its failure to serve the compliant was actually caused by the 15 death of counsel‟s father since counsel‟s declaration “fails to 16 state that [counsel] actually calendared the due date for service 17 of the complaint, . . . fails to state whether [counsel] employed 18 a „tickler‟ system to avoid missing important dates,” and fails 19 to explain why co-counsel or his law partner could not take over 20 for him. (Opp‟n 4:21-5:6.) 21 Plaintiff‟s counsel responds that his failure to comply 22 with 23 distractions caused by his father‟s illness and death” rather 24 than a failure to put in place an appropriate monitoring system; 25 that his law partner was also “traveling to the funeral” with him 26 since she is his wife; and that “under the circumstances . . . 27 [he] never thought to contact” co-counsel. (Reply 5:1-2; 5:3-6.) 28 court‟s order is “the sole and direct result of the Plaintiff has shown that the equity factors weigh in 4 1 its favor. Therefore Plaintiff‟s motion will be granted. 2 III. CONCLUSION 3 For the stated reasons, Plaintiff‟s Rule 60(b) motion 4 for relief is GRANTED. Therefore, the judgment in Docket No. 6 is 5 vacated and the order in Docket No. 5 is rescinded. 6 Dated: February 18, 2015 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5

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