Johnson v. Patel, et al.

Filing 48

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 2/23/16 ORDERING that plaintiff's 36 Motion for Attorney's Fees is GRANTED in PART. Defendants are directed to pay $7,467.50 in fees and $200.00 in costs to plaintiff. The hearing set for 2/22/2016 is hereby VACATED. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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----oo0oo----

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SCOTT JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

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CIV. NO. 2:14-2078 WBS AC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

v.
AMRAT K. PATEL; DAMYANTI A.
PATEL,
Defendants.

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----oo0oo---Plaintiff Scott Johnson, a wheelchair-bound

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quadriplegic, brought this action against defendants Amrat K.

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Patel and Damyanti A. Patel as owners and operators of America’s

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Best Value Inn, a hotel in Stockton, California.

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Plaintiff asserted violations of the Americans With Disabilities

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Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., California’s Unruh Civil

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Rights Act (“UCRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq., and related

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state-law causes of action.

(Id.)

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(Docket No. 1.)

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In September 2015, the court granted summary judgment

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in favor of plaintiff on his ADA and UCRA claims and entered

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judgment accordingly.

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court is plaintiff’s motion for $9,917.50 in attorney’s fees and

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costs pursuant to the ADA and UCRA.

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court might have benefited somewhat from oral argument, the court

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is mindful of the savings to defendants if this fee motion were

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submitted on the briefs.

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hearing set for February 22, 2016 and take the matter under

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(Docket Nos. 33-34.)

Presently before the

(Docket No. 36.)

While the

The court will, therefore, vacate the

submission pursuant to Eastern District Local Rule 230(g).
“The ADA authorizes a court to award attorneys’ fees,

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litigation expenses, and costs to a prevailing party.”

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Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002); see 42 U.S.C.

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§ 12205; 28 C.F.R. § 35.175.

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fees to a prevailing party in a suit brought under the UCRA.

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Cal. Civ. Code §§

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plaintiff was the prevailing party here, but contend that a fee

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award of $9,917.50 is unreasonable under the circumstances.

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(Docket No. 44.)

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Lovell v.

The court may also award attorney’s

52(a), 55.55.

See

Defendants do not dispute that

To determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee,

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the court must apply a two-step analysis.

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Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013).

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must determine what constitutes a reasonable fee using the

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lodestar method.

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multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the

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litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.

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461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

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the lodestar figure constitutes an appropriate fee award.

Id.

Gonzalez v. City of
First, the court

This lodestar figure is calculated by

Hensley v. Eckerhart,

There is a “strong presumption” that

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United

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Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 406 (9th

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Cir. 1990).
Second, the court may then adjust the lodestar figure

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upward or downward based on a variety of factors.

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F.3d at 1202.

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award, the court need not “achieve auditing perfection.”

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Vice, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2217 (2011).

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the court may use estimates and take into account its overall

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sense of the litigation to determine a reasonable fee.

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I.

Gonzalez, 729

In determining the size of an appropriate fee
Fox v.

During either of these steps,

Id.

Lodestar Computation
A.

Reasonable Number of Hours

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“The prevailing party has the burden of submitting

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billing records to establish that the number of hours it has

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requested are reasonable.”

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court may reduce the hours “where documentation is inadequate; if

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the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; [or] if the

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hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.”

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Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir.

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1986).

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Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202.

The

Plaintiff has submitted a billing statement itemizing

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the time spent by attorneys Mark Potter, Phyl Grace, Dennis

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Price, Amanda Lockhart, and Christina Sosa.

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(“Billing Statement”) (Docket No. 36-3).)

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indicates that Potter billed 21.6 hours, Grace 1.7 hours, Price

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3.7 hours, Lockhart 6.6 hours, and Sosa 9.3 hours, totaling 42.9

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hours of attorney time.

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(Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 2
The billing statement

(See id.)

Potter billed an estimated 8.0 hours to prepare the
reply brief in support of the pending motion for attorney’s fees
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and to prepare for and attend the oral argument.

