Johnson v. Ruiz et al

Filing 16

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 06/29/15 ORDERING that plaintiff's 12 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff is hereby granted an injunction requiring defendants to provide a lowered transaction counter and ad equate accessible parking that is not blocked by inventory in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines contained in 28 C.F.R. Part 36. The court further awards plaintiff statutory damages in the amount of $4,000. (Benson, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SCOTT JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

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NO. CIV. 2:14-1663 WBS AC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
LEONCIO NATERAS RUIZ; MARIA
ISABEL RUIZ; ROBERT DEVITA;
and DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff Scott Johnson, a wheelchair-bound

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quadriplegic, brought this action against defendants Leoncio

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Nateras Ruiz, Maria Isabel Ruiz, and Robert Devita, who own and

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operate a store called Valley Trading Post.

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that he visited Valley Trading Post and encountered barriers to

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access that violate the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42

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U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and related California laws.

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Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

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of Civil Procedure 56.

(Docket No. 12.)
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Plaintiff alleges

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Plaintiff is a quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair for

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mobility and owns a specially equipped van with a lift that

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deploys from the passenger side to accommodate his wheelchair.

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(Decl. of Scott Johnson (“Johnson Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3 (Docket No. 12-

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3).)

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store owned and operated by defendants in Stockton, California.

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(Id. ¶ 5; Defs.’ Answer ¶ 2 (Docket No. 5).)

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disabled parking space and access aisle was outlined with faded,

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white paint instead of blue.

On April 8, 2014, plaintiff visited Valley Trading Post, a

The store’s single

(See Johnson Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 4.)

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Several pieces of store merchandize were also placed in the

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disabled parking space, preventing plaintiff from parking there.

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(Id.)

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accessible parking space.

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Plaintiff therefore parked in an undesignated, non(Id. ¶ 5.)

Inside the store, plaintiff found a transaction counter

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that measured fifty inches in height.

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There was no lowered counter, and plaintiff could not see the top

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of the transaction counter or use it from his wheelchair.

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6.)

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(See id. ¶ 6, Ex. 4.)

(Id. ¶

Plaintiff states that he attempted to visit the store

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at least five additional times during the month of April 2014,

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including on April 11, April 14, April 18, and two separate

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occasions on April 21.

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disabled parking space blocked by store inventory, including

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boats, motorbikes, bicycles, lawnmowers, and other merchandize.

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(Id. ¶ 7, Ex. 4.)

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space on each occasion.

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(Id. ¶ 7, 9.)

Each time he found the

Plaintiff took photographs of the parking
(See id. Ex. 4.)

Plaintiff’s lawsuit asserts four claims: (1) violations
of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) violations of
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California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”), Cal. Civ. Code

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§§ 51 et seq.; (3) violations of the California Disabled Persons

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Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 54-54.8; and (4) common-law negligence.

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(Compl. ¶¶ 14-26 (Docket No. 1).)

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judgment as to his first two claims and states in his motion that

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he will stipulate to dismiss his California Disabled Persons Act

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and negligence claims if the court grants summary judgment as to

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his claims under the ADA and UCRA.1

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Plaintiff moves for summary

(Pl.’s Mem. at 3.)

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief ordering

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defendants to make their facilities readily accessible to and

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usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent required by

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the ADA.

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$8,000 in statutory damages.

(See Compl. at 7; Pl.’s Mem. at 10.)

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He also seeks

(See Pl.’s Mem. at 10-11.)

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that

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there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

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P. 56(a).

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of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

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reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

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favor.

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(1986).

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Fed. R. Civ.

A material fact is one that could affect the outcome

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

Plaintiff has not yet presented the court with a
stipulation to this effect signed by both parties. As the court
has previously explained in another case involving the same
plaintiff, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs the
unilateral withdrawal of claims. See Johnson v. Wayside Prop.,
Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 973, 975 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Hells
Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683,
687 (9th Cir. 2005)). If plaintiff intends to withdraw his third
and fourth claims, he must either explain why dismissal is
appropriate under Rule 15 or submit a stipulation signed by both
parties.
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burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

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fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

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negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

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Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the non-

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moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential

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element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.

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Id.

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Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

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burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific

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facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

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324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

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the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is

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some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

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Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

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“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be

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insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

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reasonably find for the [non-moving party].”

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at 252.

Id. at

To carry this burden,

Matsushita

Anderson, 477 U.S.

