Safari Club International v. Harris et al

Filing 37

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 4/28/2015 GRANTING #15 Motion to Dismiss; GRANTING the plaintiff fourteen (14) days leave to file a First Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies in any dismissed claim. (Michel, G.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:14-CV-01856-GEB-AC

v.
KAMALA D. HARRIS, in her
official capacity as the
Attorney General of
California, and CHARLTON H.
BONHAM, in his official
capacity as the Director of
the California Department of
Fish and Wildlife,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Defendants.

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Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff‟s Complaint with

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prejudice, arguing Plaintiff‟s “Complaint is comprised of little

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more than boilerplate legal conclusions that fail to satisfy the

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pleading burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).”

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(Def.‟s Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) 2:11-12, ECF No. 15.)

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alleges in its Complaint that California Fish & Game Code § 4800

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(“the Import Ban”) violates the federal Equal Protection Clause

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and

dormant

Commerce

Clause,

and
1

asserts

it

Plaintiff

“adversely

and

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significantly harms interstate commerce and serves no legitimate

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state or local interest.” (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff also

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seeks an injunction enjoining state officials from enforcing the

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Import Ban.

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Defendants

argue

“plaintiff

neither

identifies

the

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nature of the „burden‟” on interstate commerce, “nor suggests how

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it outweighs the putative benefits of the [Import Ban].” (Mot.

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11:9-10.) The Human Society of the United States (“HSUS”) filed

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an amicus curiae brief in support of the dismissal motion in

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which it argues, inter alia, that the Import Ban is rationally

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related to the government‟s interest in preventing cruelty to

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mountain lions.

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The Import Ban was approved by California voters in

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1990 as Proposition 117. It states in relevant part: “it is

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unlawful to take, injure, possess, import, or sell any mountain

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lion

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4800(b)(emphasis

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prohibition of “the importation, transportation, and possession

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in California of mountain lions hunted outside of California.”

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(Compl. ¶ 1.)

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or

any

part

or

product

added).

thereof.”

Plaintiff

Fish

and

Game

challenges

the

Code

§

ban‟s

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that the Import Ban

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discriminates against “hunters who wish to legally hunt mountain

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lions” outside of California as compared to “[h]unters of other

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species . . . [who] are not subject to the complete ban on the

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importation, transportation, and possession of their harvested

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animals in California.” (Compl. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff also allege its

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members “desire to . . . participate in mountain lion hunts
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1

outside of California with the intent of importing any harvested

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mountain lion into California,” and that “[b]ut for the Import

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Ban”

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alleges that once a mountain lion is “reduced to possession by

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[a] hunter . . . [it] becomes an article of interstate commerce,”

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and

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mountain lions into California where they would generate income

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through, inter alia, taxidermy, demonstrating that “[t]he adverse

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impacts on interstate commerce [from the Import Ban] outweigh any

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local interests . . . Defendants might claim [are] advanced by

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the Import Ban.” (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 44, 47.)

they

that

could

the

do

so.

Import

Ban

12

(Compl.

¶¶

prevents

5,

the

2.)

Plaintiff

movement

of

further

harvested

II. LEGAL STANDARD

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“To

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss,

a

complaint

must

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contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

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Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.

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2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim

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has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

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that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

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(2007)). “For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept all

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well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe

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them

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Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th

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Cir. 2012). However, the court does “not accept legal conclusions

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in the complaint as true, even if cast in the form of factual

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allegations.” Lacano Inv., LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071

in

the

light

most

favorable

3

to

the

Caviness v.

nonmoving

party.”

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(9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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III. CONSIDERATION OF DOCUMENTS BEYOND THE PLEADINGS

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Defendants support their motion with a request that

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judicial notice be taken of Exhibit A attached to the Gordon

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Declaration, which is the text of the California Ballot Pamphlet

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for

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district

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pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.‟” United States v.

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Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lee

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v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)). However,

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“[a] court may, . . . consider certain materials [including]

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documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by

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reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without

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converting

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judgment.” U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Judicial notice is taken of the California Ballot Pamphlet for

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Proposition 117 since this information about the Import Ban was

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publicly

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“mountain lion hunting is cruel and unnecessary.” (Def. RJN Ex.

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A, p. 42, ECF No. 15-2.)

Proposition

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the

(ECF

“„may

court

117.

not

motion

available

to

to

No.

15-2).

consider

dismiss

voters

and

As

any

into

a

general

material

a

motion

includes

the

rule,

beyond

for

a

the

summary

argument

that

Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of Exhibits A, B, D,

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and

E

attached

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printouts

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California Department of Fish and Wildlife (Exs. A and B), the

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International Union for Conservation of Nature (Ex. D), and the

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United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

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(Ex.