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plaintiff’s reply brief, Potter indicates that the actual time he

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spent preparing plaintiff’s reply brief was thirty minutes.

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(Pl.’s Reply at 2 (Docket No. 45).)

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pending motion under submission and vacated the hearing, Potter

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did not have to expend any time preparing for or attending oral

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argument.

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entry by 7.5 hours.

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thus reduced to 14.1 hours, and the total attorney time expended

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(Id. at 3.)

In

Because the court took the

The court will therefore reduce Potter’s estimated
The time reasonably expended by Potter is

in this case is reduced to 35.4 hours.

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Defendants argue that the number of hours expended are

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excessive by pointing to the Magistrate Judge’s January 22, 2015

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Order on plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.

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22, 2015 Order and Findings & Recs. (“January 22 Order”) (Docket

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No. 14).)

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for default judgment and the January 22 Order was vacated,

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(Docket Nos. 20, 22), that Order recommended that plaintiff’s

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counsel be awarded $2,050 in attorney’s fees for 8.2 hours

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expended in this case, (see January 22 Order at 6-7).

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contend that very little had transpired between January 22, 2015

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and now that would justify additional significant activity by

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plaintiff’s counsel.

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(See January

Although plaintiff subsequently withdrew his motion

Defendants

The billing statement in support of the pending motion

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indicates that the attorneys here expended an additional 27.3

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hours in this litigation since the January 22 Order.

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finds that this amount is reasonable in light of the work

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performed following the January 22 Order, including time spent on

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the Rule 26 Joint Status Report, (Docket No. 17), plaintiff’s
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The court

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motion for summary judgment, (Docket Nos. 25, 27, 31),

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plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, (Docket Nos. 26, 30), and the

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settlement negotiations that took place, (Potter Decl. ¶¶ 3-11

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(Docket No. 36-2); see also Docket Nos. 32, 37-38).

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thus concludes that 35.4 total hours of attorney time expended in

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this litigation is reasonable.

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B.

The court

Reasonable Hourly Rate
The reasonable hourly rate is determined according to

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“the prevailing market rates in the relevant community,” Blum v.

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Stenson, 465 U.S. 866, 895 (1984), “for similar work performed by

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attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation,”

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Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210–11 (9th Cir.

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1986).

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district court sits.”

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F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

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community in this case is the Sacramento Division of the Eastern

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District of California.

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The relevant legal community “is the forum in which the
Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608
The relevant

The prevailing party has the burden of producing

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sufficient evidence that its “requested rates are in line with

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those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers

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of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”

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Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11; accord Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1206.

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Plaintiff’s counsel here seek hourly rates of $300 for Potter,

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$175 for Grace, and $150 each for junior associates Price,

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Lockhart, and Sosa.

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(Docket No. 36-1).)

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(See Billing Statement; Pl.’s Mem. at 4

“The hourly rate for successful civil rights attorneys
is to be calculated by considering certain factors, including the
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novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill required to try

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the case, whether or not the fee is contingent, the experience

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held by counsel and fee awards in similar cases.”

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of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008).

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disability access cases are a subset of civil rights practice,

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the reasonable hourly rate merited in routine disability access

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cases typically falls below the hourly rate charged in more

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complicated civil rights cases.

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Inc., Civ. No. 2:13-1610 WBS AC, 2014 WL 6634324, at *6 (E.D.

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Moreno v. City
While

See Johnson v. Wayside Prop.,

Cal. Nov. 21, 2014).

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Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledge that this case involved

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a fairly straight-forward application of the law, and that it did

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not present novel or difficult issues requiring a high level of

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skill or specialization.

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also examined the experience of Potter, Grace, and Lockhart in

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previous, unrelated disability access cases brought by plaintiff

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and found that hourly rates of $300 for Potter, $175 for Grace,

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and $150 for Lockhart were reasonable.

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at *8; Johnson v. Allied Trailer Supply, Civ. No. 2:13-1544 WBS

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EFB, 2014 WL 1334006, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014).

(Pl.’s Mem. at 6-7.)