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In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must

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view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

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party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor.

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255.

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and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

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functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for

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summary judgment . . . .”

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Id. at

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,

Id.

Defendants do not dispute that their property was not
fully ADA compliant, and they offer no evidence to refute the
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alleged violations.

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Accordingly, because there is no genuine dispute regarding the

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existence of barriers to access, the court will enter summary

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judgment for plaintiff on the issue of liability under the ADA

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and the UCRA.2

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(Defs.’ Opp’n at 1 (Docket No. 13).)

Defendants challenge goes only to the amount of

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monetary damages due to plaintiff under the UCRA.

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at 2-3.)

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by barriers to access to recover monetary damages.

(Defs.’ Opp’n

Unlike the ADA, the UCRA permits plaintiffs aggrieved
Cal. Civ.

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Code § 52(a); Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 669

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(2009).

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thereby mooted the plaintiff’s ADA claim, those remedial measures

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will not moot a UCRA claim for damages.

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(US), Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Karlton,

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J.) (citing Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1131 (C.D.

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Cal. 2005)).

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Even if a defendant has removed barriers to access and

Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports

The UCRA provides statutory damages for each occasion a

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plaintiff is denied full and equal access.

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§§ 52(a), 55.56(e).

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that he visited Valley Trading Post a total of six times, and

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each time he found the accessible parking spot obstructed by

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defendants’ inventory.3

Cal. Civ. Code

Plaintiff has presented undisputed evidence

The minimum statutory damages available

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The UCRA “incorporates the substantive standards of the
ADA and creates a private right of action as a matter of state
law.” Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Law School Admission
Council Inc., 896 F.Supp.2d 849, 865 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The law
provides that “[a] violation of the right of any individual under
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . shall
also constitute a violation of [the UCRA].” Cal. Civ. Code
§ 51(f).
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Plaintiff has provided date-stamped photographs of the
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for each visit is $4,000.

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See Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a).

However, “in an action alleging multiple claims for the

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same construction-related accessibility violation on different

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particular occasions,” California law requires the trier of fact

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to “consider the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct in

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light of the plaintiff’s obligation, if any, to mitigate

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damages.”

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or the equivalent of two visits.

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evidence of any effort to mitigate damages.

Id. § 55.56(h).

Plaintiff initially requested $8,000
However, he has presented no
For example, there

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is no evidence that plaintiff alerted defendants to the barriers

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he encountered before returning to their store, and plaintiff has

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not suggested any reason why he may have expected the barriers to

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be removed upon his return visits.

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Civ. No. 11-00643 JCS, 2013 WL 6073516, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18,

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2013) (“One way that plaintiffs may fail to meet their duty [to

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mitigate damages] is to make multiple visits to the same facility

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before they could reasonably expect that the barrier was

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corrected; this is sometimes referred to as stacking.”)

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See Yates v. Vishal Corp.,

Rather than argue the point, plaintiff’s reply brief

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further limited his requested relief to $4,000--the minimum

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damages available for a single occasion he was denied full and

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equal access.

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concession eliminates the obstacle of mitigation.

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therefore grant summary judgment for plaintiffs in the amount of

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$4,000.

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(Pl.’s Reply at 2 (Docket No. 14).)

This
The court will

At oral argument, the court noted--and the parties

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parking space from each visit.

(Johnson Decl. Ex. 4.)
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agreed--that this case could have been settled much earlier for

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the same amount.

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disability-related cases filed by this same plaintiff routinely

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settle for $4,000 before the filing of a dispositive motion.

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those cases, counsel agree that the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees

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generally amount to no more than $6,000 to $8,000.

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plaintiff’s decision to hold out for a damage award of $8,000

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until the last minute has caused him to incur seemingly

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unnecessary attorneys’ fees that he may later seek to recover

Counsel for both sides represented that similar

In

Yet,

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from defendants.

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seriously take this fact into account in deciding how much to ask

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for in attorney’s fees in this case.

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Accordingly, the court cautions counsel to

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

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summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

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is hereby granted an injunction requiring defendants to provide a

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lowered transaction counter and adequate accessible parking that

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is not blocked by inventory in compliance with the Americans with

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Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Americans with Disabilities Act

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Accessibility Guidelines contained in 28 C.F.R. Part 36.

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court further awards plaintiff statutory damages in the amount of

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$4,000.

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Dated:

June 29, 2015

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Plaintiff

The