Johnson v. Patel, et al.

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 9/21/2015 GRANTING 25 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED an injunction requiring defendants to make their facility readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The court also awards plaintiff statutory damages in the amount of $8,000. CASE CLOSED. (Donati, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SCOTT JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

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NO. CIV. 2:14-02078 WBS DAD
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
AMRAT K. PATEL; and DAMYANTI
A. PATEL,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff Scott Johnson, a wheelchair-bound

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quadriplegic, brought this action under the Americans With

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Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and related

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California laws, and now seeks summary judgment pursuant to

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

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I.

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Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff uses a wheelchair for mobility and owns a

specially equipped van with a lift that deploys from the

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passenger side to accommodate his wheelchair.

(Johnson Decl. ¶¶

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2-3 (Docket No. 25-4).)

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occasions within a two-month period, plaintiff visited the

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American’s Best Value Inn (“Inn”), a hotel in Stockton,

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California owned and operated by defendants Amrat K. Patel and

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Damyanti A. Patel.

On March 27, 2014 and on four additional

(Id. ¶¶ 4, 11; Pl.’s Mem. at 1.)

Plaintiff found that the two handicap parking spaces

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had handicap logos painted over them but did not have a tow away

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or fine warning near the spaces.

(Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8.)

Only

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one of the spaces had a pole-mounted sign indicating that it was

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a “Van Accessible Space” and the other did not have any kind of

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signage.

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in the access aisle between the spaces were painted white or

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yellow instead of blue.

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not contain the required “No Parking” lettering or a blue border.

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(Id. ¶ 7.)

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not level with each other due to a built up curb ramp.

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¶ 9.)

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(Id. ¶ 6.)

The outline of the spaces and the stripes

(Id. ¶¶ 6-8.)

The access aisle also did

The handicap parking spaces and access aisles were

The slope of the ramp was greater than 2.2%.

(Id.

(Id. ¶ 21.)

When plaintiff returned to the Inn on April 18 and 21,

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2014 in order to rent a room, plaintiff was forced to leave the

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ramp of his van open and down for fear of being blocked by

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another vehicle.

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from the parking lot to the entrance that had a very steep slope.

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(Id. ¶ 14.)

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Inn had panel style handles that required plaintiff to grasp and

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twist with his wrist, which is extremely difficult for plaintiff

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due to his disability.

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(Id. ¶ 13.)

He then encountered a ramp leading

The entrance doorway to the business office of the

(Id. ¶ 15.)

Upon entering, plaintiff found the transaction counter
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was too high and he was unable to see the top of the counter.

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(Id. ¶ 16.)

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by people in wheelchairs.

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wheelchair accessible room, he was told none were available.

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(Id. ¶ 17.)

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access aisle, entrance ramp, and door handle during his various

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visits.

(Id.)

When plaintiff requested a

Plaintiff took photographs of the parking spaces,

(Id. Ex. 3.)
Plaintiff indicates he has visited Stockton in order to

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There was no lowered section of the counter for use

shop, eat, and stay overnight on a number of occasions over the

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past two years and plans to continue to do so in the future.

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(Id. ¶ 24.)

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from plaintiff’s home in Carmichael to Fresno, where plaintiff’s

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son attends school.

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he would like to stay at the Inn in the future, when the

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violations have been remedied.

Stockton is a convenient stopping point on the drive

(Johnson Suppl. Decl. ¶ 2).

Plaintiff says

(Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 24-25.)

Plaintiff’s lawsuit asserts four claims: (1) violations

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of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) violations of

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California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”), Cal. Civ. Code

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§§ 51(f), 52(a); (3) violations of the California Disabled

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Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54-54.8; and (4) common-law

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negligence.

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for summary judgment on his first two claims and states in his

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motion that he will stipulate to dismiss his California Disabled

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Persons Act and negligence claims if the court grants summary

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judgment on his ADA and UCRA claims.1

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(Compl. at 5-9 (Docket No. 1).)

Plaintiff now moves

(Pl.’s Mem. at 3.)

Plaintiff has not yet presented the court with a
stipulation to this effect signed by both parties. As the court
has previously explained in another case involving the same
plaintiff, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs the
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Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief ordering defendants

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to make their facility readily accessible to and usable by

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individuals with disabilities to the extent required by the ADA.