The court has

Wayside, 2014 WL 6634324,

Potter is the managing partner of the Center for

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Disability Access (“CDA”), has litigated over 2,000 disability

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cases, and has practiced disability litigation for over twenty

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years.

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Grace is an associate at CDA with twenty years of experience, and

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Lockhart is an associate who was admitted to the practice of law

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in June 2013.

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(Potter Decl. ¶ 2); Wayside, 2014 WL 6634324, at *5.

Wayside, 2014 WL 6634324, at *5.

Plaintiff’s counsel do not cite any new cases finding
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that the reasonable hourly rate in Sacramento for attorneys in a

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routine disability access case exceeds the rates approved in

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Wayside and Allied Trailer Supply.

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new evidence showing that Sacramento attorneys representing

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plaintiffs in routine disability access cases charge rates in

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excess of those approved in Wayside and Allied Trailer Supply.

Nor do counsel provide any

Consistent with the court’s prior opinions, therefore,

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the court finds that the requested hourly rates of $300 for

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Potter, $175 for Grace, and $150 for Lockhart are reasonable in

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this case.

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Sosa’s qualifications, the court finds that the requested hourly

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rate of $150 for Price and Sosa are also reasonable here.

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Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Albright, Civ. No. 2:11-2260 WBS

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CMK, 2013 WL 4094403, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013).

See

Accordingly the lodestar in this case is $7,467.50,

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In the absence of any evidence regarding Price and

calculated as follows:

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Potter:

14.1

x

$300

=

$ 4,230.00

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Grace:

1.7

x

$175

=

$

297.50

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Price:

3.7

x

$150

=

$

555.00

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Lockhart:

6.6

x

$150

=

$

990.00

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Sosa:

9.3

x

$150

=

$ 1,395.00
$ 7,467.50

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II.

Adjustments to the Lodestar
Plaintiff’s counsel do not seek an adjustment or

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multiplier to the lodestar amount.
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(Pl.’s Mem. at 6.)1

Although plaintiff’s counsel do not seek an adjustment
to the lodestar, they address the relevant factors under Hensley,
461 U.S. at 430 n.3. (Id. 5-10.) As to the undesirability of
the case, counsel indicate that the “clientele is largely (as in
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Defendants argue that Potter’s fee request should be reduced by

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fifty percent because this was not a complicated case and because

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most of Potter’s billed tasks could have been performed by more

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junior attorneys at lower hourly rates.

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held that the court “may not attempt to impose its own judgment

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regarding the best way to operate a law firm, nor to determine if

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different staffing decisions might have led to different fee

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requests.”

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level of the work performed, and the result achieved--not whether

Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1115.

The Ninth Circuit has

“The difficulty and skill

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it would have been cheaper to delegate the work to other

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attorneys--must drive the district court’s decision.”

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Id.

The court’s task is thus to evaluate the reasonableness

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of the time expended by the billing attorney, not assess whether

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another attorney could have completed the task for the same or

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less expense.

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of the strong presumption that the lodestar figure constitutes an

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appropriate fee amount, the court concludes that no further

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adjustment to the lodestar is warranted.

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III. Costs

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For the reasons previously discussed, and because

Plaintiff also seeks costs in the amount of $200 for

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pre-filing investigation expenses.

(See Pl.’s Mem. at 5, 10;

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Potter Decl. ¶ 12; Billing Statement at 1.)

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object to these costs and the court will therefore award them to

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plaintiff.

Defendants do not

See Wayside, 2014 WL 6634324, at *9.

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the present case) very low income or indigent.” (Id. at 9.) The
plaintiff in this case has successfully brought hundreds of
disability access cases in this court alone. It is therefore an
insult to the intelligence of this court to suggest that he is
“very low income or indigent.”
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

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(1) plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs

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(Docket No. 36) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in part;
(2) defendants are directed to pay $7,467.50 in fees

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and $200.00 in costs to plaintiff; and
(3) the hearing set for February 22, 2016 is hereby

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VACATED.

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Dated:

February 23, 2016

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