Johnson v. Yolo County Jail et al

Filing 7

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd on 04/21/15 granting 5 Motion to Proceed IFP. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees shall be collected in accordance with the court's o rder to the Sheriff of Yolo County filed concurrently herewith. Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed. Plaintiff is granted 30 days from the date of service of this order to file a second amended complaint. The clerk of the court shall send plaintiff the court's form for filing a civil rights action. (Plummer, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ALFONSO JOHNSON,

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No. 2:14-cv-2253 DAD P

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

YOLO COUNTY JAIL et al.,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se. Plaintiff and a fellow inmate

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previously commenced a civil rights action by filing a complaint, primarily complaining about

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not receiving adequate medical and mental health care. See Case No. 2:14-cv-01915 DAD P.

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The undersigned severed plaintiff‟s claims, directed the Clerk of the Court to open this separate

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civil action for plaintiff, dismissed his original complaint and granted him leave to file an

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amended complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 3) Plaintiff has

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complied with the court‟s order.

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Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§

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1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in

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accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct
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the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff‟s county jail trust

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account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for

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monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month‟s income credited to plaintiff‟s

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county jail account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of

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the Court each time the amount in plaintiff‟s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in

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full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims

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that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

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Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

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pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

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Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only „a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,‟ in order to „give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.‟” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more

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than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

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allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550

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U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the
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allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

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738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all

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doubts in the plaintiff‟s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

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Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

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(1976). “A person „subjects‟ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of

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their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant

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holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

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violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

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Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

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concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

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Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT
In his amended complaint plaintiff has identified as defendants the Yolo County Jail,

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Tammy Owens (the Director of Medical), Yolo County Sheriff Ed Prieto, Commander Robbin

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Faliuy, and Lieutenant Radamaker. The allegations of plaintiff‟s amended complaint are

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somewhat difficult to decipher, but he appears to allege that since April 2014, he has not received

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adequate treatment for his mental illness and has not received pain medication for head trauma he

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suffered in 2011. In his amended complaint plaintiff also alleges that he suffers from bipolar
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depression and headaches. In terms of relief, plaintiff requests the award of damages. (Compl. at

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3.)

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DISCUSSION

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The allegations in plaintiff‟s amended complaint are so vague and conclusory that the

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court is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for

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relief. The amended complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must

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give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim

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plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

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Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants

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engaged in that support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the

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requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the amended complaint must be dismissed. The court

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will grant plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.

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If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he must allege facts

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demonstrating how the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of his federal

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constitutional or statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The second

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amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the

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deprivation of plaintiff‟s rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is

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some affirmative link or connection between a defendant‟s actions and the claimed deprivation.

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Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 588 F.2d at

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743. Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

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sufficient. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.

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Plaintiff‟s amended complaint suffers from a number of additional deficiencies. As an

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initial matter, the court notes that plaintiff has named a number of supervisory officials, including

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jail medical director Tammy Owens and Yolo County Sheriff Ed Prieto as defendants in this

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action. As noted above, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

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actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. The Ninth Circuit has made

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clear that a supervisory defendant may be held liable under § 1983 only “„if there exists either (1)
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his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal

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connection between the supervisor‟s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.‟” Starr v.

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Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th

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Cir.1989)). In this case, it does not appear from the allegations of plaintiff‟s amended complaint

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that the supervisory defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his

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constitutional rights. If plaintiff wishes to proceed against any supervisory defendants, he will

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need to allege facts in his second amended complaint clarifying the causal connection between

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the defendants and his alleged constitutional deprivations.

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In addition, if plaintiff wishes to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate

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medical and/or mental health care, he is advised that inadequate medical and mental health care

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do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under § 1983 unless the mistreatment

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rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429

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U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (“deliberate

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indifference” standard also applies in cases involving the adequacy of mental health care in

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prisons). In general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or

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intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or may be shown by the way in which prison

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officials provide medical care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir.

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1988).

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If plaintiff wishes to proceed on a claim that he was provided constitutionally inadequate

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medical and/or mental health care, he must allege facts demonstrating how each named

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defendant‟s actions rose to the level of “deliberate indifference.” Plaintiff is also advised that

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mere differences of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff as to the proper course of

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treatment for a medical condition do not give rise to a § 1983 claim. See Toguchi v. Soon Hwang

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Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.

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1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337,

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1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Moreover, before it can be said that a prisoner‟s civil rights have been abridged, “the
indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere „indifference,‟ „negligence,‟ or
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„medical malpractice‟ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d

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458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). See also Wood v. Housewright, 900

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F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (“In determining deliberate indifference, we scrutinize the

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particular facts and look for substantial indifference in the individual case, indicating more than

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mere negligence or isolated occurrences of neglect.”).

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Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S.

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at 104-05. To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from delay in providing care,

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however, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the delay was harmful. See Berry v. Bunnell,

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39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Hunt v. Dental Dep‟t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989);

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Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm‟rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). In this

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regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would provide

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additional support for the inmate‟s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his

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needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Finally, insofar as plaintiff wishes to proceed in this action against Yolo County, he is

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advised that will need to satisfy four conditions in order to establish municipal liability: “(1) that

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[the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality

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had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff‟s constitutional

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right and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Van Ort v.

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Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). In any

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second amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, he should identify any policy (or policies)

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pertinent to his claims. He must also allege therein facts that show he received inadequate

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medical and/or mental health care pursuant to the policy and that the policy was the “moving

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force” or cause of his injury. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to make his

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second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th

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Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the prior pleading no longer serves
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any function in the case. Therefore, in any second amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, as in

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an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

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alleged.

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CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff‟s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 5) is granted.

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2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. The fee

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shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court‟s order to the Sheriff of Yolo County

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filed concurrently herewith.

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3. Plaintiff‟s amended complaint is dismissed.

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4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second

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amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules

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of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the

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docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”; failure

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to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in dismissal of this

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action without prejudice.

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5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court‟s form for filing a civil

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rights action.

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Dated: April 21, 2015

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DAD:9
john2253.14a

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