Hampton v. Haynie et al

Filing 6

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 10/14/14 ORDERING that 5 Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED; Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with 30 days to file an amended complaint.(Dillon, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAMES HAMPTON,

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No. 2:14-cv-2038 KJN P

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

R. HAYNIE, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 636(b)(1). Plaintiff consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See 28

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U.S.C. § 636(c).

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Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action.

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28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing

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fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will

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direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account

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and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly

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payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account.

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These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time

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the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(b)(2).

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

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Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

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pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

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Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.

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2000) (“a judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably

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meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at

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1227.

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations

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sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.

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However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.
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Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal

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quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as

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true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the

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pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

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(1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

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Plaintiff alleges that on July 7, 2014, he was forced to take a cellmate and deliberately

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placed in a dangerous situation. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges he informed defendants

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Sherburn, Dragash and Haynie that plaintiff and his cellmate were not getting along, but was told

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to “deal with it.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims he told defendant Sherburn and Haynie that they were

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placing plaintiff’s life in danger, and they responded, “so.” Plaintiff alleges that defendant

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Haynie told defendant Sherburn to issue plaintiff a rules violation report for plaintiff’s refusal to

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take a cellmate. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff claims that the rules violation report was falsified,

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and was subsequently dismissed. Plaintiff had another altercation with the same inmate two days

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later. Defendant Haynie put plaintiff in administrative segregation for safety, claiming that

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plaintiff “staged these fights.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) However, plaintiff’s cellmate, Candler, was

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allowed to stay in the cell in which they had the altercation. Plaintiff contends that it takes two

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inmates to “stage a fight.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff claims that defendant Haynie knew

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plaintiff would write a grievance, and wrote the false rules violation report to cover placing

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plaintiff in danger. Plaintiff claims he lost his job, property, and was put in administrative

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segregation.

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Plaintiff claims that defendants Burnett and Compton “are charged under deliberate

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indifference . . . to block plaintiff and grant immunity to [the other] defendants.” (ECF No. 1 at

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4.) Plaintiff claims both of these defendants had a chance to correct a wrong.

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First, plaintiff appears to allege that defendants Burnett and Compton are liable based on

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their role in the inmate grievance process. However, prisoners have no stand-alone due process

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rights related to the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640

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(9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there

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is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1063
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(2004). Put another way, prison officials are not required under federal law to process inmate

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grievances in a specific way or to respond to them in a favorable manner. Because there is no

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right to any particular grievance process, plaintiff cannot state a cognizable civil rights claim for a

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violation of his due process rights based on allegations that prison officials ignored or failed to

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properly process grievances. See, e.g., Wright v. Shannon, 2010 WL 445203 at *5 (E.D. Cal.

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Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals

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failed to state a cognizable claim under the First Amendment); Towner v. Knowles, 2009 WL

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4281999 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009) (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials screened out

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his inmate appeals without any basis failed to indicate a deprivation of federal rights); Williams v.

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Cate, 2009 WL 3789597 at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no protected liberty

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interest in the vindication of his administrative claims.”). The altercations between plaintiff and

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his cellmate had taken place by the time plaintiff filed his grievance; thus, defendants Burnett and

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Compton could not have acted to prevent the altercations. Plaintiff should not renew his claims

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against defendants Burnett and Compton in any amended complaint.

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Second, the falsification of disciplinary reports does not state a stand-alone constitutional

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claim. See, e.g., Lee v. Whitten, 2012 WL 4468420, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2012). Indeed, as set forth

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above, there is no constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system, and a

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prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed right not to be falsely or wrongly accused of conduct

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which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d

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450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Sprouse’s claims based on the falsity of the charges and the

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impropriety of Babcock's involvement in the grievance procedure, standing alone, do not state

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constitutional claims.”); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The prison

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inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of

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conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”). In sum, plaintiff's

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allegations of a false report and cover up, standing alone, do not state a cognizable constitutional

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claim. See, e.g., Higgins v. Medina, 2009 WL 3255268, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding not

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cognizable plaintiff's due process claim arising from the falsification of reports and other

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documents relating to incident of excessive force because prisoners do not have an independent

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right, grounded in the Due Process Clause, to an accurate prison record).

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Third, plaintiff makes vague references to retaliation. Under the First Amendment, prison

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officials may not retaliate against prisoners for initiating litigation or filing administrative

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grievances. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). A viable claim of First

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Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some

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adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that

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such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

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not reasonably advance a legitimate penological purpose. Id.; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813,

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816 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, plaintiff failed to allege any facts supporting each element of a

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retaliation claim, as required by Rhodes. Moreover, it is not clear that plaintiff was engaged in

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protected conduct at the time of the alleged retaliatory act.

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Fourth, it is unclear whether plaintiff may be able to state cognizable Eighth Amendment
claims against the remaining defendants.
It is well established that a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

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serious harm to an inmate violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth

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Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.

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25, 31-32 (1993). “It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of

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another that translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s

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safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. There are objective and subjective requirements which must be

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met to prevail on such an Eighth Amendment claim. First, for the objective requirement, “the

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inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

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harm.” Id. Second, the prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See id.

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Here the state of mind is one of deliberate indifference. See id. A prison official who knows of

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and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate's health or safety demonstrates deliberate

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indifference. See id. at 837. Thus, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the

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inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that

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inference.” Id. However, an official who knows of a substantial risk to an inmate’s health or
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safety but acts reasonably under the circumstances will not be held liable under the cruel and

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unusual punishment clause, even if the threatened harm results. See id. at 843.