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Declaration is considered since it is incorporated by reference

E).

of

(ECF

to

the

No.

the

Burdin

website

28.)

for

Declaration;
the

Exhibit

4

A

the

following

attached

exhibits

are

entities:

the

to

the

Burdin

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into the Complaint. (See Compl. ¶ 32.) However, it has not been

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shown that the contents of the remaining portion of the request

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concerns

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Plaintiff‟s request is denied. Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v.

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City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006)

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(“We

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materials], as they are not relevant to the resolution of this

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appeal.”).

the

decision

decline

to

below;

take

therefore

judicial

9

notice

this

of

portion

the

of

[requested

IV. DISCUSSION

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A. Equal Protection Clause

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Defendants

argue

Plaintiff‟s

Equal

Protection

Clause

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claim should be dismissed since Plaintiff has not, and cannot,

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plausibly

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relationship to the government‟s interests in enacting it. HSUS

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argues the ban advances the government‟s interest in preventing

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cruelty to mountain lions.

allege

that

the

Import

Ban

bears

no

rational

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Plaintiff counters it is not required to allege that

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the government‟s interest in preventing cruelty to mountain lions

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bears no rational relationship to the Import Ban, and that this

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asserted

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considered by the voters.

interest

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is

a

post

hoc

justification

that

was

not

“Social and economic legislation like the [Import Ban]

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that

does

not

employ

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fundamental rights must be upheld against equal protection attack

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when the legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate

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governmental

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(1981).

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upheld

purpose.”

suspect

Hodel

classifications

v.

Indiana,

452

or

impinge

U.S.

314,

on

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“The Supreme Court has long held that a law must be
under

rational

basis

review
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„if

any

state

of

facts

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reasonably

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imposed by the law. This lowest level of review does not look to

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the actual purpose of the law. Instead, it considers whether

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there is some conceivable rational purpose that [voters] could

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have had in mind when [they] enacted the law.” SmithKline Beecham

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Corp. v. Abbott Lab., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014)(citing

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McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)). When “applying

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rational basis review . . . , any hypothetical rationale for the

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law [will] do.” Witt v. Dep‟t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817

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may

be

conceived

to

justify‟

the

classifications

(9th Cir. 2008).

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The general rule is that legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if
the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. When social or economic legislation
is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause
allows the States wide latitude, and the
Constitution presumes that even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic processes.

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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440

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(1985).

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Plaintiff‟s Complaint does not contain an allegation

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concerning the Import Ban‟s presumed rational relationship to the

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government‟s interest in preventing cruelty to mountain lions.

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Therefore,

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dismissed.

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should not be granted leave to amend this claim.

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Plaintiff‟s
However,

Equal

Protection

Defendants

have

not

Clause

shown

claim

that

is

Plaintiff

B. Dormant Commerce Clause

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The
claim

movants
should

also
be

argue

dismissed

Plaintiff‟s

prejudice,

Commerce

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Clause

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Plaintiff has not, and cannot plausibly allege that any burden
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with

dormant

contending

1

the

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excessive

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Specifically,

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mountain

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allegations concerning this local benefit.

Import

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Ban

in

imposes

relation
HSUS

lions,

on

interstate

to

the

ban‟s

argues

the

Import

and

Plaintiff‟s

commerce

putative
Ban

is

local

prevents

Complaint

is

clearly
benefits.

cruelty

to

devoid

of

[P]recedent[] provide[s] for two levels of
scrutiny for challenges to a state statute
under the dormant Commerce Clause. If the
statute
discriminates
against
interstate
commerce,
it
will
be
subject
to
the
“strictest scrutiny.” Discrimination in this
context means differential treatment of instate and out-of-state economic interests
that benefits the former and burdens the
latter.” If the state statute does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
interstate commerce is “clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”

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Indep. Training & Apprenticeship Program v. Cal. Dep‟t of Indus.,

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730

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Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting

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Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970))).

F.3d

1024,

1038

(quoting

Nat‟l

Ass‟n

of

Optometrists

&

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Plaintiff alleges the Import Ban discourages California

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residents from traveling to other states where they would spend

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money

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stifles income that could be generated in California through the

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taxidermy of harvested mountain lions. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 27, 44-45.)

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Plaintiff

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commerce outweigh[s] any local interests the . . . Defendants

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might claim is advanced by the Import Ban.” (Id. ¶ 47.) Even if

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such burdens are cognizable under the Commerce Clause, Plaintiff

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has not plausibly plead how or why those burdens on interstate

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commerce are “clearly excessive” in light of the asserted local

in

pursuit

also

of

a

alleges

mountain

this

lion

hunt,

“adverse

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and

impact

that

on

the

ban

interstate

1

benefit of preventing cruelty to mountain lions. Therefore, this

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claim

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Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend this claim.

is

dismissed.

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However,

Defendants

have

not

shown

that

V. CONCLUSION

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For the stated reasons, Defendants‟ motion to dismiss

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is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted fourteen (14) days leave from

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the date on which this order is filed to file a First Amended

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Complaint addressing the deficiencies in any dismissed claim.

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Dated:

April 28, 2015

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