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(Id. at 11.)

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UCRA, $4,000 of which is for his first five visits to the Inn and

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$4,000 of which is for the many times he was deterred from

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visiting.

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II.

He also seeks $8,000 in statutory damages under the

(Id. at 12.)

Discussion
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that

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there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

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P. 56(a).

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of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

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reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

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favor.

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(1986).

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burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

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fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

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negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

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Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the non-

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moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential

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element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Fed. R. Civ.

A material fact is one that could affect the outcome

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

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unilateral withdrawal of claims. See Johnson v. Wayside Prop.,
Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 973, 975 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Hells
Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683,
687 (9th Cir. 2005)). If plaintiff intends to withdraw his third
and fourth claims, he must either explain why dismissal is
appropriate under Rule 15 or submit a stipulation signed by both
parties.
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Id.

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Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

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burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific

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facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

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324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

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the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is

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some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

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Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

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“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be

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insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

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reasonably find for the [non-moving party].”

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at 252.

Id. at

To carry this burden,

Matsushita

Anderson, 477 U.S.

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In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must

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view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

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party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor.

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255.

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and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

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functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for

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summary judgment . . . .”

Id. at

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,

Id.

Defendants do not dispute that the barriers to access

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plaintiff identified violate the ADA.

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No. 27).)

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regarding the existence of the barriers to access, the court will

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grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of

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liability under the ADA and the UCRA.2

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(Defs.’ Opp’n at 1 (Docket

Accordingly, because there is no genuine dispute

The UCRA “incorporates the substantive standards of the
ADA and creates a private right of action as a matter of state
law.” Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Law School Admission
Council Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The law
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Defendants contest only the amount of monetary damages

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plaintiff should receive under the UCRA.

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the ADA, the UCRA permits a plaintiff aggrieved by barriers to

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access to recover monetary damages.

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Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 669 (2009).

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generally provides for a minimum of $4,000 in statutory damages

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for each occasion a plaintiff has been denied full and equal

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access to a place of public accommodation.

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§§ 52(a), 55.56(a).

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(Id. at 1-2.)

Unlike

Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a);
The UCRA

See Cal. Civ. Code

A plaintiff is denied full and equal access if a

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plaintiff has “personally encountered” a violation or has been

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“deterred from accessing a place of public accommodation” on a

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particular occasion.

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Taco, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (S.D. Cal. 2005)(“[I]n

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expanding UCRA’s reach beyond denial of equal access upon actual

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visitation to include liability for incidents of deterrence,

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courts have assumed that disabled plaintiffs remain entitled to

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damages for each time he or she has actually visited the

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offending establishment.”).

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was deterred, the plaintiff must establish both of the following:

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(1) The plaintiff had actual knowledge of a violation
or violations that prevented or reasonably dissuaded
the plaintiff from accessing a place of public
accommodation that the plaintiff intended to use on a
particular occasion.
(2) The violation or violations would have actually
denied the plaintiff full and equal access if the
plaintiff
had
accessed
the
place
of
public
accommodation on that particular occasion.

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Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(b); Freezor v. Del

To demonstrate that the plaintiff

provides that “[a] violation of the right of any individual under
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . shall
also constitute a violation of [the UCRA].” Cal. Civ. Code
§ 51(f).
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Cal. Civ. Code §§ 55.56(d)(1)-(2).
When a plaintiff is alleging multiple claims for

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statutory damages, the UCRA requires the court to consider the

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reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct in light of his duty to

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mitigate damages.

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and provides: “In assessing liability under subdivision (d), in

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an action alleging multiple claims for the same construction-

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related accessibility violation on different particular

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occasions, the court shall consider the reasonableness of the

Section 55.56(h) applies to deterrence claims

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plaintiff’s conduct in light of the plaintiff’s obligations, if

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any, to mitigate damages.”

Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(h).

In several cases in which a plaintiff was seeking

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damages for multiple visits to a facility, the issue of

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mitigation has precluded summary judgment.

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Johnson v. Wayside Property, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 973, 981

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(2014), the same plaintiff contended that he was entitled to an

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award of $8,000 for his two visits to Wayside Lumber.