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Plaintiff’s allegations that he informed defendants Sherburn, Dragash and Haynie that

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plaintiff and his cellmate were not getting along, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate a

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substantial risk of harm to plaintiff. Indeed, the medical report of injury from the incident reflects

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that plaintiff sustained no injuries. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) In the rules violation report, defendant

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Sherburn claimed that both plaintiff and his cellmate were watching as defendant Sherburn

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approached for medication pass, and once the door was half open, plaintiff and his cellmate began

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“slapping” each other with “open hands.” (ECF No. 1 at 21.) Although plaintiff claims he told

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defendants Sherburn and Haynie that they were placing plaintiff’s life in danger, plaintiff fails to

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allege facts supporting such claim or demonstrating that he faced a substantial risk of serious

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harm. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend should he be able to allege sufficient facts to support an

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Eighth Amendment violation.

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Finally, plaintiff concedes that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in

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connection with these claims. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff states that he filed a grievance, but that

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defendants Burnett and Compton saw “it in their interest not to process.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.)

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to

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provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

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facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

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Exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,

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524 (2002).

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Compliance with the exhaustion requirement is mandatory for any type of relief sought.

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Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739, 741(2001) (holding that prisoners must exhaust their

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administrative remedies regardless of the relief they seek, i.e., whether injunctive relief or money

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damages, even though the latter is unavailable pursuant to the administrative grievance process);

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accord Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is

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mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.”); see also
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Panaro v. City of North Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2005) (The PLRA “represents a

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Congressional judgment that the federal courts may not consider a prisoner’s civil rights claim

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when a remedy was not sought first in an available administrative grievance procedure.”).

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Prisoners who file grievances must use a form provided by the California Department of

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Corrections and Rehabilitation, which instructs the inmate to describe the problem and outline the

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action requested. The grievance process, as defined by California regulations, has three levels of

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review to address an inmate's claims, subject to certain exceptions. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

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§ 3084.7. Administrative procedures generally are exhausted once a plaintiff has received a

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“Director’s Level Decision,” or third level review, with respect to his issues or claims. Id.

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§ 3084.1(b).

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As noted above, the PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies.

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Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an

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agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can

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function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”

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Id. at 90-91. Thus, compliance with grievance procedures is required by the PLRA to properly

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exhaust. Id. The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or

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otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 83-84. When the

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rules of the prison or jail do not dictate the requisite level of detail for proper review, a prisoner’s

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complaint “suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.”

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Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). This requirement is so because the

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primary purpose of a prison’s administrative review system is to “notify the prison of a problem

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and to facilitate its resolution.” Id., 557 F.3d at 1120.

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Non-exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. Bock, 549 U.S. at 204, 216.

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However, where it is clear that a plaintiff has not first exhausted his administrative remedies,

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courts may dismiss such claims sua sponte. See id. at 199, 214-16 (exhaustion is an affirmative

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defense and sua sponte dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA

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is only appropriate if, taking the prisoner’s factual allegations as true, the complaint establishes

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the failure to exhaust); see also Salas v. Tillman, 162 Fed. Appx. 918 (11th Cir. 2006), cert.
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denied, 549 U.S. 835 (2006) (district court’s sua sponte dismissal of state prisoner’s civil rights

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claims for failure to exhaust was not abuse of discretion; prisoner did not dispute that he timely

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failed to pursue his administrative remedies, and a continuance would not permit exhaustion

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because any grievance would now be untimely).

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Despite plaintiff’s claim that defendants Burnett and Compton failed to process plaintiff’s

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grievance because it was “in their interest,” plaintiff provided a copy of their appeal response

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which states that the appeal was rejected because plaintiff included “multiple issues that [did] not

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derive from a single event, or [were] not directly related and cannot be reasonably addressed in a

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single response due to this fact.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) The Appeals Coordinator is authorized and

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obligated to reject any appeal that is not submitted in compliance with prison regulations

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concerning the appeals process. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.3 (setting forth criteria for

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rejecting appeals).

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Review of plaintiff’s grievance reflects that plaintiff did, in fact, complain about multiple

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unrelated issues. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) Further, plaintiff was advised that he could “resubmit the

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unrelated issues separately using separate appeals.” (Id.) It is unclear whether plaintiff followed

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the directions and re-submitted his appeals separately, or whether plaintiff attempted to pursue his

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claims through the next level of appeal if he believed the rejection was in error. Plaintiff is

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cautioned that if he did not pursue his administrative appeals through the third level of review he

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risks dismissal of his claims.

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The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is

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unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The

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court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required

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by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a

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complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones

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v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least

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some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim.

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Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the

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complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.
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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

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about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo v.

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Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each

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named defendant is involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is

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some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation.

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Id.; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

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(9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil

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rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

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make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

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complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists

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because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

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Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

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pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

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original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

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alleged.

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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

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2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff

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is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the

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Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently

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herewith.

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3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.

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4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached

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Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

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a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

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b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.
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Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must

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also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.”

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Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of

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this action.

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Dated: October 14, 2014

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/hamp2038.14

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAMES HAMPTON,

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No. 2:14-cv-2038 KJN P

Plaintiff,
v.

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

R. HAYNIE, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order
filed______________.
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Amended Complaint

DATED:
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Plaintiff