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denied summary judgment on the issue of damages because there was

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a genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff mitigated

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damages: plaintiff provided “no evidence that indicates he

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alerted defendants to the barriers he encountered before he made

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a second visit or that he expected the barriers to be removed

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before he returned.”

For example, in

This court

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Similarly, in Ramirez v. Sam’s for Play Café, Civ. No.

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11-1370 MEJ, 2013 WL 4428858, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013),

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the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment due

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to a factual dispute over whether the plaintiffs mitigated

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damages.

The court questioned whether the plaintiffs acted
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reasonably when they chose to visit the Café three times in
thirty days despite the likelihood that they would continue to
encounter barriers to access.

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Both of the above cases are distinguishable because
they dealt with a plaintiff seeking $4,000 for each visit, not
$4,000 for all visits and an additional $4,000 for deterrence as
the plaintiff requests in this case.

reasonableness of a plaintiff’s conduct when the plaintiff seeks
damages for deterrence, not return visits, is slightly less
straightforward.

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At a minimum, the statute suggests that the

plaintiff must identify a particular occasion on which the
plaintiff was reasonably dissuaded from visiting the facility due
to his actual knowledge of the violation.

See Johnson v. Kuo

Lin, Civ. No. 2:13-01484 GEB-DAD, 2015 WL 1956532, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. Apr. 29, 2015) (denying plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment because plaintiff did not provide “facts
evincing that he was deterred from visiting [d]efendants’
restaurant on a ‘particular occasion’”).3

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Assessing the

Here, plaintiff presents evidence that he had actual
knowledge of violations at the Inn from his five visits.
(Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 5-23.)

He personally observed the noncompliant

parking spaces and access lane, the steep entrance ramp, the high
transaction counter, and the panel style door handle on five

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Plaintiff argues that California Civil Code subsection
55.56(h) applies only when a plaintiff seeks more than one
deterrence penalty award, not when a plaintiff seeks damages for
a single encounter and a single deterrence claim. (Pl.’s Reply
at 5 (Docket No. 28).) Even if this interpretation of the
statute is correct, it would not change the outcome under the
facts of this case.
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separate occasions.

(Id.)

Plaintiff states he was deterred from

additional attempts at patronage on a number of occasions in 2014
because of the violations:
Although I live in Carmichael, I drive down to the
Stockton area on a constant and ongoing basis. I have
shopped, stayed, eaten and otherwise visited Stockton
on scores of occasions over the last two years and
will continue to do so in the future.
The Inn is
conveniently located and in close proximity to the
areas I frequent. Once the barriers are fixed, I will
return and continue to patronize the Inn on a regular
and ongoing basis.
(Id. ¶¶ 24-25).

Plaintiff has thus satisfied the initial burden

of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
as to deterrence and the reasonableness of his conduct.
Defendants have not presented a single piece of
evidence to the contrary.

Defendants did not, for example,

provide evidence suggesting plaintiff had any reason to believe
barriers had been remediated or that his deterrence was
unreasonable for some other reason.

As a result, defendants

failed to meet their burden of showing that there is a genuine
issue of material fact for trial.

Accord Yates v. Vishal Corp.,

Civ. No. 11-00643 JCS, 2013 WL 6073516, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18,
2013) (awarding $4,000 for deterrence after the bench trial when
the plaintiff “stated that he decided not to stay at the Hotel on
at least one occasion because of [his] knowledge” of the
architectural barriers at the Hotel and the defendant “presented
no evidence to the contrary”); Langer v. GTAC, Inc., Civ. No. 141071 BTM WVG, 2015 WL 3492475, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 3, 2015)
(awarding $4,000 on a motion for default judgment because the
plaintiff “states that due to the lack of a single functioning

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compliant handicap parking space, he was deterred from
patronizing” the defendants’ facility and “[t]his is sufficient
evidence to support an award of statutory damages in the amount
of $4,000”).

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Accordingly, because defendants conceded liability
under the ADA and the UCRA and failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the amount of statutory damages owed to
plaintiff, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion with respect
to liability and damages.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

Plaintiff

is hereby granted an injunction requiring defendants to make
their facility readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities to the extent required by the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990.

The court also awards plaintiff

statutory damages in the amount of $8,000.
Dated:

September 21, 2015

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